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Why do political action committees (PACs) donate money to some candidates 
and not others?  Answers to this PAC-strategy question take two different forms.  First, 
scholars emphasize demand-side variables of the legislative market (e.g., geographic 
location of PAC donors), culminating in the organizational presence model of PAC 
strategy, which discounts legislative strategies and finds that PACs donate to 
ideologically friendly, electorally vulnerable candidates who campaign where PACs 
have an organizational presence.  Second, public choice scholars emphasize supply-side 
variables of the legislative market (e.g., congressional member attributes), culminating 
in the legislative asset model of PAC strategy, finding that PACs donate to the lowest 
cost congressional members in the best position to provide legislation, or a legislative 
strategy.  Using data from the Center for Responsive Politics, I test each model using 
every PAC donation to a congressional candidate from 1990-2006, organized by the 
geographic location of PAC donor-bases and the PAC’s policy sector.  I find both 
models deficient in explaining PAC strategy.  Only a small portion of PACs make 
decisions bounded by the geography of individual donors, making most PACs the 
nationalizing force many feared in the early 1980s.  While PACs exhibit a clear strategy 
that seeks legislative benefit, the statistical significance of the legislative asset model 
comes from its ability to explain small donations with more accuracy than large PAC 
donations.  In an attempt to reconcile these two approaches, I re-specify the legislative 
asset model with a conditional hypothesis: PACs donate money according to legislator 
characteristics and legislative strategies, but predominantly within the geography of its 
donor-base. This conditional hypothesis forms the foundation of a new mediated model, 
 xviii 
as the legislative strategy of PACs is mediated by the geographical distribution of its 
donor-base.  This conditional hypothesis improves the explanatory power of PAC-
strategy models marginally; however, the representational flaw in the PAC system still 
remains: PAC money creates financial constituencies that deviate from the geographic 
constituencies, exacerbating the differences between organized and unorganized 








POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, GROUP THEORY, AND CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE 
 
The point, for the 946,326th time is that people get elected to office by currying the 
favor of powerful interest groups. They don't get elected for their excellence as political 
philosophers.1  
 
~Dean Baker, 21 December 2008~ 
Introduction 
To understand which interest(s) politicians represent is to understand the 
structure, processes, and outcomes of a representative government.  James Madison 
articulated as much when he crafted his foundational argument in Federalist Paper #10: 
A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed 
interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, 
and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and 
views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the 
principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction 
in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government. 
 
While much scholarly debate surrounding this and other passages, (especially 
Madison’s mention of creditors and debtors) concerns the extent to which Madison 
viewed American politics through the lens of economic class conflict (e.g., Manley 
1987), there is less discussion over the Madisonian reasons why individuals would be 
motivated for political action.  Madison’s political participation principle is as follows: 
the principle task of modern legislation is to regulate different economic interests (e.g., 
manufacturing, mercantile interests, real estate, finance), which involves the spirit of 
party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.  Since 
                                                
1 This quote is from the 21 December 2008 blog posting by Dean Baker, economist and co-founder of the 
Center for Economic and Policy Research, found at: http://www.prospect.org/csnc/blogs/beat_the_press, 




the primary task of legislation is to regulate the economy, it is inevitable that interested 
parties would be involved in the making and passing of that legislation.  Of all the 
principles attributed to Madison, and Federalist Paper #10 in particular (e.g., scope of 
conflict, pluralism, and what would become elements of Marxism), scholars miss this 
simple, yet foundational participation principle.  All other political theories developed 
from Madisonian thought are secondary to his thought on why and which groups 
participate in lawmaking.  Politics is the label scholars, journalists, activists, and 
commentators give to all behavior, speech, and thought flowing from Madison’s 
participation principle. 
The spirit of party and faction involves itself in contemporary government 
through a variety of activities, including funding policy research (e.g., think tanks), 
lobbying (e.g., information dissemination), and campaign contributions; in essence, the 
spirit of party and faction subsidizes its political representation in order to influence the 
substance of economic and social policy.  Any robust understanding of political 
representation must understand how interested parties subsidize it to suit their particular 
interests, and understanding the subsidization of political representation begins with 
campaign finance because holding congressional office requires a privately financed 
election, making campaign contributions representative of a political relationship 
between organized interests and political decision-makers.2  This relationship is a 
market of political influence. 
                                                
2 Thomas Ferguson (1995, 8) calls this method the golden rule: “to discover who rules, follow the gold 




Individuals seeking congressional office demand money and will be able supply 
legislation; organized interests demand specific types of legislation and supply money.  
I examine one aspect of this market by asking: why do political action committees 
(PACs) form financial relationships with some congressional candidates and not others?  
I define the variation in PAC decision-making, to form financial relationships with 
some congressional candidates and not others, as PAC strategy.  I am seeking answers 
to this PAC-strategy question rather than PAC-formation and PAC-influence questions 
because scholars have not clarified the debates concerning PAC strategy.  While 
disagreements about why some groups form PACs (e.g., Gray and Lowery 1997) and 
the nature of PAC influence on election results and legislation (e.g., Baumgartner and 
Leech 1998, 127-146) certainly exist, and scholars developed different theories to 
reflect those disagreements, scholars have neglected theoretical debates about PAC 
strategy.3  PACs use a host of variables in making strategic decisions, and the collective 
outcome of all these decisions is called the PAC system of influence. 
Typically, scholars describe PAC strategy using particular variables measuring: 
organizational-maintenance (PACs donating more money to congressional candidates 
in districts with PAC donors), electoral (PACs donating more money to congressional 
candidates who face a close election), ideological (PACs donating more money to 
ideologically friendly candidates), and legislative (PACs donating more money to 
incumbents occupying institutionally favorable positions) strategies.  Many studies seek 
                                                
3 Sabato (1984, 30-33) finds specific reasons why some companies do and do not form PACs: pressure 
from a chief executive officer, government regulation of the industry, the company may not want to give 
the appearance of corruption by forming a PAC, and the free-rider problem with some companies allows 




to find which strategies PACs use the most; however, scholars have found that PACs 
use multiple strategies (e.g., Grier and Munger 1986; Stratmann 1992), making the 
search for one dominant strategy futile.  Instead, understanding the dynamic nature of 
PAC strategy and the PAC system is important because these strategies can help 
scholars understand larger issues in political science and American politics. 
At stake in answering the PAC-strategy question is not a complete 
understanding of congressional campaign finance.  Since 1990, congressional 
candidates receive at least one-third of their funding from the PAC system, making 
PACs an important piece of campaign financing, but certainly not representative of the 
entire system.4  Instead, what is at stake in answering this question is a fresh 
understanding of the PAC’s role in political representation, group theory, and 
congressional campaign finance.  PAC strategy creates empirical and normative 
dilemmas for political representation, the understanding of groups in American political 
life, and for campaign finance regulation.  The remainder of this introductory chapter 
situates PAC strategy in relation to these empirical and normative dilemmas and 
outlines how I explain PAC strategy in congressional elections from 1990 through 
2006.  On the question of PAC strategy, scholars have allowed multiple, sometimes 
contradictory, perspectives to exist for decades without testing these perspectives 
against each other.  The most empirically accurate answer to the PAC-strategy question 
is vital if political scientists, economists, journalists, and activists are to follow the 
money effectively. 
                                                
4 Data concerning the source of congressional campaign funds comes from the Campaign Finance 




The remainder of this introduction occurs in five sections.  First, I discuss the 
historical development of PACs via federal legislation, bureaucratic decisions, and 
Supreme Court cases, and the role PACs play in congressional elections.  The 
development of PACs as a strategy of organized interests to influence politics benefits 
business over labor, and provides a foundation for understanding American elections 
through the eyes of political competition between business interests.  Second, I 
introduce the political representation problem posed by PAC strategy.  In congressional 
elections, PACs are positioned to create financial constituencies with policy preferences 
different and perhaps antithetical to the preferences of geographic constituencies.  
Third, I outline two different approaches to PAC strategy, the demand-side and supply-
side approaches.  While both approaches explain PAC strategy differently, both 
approaches agree that PACs do not create separate financial constituencies antithetical 
to geographic constituencies.  Testing and synthesizing these two approaches represents 
this study’s core project.  Fourth, I address the debate over the influence of political 
money.  If money distributed in congressional elections does not influence elections or 
legislation, then understanding PAC strategy is purely academic.  I argue that literature 
in the business-power tradition places importance on the economic influence of politics, 
and much of the disagreement among scholars concerning this issue derives from 
conceptual differences about money’s purpose in politics.  In the fifth and final section, 
I outline the empirical research project and how this project contributes to the empirical 






The Role of Organized Interests in Elections: A Brief History 
 The role of organized interests in federal elections became more visible in the 
1970s.  The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 with the ensuing 1974 and 
1976 amendments, Supreme Court decisions, and bureaucratic rules established a 
framework for organizing and monitoring campaign finance.  Separate segregated 
funds, or PACs, are central to this framework (Epstein 1979, 160).  Concerned about a 
Supreme Court opinion adverse to the fundraising and spending ability of labor in 
Pipefitters Local #562 v. United States, it was the Hansen Amendment that established 
separate segregated funds in the FECA of 1971 (Epstein 1979, 164).5  If an organized 
interest wishes to contribute money to a candidate and/or political party, via a direct 
donation, then that organized interest must form a PAC.  By recognizing the PAC in 
federal legislation, and establishing the Federal Election Commission, the federal 
government changed dramatically campaign finance regulations and politics.  In the 
mid-1970s, federal campaign finance regulation went from “sporadic, fragmentary, ad 
hoc, unenforced and largely unenforceable legislative efforts” to “detailed statutory 
schemes, frequently administered by newly created regulatory bodies” with a “mandate 
to monitor and safeguard the sanctity of elections” (Epstein 1979, 159).  The publicly 
and legally stated purpose was simple: to equate the amount of money with the strength 
of political ideas and to help prevent the appearance of corruption in American 
representative democracy. 
                                                
5 At issue in Pipefitters Local #562 v. United States (1972) was labor’s creation of separate segregated 
funds to circumvent laws banning union donations to political candidates.  The Supreme Court ruled that 
the 1971 Federal Election Act ban on union contributions (section 610) did not apply to separate 





 Before the FECA of 1971, the Tillman Act of 1907 established the regulation of 
corporate political action by banning the use of corporate funds for direct donations, and 
later expanded to include donations to primaries, party conventions, and all 
expenditures in general (Epstein 1979, 160).  The regulation of labor before 1971 
occurred on a different historical timeline, but the regulation had similar goals and 
purpose.  The War Labor Disputes Act of 1943 (Smith-Connally Anti-Strike Act) 
banned labor union campaign contributions during times of war, and the Labor 
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) of 1947 extended this ban to times of 
peace.  With the Taft-Hartley Act, the federal government’s campaign contribution 
regulation of corporations and unions became standardized (Epstein 1979, 161; Grier 
and Munger 1986, 350).   
 Efforts by corporations and unions to circumvent this regulation began in force 
from the early 1940s and lasted until the late 1960s.  As a way to bypass the ban on the 
use of corporate and union treasuries in politics, unions established organizations 
similar to separate segregated funds.  The earliest and largest of these groups belonged 
to the Congress of Industrial Organization (C.I.O.) and the American Federation of 
Labor (A.F.L.), and once these unions merged, they formed the Committee on Political 
Education (C.O.P.E.), which is the precursor to the modern-day PAC (Epstein 1979, 
161).  In response to increasing regulatory demands, and labor union presence, 
corporations began forming large PACs, starting with the Business-Industry PAC 
(BIPAC) formed by the National Association of Manufacturing (Epstein 1979, 163).  
Beyond policy demands, union and corporate PACs had different functions:  
While virtually from the outset of organized labor’s electoral involvement, its 




participation, business electoral activity has, until recently, focused on 
stimulating political activity among elites – namely, ranking corporate officers, 
directors, and shareholders.  Until the overall reforms in campaign financing 
laws during the 1970s, monies from business-related sources could enter the 
electoral arena legally in virtually unlimited amounts in the form of individual 
campaign contributions (Epstein 1979, 162). 
 
The irony of PAC development is that labor unions were thought to benefit from the 
PAC system because it was labor unions using separate segregated funds before 1971, 
and corporate donations usually came in the form of individual contributions.  Of the 
corporate segregated funds in existence, all focused exclusively on raising and spending 
money, not mobilizing voters (Epstein 1979, 163).  Labor also lobbied to prevent the 
banning of PAC giving for organizations with government contracts, which benefitted 
corporations, as most government contracts occur with corporations; “thus, business 
firms were the major beneficiaries of the AFL-CIO’s 1974 efforts,” as these efforts 
contributed to the growth of corporate PACs (Epstein 1979, 166-167).   
Probably the most important decision made during the 1970s was a bureaucratic 
rule by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) in the SUN-PAC and SUN-EPA cases.  
In April 1975, only three months after the beginning of the agency, the FEC ruled in 
favor of Sun Oil Company, allowing (1) corporate treasuries to be used to fund and staff 
the company’s PAC, (2) corporations to form multiple PACs with each PAC having its 
own contribution limit, and (3) allowing the company to use payroll deductions to fund 
the PAC.  This last ruling expanded the source of funds for a corporate PAC greatly; not 
only could the corporate PAC solicit from shareholders, but also employees, who may 
or may not be a union member, which was the greatest contributing factor of corporate 




 In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court upheld a majority of regulations 
in the 1971 FECA and 1974 amendments.  The Supreme Court also indicated that 
unions and corporations could form as many PACs as possible through voluntary 
donations, with each PAC having a separate individual contribution limit of $5,000 
(Epstein 1979, 169).  Also in 1976, Congress with President Ford’s signature amended 
the FECA once again to reverse the FEC’s SUN-PAC and SUN-EPA rulings that were 
beneficial to corporations.  Corporations were limited in its solicitation efforts from 
employees to twice a year, forcing corporate PACs to raise funds from shareholders and 
executive positions, and forcing multiple PACs of the same corporation to abide by the 
same contribution limits, preventing the pooling of PAC contributions to the same 
candidate (Epstein 1979, 170; also see Sabato 1984, 52-53).6  The purpose of the 
decade-long legislative process was simple: to protect union members and shareholders 
from having their money used for political purposes against their will, and to prevent 
the perception of corruption (Epstein 1979, 188).   
Despite these reform goals, the PAC structure has not provided a “politically 
meaningful role for those social groups (e.g., minorities, women, the economically 
disadvantaged) which do not possess the requisite financial or organizational resources 
to emulate” (Epstein 1979, 189).  The concern for political representation has always 
been that money trumps concern for those whose interests are not represented 
monetarily; however, PACs created a concern among scholars that monetary interests 
                                                
6 Sabato (1984, 53) recognizes the different fundraising situation of trade PACs: “Trade PACs have more 
flexibility in soliciting their noncorporate members – there is no limitation on frequency there – and trade 
PACs can of course freely solicit their own executive and administrative staffs.  They have the same 




would become more organized and centralized, perhaps making geographic 
representation obsolete. 
PAC Strategy and Representation: Geographic versus Financial Constituencies 
With the increase of PAC contributions in the early 1980s, it did not take long 
for scholars to recognize the potential problems posed by PACs to political 
representation.  The ability for individuals and PACs to contribute money across state 
and district lines to areas outside their voting jurisdiction creates the possibility that 
politicians will have two competing constituencies, one geographic and the other 
financial.  PACs are in a unique position to nationalize and centralize campaigns that 
force the “detachment of congressmen from their electoral constituencies” (Eismeier 
and Pollock 1984, 122).  If PAC strategy contributes to this detachment, then PACs will 
form monetary relationships with congressional candidates from districts and states that 
differ geographically from the districts and states where PAC headquarters and donors 
reside.  This possible occurrence generates this question: to what extent is the financial 
constituency emanating from strategic PAC decisions, different from the geographic 
constituency of a congressional member?  To determine the level of incongruence 
between geographic and financial constituencies, scholars define these interests 
objectively, using ideology, employment statistics, and donor residence.   
As it turns out, the PAC system is famous for sending money across district and 
state lines.  Grenzke (1988, 87) finds that the “proportion of within-district PAC money 
is a miniscule 2% and dropping,” and the “proportion of within-state money is larger, 
but still only about 14%.”  The tension between geographic and financial constituencies 




constituents.  In theory, and as the law allows, PAC money can cross-district lines using 
three different cues to select candidates: legislative, electoral, and ideological (Eismeier 
and Pollock 1985, 197; Grier and Munger 1986; Wright 1985, 403).  It is more common 
for PAC scholars to call these cues strategies, and many scholars develop an extensive 
vocabulary to describe these three PAC strategies (see Eismeier and Pollock 1986, 292; 
and Gopoian 1984, 259-263 for examples of synonyms for these three PAC strategies).  
A legislative strategy connotes PAC contributions flowing to candidates that have 
occupied or will occupy important legislative decision-making positions in Congress.  
For example, politicians sitting on a committee of jurisdiction or occupying the 
chairpersonship of that committee would garner more PAC contributions because PACs 
want legislative favors.  If a PAC pursues an electoral strategy, then PACs give more 
money to candidates in potentially close elections to gain leverage on that candidate’s 
future voting behavior while in office.  The competitiveness of the district, the 
experience of the challenger, and the closeness of poll numbers going into the election 
are all-important variables in an electoral strategy.  An ideological strategy indicates 
that PACs contribute money to a candidate who is ideologically congruent with 
members of the PAC.  There is nothing more stable in our understanding of PAC 
strategy than the presence of these three strategies; however, more fundamental goals 
govern PAC strategy. 
The use of the term strategy connotes PAC decision-making to achieve a desired 
goal.  If PACs have legislative, electoral, and ideological goals, then PACs will have 
legislative, electoral, and ideological strategies.  With some notable exceptions (e.g., 




that PACs pursue one of these strategies over all others.  Understanding these strategies 
as mutually exclusive still dominates recent research (e.g., Bonica 2010, 26-31).  The 
research seeking to find which strategy dominates PAC decision-making is unnecessary 
because the question misses this important theoretical point: legislative, electoral, and 
ideological strategies are not strategies at all since two more fundamental goals govern 
PAC decision-making: organizational maintenance and/or marginal-cost selection.  
What the literature calls strategies (legislative, electoral, ideological) are variables 
correlated with other overarching strategies related to the two primary goals of PAC 
behavior.  PAC strategy is goal oriented by definition and it would seem highly unlikely 
that individual PACs would be naïve enough to think their money could have deciding 
effects on elections or roll-call votes or the ideological distribution in Congress, 
especially with small PAC budgets.  PACs have higher-order goals that correspond to 
the selection of candidates based on legislative, electoral, and/or ideological 
characteristics.  In other words, what the literature calls PAC strategies are by-products 
of other more fundamental choices PACs have to make: choosing between an 
organizational-maintenance and a marginal-cost strategy.  Both of these strategies 
discount the harmful division between geographic and financial constituencies. 
The two different approaches to PAC contribution strategy reconcile geographic 
and financial constituencies differently.  The first argues that PACs donate money to 
congressional districts and states where they have an organizational presence (i.e., 
donor base); hence, geographic and financial constituencies are not in conflict because 
the geographic constituency is the financial constituency.  The second argues that PACs 




constituency characteristics); hence, the ideas of the geographic and financial 
constituencies are not in conflict.  While both approaches come to similar theoretical 
conclusions, each approach arrives at this conclusion differently.  
Group Theory: Demand- versus Supply-Side Approaches 
Starting in the 1970s, group theory withdrew from its central position in the 
political science subfield of American politics to the periphery (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998); however, there was a corresponding rise in group theory concerns in economics, 
specifically within the field of public choice.7  Some of the early studies of PAC 
strategy published in the premiere political science journals used a demand-side 
approach to analyze PAC strategy, while those public choice scholars taking center 
stage in group theory development used a supply-side approach to PAC strategy.  The 
demand-side approach to PAC strategy takes organizational maintenance to be the most 
important goal of PAC strategy.  It is a demand-side approach because PAC strategy is 
governed by the characteristics of those demanding legislation.  The supply-side 
approach to PAC strategy takes rent seeking, the purposive action of accruing the most 
legislative benefit with the least cost via a marginal-cost analysis of legislative favors, 
as the most important goal of PAC strategy.  It is a supply-side approach because PAC 
strategy is governed by characteristics of those supplying legislation.  In what follows, I 
explain briefly the demand- and supply-side approaches.   
                                                
7 Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 45) blame the move of group theory from central to periphery in the 
study of American politics on scholarly disagreements concerning the causality of money and power, 
variable measurement, hypothesis testing, and many scholars having a normative bias.  None of these 
methodological debates prevented public choice scholarship from thriving, which Baumgartner and 
Leech confine to a footnote.  The result has been an unquestioned acceptance of public choice PAC 




Where you stand depends on where you sit is a common phrase meaning the 
opinions and decisions a person forms and makes will always be in relation to their own 
interests.  To the extent scholars can recognize PAC interests through its strategy, where 
individual PAC donors sit may determine where the PAC stands.  The demand-side 
approach, using organizational analyses, asks this sub-question: how does the 
geographic distribution of PAC donors influence the choice of PAC strategy?  In other 
words, do PACs pursue an organizational-maintenance or marginal-cost strategy, and 
does the geographic distribution of donors influence this decision?   
All organizational analyses of PACs recognize the tension within a PAC 
between the committee that makes contribution decisions and the individual donors 
supplying the money that PAC decision-makers use to fund candidate campaigns.  The 
PAC decision-making committee and the individual donors sit in different places and 
take different stands on who should receive the contributions.  While the size of a 
PAC’s budget, certainly an organizational variable, places mathematical constraint on 
PAC strategy, it is the internal dynamic between PAC decision-makers and PAC donors 
that provides the tension between organizational maintenance and a pure, rent-seeking, 
marginal-cost strategy.  The organizational presence model emphasizes this tension in 
explaining PAC strategy.  
The organizational presence model represents the most coherent explanation of 
how a PAC’s organizational maintenance goals influence its contribution strategies.  
The essence of the organizational presence model is to show how the “factors that allow 
some PACs to become very rich are the very same factors that undercut their potential 




necessities of demanding legislation (Wright 1985, 400).8  The reason for this 
conundrum is that local inputs influence PAC decision-making and these local inputs 
prefer an electoral and ideological contribution strategy, discounting the legislative 
strategy preferred by national inputs.  Local PAC inputs are those individuals working 
in local field offices, whose duty is to raise money for enlarging PAC budgets. PAC 
staffs listen to local inputs because of the internal, organizational maintenance goals of 
PACs.  Listening to local donors and local PAC officials is vital to continuing the 
funding stream in future elections, and this organizational need results in an electoral 
and local strategy because local PAC donors are political amateurs and either do not 
know or are not interested in the legislative effectiveness of donations, or know more 
about electoral and ideological characteristics of politicians (Wright 1985, 405). 
According to Wright (1985), if local activists have influence on PAC decisions, then 
PACs should give to ideologically friendly candidates in close elections, located in 
districts and states where they have donors (Wright 1985, 406; see also Gopoian 1984, 
271).  Countering this strategy of organizational maintenance is the marginal-cost 
strategy identified by public choice scholars. 
While the study and centrality of organized interests diminished among political 
science in the 1970s (Baumgartner and Leech 1998), it began to rise in the research 
program of public choice.  The field of public choice derives from one postulate: the 
application of economic assumptions and pro-market philosophy to politics will provide 
                                                
8 The five national PACs Wright (1985, 401-402) examines are the American Medical PAC, Dealers 
Election Action Committee, American Bankers Association, Realtors PAC, and the associated General 
Contractors PAC, for the 1978 and 1980 election cycles.  To measure organizational presence, Wright 




new insights on policymaking processes and outcomes.  Public choice is simply the 
“economic study of nonmarket decision-making, or…the application of economics to 
political science” (Mueller 1976, 395).9  Central to public choice is the concept of rent 
seeking, the cost paid by an organized interest to accrue economic benefit from 
government, as all benefits from government have a price, and “in the political world 
that price can be paid in the form of campaign contributions” (Mitchell 1990, 90).  
While public choice argues rent-seeking behavior fails in creating economic efficiency, 
the rent-seeking system itself is in equilibrium.  The legislative asset model is the most 
comprehensive application of public choice to PAC strategy modeling (Grier and 
Munger 1986).  
Derived from Denzau and Munger’s (1986) supply of public policy model, the 
legislative asset model maintains the same assumptions, as its fundamental premise is 
that when PACs act rationally in their own self-interest (maximizing their separate, 
distinct preferences), the system of interacting politicians, organized interests, and 
unorganized interests is in equilibrium.10 PACs are seekers of the cheapest favors 
possible, as they supply money and demand legislation and regulation.   
                                                
9 In their review of group theory, Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 66) only make brief reference to the 
public choice approach of the Chicago and Virginia Schools of economic thought.  The public choice 
perspective developed by these schools dominates explanations of organized interest formation, strategy, 
and influence since the 1970s.  For a review of how these schools of thought developed see Mitchell 
(1990), Mitchell and Munger (1991), and Mueller (1976, 1988).  
10 Legislators, voters, and organized interests are all constrained maximizers, who seek the most efficient 
way of utilizing their discretionary activities.  Legislators are constrained by the total effort they can 
dispense to voters and organized interests, voters are constrained by who appears on their voting ballot, 
and organized interests are constrained by their scare resources (Denzau and Munger 1986, 92). The 
model is a supply-side model because it explains PAC contribution strategy through those that supply 
public policy (i.e., legislators).  The legislator’s promised level of effort is the basis on which PACs 
strategize, and this effort derives from a legislator’s institutional capacity and constituent preferences, 





Grier and Munger’s (1986) legislative asset model conveniently subsumes all 
cues and PAC distinctions (rational, pragmatic, investor, ideological) under one 
postulate: all PACs will pursue their goals efficiently.  Some PACs will pursue more 
legislative ends, which place primacy on the committee assignment, while other PACs 
place primacy on ideology so that ideological variables become more significant than 
others.11  This application began a systematic inquiry into PAC spending combining 
legislative (i.e., pragmatic, investor-oriented PACs), electoral, and ideological cues (i.e., 
ideological PACs) into one model of PAC behavior, as evidence shows that PACs use 
different strategies for different legislators (Stratmann 1992, 648).12  
If organized interests are rent seekers, and PACs are an extension of some 
organized interests, then the legislative process is the highest concern for PACs, as 
PACs will pursue a legislative strategy.  Since much of the legislative process occurs in 
congressional committees, committee assignment should explain most of the variation 
in PAC donations, and is considered vital to the supply-side approach (Endersby and 
Munger 1992, 79; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 113).  In sum, the legislative 
                                                                                                                                          
each legislator (i.e., institutional capacity, constituency characteristics) is the supply price to the PAC, or 
the supply price for public policy. 
11 Some argue that the public choice approach, and by extension, the legislative asset model, do not think 
PACs are benign access seekers: “a considerable portion of recent discussion insists that PAC campaign 
contributions, in general, are merely investments in ‘access’ to (be able to ‘tell the PAC’s story) 
incumbent politicians that are invariant with respect to either regulatory philosophy or voting records.  
Nevertheless, doubts about these contentions, quite understandably, persist,” and they are found in the 
public choice literature (Havrilesky 1990, 243-244).  Many authors use a dichotomy between pragmatic, 
legislative, or investor oriented PACs versus electoral, ideological PACs (e.g., Rudolph 1999, 196-197; 
Sorauf 1988; Snyder 1990, 1992, 1993). 
12 The central dichotomy in the PAC-strategy literature has always been investment versus ideological, as 
investor PACs are “set up by organizations with relatively narrow economic interests – corporations, 
labor unions, trade associations, and farmers’ cooperatives,” but “ideological PAC contributions should 
be less persistent than investor PAC contributions…in particular, while there is persistence in both types, 
ideological PAC contributions exhibit considerably more year-to-year variation than investor PAC 
contributions” (e.g., Snyder 1992, 19).  It is the unconnected PACs, as defined by the FEC, which are 




strategy expects incumbency, committee assignments, majority party status, leadership 
positions, and both chamber and committee seniority to explain the variation in the real 
dollar amount of PAC donations to congressional candidates.  Ideology and electoral 
characteristics also contribute to making a low-cost contribution decision. 
A PAC uses an ideological cue if that PAC accounts for a congressional 
members’ voting ideology, political party (correlates with ideology), and by extension, 
constituency concerns.  This strategy seeks to reduce constituent costs on the PAC by 
contributing to congressional members who can act on PAC needs without creating 
discontent among constituents.  PACs donate to congressional members who are 
ideologically similar because it would cost too much to shift a member ideologically 
(Grier and Munger 1986, 355).  If a PAC gives more money to one political party over 
another, then that PAC is using an ideological cue (Brunell 2005, 685).  In sum, the 
ideological strategy predicts that ideology explains the variation in the real dollar 
amount of PAC donations to congressional candidates. 
 An electoral cue indicates that PACs donate to those friendly members who face 
electoral uncertainty during the current election, allowing PACs to acquire leverage 
over a winning candidate in the next congressional session.  Electoral costs refer to a 
PAC’s ability to rent low-cost members by supporting vulnerable representatives.  
Congressional members are more likely to act in the PAC’s interest when the member 
needs money to win an election.  If the candidate campaigns for a safe seat, then PACs 
must spend more money to acquire the congressional member’s attention (Grier and 
Munger 1986, 353-355).  Underlying these three cues is the notion that PACs donate 




will not donate the required amount of money (it may be an amount beyond the limit 
anyways) necessary to shift a congressional member’s policy preferences in a direction 
opposite of his/her constituency.13   
 The assumption that must occur for this model to be the most accurate 
explanation of PAC strategy, and for the rent-seeking system to be in equilibrium, is 
that PACs are placeless entities: 
Our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between 
serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his 
constituency…we do not model interest group decisions directly, assuming 
simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost 
supplier…policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the 
incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium (Grier and Munger 1991, 24-
25). 
 
The legislative asset model, and all research that uses this model, views legislators and 
voters as bound geographically to a district, and it is PACs that can maneuver among 
districts donating money.  Much of the PAC literature either implicitly (e.g., Grenzke 
1989, 259; Rudolph 1999, 196-197) or explicitly (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 
1999, 511; Endersby and Munger 1992, 79; Grier and Munger 1991, 1993; Grier, 
Munger, and Torrent 1990, 113; Havrilesky 1990, 243; Hersch and McDougall 2000, 
331; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1163; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 43-44; Snyder 
                                                
13 There is a nuance to the supply-price thesis:  
Political action committees would waste resources if they paid every legislator his or her supply 
price.  Only a majority has to vote in their interests and thus be given contributions in their 
election campaigns.  Some legislators may require no compensation since their constituency 
interests are similar to PAC interests; their supply price for voting in the PACs interest is zero.  
Under the assumption that these legislators are not sufficient to obtain a majority in Congress, 
votes have to be bought from legislators who require progressively higher price to change their 
platform.  To minimize costs, the PAC will rank each legislator according to the compensation 
required to move from the vote-maximizing position to the position preferred by the PAC 
(Stratmann 1992, 650).   
So, the median member of the House of Representatives should receive the most contributions.  PACs do 




1993, 219-220; Stratmann 1992, 649) adopts the legislative asset model and the 
assumption that PACs are not geographically bound.  By law, this conceptualization of 
elections is true, money can (and does) cross district and state lines, but voters and 
legislators cannot; however, in reality, the model ignores demand-side constraints 
making PAC donations less portable (e.g., PACs have organizational maintenance goals 
and must respond to individual donor wishes).  The assumption that PACs are placeless 
entities, responding to supply prices, unbound by organizational need and geography is 
not academic, its accuracy has real consequence for the public choice approach to 
politics. 
The purpose of the legislative asset model is to show how the distribution of 
organized interests in American politics (i.e., the demand side) is inconsequential for 
public policy outputs because organized interests respond to supply-side forces, and 
these supply-side actors (i.e., legislators) must respond to unorganized interests, since 
voters hold legislators accountable at the voting booth; thus, PACs donate money to 
legislators who cannot deviate beyond the policy parameters set by unorganized 
interests.  For this story to represent reality, PACs must be placeless organizations.  The 
organizational presence model differs because it predicts PACs to contribute money 
where it has individual donors and an office, making PACs geographically bound.   
This debate between organizational-maintenance and marginal-cost/rent-seeking 
PAC strategies, the focus of this research, is academic in its purest sense if money does 
not influence politics.  While the focus of this research is PAC strategy, treating money 
as a dependent variable, I outline in the next section the debate on the effectiveness of 




Campaign Finance: Does (PAC) Money Matter? 
The political representation and group theory debates brought to the forefront by 
PAC strategy are academic if money does not contribute to political outcomes, and 
knowledge of PAC strategy, the focus of this inquiry (PAC contributions as the 
dependent variable), cannot inform campaign finance debates unless the public deems 
this strategy as an important determinant of political outcomes.  Generations after 
Louise Overacker’s foundation work in this subject, Money in Elections, scholars still 
debate the influence of money in politics.  The opposing sides on this debate could not 
be further apart, either scholars find evidence of moneyed interests forming public 
policy, or scholars find and argue that moneyed interests are redundant and irrational; 
very simply, money either matters a great deal, or money simply symbolizes wine 
brought to a dinner party, or what I call the elections-as-a-dinner-party hypothesis (i.e., 
money in politics is redundant and epiphenomenal to an existing relationship).   
The gulf between these two positions is large; however, a careful articulation of 
each position and the differences of each will show the debate exists because of 
differences in the conceptualization of political money and methodology.  To this end, I 
argue that scholars must properly conceive the utility of money in politics and 
understand the type of relationship money fosters between private interests and public 
servants.  If scholars agree on the same conceptualization of money and on the 
parameters of adequate methodology, then these debates can be muted and scholars can 
make progress in answering the money question in politics.   
The money question in politics is an old one: 
Attempts to influence the voter are as old as the ballot box itself and have gone 




When manipulation by force, intimidation, stuffing the ballot box, and falsifying 
returns becomes impossible or difficult the voter has been appealed to by money 
and the things only money can buy.  The use of money in elections is no new 
problem, nor is it one which can be divorced entirely from the larger question of 
the manipulation of the electorate generally (Overacker 1932, 18-19). 
 
In the United States, the issue of political money is noted in the Congressional Record 
during the early 1920s and House hearings on the Corrupt Practices Act in 1921 (was 
not law until 1925) (Overacker 1932, 1-2).  Money must be spent to have elections and 
to operate a political apparatus; hence, questioning the potential influence of that money 
on decisions of the public interest is natural.  The history of campaign-finance 
scholarship indicates data is hard to access, as many of the classic studies used 
biographies of public officials, the results of congressional investigations, reports of 
National Party Committees, and personal accounts and public testimony of public 
officials to cobble together a coherent portrait of monetary interests and the relationship 
between private interests and public officials (e.g., Overacker 1932, viii). 
After this heroic effort, it took only until the second sentence of the preface for 
Louise Overacker (1932, vii) to state the core issue of the campaign-finance debate in 
the United States:  
Many are beginning to wonder if present-day methods of raising and spending 
campaign funds do not clog the wheels of our elaborately constructed 
mechanism of popular control, and if democracies do not inevitably become 
plutocracies (Overacker 1932, vii).  
 
The criteria Overacker uses to assess when money becomes an undue influence is 
simply stated: whether money prohibits popular control of government decision-making 
with majority rule, or more specifically, whether the “use of money prevents the voter 
who has something to express from expressing his wants as he feels them, or protecting 




wants” (Overacker 1932, 4). Scholars are still debating whether or not the use of money 
in politics crosses this line.  Overacker sets the foundation for most of the political-
money issues scholars debate today: the history of money in politics, why money is 
needed, how much money politicians spend, the effectiveness of money, and whether 
the amount and influence of money represents a danger to democratic practices.  
Despite her monumental achievement, there are those who deny the importance of 
money in politics (e.g., Milyo 2002) and even celebrate the deregulation of campaign 
finance to allow unlimited and undisclosed monetary donations (e.g., Smith 2001, 201-
227).14  To establish the importance of political money, I begin with arguments 
discounting its significance, which I summarize as the elections-as-a-dinner-party 
argument. 
Every argument against the significance of money on political behavior is 
mentioned in this carefully crafted parable: 
When I was a boy, my family would occasionally receive tall baskets filled with 
fruits, nuts, and jams, most often around the holidays.  These gifts from business 
acquaintances of my father were not meant to be inducements for him to break 
the law; rather, they were little niceties intended to maintain ongoing 
relationships.  Today, when my wife and I are invited to dinner, we usually 
bring flowers or a bottle of wine as a gift.  This is not some crass attempt on our 
part to ensure that sanitary conditions are maintained during meal preparation; it 
is only a symbol of our appreciation for the kindness of our hosts.  Not for a 
moment do I believe that we would be ostracized should we go to dinner 
engagements empty-handed, nor would my father have punished nongivers.  As 
such, these gift exchanges can be seen as epiphenomena: they symbolize 
underlying relationships, but they do not constitute relationships (Milyo 2002, 
157). 
 
                                                
14 Smith (2001) argues that money is important in politics, which is why it should be deregulated.  This 




The criticism of the study of political money (from this point forward, I call the political 
money perspective) embedded in this story collectively constitutes the elections-as-a-
dinner-party perspective.  There are four components to this perspective: (1) monetary 
relationships are only corrupt if there is a quid pro quo exchange of money for 
legislative favors (the father would never think about punishing dinner guests showing 
up empty-handed), (2) monetary exchanges are epiphenomenal to existing, friendly 
relationships making the study of political money methodologically flawed (friends 
bringing other friends gifts), (3) there are other more important aspects of politics than 
money (equating monetary exchanges during elections with relaxing, inconsequential, 
social events), and (4) political parties are autonomous agents and not beholden to 
investors (the father hosting the event invites the guests, and is indifferent to the guests 
bringing a gift).  The elections-as-a-dinner-party argument falsely characterizes the 
political money perspective, and does not address the extant literature challenging its 
benign view of the relationships between organized interests and political parties.  By 
bringing this misunderstanding to light, there are chances to reconcile these differing 
perspectives; however, the goal of this section is to establish the importance of political 
money by addressing the four criticisms offered by Milyo (2002).   
 First, the elections-as-a-dinner-party perspective argues that the political money 
perspective defines the purpose of monetary exchanges to be quid pro quo, and there is 
very little evidence to support this conceptualization of money in politics.  To find 
evidence of quid pro quo, scholars must find evidence of an exchange of money for 
services (i.e., a smoking gun), where the political outcome would be different with a 




this type of exchange in politics (i.e., bribery laws), the quid pro quo standard is 
impossible to meet, so it becomes questionable why the elections-as-a-dinner-party 
crowd wishes to characterize the study of political money in this way.  For example, 
Milyo (2000, 75-76), the author of elections-as-a-dinner-party thesis, characterizes the 
study of political money in this fashion: 
There is a dearth of systematic and consistent evidence to support the 
conventional wisdom that money plays a dominant and nefarious role in 
American politics.  The familiar mantra of reform, which advocates that 
corporate PAC contributions are bribes, is therefore a simplistic and exaggerated 
view that plays on this public ignorance…literature on campaign finance has 
done a disservice to the public policy debate – and to the general advancement 
of knowledge – by too often taking as self-evident that PAC contributions are 
highly valuable to the recipient and donor alike. 
 
This perspective characterizes the political money perspective as being narrowly 
focused on quid pro quo, when in fact quid pro quo is illegal and does not exist, which 
is a disservice to the public; however, those working in the political money perspective 
do not equate the monetary exchange with quid pro quo and one must wonder if Milyo 
uses this high, legal standard to purposely dismiss attempts to show money matters in 
politics.   
 The adverse effects of money reach well beyond quid pro quo exchanges.  The 
political money perspective examines why only certain individuals/donors are invited to 
the party and the broad policy effect of this limited invitation list.  It may have been a 
slip of the pen, but it is apt that those who were invited to Milyo’s dinner party were 
only business acquaintances.  The political money perspective would ask: why were 
only business acquaintances invited?   
Investment theory, as developed by Thomas Ferguson, claims that scholars, 




they account for the financing of politicians, which is called the Golden Rule of 
Political Analysis, “to discover who rules, follow the gold (i.e., trace the origins and 
financing of the campaign)” (Ferguson 1995, 8).  As long as campaign finance is 
properly understood, this analysis is distinct from the analysis usually offered by 
mainstream political commentators, who try to explain elections in strictly rhetorical 
and vague terms.15 The political party represents investor-bloc coalitions who coalesce 
during elections.  Investment theory’s assumptions, findings, and implications are 
antithetical to rational-choice approaches (e.g., Downs 1957) because: (1) political 
parties maximize money, not votes; (2) political parties are organizations that represent 
business elite investments, not independent organizations detached from its financiers; 
(3) political party policy preferences represent those of its investors, not those of the 
median voter; and (4) not all policy preferences are discussed seriously by the two 
political parties because on issues that both of its major investors agree, there will be no 
conflict (Ferguson 1995, 21-36).  In sum, major-investor blocs are the only groups of 
people who can pay the price to control government, which changes the definition of 
the political party from coalitions of voters to coalitions of investors, making it difficult 
(but not impossible) for voters to control political party policy positions, as the parties 
do not move to the center and do not set the agenda with all issues of societal 
importance; thus, “the electorate is not too stupid or too tired to control the political 
                                                
15 For example, journalists claimed that the Democratic Party lost the majority in the House of 
Representatives in 2010 because President Obama was an elitist (Baker 2010) and lacked a clear, cogent 




system.  It is merely too poor” (Ferguson 1995, 384).16  Establishing the importance of 
money beyond the quid pro quo exchange does not address the second criticism of the 
political money perspective: it is fraught with methodological problems. 
The second criticism of the political money perspective argues that monetary 
exchanges are epiphenomenal to existing, friendly relationships making the study of 
political money endogenous, meaning that it is not money that forms the relationship 
between organized interests and politicians, it is some other underlying tie that binds.  
The decision to contribute money is explained by the same forces that explain the 
behavior of congressional members (e.g., ideology, partisanship, constituency 
characteristics); hence, it is difficult to distinguish a unique money effect.  In Milyo’s 
words, monetary exchanges “symbolize underlying relationships, but they do not 
constitute relationships” (Milyo 2002, 157).    
In response, there are many studies that account for this methodological 
problem, and the contribution these studies make to the political money perspective is 
their creative research designs, and this creativity results in substantive knowledge 
about the effect of political money (Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 2010; De 
Figueiredo and Edwards 2007; Eggers and Hainmueller 2010; Hall and Wayman 1990; 
Roberts 1990; Stratmann 1998, 2002; Tahoun 2010; Ziobrowski et al 2004).  The first 
way to overcome the redundancy dilemma is to study the effect of money on 
congressional member behavior, not roll call votes.  Since PACs distribute money to 
their friends in Congress, what does this money buy?  According to Hall and Wayman 
                                                
16 Voters can control the political parties via the electoral process if voters participate in efficacious 
secondary organizations that group small donations and resources, and that minimize information costs 




(1990) this money buys mobilization; money subsidizes representation by making a 
congressional member more active on the PACs interests (e.g., actually attending 
committee meetings, asking more questions, offering more amendments, and brokering 
deals behind closed doors).  There are many variables that influence roll call votes (e.g., 
party leadership pressure, constituent interests), but one of the practical decisions a 
congressional member must make is how to spend his/her time, and PAC money helps 
the congressional member make that crucial decision.   
A second method to overcome the redundancy dilemma is to use special 
instances from congressional history.  Stratmann (2002) finds two votes meant to repeal 
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.17  The first in 1991 and the second in 1998, both acts 
failed to become law, but repeal efforts finally succeeded in 1999.  In 1991 and in 1998, 
commercial banks resisted repeal of the 1933 act, while investment and insurance banks 
pressed for repeal.  Finding the same group of House members who voted in 1991 and 
1998, Stratmann (2002) is able to control for pre-existing preferences of those 
congressional members, and found that an increase in commercial banking money 
correlated with vote switching from 1991 to 1998, and the same was true for an increase 
in investment/insurance campaign donations.  Hall and Wayman (1990) and Stratmann 
(2002) develop unique research designs to account for the redundancy issue in the 
                                                
17 The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 alleviated the tight monetary policy resulting from the gold standard by 
allowing the Federal Reserve to accept amounts of paper (government bonds) as collateral for currency, 
at an acceptable paper-to-gold ratio.  The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 famously separated investment from 
commercial banking activity and insurance.  This act was repealed in full when President Bill Clinton 
signed a large authorization bill in 2000; embedded in this authorization bill was the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act (commonly referred to as Gramm-Leach-Bliley) that allows commercial banks, 




political money literature and find that money does influence the behavior of 
congressional members, even in roll call votes.   
A third method to find the effects of money is to examine the benefits accrued to 
the businesses that give, which is to examine stock price fluctuations.  Roberts (1990) 
finds that the seniority system in the Senate provides benefits to the businesses tied to 
those Senators with seniority.  Businesses are tied to a Senator if that business is located 
within the same state and/or has helped to fund the Senator’s campaign.  In a legislative 
system that delegates agenda setting and legislative powers to more senior members, 
there will be built-in expectations when power is handed over from one Senator to the 
next, especially when there is an abrupt change of power, as in unexpected death.  
When Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA) died unexpectedly of a heart attack on 
September 1, 1983, and was replaced by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) as the ranking 
minority member on the Armed Services committee (Senator Nunn became chair of this 
committee from 1985 to 1995), what was the reaction of stock traders?   
Assuming that stock traders are intelligent, vested observers of the political 
system, cognizant of the benefits senior Senators can bestow, abnormal stock price 
fluctuations would be an appropriate indication of benefits.  Not surprisingly, 
controlling for many factors, the businesses in the state of Washington and those who 
funded Jackson’s campaign (but not Nunn’s) went down the next day, and those tied to 
Nunn went up (Lockheed Martin, the largest defense employer in the state of Georgia in 
the early to mid-1980s posted a one-day gain attributable only to the death of Jackson, 
of 2.5%).  Roberts (1990) shows in this case study that the seniority system grants 




find unique ways to overcome methodological issues, the reward is to find money 
matters in politics; however, there are those that argue money is one of many resources 
that carry currency in legislative struggles. 
The third criticism of the political money perspective is that there are other more 
important aspects of politics than money.  The most recent incidence of this critique 
comes from Grossmann (2009), when he tries to interpret the failure of the Obama 
administration to alter the politics of Washington that appeal to organized interests at 
the cost of achieving the public good.  According to this critique, Obama failed to alter 
the perceptions about politics because he focused too much attention on campaign 
finance and lobbying (e.g., limiting the revolving door and stressing small donations 
over large donations), because the bias in the political system is not monetary, but 
organizational, as the system “privileges those political interests that stimulate the most 
organization and institutionalized representation” (Grossmann 2009, 3).  Grossman 
(2009, 4) argues that “advocacy groups that hire lobbyists and make PAC contributions 
are not more prominent in public debate or more involved in policymaking,” and it is 
the “age, internal staff, and public membership of these organizations [that] are much 
more predictive of their levels of prominence and involvement.”  Grossmann (2009) 
misrepresents the political money perspective, as cash transfers are not simply the only 
influence of money; the organizational maturity and staff presence in Washington, D.C. 
is also indicative of moneyed interests.   
Grossmann combines the old hat criticism of the political money perspective 
(i.e., focused too heavily on quid pro quo exchanges) with his criticism that the political 




The relative influence of the interests groups that Obama invites to the table is 
unlikely to be driven solely by either the force of their arguments or the direct 
quid pro quo exchanges.  Interest groups with better-established reputations, 
more experienced staff, better connections to other groups, and better research 
materials are likely to have advantages.  In other words, resources spent on 
building organizational capacity provide at least as significant an advantage as 
direct money transfers (Grossmann 2009, 7). 
 
What does it take to build organizational capacity?  Money.  Grossmann neglects 
serious scholarship that looks beyond the cash transfer toward the funding of 
organizations and think tanks that produce information (see Mayer 2009 for a 
journalistic account, and O’Connor 2009 for an academic account of moneyed interests 
forming think tanks and building organizational capacity).  The political money 
perspective argues that moneyed interests filter through the political system because 
powerful, mature, organizations wish to protect their ability to make profit.  Without 
developing some motivational reasoning for political participation, Grossmann is forced 
to conclude with this tautological vision of politics: “some public interests are better 
represented by organizations in Washington because some public groups are more 
politically engaged” (Grossman 2009, 8).   
The fourth criticism of the political money perspective argues that political 
parties are autonomous agents and not beholden to investors.  Grossmann (2009, 2-3) 
grants the competition between the two political parties much power: 
Being heard does not guarantee that your views will be incorporated, however.  
America’s two political parties each have relatively visible and stable interest 
group coalitions, including representatives of many public groups associated 
with their electoral coalitions as well as institutions that provide direct support to 
each party’s legislative agenda.  The consolidated Democratic leadership is 
likely to incorporate more views from interest groups and public constituencies 
that are members of their coalition.  As a result, the nation may undergo 





The argument is that Americans can see significant policy change without a 
change in how public policy is made, mainly due to the strength of the political party 
coalitions, which has very little to do with monetary exchanges.   This conception of the 
political party, as vote-maximizing agents, is tradition in political science.  Even those 
on the elitist side of the pluralism/elitism debates viewed political parties as 
autonomous actors in the political process (e.g., Schattschneider 1975 [1960], chapter 
3).  This position should not be taken as truth, as the investment theory of political 
parties argues and shows with evidence from political party change in the 1920s and 
1930s that political parties are a function of the interests that invest in them (Ferguson 
1995, chapters 1 and 2).   
The final criticism of the political money perspective, implied by Milyo’s (2002) 
parable, but not fully developed in the story, is formulated in the form of a question: 
“why is there so little money in U.S. politics” (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 
2003, 105)?  At issue is the amount spent on elections does not come close to the 
amount spent by the federal government; hence, money in politics should be viewed as 
a consumption good (e.g., entertainment, feeling effective) and not as an investment 
because the gains from trade are too large and shares of the budget would have been 
diminished over time if money actually bought legislative favors (Ansolabehere, de 
Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003).  Another reason why PACs account for only one-third of 
a congressional member’s reelection fund is that they know they receive little in return, 
and the evidence that individuals contribute more to politics than organized groups 
gives credence to the consumption thesis (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 




current hard money limits” (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003, 125).  
There are four brief responses to this criticism of studying money as an investment.  
First, the dichotomy between individuals and groups is silly, as large donations from 
individual donors should be considered investment-oriented money (see Ferguson 2005, 
30-31).  Second, chapter two of this study shows that the average PAC contribution is 
increasing (after adjusting for inflation), indicating that PACs are encroaching upon the 
hard money limit.  Third, money can be influential in a variety of venues, not only the 
direct donation (e.g., independent expenditures, lobbying).  Fourth, the paradox that 
more money should be spent in politics to form equilibrium between the federal 
government budget and campaign spending is a strange comparison indeed.  The federal 
government spends money on goods and services for over 300 million people.  The cost 
to supply these public goods is much greater than supplying one public good: an 
election.  There are 535 elections (primaries not included) for Congress and one 
presidential election, of which only a handful of states see high amounts of spending.  
Including lobbying and campaign finance, it is much less expensive to pay the costs of a 
political party and elections (both public goods) than it is to provide infrastructure, 
defense, and social services.  There is not more money in elections because politicians 
do not need more money to be satisfied; politicians still know who their major investors 
are without having more money.  Relative strength is important, not the percent spent as 
a percentage of gross domestic product or the budget.18 
                                                
18 See Milyo (2002, 85) for other strange comparisons with campaign spending, such as philanthropy.  
While it is obvious that corporate campaign spending is less than the amount spent on philanthropy 





If quid pro quo exchanges do not readily exist (or if scholars define the only 
effect of money as quid pro quo), if money is epiphenomenal to friendships and 
working relationships, if there are more important aspects of politics than money, and if 
politicians are autonomous agents, then the study of political money becomes the study 
of political redundancy and scholars would be better served to study other aspects of 
political life (assuming money and these other aspects are mutually exclusive) and by 
implication, organized interests are benign organizations.  The above evidence suggests 
the debate about the effectiveness of political money is still open, with ample evidence 
suggesting PAC coalitions are important to understand.  In order to reconcile these 
positions, scholars must have a wider definition of political money (beyond cash 
transfers) and create research designs that overcome methodological problems.  Based 
on the information above, the study of PAC strategy and the PAC system provides an 
important foundation to understand the interests engaged in congressional elections. 
Conclusion 
Few aspects of American politics are left untouched by money, as wealthy 
people influence agenda setting and public opinion (e.g., Mayer 2010), policy planning 
and formulation (e.g., O’Connor 2009), political campaigns and political party conflict 
(e.g., Ferguson 1995), lobbying (e.g., Hall and Wayman 1990), economic policy (e.g., 
Greider 1987), and they define the role of government in capitalism, with the most 
recent example being the cause and consequence of the 2008 Great Crisis (e.g., 
Ferguson and Johnson 2009a, 2009b; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Johnson and Kwak 
                                                                                                                                          
spending can be viewed as political (e.g., Mayer 2009) and is an obvious source of decreasing the tax 




2010).  This perceived influence prompts some to ask if America is an oligarchy 
(Winters and Page 2009).  The concern about money in politics flows from a tradition 
articulated eloquently by Louise Overacker in 1932, as she sketched a thought process 
that for many scholars is how they find themselves studying political money.  
Overacker’s work derives from data and research partially collected by Victor J. West, a 
political scientist at Stanford who died before publication, leaving Overacker to expand 
and finish his project.  She writes: 
For years before his death in February, 1927, he had been collecting material for 
what was at first a study of corrupt practices act.  Later, with somewhat changed 
emphasis and scope, the central theme became ‘Money in Elections’…from a 
study of the brief outlines found among his notes, it is evident that in the course 
of the years the study had become less and less a consideration of laws and their 
operation, and more and more a statement of the underlying problem in terms of 
a theory of parties and the electoral process (Overacker 1932, x). 
 
Scholars conduct research on campaign finance, lobbying, and political money in 
general because they are seeking the origins of political decision-making and believe we 
must move beyond the written law to the representation of moneyed interests.  This 
study is a beginning.  Seeking to understand a part of congressional elections via the 
strategic actions of the primary organization disseminating money: the political action 
committee. 
 I begin this empirical exploration in Chapter Two by analyzing the PAC system 
from 1990-2006.  Chapter Two is an update of previous work in the 1980s that 
examined the PAC system by accounting for the candidates favored by PACs (see 
especially Sabato 1984).  Chapter Two is a macro-examination of the PAC system, 
deciphering the importance of incumbency, ideology, election vulnerability, committee 




establishes the importance of variables used to test two theories of PAC strategy, in 
addition to supporting and critiquing some of Sabato’s findings in the mid-1980s.   
 Chapter Three and Chapter Four test the demand-side and supply-side approach 
to PAC strategy respectively.  My findings indicate that both approaches lack in 
explanatory power, leaving room for a new model of PAC strategy that takes both 
organizational-maintenance and marginal-cost strategies seriously.  Chapter Five tests 
this new model, the mediated model, on a twelve policy domains establishing how 
scholars can derive more complete analyses of PAC strategy.  The concluding chapter, 
Chapter Six relates the mediated model to representation concerns, arguing that the 
financial-versus-geographic-constituencies debate is just one concern in congressional 
elections.  Instead, scholars must re-acquaint themselves with a distinction made long 
ago between organized and unorganized interests (Schattschneider 1975 [1960]), as 
PACs embody a system of already organized interests, and PAC strategy does not 
undermine our privately-financed system of elections any more than what would exist 
by having a system of only individual donations; however, PACs certainly do not 













THE PAC SYSTEM 
 
Introduction 
From the 1972 electoral cycle, the first with legally sanctioned PACs, through 
the 1982 electoral cycle, known as the PAC Decade, the number of PACs increased 
from 113 to 3,479 and the amount of PAC donations increased from $19.1 million to 
$190.2 million, a 350 percent increase after adjusting for inflation (Sabato 1984, 10-14).  
During this time, PACs became responsible for a larger portion of campaign finance.  
Much of the growth in PAC population and donation activity occurred after the FEC’s 
SUNPAC decision to allow unlimited spending from corporate/union treasuries to 
maintain a PAC, which means these treasuries can pay for the PAC’s overhead costs.  
PAC growth, in the number of organizations and budgets, was disproportionate during 
the decade that followed.   
Corporate sector PAC growth was the largest during the mid-1970s, as this 
sector tripled in number from 1975 to 1976 and grew by 1,600 percent from 1975 to 
1983.  During the PAC Decade, trade/membership/health PACs expanded over 100 
percent, and nonconnected PACs increased from 110 in 1977 to 821 in 1983, compared 
to the paltry growth of labor PACs from 201 in 1974 to 378 in 1983 (Sabato 1984, 11).  
Not only was growth in the number of PACs unevenly distributed, but also the 
proportion of PACs contributing to total spending was small. 
The inability for PACs to maintain spending in consecutive electoral cycles 
characterizes the PAC system, as only 61 percent of the PACs registered donated 
money in the 1982 congressional elections.  Of those PACs that donate money to 




less than 40 reported a budget of over $1 million.  Most PAC treasurers find themselves 
with modest budgets, between $10,000 and $100,000 in the early 1980s (Sabato 1984, 
11).  While this skewed distribution of spending to a handful of PACs during this 
decade lends credence to the fact that “most PACs operate on modest budgets, with 
small staffs, outside Washington, and without access to unpublished data,” overall 
spending by PACs increased and the role of these organizations as a staple in campaign 
finance became solidified (Sabato 1984, 11).   
The most common form of PAC giving during this decade, and throughout the 
1980s, was the direct donation.  In fact, PACs spent little on independent expenditures, 
money spent independently of the candidate’s campaign (e.g., television 
advertisements, literature dissemination in the district/state) (Sabato 1984, 96).  
Regarding the direct donation, corporations outpaced labor during the PAC Decade.  
Corporate and trade PACs consisted of 59 percent of all direct donations in 1982, up 
from 38 percent in 1974, and nonconnected PACs increased from 11 to 17 percent of all 
direct donations during this same time; however, “by 1982 business-related PACs were 
outspending labor in direct contributions to congressional campaigns by nearly three to 
one,” as labor’s proportion of direct donations was 24 percent by 1980 and 1982 
(Sabato 1984, 14).  Characteristics of the money market’s supply-side are only half the 
story emerging from the PAC Decade.  During this time of PAC growth in campaign 
finance comes long-standing patterns about which candidates PACs support, or the 
demand-side of the money market.  Of those needing money (e.g., congressional 




Studies from the PAC Decade find that PACs donate money to candidates 
sympathetic to the PAC’s cause, and PACs look toward a host of variables to determine 
the candidate’s level of sympathy.  In his extensive survey of PAC officials, Sabato 
(1984, 79) finds that PAC boards (and by extension local field offices giving advice to 
the board) seek answers to a whole litany of questions: 
In whose districts do we have plants or local divisions? 
Which congressmen are on the House or Senate committees affecting us? 
Which congressmen have been particularly accessible to us and have attempted 
to understand our problems? 
Which congressmen have voted ‘right’ on our issues and concerns? 
What is the political situation in the districts we want to target? 
Who especially needs help? 
For non-incumbents, where do they stand on our issues and how close to us have 
they been in the past?  What are their electoral chances?  What political 
consultants have they hired, what do their poll results say, and how much have 
they raised so far and from what groups?  Which House or Senate committee 
assignments will they seek if elected? 
 
To the extent that a candidate’s answers or situation is satisfactory to the PAC, a 
donation will likely follow, given a certain level of PAC resources.  While some 
idiosyncratic decisions occur in the PAC system, based on loyalty to likely losers, 
personal affinity, or grudges (Sabato 1984, 80), much of PAC strategy is predictable 
and consistent.  Studies of the PAC Decade find that PACs find sympathetic politicians 
among incumbents, Democrats or Republicans (as opposed to both or third parties), 
liberal or conservative ideologies (as opposed to both), those sitting on committees of 
jurisdiction, freshmen running for reelection, sure winners, and the various 
combinations of each to determine donation strategy (Sabato 1984, 73-89).  Studies of 
the PAC Decade also began the classic distinction embedded in the PAC community 
between pragmatic and ideological PACs (i.e., non-connected) (Sabato 1984, 73-78).  




allow them to pursue a strictly ideological strategy (e.g., pro-life PACs), while some 
have specific legislative goals requiring a close examination of committee assignments, 
voting behavior, and constituency characteristics.  While PAC money could be evenly 
distributed among some of these variables, studies of the PAC Decade indicate that a 
PAC system bias occurs because the PAC system as a whole donates more money to 
incumbents, more to committees with broad and important policy jurisdictions (e.g., 
Ways and Means Committee), freshman, close elections, but also sure winners (e.g., 
incumbents), with the minimal likelihood of bet-hedging and donating the maximum 
contribution (Sabato 1984, 86-89).19 
 This chapter replicates and updates some of macro-analysis of the PAC system 
found when the PAC phenomena sparked political, journalistic, and scholarly interest 
after the PAC Decade.  This replication and update occurs within the theoretical 
framework established in the first chapter, and with new data dating back to the 1990 
electoral cycle.  The two approaches to PAC spending behavior, organizational 
presence and public choice, use similar PAC populations, but accentuate different 
political environmental factors (demand- versus supply-side) to explain how PACs 
behave in congressional elections and reach different conclusions about this behavior.  
Using comprehensive data released by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), I stay 
true to the PAC populations used historically by each approach, but expand and refine 
the identification of the PAC system to include every active PAC formed by an 
                                                
19 Bet-hedging, albeit infrequent, can occur when a single PAC gives to both the Democratic and 
Republican candidate in the same general election, when a single PAC gives to an incumbent, and when 
that incumbent is likely to lose, the PAC will give to the challenger; and when a single PAC gives to a 




organized interest, which could donate money potentially to every active candidate in 
the House of Representatives from the 1990 through the 2006 elections, and I organize 
these PAC donations by geography and policy domains.20  Using CRP data to explain 
PAC strategy systematically is valuable because it reaches beyond the obtuse FEC 
categorization of corporate, labor, trade, and unconnected PACs that dominated the 
PAC literature during the past four decades.   
Characteristics of the political environment help explain variations in these 
direct donations within and across election cycles.  The political environment consists 
of demand-side factors (i.e., organizational), and supply-side factors (i.e., legislative, 
electoral, and constituent factors).  The description of how I identify the PAC system, 
how I measure PAC donations and the political environment, and how these demand- 
and supply-side factors correlate with total PAC-system spending all help in explaining 
the generic nature of PAC behavior in American congressional elections.  I find, similar 
to findings in the 1970s and 1980s, PACs donate more money to incumbents, those in 
leadership positions, to freshman and the most senior members of the chamber, to the 
two major parties over third parties, to marginal districts and close elections, to winners 
over losers, and give less to the most liberal congressional members; however, I find 
some PAC donation patterns that are contrary to previous studies and patterns that 
previous studies could not find due to timeframe limitations: (1) PACs give a sizeable 
                                                
20 I would like to thank the Center for Responsive Politics for making their data available to the public.  
Their bulk data can be found at http://www.opensecrets.org, after creating a free account. I am using the 
bulk PAC data, accessed at http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/index.php.  In no way does the Center for 
Responsive Politics endorse or share in the views or conclusions of this research.  The author compiled 
and is responsible for all tables, figures, calculations, and findings generated from bulk data provided by 




amount of money to districts with an open seat, when comparing the means to 
incumbent and open seat districts, (2) PACs give to incumbents to a fault, giving the 
most money to incumbent losers in elections that change the majority party, and (3) 
there are few statistical differences in PAC donations across committee assignments.  
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the structure of the PAC system while 
defining the data and variable operationalization for the ensuing analysis of PAC-
strategy models. 
Identifying the PAC System  
Since most PAC literature seeks to move beyond formal, mathematical 
deductive theory (e.g., Bental and Ben-Zion 1975; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Edelman 
1992), into empirical projects (Poole and Romer 1985, 64), attention to case selection is 
of primary importance to study of PAC donations.  Case selection in PAC research 
occurs along two dimensions of the money market: (1) demand-side, the selection of 
politicians receiving PAC money and the timeframe of these donations, and (2) supply-
side, the selection of PACs giving the money.   
PAC-strategy models developed from analysis of PAC donations in elections for 
the House of Representatives (e.g., Wright 1985, 1989; Grier and Munger 1986); hence, 
I limit the demand-side of the political money market by analyzing only PAC 
contributions to official candidates for the House of Representatives, eliminating 
elections for the Senate and Presidency and elections for non-voting delegates in the 
House of Representatives (American Samoa, Washington, D.C., Guam, Puerto Rico, 
Virgin Islands).  Official candidates are those politicians seeking to hold office in the 




designation to determine the official status of a candidate’s PAC.  I include all PAC 
donations made to candidates with multiple PACs for the same congressional office; 
however, if candidates with multiple PACs maintain a PAC for a Senate or Presidential 
campaign (e.g., Bernie Sanders, Ron Paul), then I eliminate those donations, only 
keeping the House of Representatives PAC for the analysis.   
The time period for my sample is the 1990 election cycle through the 2006 
election cycle, using the FEC’s definition of an election cycle as starting the day after 
the general election and ending on election-day two years later.21  Table 2.1 reports the 
dates for these nine electoral cycles (primary and general elections), resulting in 3,915 




                                                
21 Using the FEC dates for election cycles is the most accurate representation of the legal environment 
facing PAC donation decisions; however, it poses practical problems when using CRP data and the FEC’s 
own data because each electoral cycle dataset produced by these organizations contains transactions that 
occurred in previous electoral cycles (e.g., corrections to transactions in previous electoral cycles).  To fix 
this problem, I aggregated all electoral-cycle datasets (1990-2006) and re-divided the transactions based 
on dates of those transactions.  Transactions occurring before 11/9/1988 or after 11/7/2006 are not 
included in the analysis.  Most of the knowledge concerning PAC strategy occurs using election cycles 
from the mid-1970s through the 1980s (e.g., Endersby and Munger 1992, 80; Grenzke 1988, 84; Grier 
and Munger 1991, 25; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 113; Havrilesky 1990, 244; Munger 1989, 182; 
Poole and Romer 1985, 65; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987, 299; Romer and Snyder 1994, 748; 
Snyder 1990, 1207; Snyder 1992, 21), with only a few studies using 1990s electoral cycles (e.g., Box-
Steffensmeier and Grant 1999, 515; Brunell 2005, 685; Florence 1999, 61; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 
1170; 2005, 42; Ruldoph 1999, 198; Shin 2004, 137). 
22 For analysis of PAC donations throughout this study, n sizes will change depending on the unit of 
analysis (candidate or district), and the type of district election (e.g., incumbent, quality challenger, open 
seat).  In general, there are two types of elections that I will not investigate in detail: (1) new open seats 
created after reapportionment (n=45) and (2) districts with two-incumbents in the general election (n=11).  
Including these districts in systematic analysis of the PAC System is difficult because many independent 
variables require using values found in the previous legislative session (e.g., committee assignment) and 
in these instances, that information does not exist, or exists for multiple incumbents in the same election.  
Discounting these districts in the usually analysis results in 3,859 congressional districts.  Some scholars 
use a trend variable will be the control variable for electoral-cycle changes in real PAC dollars (i.e., 
1990=1, 1992=2, 1994=3, 1996=4, 1998=5, 2000=6, 2002=7, 2004=8, 2006=9) (e.g., Rudolph 1999, 




Table 2.1 Electoral Cycle Dates 
Start Date   End Date   Electoral Cycle 
11/9/1988   11/6/1990   1990 
11/7/1990   11/3/1992   1992 
11/4/1992   11/8/1994   1994 
11/9/1994   11/5/1996   1996 
11/6/1996   11/3/1998   1998 
11/4/1998   11/7/2000   2000 
11/8/2000   11/5/2002   2002 
11/6/2002   11/2/2004   2004 
11/3/2004   11/7/2006   2006 
 
The second dimension important to case selection is the identification of which 
PACs to include in the analysis.  To narrow the selection of PACs, scholars conduct 
research on single PACs (e.g., Gutermuth 1999, 357; Shin 2004, 137; Wilkerson and 
Carrell 1999, 337);23 multiple PACs (Grenzke 1988, 88; 1989, 246; Welch 1979, 201; 
Welch 1980, 107);24 single-industry or single-policy domain PAC studies (Hersch and 
McDougall 2000, 330; Havrilesky 1990, 244; Stratmann 1992, 648; Stratmann 1998, 
94; Van Doren, et al 1999, 400-401);25 multiple-industry or multiple-policy domain 
PAC studies (Florence 1999, 62; Jorgensen 2010, 18-19; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 
1164; Taylor 2003, 295);26 large budget PACs, including PACs who spend over $5,000 
(Snyder 1992, 21), $50,000 (Brunell 2005, 684), over $100,000 (Romer and Snyder 
                                                
23 The PACs used in these studies include: American Medical Association, National Abortion and 
Reproduction Rights Action League. 
24 The PACs used in these studies include: American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations Committee on Political Education, United Auto Workers, National Education Association, 
American Federation of Government Employees, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, Communication Workers of America, National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action 
League, Association of General Contractors, Life Underwriter Political Action Committee, Machinist’s 
Non-Partisan Political League, United Steel Workers of America, Marine Engineer’s Beneficial 
Association, Business Industry PAC, Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, National Committee 
for an Effective Congress, NCPAC. 
25 The PACs used in these studies include: automobile manufacturing, banks, and agriculture. 
26 The PACs used in these studies include: railroads and airlines; aerospace, airlines, automobiles and oil; 
fruit, nuts, and wine; commercial banks, securities firms, investment banks, and insurance companies; 




1994, 751), or the top 500 PACs in spending (Poole and Romer 1985, 78); PACs with 
an interest group rating system (e.g., labor, business, ideological) (Poole, Romer, and 
Rosenthal 1987, 299); total PAC-system money with little delineation of policy domain 
or FEC headings (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999, 515; Silberman and Yochum 
1980, 82); or, PAC studies using all or a few FEC categories (e.g., labor, corporations 
with and without stock, cooperatives, trade associations, membership organizations) 
(Brunell 2005, 684; Endersby and Munger 1992, 84; Grier and Munger 1986, 354; Grier 
and Munger 1991, 31; Grier and Munger 1993, 619; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 
116; Kau and Rubin 1982, 111; Keim and Zardkoohi 1988, 27; Kroszner and Stratmann 
2005, 4; Magee 2002, 381; Munger 1989, 185; Romer and Snyder 1994, 751; Rudolph 
1999, 198; Snyder 1990, 1207; Snyder 1992, 21; Snyder 1993, 229; Stratmann 1996, 
616).27 
The studies listed above indicate three general trends in PAC case selection, as 
scholars choose to analyze a few PACs, a few industries, or use aggregated FEC 
headings to develop models of PAC behavior, but little PAC research organizes all 
PACs by policy domain and geographic location, the two most basic and important 
methods of organizing PACs according to PAC-strategy modeling.  I use CRP data to 
obtain all active PACs in elections for the House of Representatives, and then use CRP 
bulk data to organize these PACs by geographic location and policy domain.   
                                                
27 The studies that use all FEC categories include (Grier and Munger 1991, 31; Grier and Munger 1993, 
619; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 116; Romer and Snyder 1994, 751; Snyder 1990, 1207; Snyder 
1992, 21; Snyder 1993, 229) (Romer and Snyder 1994, 751), studies that use corporations and labor 
unions include (Brunell 2005, 684; Grier and Munger 1986, 354; Keim and Zardkoohi 1988, 27; Magee 
2002, 381; Rudolph 1999, 198; Stratmann 1996, 616), studies that use corporations include (Kau and 
Rubin 1982, 111; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 4; Munger 1989, 185), and studies that use labor unions 




CRP uses FEC data, but adds value to this government data before the 
organization releases it to the public.  CRP standardizes PAC names and the parent 
organization of the PAC, converts contribution amounts to an easily readable integer 
format, identifies which PACs were active during an electoral cycle, and provides the 
ability to organize PACs by geography and policy domain.  I use CRP data to define the 
PAC system in elections for the House of Representatives. 
To define the PAC system, I exclude PAC donations from candidate PACs, 
leadership PACs, political party PACs, other party officials, former political party 
members, non-federal candidate PACs, joint PACs, and other miscellaneous candidate 
PACs, because I expect these PACs to have strictly partisan donation patterns and 
scholars have not used these PACs in the development of PAC-strategy models; thus, 
the decision to eliminate these PACs from consideration results from an effort to stay 
true to the population PAC-strategy models are meant to explain.28  In the language of 
the FEC, I am using unauthorized separate segregated funds and independent PACs 
(PACs not authorized by candidates or political parties), which are either Non-Qualified 
Non-Party or Qualified Non-Party (i.e., multi-candidate committee) PACs.  In sum, I 
define the PAC system as those PACs representing an organized interest in House of 
                                                
28 I eliminate these committees from the analysis, including CRP codes in parentheses: candidate 
committees (Z1000), Republican candidate committees (Z1100), Democratic candidate committees 
(Z1200), third-party committees (Z1300), unknown party committees (Z1400), third-party leadership 
committees (J1300), leadership committees (J2000), Democratic leadership committees (J2100), 
Republican leadership committees (J2200), party committees (Z5000), Republican party committees 
(Z5100), Democratic party committees (Z5200), third-party party committees (Z5300), Democratic 
officials, candidates and former member committees (J2300), Republican officials, candidates and former 
member committees (J2400), non-federal candidate committees (J2500), Republican joint candidate 
committee (Z4100), Democratic joint candidate committee (Z4200), third-party joint candidate 
committee (Z4300), candidate contributions to his/her own campaign (Z9000), transfer between national 
party committees (Z9100), transfer from intermediary type 24I or 24T (Z9500), non-contribution or 





Representative elections that are not coordinated or associated with a candidate or 
political party.  Table 2.2 reports the number of PACs and the total amount of real 
dollar expenditures of the PAC system, and that of excluded PACs.  
Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Case Selection 
Election #PACs Selected      #PACs Eliminated 
Cycle  (Donations/Real 1989 Dollars)   (Donations/Real 1989 Dollars) 
1990  2,910       551 
(139,188/$106,339,999)    (10,632/$11,969,626)     
1992  3,059       591 
  (167,233/$129,316,265)    (12,750/$21,477,722) 
1994  2,947       624 
  (159,181/$115,825,336)    (16,346/$23,811,547) 
1996  2,975       724 
  (177,301/$128,913,689)    (16,801/$22,942,608) 
1998  2,898       820 
  (162,862/$126,047,676)    (17,019/$23,897,974) 
2000  2,878       867 
  (169,549/$142,484,653)    (19,650/$24,631,337) 
2002  2,858       907 
  (159,410/$141,844,009)    (21,137/$28,806,641) 
2004  2,934       954 
  (153,317/$145,407,526)    (21,739/$78,911,535) 
2006  3,055       1,028 
  (170,966/$177,441,872)    (32,397/$137,865,782) 
 
From the 1990 through the 2006 electoral cycles, the PAC system was stable in terms of 
the number of active PACs from 1990 through 2006; however, the frequency of 
transactions was volatile and the real dollar amount of PAC expenditures increased.  
From 1990 through 2000, the real dollar amount of PAC donations was cyclical, 
meaning the amount of donations increased in presidential election years and decreased 
in mid-term elections, but starting in 2002, this decrease was slight and PAC donations 
increased from the 2004 to the 2006 mid-term election.  A trend illuminated by Table 
2.2, but is not a focus of this study, is the rise in PACs associated with candidates and 




prevalent and spend more money now than in the early 1990s, which reflects the rise in 
use of leadership PACs.  The donation patterns of these PACs should be the focus of 
future empirical studies and model development.  The numbers in Table 2.2 reflect PAC 
donations of all transaction types to all candidates, past and present, and regardless of 
their intent to hold office, in an election cycle.  Parsing the PAC donation by transaction 
type to official candidates for the House of Representatives shows these aggregate 
spending trends hold, and are driven by the direct donation to candidates, not a PAC’s 
independent expenditures in the district (e.g., television advertisements, literature 
dissemination).   
Measuring PAC Donations 
 Measuring PAC donations across time requires standardizing donation amounts 
and defining which PAC transactions qualify as a donation.  Using the case selection of 
PACs and candidates mentioned above, I measure the donations from PACs to 
candidates as 1989 real dollars.  To obtain the real dollar amount, I adjust the PAC 
contribution for inflation using the annual-average Consumer Price Index (CPI).  For 
example, candidates for the 1990 election received PAC contributions in 1988 
(sparingly), 1989, and 1990; hence, donations in 1989 are the baseline and donations in 
1990 are adjusted for inflation.  The few 1988 donations will increase due to inflation in 
1989.29 
                                                
29 The Bureau of Labor Statistics (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt) reports the annual 
average CPI, and for the 1989 baseline the CPI is 124.  I adjust nominal PAC campaign contributions 
with this equation, using the 1990 CPI (130.7) adjustment as an example: (124/130.7) * PAC 




PACs donate money for/against candidates via nine different transaction types 
and the FEC regulates each of these transactions: 24A (independent expenditure against 
a candidate), 24C (coordinated expenditure), 24E (independent expenditure for 
candidate), 24F (communication cost for candidate), 24H (honorarium), 24K (direct 
contributions), 24N (communication cost against candidate), 24R (election recount 
disbursement), and 24Z (in-kind contributions).  PACs engage in direct donations when 
they donate money to a candidate’s campaign staff to use at their own discretion.  
Independent expenditures are expenses of the PAC uncoordinated with the campaign, 
such as the production and airing of television advertisements that advocate on behalf of 
a candidate and/or issue, similar to communication costs, which can be for or against a 
candidate.  In-kind contributions occur when a PAC uses its budget and staff to provide 
a service for a candidate’s campaign (e.g., polls, staff sharing), which benefits the PAC 
because it has discretion over the use of funds and provides personal interaction 
between the PAC’s and candidate’s campaign staff, potentially making this type of 
campaign financing more lucrative: 
Those PACs that do use in-kind giving are generally pleased with the results.  
They believe that a donation of money is often invisible and quickly absorbed 
by the campaign organization, while in-kind expenditures are usually prominent 
and draw attention to the PAC, making its gift a memorable one for the 
candidate and his staff.  The candidate frequently benefits substantially since the 
PAC can often provide services at a lower cost than an individual campaign can 
secure…The personal relationships thus established become very useful if the 
campaign is victorious and, as usually happens, campaign staffers become office 
staffers.  PACs are then in a better position to influence the officeholder’s 
legislative aims” (Sabato 1984, 94). 
 
The federal government limits the amount of money a PAC can give via direct 
donations, transaction type 24K, in an election cycle under both FECA (1971 – 2002) 




per candidate per election (primary, general) under both FECA and BCRA; thus, the 
maximum total amount a PAC can give to a candidate is $10,000.  The campaign 
donation data reported by the FEC, and by definition CRP, includes 24K transactions 
over $5,000 and total 24K amounts over $10,000 between individual PACs and 
individual candidates.  This phenomenon can occur for only one of two reasons: (1) the 
FEC committed an error or (2) the PAC or candidate committed a crime.  I keep these 
transactions in the dataset, and conduct outlier analysis when appropriate.  Appendix A 
reports spending limits under FECA and BCRA.30   Tables 2.3 through 2.11 show PAC 
donations by transaction type in 1989 real dollars for each electoral cycle.  These totals 
subtract instances of refunds and corrections filed at a later date; thus, transaction type 
frequencies and 1989 real-dollar totals represent net transactions and net dollars.  In all 
the analysis and reporting, net real dollars means that if a candidate received and 
returned the same amount of money to a PAC in the same year, then the net donation 
will be zero, and treated as if no transaction ever occurred; however, if the candidate 
waited until the next calendar year to return the same amount, this situation results in a 







                                                
30 This Internet conversation from a CRP employee indicates errors in transaction dates probably result 
from human error, found at http://groups.google.com/group/opensecrets-open-
data/browse_thread/thread/36af96af54497f3a.   
31 I can change this calculation easily so that only one inflation adjustment is made per electoral cycle, 
eliminating the small positive amounts for donations refunded a year later, making that refund zero; 




Table 2.3 1990 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar 
Totalsa 
Transaction Type    Frequencyb  Real Dollar Totalc 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 559   264,046 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  16   26,060 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  1,304   1,234,727 
Communication Cost For (24F)  1,272   818,771 
Honorarium (24H)    43   53,293 
Direct Contribution (24K)   133,549  102,956,715 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  26   35,508 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 3   4,449 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   2,416   946,430 
Total PAC to Candidate/District  139,188  106,339,999 
a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC 
System at any point in the election cycle 
b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 2,695)  
c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds ($2,242,585), and are 
rounded to the nearest dollar 
 
Table 2.4 1992 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar 
Totalsa 
Transaction Type    Frequencyb  Real Dollar Totalc 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 1696   828,642 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  90   40,691 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  3925   3,420,536 
Communication Cost For (24F)  1513   2,143,920 
Honorarium (24H)    3   4,744  
Direct Contribution (24K)   153,987  120,946,365  
Communication Cost Against (24N)  18   29,238 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 24   154,590 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   5977   1,747,539 
Total PAC to Candidate/District  167,233  129,316,265 
a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC 
System at any point in the election cycle 
b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 3,833)  
c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds ($3,176,756), and are 













Table 2.5 1994 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar 
Totalsa 
Transaction Type    Frequencyb  Real Dollar Totalc 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 766   525,855 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  24   2,561 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  2,702   1,296,590 
Communication Cost For (24F)  1,397   1,684,523 
Honorarium (24H)    0   0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   150,209  110,693,814 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  2   593 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 38   59,904 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   4,043   1,561,494 
Total PAC to Candidate/District  159,181  115,825,336 
a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC 
System at any point in the election cycle 
b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 3,746) 
c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds ($3,128,008), and are 
rounded to the nearest dollar 
 
Table 2.6 1996 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar 
Totalsa 
Transaction Type    Frequencyb  Real Dollar Totalc 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 1,111   1,540,481 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  2   766 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  4,265   2,348,106 
Communication Cost For (24F)  3,055   1,988,142 
Honorarium (24H)    0   0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   163,437  120,643,572 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  116   394,717 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 49   84,731 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   5,266   1,913,176 
Total PAC to Candidate/District  177,301  128,913,689 
a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC 
System at any point in the election cycle 
b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 4,221)   
c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds ($3,310,612), and are 













Table 2.7 1998 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar 
Totalsa 
Transaction Type    Frequencyb  Real Dollar Totalc 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 532   721,548 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  1   1,141 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  2,270   4,773,682 
Communication Cost For (24F)  2,360   2,249,852 
Honorarium (24H)    0   0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   152,511  116,404,487 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  1   198 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 52   73,612 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   5,135   1,823,156 
Total PAC to Candidate/District  162,862  126,047,676 
a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC 
System at any point in the election cycle 
b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 4,332)   
c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds ($3,361,701), and are 
rounded to the nearest dollar 
 
Table 2.8 2000 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar 
Totalsa 
Transaction Type    Frequencyb  Real Dollar Totalc 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 329   1,329,038 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  1   720 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  2,503   5,069,310 
Communication Cost For (24F)  3,236   2,519,147 
Honorarium (24H)    0   0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   158,052  131,724,401 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  341   109,368 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 4   5,413 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   5,083   1,727,256 
Total PAC to Candidate/District  169,549  142,484,653 
a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC 
System at any point in the election cycle 
b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 4,098)   
c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds ($3,532,125), and are 













Table 2.9 2002 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real Dollar 
Totalsa 
Transaction Type    Frequencyb  Real Dollar Totalc 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 494   596,906 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  18   285 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  2,578   3,687,622 
Communication Cost For (24F)  3,063   3,297,261 
Honorarium (24H)    4   2,423 
Direct Contribution (24K)   148,662  132,817,063 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  32   39,658 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 13   30,951 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   4,546   1,371,838 
Total PAC to Candidate/District  159,410  141,844,009 
a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC 
System at any point in the election cycle 
b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 5,095)  
c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds ($4,749,173) and are 
rounded to the nearest dollar 
 
Table 2.10 2004 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real 
Dollar Totalsa 
Transaction Type    Frequencyb  Real Dollar Totalc 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 139   397,472 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0   0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  1,858   4,148,755 
Communication Cost For (24F)  1,919   1,424,219 
Honorarium (24H)    0   0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   145,532  138,074,632 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  30   22,085 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 1   656 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   3,838   1,339,706 
Total PAC to Candidate/District  153,317  145,407,526 
a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC 
System at any point in the election cycle 
b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 4,694)  
c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds ($4,538,613), and are 













Table 2.11 2006 Electoral Cycle: Transaction Type Frequency and 1989 Real 
Dollar Totalsa 
Transaction Type    Frequencyb  Real Dollar Totalc 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 999   7,986,580 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  7   6,723 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  3,878   7,757,503 
Communication Cost For (24F)  3,176   3,988,833 
Honorarium (24H)    0   0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   159,026  156,246,186 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  62   174,461 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0   0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   3,818   1,281,586 
Total PAC to Candidate/District  170,996  177,441,872 
a. Includes all politicians with a House of Representative PAC receiving PAC donations from the PAC 
System at any point in the election cycle 
b. Transaction-type frequencies do not include instances of refunds (n = 4,741).   
c. Real dollar totals, using 1989 real dollars, are totals after subtracting refunds ($4,795,176), and are 
rounded to the nearest dollar 
 
 Tables 2.3 through 2.11 display expected and unexpected trends in PAC 
donations from 1990 through 2006.  Expectedly, the direct donation (24K) drives total 
PAC donations to House of Representative PACs.  Unexpectedly, the ebb and flow of 
donation totals in mid-term and presidential election years stops after the 2000 election 
cycle, and there is a growth of PAC independent expenditures (for and/or against a 
candidate) in House of Representative elections during the 2006 electoral cycle.  Figure 
2.1 displays this information graphically, showing the importance of the direct donation 



















Despite the rise in independent expenditures in 2006, the above information provides 
the rationale for limiting the dependent variable in this study to PAC transaction types 
24K and 24Z, since the direct donation is the most important reason for PAC formation 
and in-kind donations double as hard money in federal elections.  These findings are 
compatible with the early research on PAC spending behavior, noting: 
Despite the attention that independent expenditures have drawn, relatively few 
PACs engage in them.  Only 4 percent of all the multicandidate PACs reported 
making any independent outlays in 1981 or 1982…but another 6 percent of the 
PAC community has also indicated a desire to expand into the independent 
arena in the near future, and that proportion might well grow if Congress should 
pass major limitations on PAC giving (Sabato 1984, 96).   
 
The growth in PAC independent expenditures should be a focus of study in future 
research, even and especially after the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. 
FEC (2010).   
The dollar amounts listed above include politicians with House of 
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ensuing legislative session, while the remainder of the analysis uses only PAC-system 
donations to official candidates.  Using only official candidates for office reduces the 
total amount of PAC donations, because a small portion of PAC donations is to 
unofficial candidates (e.g., debt repayment).  Table 2.12 reports this differential in total 
amounts in each electoral cycle.   
Table 2.12: PAC Donations to All Politicians versus Official Candidates for the 
House of Representatives by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Electoral PAC Donations  PAC Donations  Differential 
Cycle  To All    to Official Candidates 
1990  103,903,145   100,407,419   3,495,726 
1992  122,693,904   108,362,990   14,330,914 
1994  112,255,309   108,408,725   3,846,584 
1996  122,556,747   118,781,211   3,775,536 
1998  118,227,643   114,956,870   3,270,773 
2000  133,451,657   132,368,792   1,082,865 
2002  134,188,901   132,436,004   1,752,897 
2004  139,414,337   135,411,417   4,002,920 
2006  157,527,772   156,014,402   1,513,370 
a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar, direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) 
only. 
 
While the real dollar amount increases, especially after the 2000 electoral cycle, 
scholars note the remarkable stability to the PAC system: 
Long-term considerations are in fact important for a large group of PACs…the 
first supporting fact is that there is a remarkable degree of persistence in PAC 
contributions over time.  The PACs that give to a representative in one year are 
very likely to give to that representative in subsequent years as well (Snyder 
1992, 18). 
 
This stability is true for the electoral cycles 1990-2006, as only 16 district observations 
out of 3,915 experienced zero or negative real PAC dollars (more total refunds than 
total PAC donations).   
In sum, I measure PAC donations as active PACs, not associated with 




Representatives (1990-2006) via direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z).32  
Depending on the model in question (organizational presence, public choice), I organize 
these PAC donations by geographical origin or by their legislative and policy concerns. 
Geography and the PAC System 
To understand the geography of the PAC system, one must determine where the 
individuals who donate money to PACs reside.  Individual donations to PACs do not 
constitute a majority of individual donations, as most individuals who donate money to 
politics either donate to individual candidates and/or political parties.  For the 1990 
through 2006 electoral cycles, only 16.9% of all individual donations was given to a 
PAC, the remainder were donations to candidates and/or parties.33  Table 2.13 displays 
the number of individual donations to PACs and to candidates and political parties for 
each electoral cycle, indicating a rise in individual donations (measured as transactions 
not unique individuals) from 1990 to 2006.   
 
 
                                                
32 There are various ways to construct the dependent variable of PAC donations: total PAC dollars (e.g., 
Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999, 515), incidence of PAC donations (e.g., Endersby and Munger 1992, 
88), PAC money to incumbents, with challenger donations treated as negative (e.g., Grenzke 1989, 248; 
Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987, 299; Rudolph 1999, 199-200), proportion of PAC money received in 
real dollars (e.g., Grier and Munger 1991, 30; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1174; Kroszner and 
Stratmann 2005, 49; Snyder 1992, 39), total PAC dollars to incumbents (e.g., Grier, Munger, and Torrent 
1990, 115-116), and change in PAC donations across election cycles (e.g., Romer and Snyder 1994, 751).  
There are different statistical methods of analyzing this dependent variable: Tobit (e.g., Florence 1999, 
62; Grier and Munger 1991, 32; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 117; Gutermuth 1999, 357; Hersch and 
McDougall 2000, 335), chi-square test, to find differences in PAC donations by certain variables, such as 
committee assignments and political party identification (e.g., Endersby and Munger 1992, 84; Kroszner 
and Stratmann 1998, 1170; Munger 1989, 181; Snyder 1992, 23); ordinary least squares regression (e.g., 
Grenzke 1989, 260); and, probit (e.g., Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987, 300). 
33 I compiled these figures from the bulk data issued by the Center for Responsive Politics, and do not 




Table 2.13 Individual Donations to PACs and to Candidates/Political Parties by 
Electoral Cyclea 
Electoral Cycle  PACs    Candidates/Parties 
1990    111,151   394,907 
1992    125,981   720,597 
1994    137,556   692,416 
1996    164,868   1,033,092 
1998    184,026   812,077 
2000    229,247   1,426,368 
2002    251,220   1,159,066 
2004    389,204   2,073,168 
2006    387,331   1,456,972 
a. The figures in this table reflect transactions between individuals and PACs and candidates/parties, and 
do not reflect transactions considered refunds (giving money back to the individual).  The figures for 
candidates/parties reflect the transactions between a candidate and his/her own PAC (a candidate giving 
to him/herself). 
 
Of those individual contributions to PACs, the geographical dispersion of those 
individual donations has definite geographical biases.  The individual contribution data 
produced by the FEC and organized by CRP has deficiencies with respect to the coding 
of each individual’s address.  Of the 1,980,584 individual donations to PACs from the 
1990 through 2006 electoral cycles, 59,096 (3%) had missing state values, 1,308 
originated from U.S. Territories, and 3,901 had incorrect state initials making it 
impossible to determine where the individual lived.  The amount of dollars flowing into 
the PAC system will not reflect the amount of dollars flowing out of the PAC system 
for two reasons.  First, the individual-level data is limited, with respect to the number of 
coding errors and the law states only individual contributions over $200 must be made 
public.  Second, PACs do not have to spend the same amount raised; thus, PACs 
maintain and spend reserves across different election cycles; however, the data can 
indicate broadly whether or not a redistribution of PAC wealth is taking place in the 
United States.  Table 2.14 shows where individual PAC donations originate by state, 




amount of real 1989 dollars raised in each state, and each state’s ranking with regards to 
mean real dollars raised.  There are disparities among the states, as some states raise 
much more per individual transaction to a PAC than others, which raises the likelihood 
that the PAC system redistributes money from one state to another (see table 2.52 and 
figure 2.5 for further discussion of this potential phenomenon).   
Table 2.14 Individual Donations to PACs, Frequency and Amount, by State for 
1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
State   Rank  Frequency  Mean1989 Real Dollars 
Alabama  40  25,757   $558.62 
Alaska   47  4,640   $522.48 
Arizona  30  25,732   $591.94 
Arkansas  14  11,045   $683.74 
California  1  235,629  $907.94 
Colorado  6  26,118   $779.37 
Connecticut  9  46,331   $720.07 
Delaware  44  5,971   $537.01 
District of Columbia   54,138   $1,806.71 
Florida   13  84,895   $684.66 
Georgia  29  57,566   $592.80 
Hawaii   50  8,100   $446.20 
Idaho   45  5,776   $535.67 
Illinois   15  102,499  $677.69 
Indiana  36  24,697   $569.16 
Iowa   42  17,217   $542.94 
Kansas   23  17,944   $630.19 
Kentucky  37  17,465   $562.73 
Louisiana  35  22,212   $569.81 
Maine   39  7,019   $559.34 
Maryland  25  51,053   $621.42 
Massachusetts  18  54,029   $662.92 
Michigan  10  52,478   $712.84 
Minnesota  33  45,353   $585.95 
Mississippi  17  9,620   $666.10 
Missouri  20  34,262   $643.27 
Montana  48  5,078   $511.19 
Nebraska  31  11,080   $591.20 
Nevada  7  11,749   $764.41 
New Hampshire 32  8,110   $587.60 
New Jersey  21  72,125   $636.90 
New Mexico  34  8,858   $576.42 




North Carolina 41  35,232   $547.13 
North Dakota  49  7,666   $482.44 
Ohio   12  72,516   $685 
Oklahoma  5  15,784   $792.76 
Oregon  28  16,252   $609.38 
Pennsylvania  11  88,782   $694.10 
Rhode Island  26  6,073   $615.19 
South Carolina 24  13,280   $621.44 
South Dakota  46  4,700   $534.31 
Tennessee  22  30,040   $634.23 
Texas   2  146,393  $886.93 
Utah   4  7,566   $826.30 
Vermont  16  3,754   $672.01 
Virginia  27  68,550   $612.08 
Washington  8  40,030   $723.35 
West Virginia  43  6,055   $541.77 
Wisconsin  38  26,038   $560.52 
Wyoming  19  3,532   $650.23 
a. I round total 1989 real dollar amounts to the nearest dollar. 
 
Policy Domains and the PAC System 
According to he public choice approach to PAC strategy, and most mainstream 
political discourse, PACs are seekers of favorable public policy; thus, PACs are an 
extension of political activity conducted in policy domains.  Studies of PAC decision-
making find that PACs: 
Share information about candidates, and some charge, coordinate contributions 
for maximum effect.  Whether or not the PACs ‘run in packs’ in selecting 
candidates, they certainly share information freely with one another and use 
regular, organized meetings as well as informal consultations to do so” (Sabato 
1984, 44). 
 
In addition, large-budget PACs and industry leaders are central in their PAC networks 
and act as guides to other PACs with less resources, leading to similar donation 
strategies among like-minded PACs (e.g., Business Industry Political Action 
Committee, Chamber of Commerce, Committee on Political Education) (Sabato 1984, 




similar policy agendas, economic needs, and ideological predispositions to coordinate 
contributions, and in essence, act as policy domains while providing campaign finance.   
 Those who study PAC donation strategy (e.g., the public choice approach, 
investment theory) often assume PAC act together in policy domains, but this 
assumption is tested only tangentially due to data and time constraints.  The FEC 
categorization of corporations, labor, and trade/membership/health PACs is not 
adequate to analyze PAC behavior by policy domain, and relates obtusely to 
congressional committee jurisdictions, and neglects other more refined methods for 
classifying PACs that can further inform our knowledge of campaign finance, lobbying, 
and representation (see, for example, Snyder’s (1992, 38-39) plea for improving PAC 
classification).  The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) has improved PAC 
classification beyond the FEC categories by classifying PACs by policy domains. 
While a select few studies incorporate the two-digit Standard Industrial Codes 
(SIC) to classify corporate and business PACs into policy domains (e.g., Munger 1989, 
185; Taylor 2003, 295), others are utilizing recent data compiled by CRP that classifies 
all PACs by policy domains using SIC and the more recent North American Industry 
Category System (NAICS) produced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); 
however, these studies limit the selection of policy domains to pro- and anti-gun, 
hawk/dove foreign policy PACs (Magee 2002, 381), and agriculture (Van Doren et al 
1999, 400-401).  Using SIC and NAICS codes, CRP organizes PACs hierarchically into 
policy sectors, industries, and categories, with a policy sector being an aggregation of 
policy industries, and policy industries are an aggregation of smaller policy categories.  




it organizes PACs by their name and industry concerns (e.g., the goods/services its 
parent company produces).  Second, it organizes PACs by their contribution; if Boeing 
donates money to a member on the Defense committee it is considered a defense policy 
contribution, but if Boeing donates money to the Transportation and Infrastructure 
committee it is considered an aviation contribution.  I choose to organize PACs into 
policy domains by the former method, because using the latter would be tautological to 
describing how PACs choose to donate money (i.e., if a contribution to the Defense 
committee is considered a defense contribution, then committee assignment and PAC 
donations will always be statistically significant).  Table 2.15 displays the number of 
active PACs in congressional elections (House of Representatives only) by policy sector 
per electoral cycle. 
Table 2.15 Number of Unique, Active PACs by Policy Sector and Electoral Cycle 
Policy  1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Agribusiness 256 272 280 285 271 272 263 273 270 
Comm./Elect. 132 126 119 109 124 152 163 168 191 
Construction 111 113 108 119 115 111 108 110 111 
Defense 57 59 66 62 62 52 54 49 52 
Energy/Nat. 324 326 321 329 324 300 271 242 244 
Resources 
F.I.R.E. 664 624 563 533 508 461 452 443 440 
Health  179 202 207 211 202 211 235 271 307 
Ideology/ 284 347 297 348 333 342 340 360 397 
Single-Issue 
Labor  234 278 266 268 248 279 245 249 247 
Lawyers/ 127 129 136 139 152 145 156 172 180 
Lobbyists 
Misc. Bus. 351 357 357 365 362 356 359 374 374 
Other  12 9 9 11 13 15 16 25 20 
Transportation 149 155 152 155 161 154 147 147 157 
Unknown 30 62 66 41 23 28 49 51 65 
Total  2910 3059 2947 2975 2898 2878 2858 2934 3055 
 
Besides the notable phenomena of different amounts of active PACs by policy sector 




over 400 active PACs), the PAC system is relatively stable in total number and per 
policy sector.  Only three policy sectors experienced swings in the total number of 
active PACs over 100.  The F.I.R.E. sector saw a decrease in the number of active 
PACs of 224, while the health and ideological policy sectors saw an increase of 128 and 
113 respectively.  When combining this trend with Tables 2.16 through 2.51 and 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3, these policy sectors, while shrinking in the number of total active 
PACs, actually donated more money in House of Representative elections, meaning 
these industries did not shrink as much as they were consolidated.   
Table 2.16 1990-1994 Agribusiness PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 
1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1990  1992  1994 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  830  3,768  218 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  0  0 
Honorarium (24H)    9,596  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   8,273,402 9,735,806 9,132,716 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  442  442 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   21,473  52,163  64,362 
Total Amount     8,305,301 9,792,179 9,197,738 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.17 1996-2000 Agribusiness PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 
1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1996  1998  2000 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  3,885  5,936  9,399 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  1,862  3,944 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   9,655,277 8,407,049 8,711,396 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 407  386  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   66,140  48,965  77,527 




a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.18 2002-2006 Agribusiness PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 
1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    2002  2004  2006 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  8,091  4,389  2,687 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  2,016  3,576 
Honorarium (24H)    689  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   7,916,911 8,217,302 9,348,424 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   45,810  52,064  53,870 
Total Amount     7,971,501 8,275,771 9,408,557 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.19 1990-1994 Communications/Electronics PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1990  1992  1994 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  0  337  0 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  0  0 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   5,659,347 6,452,105 5,285,360 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  442  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   10,088  18,649  12,421 
Total Amount     5,669,435 6,471,533 5,297,781 

















Table 2.20 1996-2000 Communications/Electronics PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1996  1998  2000 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  0  0  0 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  0  191,031 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   6,334,018 6,064,960 7,506,098 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 4,590  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   45,326  83,374  104,809 
Total Amount     6,383,934 6,148,334 7,801,938 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.21 2002-2006 Communications/Electronics PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    2002  2004  2006 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  0  0  0 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  0  0 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   7,985,742 8,535,455 9,573,060 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  345  0  1,250 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   96,895  46,561  43,851 
Total Amount     8,082,982 8,582,016 9,618,161 



















Table 2.22 1990-1994 Construction PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 
1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1990  1992  1994 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  0  0  0 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  2,089  5,430 
Honorarium (24H)    1,000  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   3,233,987 3,051,686 3,086,474 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  429 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   19,032  15,623  7,606 
Total Amount     3,254,019 3,069,398 3,099,939 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.23 1996-2000 Construction PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 
1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1996  1998  2000 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  108,014 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  0  34,963  36,005 
Communication Cost For (24F)  1,745  0  28,030 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   3,857,934 4,703,804 4,947,915 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   6,651  16,706  25,871 
Total Amount     3,866,330 4,755,473 5,145,835 



















Table 2.24 2002-2006 Construction PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 
1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    2002  2004  2006 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 8,853  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  109,418 2,401  5,471 
Communication Cost For (24F)  30,719  127  0 
Honorarium (24H)    345  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   4,775,959 6,134,928 7,150,466 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  1,587 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   25,966  30,465  13,818 
Total Amount     4,951,260 6,167,921 7,171,342 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.25 1990-1994 Defense PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 
Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1990  1992  1994 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  0  0  0 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  0  0 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   3,775,009 3,827,371 3,580,631 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   3,768  13,758  4,756 
Total Amount     3,778,777 3,841,129 3,585,387 



















Table 2.26 1996-2000 Defense PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 
Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1996  1998  2000 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  0  0  0 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  0  0 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   4,117,312 3,294,942 3,529,759 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 7,979  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   9,458  13,003  3,764 
Total Amount     4,134,749 3,307,945 3,533,523 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
Table 2.27 2002-2006 Defense PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 
Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    2002  2004  2006 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  0  0  0 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  0  0 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   3,961,461 4,694,777 4,941,097 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  9,518  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   2,740  8,100  41,882 
Total Amount     3,964,201 4,712,395 4,982,979 





















Table 2.28 1990-1994 Energy/Natural Resources PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1990  1992  1994 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  875  19,087  6,500 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  0  0 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   7,001,964 8,244,865 6,971,282 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   10,514  21,003  12,738 
Total Amount     7,013,353 8,284,955 6,990,520 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.29 1996-2000 Energy/Natural Resources PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1996  1998  2000 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  0  761  720 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  0  0 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   7,512,930 7,644,790 8,705,970 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 418  1,159  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   34,958  45,613  78,959 
Total Amount     7,548,306 7,692,323 8,785,649 



















Table 2.30 2002-2006 Energy/Natural Resources PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    2002  2004  2006 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  5,129  10,903  62,721 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  0  0 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   9,025,126 9,224,714 10,193,863 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  4,825  2,971  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 689  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   53,066  75,764  31,233 
Total Amount     9,088,835 9,314,352 10,287,817 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.31 1990-1994 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1990  1992  1994 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  468,830 852,996 0 
Communication Cost For (24F)  210,438 348,032 269,043 
Honorarium (24H)    9,487  1,897  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   17,413,820 19,164,145 17,026,232 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 3,500  73,951  2,462 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   93,558  97,540  74,028 
Total Amount     18,199,633 20,538,561 17,371,765 



















Table 2.32 1996-2000 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1996  1998  2000 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  720 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  0  1,826  0 
Communication Cost For (24F)  239,806 201,487 209,506 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   18,596,387 18,864,122 21,187,756 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 2,092  773  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   101,127 188,176 145,949 
Total Amount     18,939,412 19,256,344 21,543,931 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.33 2002-2006 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    2002  2004  2006 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  773,031 1,276,441 1,485,572 
Communication Cost For (24F)  589,865 415,416 1,182,900 
Honorarium (24H)    689  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   21,863,927 23,932,531 27,746,255 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  1,400  1,348  625 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   120,940 86,444  96,449 
Total Amount     23,349,852 25,634,380 30,511,801 



















Table 2.34 1990-1994 Health PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 
Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1990  1992  1994 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  21,827  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  3  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  5,164  728,314 26,828 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  0  0 
Honorarium (24H)    8,545  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   7,507,753 9,638,872 10,298,180 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  1,326 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   42,677  382,936 185,317 
Total Amount     7,564,139 10,771,952 10,511,651 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.35 1996-2000 Health PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 
Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1996  1998  2000 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  350,692 1,394,457 948,577 
Communication Cost For (24F)  37,883  12,864  24,222 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   10,095,435 10,043,691 11,936,944 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 7,553  4,612  372 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   264,543 187,740 149,697 
Total Amount     10,756,086 11,643,364 13,059,812 



















Table 2.36 2002-2006 Health PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 
Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    2002  2004  2006 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  9,238 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  655,015 885,474 829,055 
Communication Cost For (24F)  87,890  190,712 114,807 
Honorarium (24H)    700  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   13,328,745 15,203,219 18,280,031 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  15,853  0  615 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   112,120 120,357 51,342 
Total Amount     14,200,323 16,399,762 19,285,088 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.37 1990-1994 Ideological/Single Issue PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1990  1992  1994 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 250,736 756,576 337,324 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  26,060  40,689  2,561 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  671,945 1,737,470 1,169,040 
Communication Cost For (24F)  229,337 1,066,650 778,933 
Honorarium (24H)    10,972  949  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   6,102,727 9,103,210 6,376,019 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  22,924  24,651  324 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  5,613  4,291 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   646,139 1,026,596 849,454 
Total Amount     7,960,840 13,762,404 9,517,946 



















Table 2.38 1996-2000 Ideological/Single Issue PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1996  1998  2000 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 1,115,427 708,396 1,035,135 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  766  1,141  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  1,688,297 2,235,745 2,388,052 
Communication Cost For (24F)  272,552 309,559 535,079 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   6,449,408 6,684,923 7,658,950 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  1,962  0  109,285 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 9,323  10,976  1,440 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   972,761 977,247 887,475 
Total Amount     10,510,496 10,927,987 12,615,416 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.39 2002-2006 Ideological/Single Issue PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    2002  2004  2006 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 558,403 367,454 4,620,568 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  5,514 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  1,511,960 1,950,574 3,454,444 
Communication Cost For (24F)  142,689 161,054 162,185 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   6,800,394 6,705,206 7,066,867 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  1,446  6,278  33,431 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 7,921  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   714,771 710,894 710,763 
Total Amount     9,737,584 9,901,460 16,053,772 



















Table 2.40 1990-1994 Labor PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 
Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1990  1992  1994 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  33,371  28,470  10,866 
Communication Cost For (24F)  344,868 670,387 556,291 
Honorarium (24H)    3,449  1,897  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   28,185,608 31,165,482 29,059,464 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  3,797  202  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 949  71,932  43,017 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   55,348  45,116  32,602 
Total Amount     28,627,390 31,983,486 29,702,240 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.41 1996-2000 Labor PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 
Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1996  1998  2000 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 368,494 2,463  154,544 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  245,038 1,071,367 1,673,302 
Communication Cost For (24F)  1,227,265 1,564,236 1,366,242 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   32,268,535 29,591,346 32,772,082 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  392,528 198  83 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 33,725  53,165  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   25,416  38,103  58,560 
Total Amount     34,561,001 32,320,878 36,024,813 



















Table 2.42 2002-2006 Labor PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type in 1989 
Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    2002  2004  2006 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 9,306  29,586  3,354,158 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  285  0  1,209 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  571,487 10,355  1,732,340 
Communication Cost For (24F)  2,318,732 582,255 2,447,508 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   32,008,405 29,524,320 31,724,304 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  13,717  656  132,474 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 22,341  656  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   26,782  7,639  59,270 
Total Amount     34,971,055 30,155,467 39,451,263 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.43 1990-1994 Lawyers/Lobbyists PAC Donation Amount by Transaction 
Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1990  1992  1994 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  0  0  29 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  0  0 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   2,884,820 3,947,924 3,514,078 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  4,505 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   16,206  24,988  16,406 
Total Amount     2,901,026 3,972,912 3,535,018 




















Table 2.44 1996-2000 Lawyers/Lobbyists PAC Donation Amount by Transaction 
Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1996  1998  2000 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  6,443  0  0 
Communication Cost For (24F)  47,905  14,938  11,935 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   3,799,174 3,956,263 4,531,713 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 4,184  773  3,600 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   42,420  47,532  55,271 
Total Amount     3,900,126 4,019,506 4,602,519 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.45 2002-2006 Lawyers/Lobbyists PAC Donation Amount by Transaction 
Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    2002  2004  2006 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  37,092  345  0 
Communication Cost For (24F)  29,316  3,145  19,700 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   4,863,311 4,913,930 6,034,688 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  123 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   49,969  77,726  93,669 
Total Amount     4,979,688 4,995,146 6,148,180 



















Table 2.46 1990-1994 Miscellaneous Business PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1990  1992  1994 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  1,638  32,401 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  40  9,160  8,513 
Communication Cost For (24F)  32,049  47,601  74,826 
Honorarium (24H)    4,397  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   6,519,118 7,790,160 7,700,764 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  8,787  4,385  269 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  2,574 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   20,672  26,653  36,448 
Total Amount     6,585,063 7,879,597 7,855,795 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.47 1996-2000 Miscellaneous Business PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1996  1998  2000 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  13,045 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  38,137  1,869  0 
Communication Cost For (24F)  160,986 140,950 149,160 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   9,155,654 8,925,469 10,958,106 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  228  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 2,812  1,769  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   281,835 117,282 57,820 
Total Amount     9,639,652 9,187,339 11,120,311 



















Table 2.48 2002-2006 Miscellaneous Business PAC Donation Amount by 
Transaction Type in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    2002  2004  2006 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  125  369  123,016 
Communication Cost For (24F)  98,052  67,068  54,949 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   11,155,378 11,572,548 13,880,858 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  1,729  1,313  4,356 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   49,638  67,822  41,593 
Total Amount     11,304,922 11,709,117 14,104,772 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.49 1990-1994 Transportation PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type 
in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1990  1992  1994 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  57,147 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  0  5,055  43,694 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  0  0 
Honorarium (24H)    4,846  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   6,206,654 8,529,874 8,434,952 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  2,210  858 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   6,698  22,002  257,733 
Total Amount     6,218,198 8,559,141 8,794,384 



















Table 2.50 1996-2000 Transportation PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type 
in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    1996  1998  2000 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  3,253  12,482  371 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  3,957  0 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   8,526,087 7,884,918 8,822,385 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  0  0  0 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 11,645  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   55,053  57,480  81,101 
Total Amount     8,596,038 7,958,837 8,903,857 
a. Total dollar amounts are net dollars accounting for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
 
Table 2.51 2002-2006 Transportation PAC Donation Amount by Transaction Type 
in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Transaction Type    2002  2004  2006 
Independent Expenditures Against (24A) 0  0  0 
Coordinated Expenditures (24C)  0  0  0 
Independent Expenditures For (24E)  0  674  0 
Communication Cost For (24F)  0  0  0 
Honorarium (24H)    0  0  0 
Direct Contribution (24K)   8,593,833 8,869,677 9,550,700 
Communication Cost Against (24N)  345  0  308 
Election Recount Disbursement (24R) 0  0  0 
In-Kind Contribution (24Z)   72,571  54,829  30,456 
Total Amount     8,666,749 8,925,180 9,581,464 



































































Total PAC Spending by Electoral Cycle and Policy Sector 
Labor Communications/Electronics 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate Transportation 
Health Agribusiness 
Ideological/Single Issue Construction 
Miscellaneous Business Lawyers/Lobbyists 


















































































































Tables 2.16 through 2.51 indicate that every policy sector increased its PAC spending 
from 1990 through 2006, even after adjusting for inflation, and the majority of that 
spending is direct donations.  While ideological PACs utilize independent expenditures 
the most of any policy sector, independent expenditures are still a small portion of its 
PAC donations, until 2006.  In 1990, the ideological sector spent 11.6% of their total 
donations on independent expenditures (for and against), but in 2006, this percentage 
increased to 50.3%.  Policy sectors, according to Figure 2.2 fall into four groups (I list 
each policy sector in descending order based on their 2006 spending levels).  Labor 
PACs clearly spend more than any other sector, with F.I.R.E. in a second grouping, and 
the third group of total spenders consists of health, ideological, miscellaneous business, 
energy, communications/electronics, and transportation, with agribusiness, construction, 
lawyers/lobbyists, and defense in the fourth group.  Figure 2.3 shows how total 
spending may mislead the amount of spending per PAC per policy sector.  In terms of 
average amount per PAC, defense becomes the second most giving industry, while 
labor and F.I.R.E. still in the top three policy sectors.  In addition, the dominance of 
labor is misleading, as most PACs in most other policy sectors represent a corporation, 
and corporate spending still dominates the PAC world.   
 The purpose of the previous two sections was to introduce descriptive data about 
the PAC system, which states give the most/least to the PAC system, and which policy 
domains dominate the PAC system.  The importance of the geographic dispersion of 
PAC donors and a PAC’s policy domain on PAC strategy is the focus on chapters three 
and four respectively.  In the remaining portion of this chapter, I report the 




process, show how the entire PAC system supports certain candidates and electoral 
situations over others. 
Measuring the Political Environment 
 PACs make donation decisions within a political environment that includes both 
demand- and supply-side concerns.  Demand-side concerns include responsiveness to 
individual donor wishes to meet the PAC’s goal of organizational maintenance.  Often 
responding to individual donor needs requires PAC officials to donate money to 
politicians residing in the same state as the individual donor (e.g., if the individual 
donor resides in California, then the PAC taking the individual donor’s money will 
donate more money to California politicians).  For the demand-side approach, PACs act 
as local election, or re-election, constituencies, and the most important variable in the 
political environment facing PACs is the geographic dispersion of its donor-base (i.e., 
organizational presence).  The supply-side approach differs in its explanation of the 
political environment, emphasizing congressional member characteristics and 
legislative needs over organizational maintenance needs. 
Supply-side concerns include matching the PAC’s ideological and legislative 
needs with those of congressional members to meet the goal of efficient lobbying and 
legislative achievement.  Legislative/institutional organization, electoral conditions, and 
constituency characteristics all characterize the political environment facing PACs and 
donation decisions in the supply-side approach.  PACs are placeless entities moving 
money around the United States in response to the legislative, electoral, and 
constituency characteristics facing the congressional member.  The PAC system in its 




close elections, those in leadership positions and those sitting on important policy 
committees. 
Geographic Environment 
Examining PAC donations in net 1989 real dollars by states, across all electoral 
cycles (1990-2006) shows that the PAC system gravitates to certain states over others.  
Table 2.52 Average PAC Donations to States, 1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
State   Mean PAC Rank  #CDs   State Size 
   Donations     Ratiob 
Alabama  $275,493 32  63  .14285714 
Alaska   $462,430 2  9  1 
Arizona  $261,102 38  59  .15254237 
Arkansas  $266,202 35  36  .25 
California  $254,712 41  464  .019396552 
Colorado  $246,148 42  57  .15789474 
Connecticut  $405,225 3  51  .17647059 
Delaware  $206,132 47  9  1 
Florida   $241,522 43  209  .043062201 
Georgia  $317,339 15  104  .086538462 
Hawaii   $227,181 45  18  .5 
Idaho   $327,967 12  18  .5 
Illinois   $289,209 25  179  .05027933 
Indiana  $271,557 34  87  .10344828 
Iowa   $329,067 11  46  .19565217 
Kansas   $299,618 20  37  .24324324 
Kentucky  $348,144 8  55  .16363636 
Louisiana  $327,549 13  64  .140625 
Maine   $284,251 27  18  .5 
Maryland  $293,097 23  72  .125 
Massachusetts  $181,033 50  91  .098901099 
Michigan  $376,034 19  143  .062937063 
Minnesota  $315,521 17  72  .125 
Mississippi  $259,084 39  42  .21428571 
Missouri  $304,018 6  81  .11111111 
Montana  $380,355 5  10  .9 
Nebraska  $277,519 30  27  .33333333 
Nevada  $384,295 4  21  .42857143 
New Hampshire $308,847 18  18  .5 
New Jersey  $273,056 33  118  .076271186 
New Mexico  $337,216 10  27  .33333333 
New York  $264,394 37  276  .032608696 




North Dakota  $572,593 1  9  1 
Ohio   $278,882 29  170  .052941176 
Oklahoma  $258,527 40  51  .17647059 
Oregon  $283,583 28  45  .2 
Pennsylvania  $276,253 31  185  .048648649 
Rhode Island  $298,825 21  18  .5 
South Carolina $198,806 48  54  .16666667 
South Dakota  $354,228 7  9  1 
Tennessee  $226,996 46  81  .11111111 
Texas   $315,708 16  273  .032967033 
Utah   $288,149 26  27  .33333333 
Vermont  $185,318 49  9  1 
Virginia  $296,468 22  98  .091836735 
Washington  $345,435 9  80  .1125 
West Virginia  $241,215 44  28  .32142857 
Wisconsin  $292,057 24  78  .11538462 
Wyoming  $322,436 14  9  1 
a. Mean dollar amounts are net dollars of direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z), accounting 
for refunds and corrections, and are rounded to the nearest dollar. 
b. The state size ratio derives from Snyder (1992, 36), which is the minimum number of potential 
congressional district observations divided by the total number of district observations in a state.  For this 
research, the minimum number of congressional district observations is 9 (one congressional district for 






























Scholars have found that investment-oriented PACs (i.e., rent-seekers) donate 
disproportionately more money to congressional members from small states because it 
is more likely that these members become Senators, as PACs wish to establish long-
term relationships with legislative dividends (Snyder 1992, 20).  Table 2.52 and Figure 
2.4 indicate this relationship to be slight, as outliers such as North Dakota pull the fit 
line in an upward sloping fashion.  When comparing table 2.14 (the mean individual 
transaction originating from a state), with table 2.52 (the mean amount the PAC system 
spends in each district) across all election cycles (1990-2006), no geographic 
relationship exists.  Some states raise a lot of money per individual donation and receive 




relationship (small amounts of money per individual donation and large amounts per 




 Legislators designed the U.S. House of Representatives to divide policymaking 
labor through the committee system and distribute agenda-setting powers unevenly, 
giving the majority party, certain committee positions, and party leadership more 
agenda-setting control than other members of the chamber.  In addition, political party 
affiliation and ideological disposition of legislators give PACs an indication of the type 
of legislation the congressional member will support or write in future congressional 




environment are: committee assignment, committee chair, chamber and committee 
seniority, leadership, majority party status, political party affiliation, and ideology.34  
This list of legislative/institutional independent variables is meant to measure and find 
the effect of this division of labor, uneven agenda-setting control, and ideological 
predispositions in the House of Representatives.  I operationalize all of these 
legislative/institutional variables using values before the general election date; thus, for 
elections with incumbents, the values of these variables are those of the incumbent in 
the election, but for open seat elections, the values of these variables are those of the 
previous incumbent who is not in the general election.   
 I measure committee assignments and committee chair with a series of ordinal 
variables created for every full committee in the House of Representatives from the 
101st through the 109th congressional sessions, meant to measure the influence of 
committee assignments and chairpersonships for the 1990 election cycle (for the 102nd 
Congress) through the 2006 election cycle (for the 110th Congress) (e.g., I use the final 
committee roster of the 101st House of Representatives, 1989-1991, to create the ordinal 
variable for the 1990 election).   Changes in committee assignments do influence the 
distribution of PAC money across congressional districts (Romer and Snyder 1994, 
755-765); therefore, using the most up-to-date committee roster before the general 
election is crucial to understanding the total amount of PAC dollars to a congressional 
district.  The ordinal variables range from zero to two, with a zero indicating that the 
previous congressional member did not sit on the full committee, a one indicating that 
                                                
34 Another legislative variable is legislative reputation, measured as the frequency of PAC donations and 
statistical methods to mediate the endogeneity problem with PAC money as the dependent variable (e.g., 




the previous member did sit on the full committee, and a two indicating that the 
previous congressional member was the chair of the full committee.35  In Appendix B, I 
provide a table illustrating how full committee names in the House of Representatives 
changed during this time period, which full committees disbanded and which were 
created during this time period.  Unless I state otherwise, I will use the 109th 
congressional committee names in reference to PAC strategy.  Table 2.53 Displays the 








                                                
35 Committee assignments are vital to explaining PAC donation strategies, and is now commonplace to 
include committee chairpersonships and sometimes subcommittee assignments and rank on the 
committee (e.g. Endersby and Munger 1992, 79; Florence 1999, 71; Grenzke 1989, 249, including rank 
on committee and subcommittee; Grier and Munger 1991, 25; Grier and Munger 1993, 618; Grier, 
Munger, and Torrent 1990, 116; Gutermuth 1999, 357; Keim and Zardkoohi 1988, 27, with chairs of 
committees and subcommittees; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1164; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 50; 
Munger 1989, 181; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987, 299; Romer and Snyder 1994, 749; Rudolph 
1999, 199; Shin 2004, 138; Stratmann 1992, 651).  Some aggregate committee assignments into 
groupings based on policy (Banking and Finance Committee, Education and Labor, Energy and 
Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, Government Operations), prestige (Appropriations, Budget, Rules, 
Ways and Means), constituent (Agriculture, Armed Services, Interior, Merchant Marines, Public Works, 
Science Space and Technology, Small Business, Veterans’ Affairs), and unrequested committees (District 
of Columbia, House Administration, Post Office, Standards of Official Conduct, Select Intelligence) 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999, 517; also see Romer and Snyder 1994, 749-752).  Some find that 
committee assignments do not matter (Gopoian 1984; Wright 1985).  Others view the legislative strategy 
as secondary to PAC concerns, which would include committee assignments (Welch 1980; Eismeier and 
Pollock 1984; Poole and Romer 1985, 105-106; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987).  Some find that 
committee chairpersonships and ranking minority committee members do not influence the distribution of 
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Standards of Official Conduct 
Transportation and Infrastructure 
Veterans’ Affairs 
Ways and Means 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
 
Table 2.54 displays donations from the PAC system to each full committee in the House 
of Representatives from the 101st through the 109th Congress, and the statistical 
significance of the mean difference in PAC donations of those who sit on the 
committee, the chair of the committee, and those that do not sit on each full committee.  
According to Table 2.54, it is not so much that a congressional member needs to sit on a 
high priority committee to receive PAC money as much as it is that a congressional 
member does not want to sit on a poor committee.  There is not much statistical 
difference between many of the committees; the statistical difference in PAC-donation 
means is more likely when comparing the less important policy committees to the 
others with more notoriety.  In general, committee chairs receive more PAC donations 
than other congressional members, with some notable exceptions of Financial Services, 




difference rises to a statistically significant level.  The exceptions to this finding are the 
Energy and Commerce, Resource, and the Transportation and Infrastructure 
committees.  For rank-and-file committee members, it makes little difference which 
committee assignment one receives for receiving PAC donations.  Energy and 
Commerce and Ways and Means are the notable exceptions, otherwise, congressional 






















Table 2.54 PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbent Committee 
Members and Chairpersons, 1990 – 2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Committee  N Mean  Standard Levene Welch 
Assignmentb     Deviation (sig.)  (sig.) 
Agriculture  369 293,719 164,627 1.311  1.769  
Chair   7 289,276 136,837 (.270)  (.202) 
Otherwise  3116 276,176 185,593 
 
Appropriations 485 261,179 176,688 1.746   2.613 
Chair   9 315,239 184,618 (.175)  (.097) 
Otherwise  2998 280,675 184,420 
 
Armed Services 451 242,897* 159,484 6.254  11.664 
Chair   8 291,700 106,537 (.002)  (.001) 
Otherwise  3033 283,248 186,374 
 
Budget   316 255,031 170,710 1.629  4.104  
Chair   7 414,031 229,600 (.196)  (.037) 
Otherwise  3169 280,052 184,362 
 
Education/Work. 346 230,834* 146,320 8.461  17.937 
Chair   6 293,179 213,236 (.000)  (.000) 
Otherwise  3140 283,231 186, 356 
 
Energy/Com.  392 343,044* 180,064 1.264  46.531 
Chair   8 770,766*** 229,802 (.283)  (.000) 
Otherwise  3092 268,542 180,369 
 
Financial Ser.  476 293,438 184,374 2.876  2.169 
Chair   8 214,990 299,164 (.057)  (.143) 
Otherwise  3008 275,790 184,374 
 
Gov. Ref.  345 231,493* 144,427 7.585  18.021 
Chair   8 286,597 149,567 (.001)  (.000) 
Otherwise  3139 283,152 186,649 
 
Homeland Securityc 77 321,282 179,357 .709  .368 
Chair   2 376,067 92,164  (.492)  (.723) 
Otherwise  1103 315,459 206,898 
 
House Admin.  100 312,730 202,371 2.910  3.578 
Chair   9 411,687 193,937 (.055)  (.047) 
Otherwise  3383 276,676 182,266 
 
International Rel. 361 217,246* 137,998 15.598  46.011 




Otherwise  3124 285,307 186,859 
 
Judiciary  288 215,043* 133,968 12.918  35.255 
Chair   9 348,946 76,766  (.000)  (.000) 
Otherwise  3195 283,536 186,421 
 
Resources  352 259,856 167,338 1.877  3.280 
Chair   8 434,911** 285,096 (.153)  (.060) 
Otherwise  3132 279,701 184,659 
 
Rules   100 285,272 198,298 1.162  1.887 
Chair   8 371,941 136,803 (.313)  (.181) 
Otherwise  3384 277,621 183,073 
 
Science  390 259,204 157,262 2.891  3.173 
Chair   7 317,307 134,110 (.056)  (.069) 
Otherwise  3095 280,342 186,477 
 
Small Business 294 244,744* 163,971 2.374  6.394 
Chair   7 296,460 80,428  (.093)  (.009) 
Otherwise  3191 281,085 185,027 
 
Stand./Official Cond. 87 212,099* 116,322 8.057  19.310 
Chair   9 142,728 115,145 (.000)  (.000) 
Otherwise  3396 280,104 184,571  
 
Transport./Infra. 539 279,748 168,417 1.129  9.144 
Chair   8 460,344*** 118,682 (.323)  (.002) 
Otherwise  2945 277,251 186,005 
 
Vet. Affairs  248 268,051 156,449 3.742  9.501 
Chair   9 149,128 89,558  (.024)  (.001) 
Otherwise  3235 279,182 185,427 
 
Ways/Means  294 362,301* 217,378 19.599  24.880 
Chair   7 469,955* 385,552 (.000)  (.000) 





Intelligence  147 253,787 186,942 .901  10.696 
Chair   9 128,889* 101,437 (.406)  (.001) 
Otherwise  3336 279,528 183,261 
 
District of Columbiad 24 259,804 150,221 .267  .344 
Chair   3 177,412 170,789 (.766)  (.725) 
Otherwise  1100 241,301 153,638   
 
Merchant Marinesd 114 271,741 146,365 .152  2.441 
Chair   3 208,125 137,843 (.859)  (.177) 
Otherwise  1010 238,214 154,106 
 
Post Officed  57 234,970 130,695 2.138  .215 
Chair   3 248,491 20,151  (.118)  (.812) 
Otherwise  1067 241,855 154,906 
a. Dollar amounts are rounded to nearest dollar, only including districts where the incumbent was in the 
general election, not including districts with two incumbents in the general election, or any open seats.  
The means are calculated from districts that do include negative values, and are figured from net real 
dollars per district. 
b. Committee assignment means are calculated without donations to committee chair.  The means for the 
committee chair are figured separately. 
c. Committee assignments to the Homeland Security committee only occurred starting before the 2002 
election. 
d. These committees were eliminated after the 1994 general election. 
*Difference in mean between sitting on the committee (or being committee chair) and not sitting on the 
committee is statistically significant at the .05-level, using the Bonferroni post hoc test. 
**Difference in mean between being a committee chair and sitting on the committee is statistically 
significant at the .05-level, using the Bonferroni post hoc test. 
***Difference in mean between being a committee chair and the two other means (sitting on the 
committee, and not sitting on the committee) are statistically significant at the .05-level, using the 
Bonferroni post hoc test. 
 
These findings are congruent with studies of the PAC Decade indicating that the House 
Energy and Commerce and Ways and Means Committees are high-priced committees; 
however, the Appropriations Committee does not rise to the level of statistical 
significance (Sabato 1984, 79).   
In addition to dividing policymaking labor across different full committees and 
giving committee chairs more agenda-setting power within the committee, legislators 
gave more agenda-setting powers to the majority party, party leadership, and those 




changed in the House of Representatives to the Republican Party in 1994, and changed 
back to the Democratic Party after the 2006 election (I address the importance of the 
majority party when discussing the effect of party affiliation on PAC strategy).  I define 
party leadership as the Speaker of the House, the majority and minority party leaders, 
and the majority and minority whips.  If the previous congressional member 
representing the district was a member of their party’s leadership, then that district 
scores a one, if otherwise, then that district’s election scores a zero.  Table 2.55 reports 
the differential in PAC donations to congressional districts with a representative 
occupying a leadership position over those representatives not in leadership.  
Congressional districts with members occupying a leadership position receive almost 
three times, on average, the amount of PAC donations as districts with members not in 
leadership.36   
Table 2.55 PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Leadership Positions, 
1990-2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Position  N-Size   Mean   Standard Deviation 
Leadership  45   $751,395  $271,942 
 
Otherwise  3,814   $275,707  $172,845 
a. Dollar amounts rounded to nearest dollar, and include direction donations (24K) and in-kind donations 
(24Z) only.  The sample size does not include 11 races with two incumbents in the general election, and 
45 new open seats created after reapportionment and redistricting. 
 
The seniority system in Congress allows more senior members of committees, 
and the entire chamber, to accrue more agenda-setting power.  I measure chamber 
seniority and committee seniority in the House of Representatives similarly, the 
numerical value of each variable includes the current term the representative is serving, 
                                                
36 Typically, leadership positions receive more money from the PAC system (e.g., Florence 1999, 59; 




with one caveat: the value of chamber seniority is the number of cumulative terms and 
the value of committee seniority is the number of consecutive terms.37  I use the 
chamber and committee seniority values as they occur before each general election.  For 
example, in 1998, Robert Wexler ran for reelection in Florida’s nineteenth 
congressional district, leading to the 106th Congress; hence, he was the previous 
congressional member representing that district.  I use his committee seniority from the 
105th Congress (the last updated committee roster before the 1998 electoral cycle), 
measured to include the current 105th term, as the committee seniority value in the 1998 
election.  The 105th Congress was the first term that Representative Wexler sat on the 
International Relations committee; thus, for the 1998 election, his committee seniority 
on the International Relations committee was valued at one.  Table 2.56 reports PAC 
donations to congressional districts by chamber seniority for the 1990-2006 electoral 
cycles.  I group chamber seniority into five categories.  These five categories are: (1) 
those districts where representatives served only one term prior to the general election 
(i.e., freshmen), (2) those serving two terms, (3) those serving three or four terms, (4) 
those serving five, six, or seven terms, and (5) those congressional districts where the 
incumbent campaigning for reelection has served eight or more terms in the House of 
Representatives prior to the general election.38   
                                                
37 I would like to thank Charles Stewart and Jonathan Woon for making this data available on their 
website, http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html.  
38 Chamber seniority, including a separate variable for freshmen, is common in the literature (e.g., 
Endersby and Munger 1992, 88, but not significant; Grenzke 1989, 245; Grier and Munger 1993, 618; 
Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 116; Gutermuth 1996, 357; Kiem and Zardkoohi 1988, 27; Kroszner 
and Stratmann 1998, 1173; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 50, with age; Rudolph 1999, 199; Shin 2004, 
138, with age; Snyder 1992, 20), chamber seniority is significant (e.g., Poole and Romer 1985, 105-106; 





Table 2.56 PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Chamber Seniority, 1990-
2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Chamber Seniority N-Size  Total PAC Money  Standard 
Groupingsb    (Mean) c   Deviation 
1: 1 Session  538  $176,358,736   $182,062  
     ($327,804)d   
2: 2 Sessions  487  $126,092,196   $160,500 
     ($258,916)e 
3: 3 & 4 Sessions 785  $195,068,489   $151,569 
     ($248,495)f 
4: 5, 6, & 7 Sessions 853  $225,411,664   $173,492 
     ($264,258)g 
5: 8+ Sessions  829  $248,040,722   $221,924 
     ($299,205)h 
Total   3,492  $970,971,807   $181,601 
     ($278,056) 
a. Dollar amounts rounded to nearest dollar, and include direction donations (24K) and in-kind donations 
(24Z) only.  The sample size does not include 11 races with two incumbents in the general election, and 
45 new open seats created after reapportionment and redistricting, or any other open seats. 
b. I base Chamber Seniority groupings on the number of legislative sessions served, including the current 
session before the general election. 
c. The Levene Statistic for testing the homogeneity of variances is 24.007 and is statistically significant 
(sig.=.000).  The variances in the seven ideological groups are not similar.  As a result, the Welch statistic 
is 21.658 and is statistically significant (sig.=.000).  There are statistically significant differences between 
the means of the seven ideological groupings.  I use the Bonferroni post hoc difference of means test for 
to test each individual mean against each other. 
d. The mean of the first group is statistically different from all other means at the .05-level. 
e. The mean of the second group is statistically different from 1 and 5 at the .05-level. 
f. The mean of the third group is statistically different from 1 and 5 at the .05-level. 
g. The mean of the fourth group is statistically different from 1 and 5 at the .05-level. 
h. The mean of the fifth group is statistically different from all other means at the .05-level. 
 
The results indicate the PAC system donates differently to three tiers of seniority.  The 
mean PAC donation to districts with a freshman incumbent in the general election is 
higher than those serving two through seven terms, but the mean donation increases 
again in districts with a senior incumbent serving more than eight terms.  The difference 
between these groups is significant at the .05-level.39  The PAC system donates the most 
                                                                                                                                          
Rosenthal 1987, 302; Grier and Munger 1986; Nelson 1982).  Committee seniority, while less common, 
is a significant predictor of PAC donations (e.g., Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 50). 
39 Another way to account for the influence of seniority on PAC donations is to account for age and 





money to freshmen incumbents, and senior incumbents are the next priority, confirming 
findings from the PAC Decade dating back to the 1970s that PACs donate at higher 
rates to freshmen because “they often need the money most of all and gratefully 
remember those who help pay off their large first-election debts, and second, unlike 
veterans, they have not taken a position on many issues and are considered persuadable 
by the PACs” (Sabato 1984, 79).  Regardless of seniority status, PAC donations 
gravitate at high rates to the two major parties. 
Political party affiliation and ideology also give PACs an indication of how a 
representative legislates and votes.40  I account for political party affiliation differently 
depending on the task, as I either organize the cases according to PAC spending by 
political party (i.e., the dependent variable is PAC donations to Democrats), or I control 
for political party with a dichotomous variable (Democrats equal to 1, Republicans 
equal to 0).  Tables 2.57 and 2.58 display the number of official candidates for the 
House of Representatives for each electoral cycle and the number of Democratic and 
Republican candidates receiving PAC donations for each electoral cycle.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
in the last electoral cycle in which a legislator is running for reelection is in the House and zero in other 
periods.  The independent variables are the legislator characteristics listed earlier plus the legislator’s age 
as an instrument.  The probability of retirement or death should be an increase function of the legislator’s 
age, but age should have no impact on the frequency of repeat givers or the level of PAC contributions, 
independent of its effect on the probability of termination” (Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 53).  Those 
who control for age find that younger congressional members receive more PAC donations than older 
members, and the rate of decline in PAC donations is faster for older congressional members (Snyder 
1992, 19-20).   
40 Political party identification is a primary control variable (e.g., Brunell 2005; Endersby and Munger 
1992, 88; Florence 1999, 59; Grier and Munger 1993, 618; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 116; Kiem 
and Zardkoohi 1988, 27; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1173; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 52; 
Rudolph 1999, 199), but some find that political party identification is not important to explaining 




Table 2.57 Number of Official Candidates for the House of Representatives by 
Political Party and Electoral Cycle 
Electoral Dem.   Rep.   Indep.   Lib.   Ref.   Green   Nat. Law   Soc.   Other Write 
Cycle           In 
1990  451 428    35 48 0 0 0 5 79 10 
1992  536 467    113 120 1     11 29 11 166 0 
1994  746 810    61 78 0       7 30 3 100 0 
1996  774 801    105 152 25      5 147 12 109 0 
1998  574 628    78 151 27      10 61 11 80 0 
2000  655 721    110 256 31      37 93 4 157 3 
2002  728 807    56 225 11     58 7 3 91 40 
2004  671 731    50 151 4     44 1 7 121 24 
2006  853 705    74 124 6    40 1 4 116 14 
 
Table 2.58 Number of Official Candidates Receiving PAC Donations for the House 
of Representatives by Political Party and Electoral Cyclea 
Electoral Cycle Democrats    Republicans 
   Number (Percent of Total)  Number (Percent of Total) 
1990   394 (87.3%)    308 (71.9%) 
1992   449 (83.7%)    415 (88.8%) 
1994   490 (65.7%)    491 (60.6%) 
1996   515 (66.5%)    515 (64.2%) 
1998   392 (68.3%)    419 (66.7%) 
2000   428 (65.3%)    424 (64.7%) 
2002   455 (62.5%)    449 (55.6%) 
2004   409 (60.9%)    426 (58.2%) 
2006   520 (60.9%)    382 (54.1%) 
a. PAC donations refer to direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only. 
 
While most of the official candidates identify with the Democratic or Republican 
Parties, there is a high frequency of Independents and Libertarians during some 
electoral cycles; however, third party candidates receive an inconsequential amount of 
PAC donations.  The percentage of Democratic and Republican candidates receiving 
PAC donations has decreased from 1990 to 2006, but this decline results from an 
increase in the number of candidates instead of a decline in the distribution of PAC 
donations.   
 Tables 2.59 through 2.61 show those Democrats and Republicans receiving PAC 




party candidates for the House of Representatives receive little help for their campaign 
financing from PACs (an interesting question is why they receive PAC money at all).  
The amount of PAC donations to independent candidates during this timeframe is 
almost all due to Bernie Sanders of Vermont.  The trend in PAC donations to 
Democrats and Republicans in Table 2.59 is telling, as the PAC system gives 
disproportionately more money to Democrats when they were in the majority, 
especially the year they lost control of the House of Representatives.  Once Democrats 
lost their majority party status, the PAC system quickly, but reactionary, evened 
donations to both parties.  A similar trend emerged in 2004 and 2006 when the PAC 
system donated disproportionately more money to the Republican Party, the mean 
difference in 2006, like that between 1990-1994, is statistically significant at the .01-
level.  Table 2.59 indicates a growing comfort of the PAC system with Republican 
majorities after four decades of Democratic rule of the House of Representatives, but 
this table also shows the PAC system works hard to hold onto the status quo once it is 
comfortable with the majority party.  In both 1994 and 2006, the mean difference in 
PAC donations between the majority and minority party was at its widest margin, which 
















Table 2.59 PAC Donations to Official Democratic and Republican Candidates by 
Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Electoral Cycle Democratsb    Republicansb 
   Total (Mean)    Total (Mean) 
1990*   66,574,363 (168,970)    33,765,751 (109,629) 
1992*   72,848,258 (162,246)   35,208,049 (84,839) 
1994*   72,994,910 (148,969)   35,207,422 (71,706) 
1996   59,274,169 (115,095)   58,998,972 (114,561) 
1998   57,410,652 (146,456)   57,361,413 (136,901) 
2000   68,316,339 (159,618)   63,336,454 (149,378) 
2002   66,617,369 (146,412)   65,751,433 (146,440) 
2004   61,709,260 (150,878)   73,594,943 (172,758) 
2006*   71,097,593 (136,726)   84,911,273 (222,281) 
a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind 
donations (24Z) only  
b. The mean value was created using the number of candidates receiving PAC funds; negative net values 
were treated as zero, and candidates giving refunds in a different year had positive PAC donations due to 
the adjustments for inflation. 
* Statistically significant differences between the Democratic and Republican means at p < .01. 
 
Table 2.60 PAC Donations to Official Independent, Green, and Other Party 
Candidates by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Electoral    Independent    Green     Other  Write-In 
Cycle 
1990  61,431   0   8,064   0 
1992  204,568  0   120,891  0 
1994  133,575  0   98,627  0 
1996  469,792  0   48,304  0 
1998  113,147  0   68,947  0 
2000  277,180  62,648   384,252 0 
2002  67,618   1,395   4,624  0  
2004  88,513   1,641   23,150  0 
2006  1,891   0   41,105  0 
a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind 
















Table 2.61 PAC Donations to Official Libertarian, Natural Law, Socialist, and 
Reform Party Candidates by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Electoral    Libertarianb  Natural Lawc Socialistd  Reforme  
Cycle 
1990  0   0  0   0 
1992  0   0  0   0  
1994  1,268   0  0   0 
1996  395   1,581  0   3,161 
1998  9,073   0  0   399 
2000  6,056   720  0   720 
2002  1,861   0  0   1,866 
2004  0   0  0   0 
2006  6,766   0  0   0 
a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind 
donations (24Z) only. 
 
To measure ideology, I use Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal’s first 
dimension DW-NOMINATE scores (measuring roll call votes about government’s role 
in the economy, negative values are liberal ideologies) the value of which is the 
ideological score of the previous congressional member representing that district.41  For 
presentation purposes, I group these ideology scores into seven relatively equal groups, 
across the 1990-2006 electoral cycles to determine the ideological strategies of the 





                                                
41 I would like to thank Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal for making this data available on their 
website, http://www.voteview.com.  
42 There are many ways to PAC scholars measure ideology: as the partisan or ideological nature of the 
district (e.g., Grier and Munger 1991, 33), a sample of roll call votes important to the PAC’s policy 
agenda (e.g., Grenzke 1989, 245; Grier and Munger 1991,33; Shin 2004, 138), interest group vote score 
cards, including Americans for Democratic Action (e.g., Gutermuth 1999, 357; Havrilesky 1990, 244; 
Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1173), AFL-CIO (e.g., Endersby and Munger 1992, 88), U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce (Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 116; Rudolph 1999, 199), various labor, business, and 
ideological organizations (e.g., Poole and Romer 1985, 105-106; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987, 
298), and DW-NOMINATE, which has been squared to capture the nonlinear effects of more extreme 




Table 2.62 PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Ideology, 1990-2006 
Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Ideology  N-Size  Total PAC Money  Standard 
Groupingsb    (Mean) c   Deviation 
1: -1.00 - -.482 553  $118,883,545   $138,201  
     ($214,979)d   
2: -.481 - -.359 553  $157,151,020   $171,278 
     ($284,179)e 
3: -.358 - -.208 551  $177,445,862   $169,705 
     ($322,043)f 
4: -.207 -  .242 548  $146,215,833   $170,957 
     ($266,817)g 
5: .243 -  .405  557  $167,913,529   $192,066 
     ($301,461)h 
6: .406 -  .522  547  $161,859,976   $204,891 
     ($283,437)i 
7: .523 -  1.30  550  $155,890,195   $197,652 
     ($283,436)j 
Total   3,859  $1,085,359,959  $181,601 
     ($281,254) 
a. Dollar amounts rounded to nearest dollar, and include direction donations (24K) and in-kind donations 
(24Z) only.  The sample size does not include 11 races with two incumbents in the general election, and 
45 new open seats created after reapportionment and redistricting. 
b. I base Ideology groupings on first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, negative values indicate more 
liberal representatives 
c. The Levene Statistic for testing the homogeneity of variances is 13.033 and is statistically significant 
(sig.=.000).  The variances in the seven ideological groups are not similar.  As a result, the Welch statistic 
is 27.739 and is statistically significant (sig.=.000).  There are statistically significant differences between 
the means of the seven ideological groupings.  I use the Bonferroni post hoc difference of means test for 
to test each individual mean against each other. 
d. The mean of the first group is statistically different from all other means at the .05-level. 
e. The mean of the second group is statistically different from 1 and 3 at the .05-level. 
f. The mean of the third group is statistically different from 1, 2, and 7 at the .05-level. 
g. The mean of the fourth group is statistically different from 1, 3, and 5 at the .05-level. 
h. The mean of the fifth group is statistically different from 1 and 4 at the .05-level. 
i. The mean of the sixth group is statistically different from 1 at the .05-level.  
j. The mean of the seventh group is statistically different from 1 and 3 at the .05-level. 
 
The larger means show the PAC system’s majority party bias, as the Republicans were 
in the majority from 1995-2007.  The results also indicate a general propensity of the 
PAC system to support Democrats and Republicans across the ideological spectrum.  
The lowest mean PAC donations, and statistically different from the rest at the .05-




Collectively, committee assignment, committee chairpersonship, majority-party 
status, party-leadership status, chamber and committee seniority, political party 
identification, and ideology are meant to measure the important aspects of institutional 
design in Congress, accounting for the division of labor, uneven ability to affect the 
legislative agenda, and the ideologies of those congressional members making public 
policy.  The PAC system also responds to the electoral environment in each 
congressional district, by donating more money to incumbents and those Democrats and 
Republicans in need. 
Electoral Environment 
These independent variables measuring the electoral environment facing 
candidates indicate the willingness of PACs to donate money to competitive races and 
incumbents, but also challengers more likely to win.  The list of independent variables 
measuring the electoral environment includes: district partisanship, margin of victory, 
incumbency, quality challengers, and the interaction of incumbency and quality 
challengers with political party affiliation.43 
To measure district partisanship, I use the Democratic Presidential Two-Party 
Normal Vote (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006).  To obtain this variable, I 
subtract the percentage of two-party vote received by the Democratic presidential 
candidate in the nation from the percentage of the two-party vote received by the 
Democratic presidential candidate in the congressional district.  This simple subtraction 
                                                
43 I would like to thank Gary Jacobson for supplying (1) the Democratic presidential two-party vote 
percentage in each congressional district, which is also updated after redistricting and reapportionment, 





normalizes the presidential vote, and it’s value “is comparable across districts and 
elections and independent of the results of congressional elections themselves” 
(Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 2006, 78).  I use the most current Democratic 
Presidential Two-Party Normal Vote to explain the variation in PAC dollars in a given 
congressional election.  In mid-term elections, I use the previous normal vote, and for 
presidential election years, I use the current normal vote.  For example, I use the 2000 
democratic presidential normal vote to explain PAC donations in the 2002 mid-term 
election, and I use the 2004 democratic presidential normal vote to explain PAC 
donations in the 2004 congressional elections (Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning 
2006, 78).  The values of this variable range from -1 to 1 and negative values represent 
Republican districts.  The Democratic Presidential Two-Party Normal Vote (normal 
vote) measures two aspects of PAC strategy.  First, it measures any PAC system bias to 
partisan constituencies, and second, it measures PAC system bias to marginal or safe 
districts.   
Table 2.63 groups the normal vote into seven relatively equal categories in order 
to measure PAC donations to congressional district-by-district partisanship.  The results 










Table 2.63 PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by District Partisanship, 
1990-2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
District Partisanship N-Size  Total PAC Money  Standard 
Groupingsb    (Mean) c   Deviation 
1: -1.00 - -.125 560  $150,635,764   $201,985 
     ($268,992)d 
2: -.124 - -.074 558  $146,224,847   $161,270 
     ($262,052)e 
3: -.073 - -.035 560  $171,466,709   $193,799 
     ($306,191)f 
4: -.034 -  .007 559  $189,878,977   $182,831 
     ($339,676)g 
5: .008 -  .060  560  $194,121,082   $224,109 
     ($346,645)h 
6: .061 -  .142  559  $145,360,905   $152,444 
     ($260,037)i 
7: .143 -  1.00  559  $109,440,487   $111,397 
     ($195,779)j 
Total   3,915  $1,107,128,770  $185,151 
     ($282,792) 
a. Dollar amounts rounded to nearest dollar, and include direction donations (24K) and in-kind donations 
(24Z) only. 
b. I base District Partisanship groupings by the democratic presidential normal vote, negative values 
indicate more conservative districts because the Democratic presidential candidate received a larger 
percentage of votes nationally than in the particular district. 
c. The Levene Statistic for testing the homogeneity of variances is 34.110 and is statistically significant 
(sig.=.000).  The variances in the seven ideological groups are not similar.  As a result, the Welch statistic 
is 67.902 and is statistically significant (sig.=.000).  There are statistically significant differences between 
the means of the seven ideological groupings.  I use the Bonferroni pos hoc difference of means test for to 
test each individual mean against each other. 
d. The mean of the first group is statistically different from 3, 4, 5, and 7 at the .05-level. 
e. The mean of the second group is statistically different from 3, 4, 5, and 7 at the .05-level. 
f. The mean of the third group is statistically different from all other means at the .05-level. 
g. The mean of the fourth group is statistically different from 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 at the .05-level. 
h. The mean of the fifth group is statistically different from 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 at the .05-level. 
i. The mean of the sixth group is statistically different from 3, 4, 5, and 7at the .05-level.  
j. The mean of the seventh group is statistically different from all other means at the .05-level. 
 
The mean PAC donation to the most conservative districts (groups one and two) is 
higher, and statistically significant at the .05-level, than the most liberal districts (group 
seven).  In terms of PAC donations to marginal congressional districts, the PAC system 
donates more money to the more marginal districts.  Districts in groups four and five, 
the most marginal, receive more PAC money, at statistically significant levels (p < .05), 




PACs donate at higher rates to close elections (Sabato 1984), to the extent that the 
normal vote measures close congressional elections.   
In addition to district partisanship, the current election’s margin of victory gives 
an indication of the electoral environment facing PACs and candidates.44  I construct the 
margin of victory by subtracting the second-place candidate’s vote total from that of the 
winner, and divide that difference by the total vote between the winner and second-
place candidate; specifically, this variable is the percent difference between the first- 
and second-place candidates.  While election margins could be a function of candidate 
spending, the ability of an individual PAC, or even a policy domain to affect this 
margin is negligible.  Of primary concern is the correlation between PAC donations and 
close elections. 
Table 2.64 PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Electoral Margin of 
Victory, 1990-2006 Electoral Cycles in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Electoral Victory Marginb  N-Size   PAC Spending 
       Total      Meanc 
1: 0 - .0771944   391  172,172,674  440,339d 
2: .0771945 - .1520392  392  160,096,063  408,408e 
3: .1520393 - .2158535  391  130,609,155  334,039f 
4: .218536 - .2769802   392  112,321,392  286,534g 
5: .2769803 - .3323993  392  97,790,356  249,465h 
6: .3323994 - .3876466  391  95,142,188  243,330i 
7: .3876467 - .4561869  392  90,554,070  231,005j 
8: .4561870 - .5627199  391  89,460,272  228,798k 
                                                
44 Scholars measure electoral vulnerability in several ways: electoral margin in district in previous 
election (e.g., Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1173; Snyder 1990, 1214), electoral margin in current 
election (e.g., Grier and Munger 1993, 618; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 116), both electoral margin 
in previous and current election (e.g., Endersby and Munger 1992, 88; Grenzke 1989, 251), electoral 
margin with interactive term for PAC friend or foe (e.g., Grenzke 1989, 251), percentage of vote won in 
previous election (Kroszner and Stratmann 2005), dummy variables for election margins under 25% (e.g., 
Poole and Romer 1985, 105-106; Poole, Romer, and Rosenthal 1987, 300) and under 60% of the vote 
(e.g., Shin 2004, 138).  Some electoral variables use percent of challenger spending (out of the total 
spending for entire district/state) as a measure of closeness of the election (e.g., Gutermuth 1999, 364).  
Some find that expectations of a close election increase PAC donations to the challenger (e.g., Poole and 




9: .5627200 - .8396323  392  80,979,205  206,580l 
10: .8396324 – 1   391  78,003,395  199,497m 
a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind 
donations (24Z) only 
b. I base election margin groupings by the percentage difference in votes between first and second place, 
(first place votes – second place votes)/(first place votes + second place votes). 
c. The Levene Statistic for testing the homogeneity of variances is 25.582 and is statistically significant 
(sig.=.000).  The variances of the ten electoral margin groups are not similar.  As a result, the Welch 
statistic is 78.129 and is statistically significant (sig.=.000).  There are statistically significant differences 
between the means of the ten electoral margin groupings.  I use the Bonferroni pos hoc difference of 
means test for to test each individual mean against each other. 
d. The mean of the first group is statistically different from 3 – 10 at the .05-level. 
e. The mean of the second group is statistically different from 3 – 10 at the .05-level. 
f. The mean of the third group is statistically different from all other means at the .05-level. 
g. The mean of the fourth group is statistically different from 1 – 3 and 6 – 10 at the .05-level. 
h. The mean of the fifth group is statistically different from 1 – 3, and 9 and 10 at the .05-level. 
i. The mean of the sixth group is statistically different from 1 – 4, and 10 at the .05-level.  
j. The mean of the seventh group is statistically different from 1 – 4 at the .05-level. 
k. The mean of the eighth group is statistically different from 1 – 4 at the .05-level. 
l. The mean of the ninth group is statistically different from 1 – 5 at the .05-level. 
m. The mean of the tenth group is statistically different from 1 – 6 at the .05-level. 
 
 Table 2.64 reports total PAC donations to all general elections for the House of 
Representatives by competitiveness of the election.  According to Table 2.64, the more 
competitive elections receive more PAC donations.  If the percent of votes the winner 
receives over the second-place candidate moves below fifteen percent, the average 
amount of PAC donations in that district climbs above $400,000 1989 real dollars.  The 
least competitive elections accrue under $200,000 1989 real dollars on average; 
although PAC dollars flow to districts with close general election results, PACs still 




                                                
45 There are two ways of hypothesizing about PAC donations in close elections: “security of the seat has 
two offsetting effects.  On the one hand, PACs may be more willing to develop relationships with and 
make higher contributions to more secure legislators.  On the other hand, an extra dollar of contributions 
may be less valuable to incumbents who have little worry about fending off challengers in the next 
election, so they may expend less effort in working for special interests and developing reputations.  
Conversely, legislators in less secure seats may have a higher demand for contributions and may expend 




Table 2.65 PAC Donations to General Election Winners by Political Party and 
Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Electoral Winners  Democratic  Republican 
Cycle     Winners  Winners 
Total (Mean) 
1990 88,214,278 (202,791)       60,409,630 (226,253) 27,801,707 (166,477) 
           n=267   n=167 
1992 85,179,396 (195,815)       57,542,405 (223,033) 27,628,506 (156,980) 
           n=258   n=176 
1994 81,357,633 (187,029)       49,506,089 (242,667) 31,849,054 (138,474) 
           n=204   n=230 
1996 95,350,037 (219,195)       45,963,302 (222,045) 49,355,913 (218,389) 
           n=207   n=226 
1998 99,522,701 (228,788)       49,805,037 (236,043) 49,714,157 (222,933) 
           n=211   n=223 
2000 112,987,854 (259,742)     56,863,413 (268,224) 56,124,441 (253,957) 
           n=212   n=221 
2002 113,218,937 (260,273)     53,441,263 (260,689) 59,777,674 (261,038) 
           n=205   n=229 
2004 121,421,464 (279,130)     52,961,018 (262,183) 68,457,492 (295,075) 
           n=202   n=232 
2006 130,523,531 (300,054)     63,587,644 (272,908) 66,935,882 (331,366) 
           n=233   n=202 
a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind 
donations (24Z) only. 
 
Table 2.66 PAC Donations to General Election Losers by Political Party and 
Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Electoral Cycle Democratic Loser   Republican Loser 
1990   5,429,730 (41,134)   5,311,938 (24,255) 
    n=132     n=219 
1992   11,913,028 (73,086)   6,241,729 (26,116) 
    n=163     n=239 
1994   21,497,354 (110,243)   2,430,423 (12,928) 
    n=195     n=188 
1996   11,962,568 (55,640)   8,428,193 (42,141) 
    n=215     n=200 
1998   6,633,004 (39,482)   6,922,347 (40,014) 
    n=168     n=173 
2000   10,176,753 (53,281)   5,612,684 (31,009) 
    n=191     n=181 
2002   9,950,752 (53,788)   3,298,116 (19,515) 
    n=185     n=169 
2004   7,645,904 (38,817)   3,774,002 (21,689) 
    n=197     n=174 




    n=192     n=187 
a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind 
donations (24Z) only. 
 
 Tables 2.65 and 2.66 report total PAC donations by winners (Democrat, 
Republican) and losers (Democrat, Republican).  Comparing across tables, it is clear 
that the PAC system gives more to the 3,915 winners from 1990-2006 than losers.  
Again, this spending hints at an incumbent, majority-party strategy.  Table 2.66 reports 
the amount of PAC money flowing to Democratic and Republican losers, and these 
amounts increase during electoral cycles that changed the majority party.  In 1994, the 
PAC system gave more money to Democratic losers than any other year, and in 2006, 
the PAC system gave more money to Republican losers than any other year.  It is 
conceivable that the phenomena of PACs giving to winners correlates with an 
incumbent donation strategy.  In theory, PACs achieve success with incumbent 
donation strategies along two dimensions.  First, the parent organization achieves access 
during the legislative session by reminding the incumbent of who helped to fund his/her 
campaign.  Second, PACs can claim success with their donor-base by publicizing a high 
win-to-loss ratio (Sabato 1984, 78).   
There are two methods that I use to account for the presence of incumbents, 
quality challengers, and the interactive effects of those variables with political party 
affiliation.46  First, I organize the cases according to PAC spending by incumbents (i.e., 
the dependent variable is PAC donations to incumbents), which I also organize by 
                                                
46 Other ways to measure the presence of quality challengers include: challenger expenditures when only 
examining PAC donations to incumbents since “challenger expenditures are highly correlated with 
proxies for challenger quality but more straightforward to measure” (Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 52).  
It is possible to run a fixed effects model to control for unobserved candidate phenomena (Kroszner and 
Stratmann 2005, 52).  Some measure challenger policy opinions with congressional quarterly 




Democratic and Republican incumbents.  Second, I control for incumbents in the races 
with a dichotomous variable (incumbent races equal to 1, otherwise equal to 0), which I 
also create dichotomous variables for Democratic and Republican incumbent races.  
These two ways for measuring incumbent donation strategies also apply to quality 
challengers found in the general election.  I measure the presence of quality challengers 
with a dichotomous variable, one each for Democratic and Republican quality 
challengers.  Those challengers that have held public, elected office in the past receive a 
one, and zero for otherwise.  This variable captures an element of challenger demand 
for PAC donations, usually not accounted for in quantitative studies.  Candidates often 
solicit PAC donations and challengers must engage in elaborate processes to convince 
PACs that they are worthy of money: 
PAC-hungry challengers are also urged to send ‘PAC kits,’ a kind of investment 
portfolio, to the appropriate officials.  The kits usually contain a profile of the 
candidate and district, past voting results, a sketch of candidate’s orientation, 
budget, issue, stands, endorsements, and perhaps derogatory information about 
the opponent.  While some candidates send out a ‘Dear PAC’ form letter, the 
wiser ones personalize the kit’s cover letter, perhaps including specific 
comments on each group’s legislative agenda.  The cover letters also frequently 
emulate the emotional appeals of direct mail; the candidates passionately explain 
why their election is essential to the PAC’s goals as well as to the survival of 
Western civilization…they follow up with frequent ‘newsnotes,’ telephone calls 
from the staff, and personal visits from the candidate.  Repeated solicitation is 
often the key to a PAC contribution for a challenger (Sabato 1984, 113).   
 
Table 2.67 Number of Official Incumbents, Challengers, and Quality Challengers 
for the House of Representatives by Electoral Cycle 
Electoral Total  Incumbentsa Challengers  Quality  
Cycle  Candidates      Challengers 
1990  1,056  407  649   81 
1992  1,454  367  1,086   180 
1994  1,835  388  1,447   115 
1996  2,130  386  1,744   131 
1998  1,620  402  1,218   114 
2000  2,067  412  1,655   116 




2004  1,804  406  1,398   96 
2006  1,937  423  1,514   99 
a. The number of incumbents includes eight instances of independent incumbents and Bernie Sanders of 
Vermont represents 7 of those instances.  
 
Table 2.68 Number of Official Incumbents, Challengers, and Quality Challengers 
Receiving PAC Donations for the House of Representatives by Electoral Cycle 
Electoral Incumbents  Challengers  Quality Challengers 
Cycle  Number (% of Total) Number (% of Total) Number (% of Total) 
1990  399 (98.0%)  306 (47.1%)  70 (86.4%) 
1992  361 (98.1%)  508 (46.8%)  176 (97.8%) 
1994  380 (97.9%)  610 (42.2%)  112 (97.4%) 
1996  374 (96.9%)  667 (38.2%)  128 (97.7%) 
1998  398 (99.0%)  428 (35.1%)  107 (93.9%) 
2000  409 (99.3%)  489 (29.5%)  109 (93.9%) 
2002  415 (99.3%)  501 (31.2%)  94 (91.3%) 
2004  405 (99.8%)  437 (31.3%)  84 (87.5%) 
2006  420 (99.3%)  503 (33.2%)  86 (86.9%) 
 
Tables 2.67 and 2.68 display the number of incumbents, challengers, and quality 
challengers for the House of Representatives between 1990 and 2006, and the percent of 
those candidates receiving PAC donations during those same electoral cycles.  These 
tables indicate two trends in PAC donations: (1) PACs donate to almost one hundred 
percent of incumbents campaigning for office and (2) PAC donations to challengers are 
actually directed toward quality challengers instead of the run-of-the-mill challenger.  
Table 2.69 reports the dollar amounts PACs donate to incumbents, challengers, and 
quality challengers, who are a subset of the challenger total.  Not surprisingly, PACs 
donate more money to incumbents, and most PAC donations to challengers are to 
quality challengers, which could capture candidate demand and the professionalization 








Table 2.69 PAC Donations to Official Incumbents, Challengers and Quality 
Challengers by Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Electoral Incumbentsb     Challengersc     Quality Challengersd 
Cycle  Total (Mean)     Total (Mean)    Total (Mean) 
1990  85,232,355 (213,615)    15,177,253 (49,599)    8,306,238 (118,661) 
1992  83,918,442 (232,461)    24,446,465 (48,123)    15,313,810 (87,010) 
1994  86,176,209 (226,780)    22,245,307 (36,468)    11,573,732 (103,337) 
1996  89,869,211 (240,292)    28,924,692 (43,365)    14,903,927 (116,437) 
1998  94,418,819 (237,233)    20,543,567 (47,999)    11,645,523 (108,837) 
2000  107,373,024 (262,526)   25,000,334 (51,125)   15,398,276 (141,269) 
2002  108,850,235 (262,290)   23,587,034 (47,080)   12,408,566 (132,006) 
2004  118,246,199 (291,966)   17,168,153 (39,286)    9,592,421 (114,195) 
2006  135,807,165 (323,350)   20,399,808 (40,556)   11,174,869 (129,940) 
a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind 
donations (24Z) only. 
b. Amounts include PAC spending on incumbents that were official candidates during the electoral cycle, 
but were not official candidates for the general election (e.g., lost primary, died, appointed to 
bureaucracy), which includes PAC money to incumbents in open seats.  Negative values and zeros are not 
included in totals.  Means determined from the sample size of those receiving PAC donations, not the 
universal set. 
 
Table 2.70 Number of Official Incumbents, Challengers, and Quality Challengers 
for the House of Representatives by Political Party and Electoral Cyclea 
Electoral Incumbents  Challengers  Quality Challengers 
Cycle  D R  D R  D R 
1990  248 159  203 269  34 47 
1992  226 140  309 327  89 91 
1994  229 158  517 653  55 60 
1996  169 216  605 585  79 52 
1998  189 212  385 416  63 51 
2000  205 205  450 516  58 58 
2002  204 213  524 694  49 54 
2004  193 212  478 519  48 48 











Table 2.71 Number of Official Incumbents, Challengers, and Quality Challengers 
Receiving PAC Donations for the House of Representatives by Political Party and 
Electoral Cyclea 
Electoral   Incumbents      Challengers   Quality Challengers 
Cycle D  R  D  R  D  R 
Number (% of Total) 
1990 243 (97.9) 156 (98.1) 152 (74.8) 153 (56.8) 31 (91.2) 39 (83.0) 
1992 225 (99.1) 135 (96.4) 223 (72.1) 279 (85.3) 87 (97.8) 89 (97.8) 
1994 223 (97.3) 156 (98.7) 267 (51.6) 336 (51.4) 53 (96.4) 59 (98.3) 
1996 167 (98.8) 206 (95.3) 348 (57.5) 311 (53.1) 78 (98.7) 50 (96.2) 
1998 189 (100) 208 (98.1) 202 (52.4) 212 (50.9) 62 (98.4) 45 (88.2) 
2000 204 (99.5) 203 (99.0) 237 (52.6) 229 (44.3) 55 (94.8) 54 (93.1) 
2002 203 (99.5) 211 (99.0) 251 (47.9) 238 (34.2) 47 (95.9) 47 (87.0) 
2004 193 (99.4) 211 (99.5) 215 (44.9) 216 (41.6) 42 (87.5) 42 (87.5) 
2006 195 (99.4) 225 (99.1) 325 (49.3) 170 (35.6) 52 (96.3) 34 (75.6) 
 
 
Table 2.72 PAC Donations to Incumbents by Party and Electoral Cycle In 1989 
Real Dollarsa 
Electoral Cycle Democratic Incumbentsb  Republican Incumbentsb 
   Total (Mean)    Total (Mean) 
1990   57,269,506 (235,677)   27,962,849 (179,249) 
1992   57,014,675 (253,399)   26,769,367 (198,292) 
1994   60,393,085 (270,821)   25,652,876 (164,442) 
1996   39,487,422 (236,452)   50,208,478 (243,730) 
1998   45,888,599 (242,797)   48,425,538 (232,815) 
2000   54,699,675 (268,136)   52,396,349 (258,110) 
2002   53,342,483 (262,771)   55,445,861(262,777) 
2004   52,698,244 (273,048)   65,466,353 (310,267) 
2006   56,843,351 (293,007)   78,963,814 (350,950) 
a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind 
donations (24Z) only. 
b. Amounts include PAC spending on incumbents that were official candidates during the electoral cycle, 
but were not official candidates for the general election (e.g., lost primary, died, appointed to 
bureaucracy). Net negative sums of money are treated as zero, no instance of receiving PAC money; thus, 













Table 2.73 PAC Donations to Democratic and Republican Challengers by 
Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Electoral Cycle Democratic Challengersb  Republican Challengersc 
   Total (Mean)    Total (Mean) 
1990   9,304,857 (61,216)   5,802,901 (37,927) 
1992   15,816,879 (70,928)   8,438,527 (30,246) 
1994   12,588,279 (47,147)   9,553,807 (28,434) 
1996   19,785,067 (56,854)   8,789,703 (28,263) 
1998   11,521,545 (57,037)   8,935,139 (42,147) 
2000   13,615,200 (57,448)   10,930,557 (47,732) 
2002   13,266,615 (52,855)   10,303,395 (43,292) 
2004   9,011,016 (41,912)   8,125,600 (37,619) 
2006   14,227,161 (43,776)   5,932,587 (34,898) 
a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind 
donations (24Z) only. 
 
Table 2.74 PAC Donations to Democratic and Republican Quality Challengers by 
Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
 
Electoral Democratic Quality Challengersb Republican Quality Challengersc 
Cycle   Total (Mean)    Total (Mean) 
1990   4,496,670 (145,054)   3,809,569 (97,681) 
1992   10,132,473 (116,465)   5,181,337 (58,217) 
1994   6,764,636 (127,635)   4,809,096 (81,510) 
1996   10,321,303 (132,324)   4,582,625 (91,653) 
1998   6,941,450 (111,959)   4,704,073 (104,535) 
2000   8,060,009 (146,546)   7,338,268 (135,894) 
2002   6,714,563 (142,863)   5,694,002 (121,149) 
2004   5,062,007 (120,524)   4,530,415 (107,867) 
2006   7,007,763 (134,765)   4,167,106 (122,562) 
a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind 
donations (24Z) only. 
 
Tables 2.75 and 2.76 best exemplify the PAC system’s incumbent and majority party 
bias.  In elections that changed the majority party, 1994 and 2006, it was “déjà vu all 




in 1994, the highest by far in this 16-year period, and in 2006, PACs donated to all 22 
Republican incumbent losers, also the highest in this time period.47   
Table 2.75 Total Number of General Election Incumbent Losers by Political Party 
and Election Cycle 
Electoral  Democratic    Republican 
Cycle   Total     Total 
   (#Receiving PAC Money)  (#Receiving PAC Money) 
1990   6 (6)     9 (9) 
1992   13 (13)     6 (6) 
1994   34 (34)     0 (0) 
1996   3 (3)     18 (17) 
1998   1 (1)     5 (5) 
2000   2 (2)     4 (4) 
2002   2 (2)     2 (2) 
2004   3 (3)     2 (2) 
2006   0 (0)     22 (22) 
 
Table 2.76 PAC Donations to General Election Incumbent Losers by Political 
Party and Election Cycle in 1989 Real Dollarsa 
Electoral Cycle Dem. Incumbent Losers  Rep. Incumbent Losers 
   (PAC Money to Winners)  (PAC Money to Winners) 
1990   $1,772,640    $2,400,077 
   ($323,539)    ($1,486,401) 
1992   $4,274,595    $1,611,546 
   ($825,332)    ($596,437) 
1994   $12,967,453    0 
   ($2,292,344)    (0) 
1996   $994,943    $4,534,444 
   ($247,435)    ($3,606,272) 
1998   $368,214    $2,064,159 
   ($212,038)    ($965,521) 
2000   $693,052    $1,853,519 
   ($147,372)    ($1,292,599) 
2002   $1,262,387    $1,006,958 
   ($367,106)    ($264,019) 
2004   $1,349,759    $1,291,374 
   ($348,143)    ($399,550) 
2006   0     $11,488,887 
   (0)     (3,281,050) 
                                                





a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind 
donations (24Z) only. Incumbents receiving money means that they receive a net positive value of 1989 
real dollars from the entire PAC system.  These numbers do not reflect the 11 races with two incumbents 
in the same general election. 
b. For 1990, PAC money to Bernie Sanders (I) VT is considered PAC money to Democratic winner over 
a Republican incumbent. 
 
Table 2.77 examines PAC donations to incumbents and open seats by district, not per 
candidate, reaching similar conclusions; however, unexpectedly, PACs donate more 
money to open seats on average than to districts with incumbents in the general 
election.   
Table 2.77 PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Select Incumbent 
Variables and Electoral Cycle in 1989 Real Dollarsa  
Electoral Incumbent  Two Incumbent Incumbent w/   Open 
Cycle  Races  Races   No Challenger  Seats 
1990  91,594,018 ----   13,776,146  8,811,100  
  (226,158)    (164,002)  (293,703) 
  n=405     n=84   n=30 
1992  86,137,207 2,946,736  5,045,274  19,270,670 
  (254,092) (589,347)  (194,049)  (211,766) 
  n=339  n=5   n=26   n=91 
1994  94,467,517 ----   8,816,465  13,940,291 
  (246,651)    (169,547)  (268,083) 
  n=383     n=52   n=52 
1996  104448875 ----   3,636,644  14,330,296 
  (273426)    (191,402)  (270,383) 
  n=382     n=19   n=53 
1998  103,864,685 ----   17,209,530  11,092,186 
  (259,014)    (183,080)  (326,241) 
  n=401     n=94   n=34 
2000  117,017,439 ----   11,772,513  15,350,646 
  (292,544)    (192,992)  (438,590) 
  n=400     n=61   n=35 
2002  109,201,594 4,418,649  18,862,440  18,812,952 
  (285,868) (1,104,662)  (232,870)  (383,938) 
  n=382  n=4   n=81   n=49 
2004  121,960,107 2,561,836  16,643,940  10,889,474 
  (306,432) (1,280,918)  (260,062)  (311,128) 
  n=398  n=2   n=64   n=35 
2006  142,280,366 ----   15,622,163  13,732,129 
  (353,931)    (269,348)  (416,125) 
  n=402     n=58   n=33 




  n=3492 n=11      n=412 
a. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar and include direct donations (24K) and in-kind 
donations (24Z) only. 
b. For total PAC spending from 1990 through 2006, using the Bonferroni post hoc method, the difference 
in means between incumbent, two-incumbent, and open seat districts is all statistically significant at the 
.05 level.  The Levene statistics is 13.346 (.000) and the Welch statistic is 17.643 (.000) 
 
These electoral independent variables help measure the partisan competitiveness 
of a district and election, along with the type of attachments PACs form with candidates 
(e.g., incumbents, quality challengers, Democrats, Republicans).  The third group of 
independent variables measures the characteristics of the constituency facing each 
candidate.   
Constituency Environment 
 In addition to district partisanship, defined as an electoral variable, I measure 
constituency characteristics with industry employment data within each congressional 
district, provided by the United States Census Bureau in the 1980, 1990, and 2000 
census, which the bureau updates for changes in congressional district boundaries 
caused by redistricting and reapportionment.48  The Census Bureau obtains industry 
employment data within congressional districts from its long-questionnaire, which is a 
one-in-six sample of the United States population with the figures weighted to 
determine the industry employment statistics in each congressional district.  These 
numbers are then adjusted for new district boundaries created after redistricting and 
                                                
48 I use industry employment by congressional districts located in these specific census datasets: 1980 
Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3D (congressional district lines used for the 98th 
Congress); 1980 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3H (congressional district lines 
used for the 99th Congress); 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3D 
(congressional district lines used for the 103rd Congress, and updated for the 104th and 105th Congress 
district lines); 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3D (congressional district 
lines used for the 106th Congress, and updated for the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congress district lines).  I 
obtained this data from the United States Census Bureau website, http://www.census.gov, and the Inter-




reapportionment.  Table 2.78 displays which census data, with corresponding district 
boundaries, I used for each election cycle.  Overall, I used the most recent census 
figures possible, with the appropriate redistricting and reapportionment adjustments.  
The industry employment numbers only changed as a result of a new census or 
redistricting and reapportionment, and for those latter cases, industry employment 
numbers only changed for those districts, not the entire 435 districts in the House of 
Representatives. 
Table 2.78 Election Year with Corresponding Census Data 
Election Year (Ensuing Congressional Session) Census Data by District Lines 
1990 (102nd)    1980: 98th with 99th Redistrictinga 
1992 (103rd)    1990: 103rd District Lines 
1994 (104th)    1990: 103rd with 104th Redistrictingb 
1996 (105th)    1990: 103rd with 105th Redistrictingc 
1998 (106th)    2000: 106th District Lines 
2000 (107th)    2000: 106th District Lines 
2002 (108th)    2000: 108th District Lines 
2004 (109th)    2000: 108th with 109th Redistrictingd 
2006 (110th)    2000: 108th with 110th Redistrictinge 
a.  California (all districts), Hawaii (all districts), Louisiana (districts 1, 2, 3), Maine (all districts), 
Mississippi (all districts), Montana (all districts), New Jersey (all districts), New York (districts 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 34), Texas (all districts), and Washington (all districts) 
redrew congressional district lines for the 1984 election leading to the 99th Congress 
b. Maine (all districts) and Minnesota (all districts) redrew congressional district lines for the 1994 
election 
c. Florida (districts 2-6), Georgia (all districts), Kentucky (districts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6), Louisiana (all districts), 
and Texas (districts 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 18, 22, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30) redrew congressional district lines for the 
1996 elections 
d. Maine (all districts), and Pennsylvania (all districts), Texas (all districts) redrew congressional district 
lines for the 2004 election 
e. Georgia (all districts) and Texas (districts 15, 21, 23, 25, 28) redrew congressional district lines for the 
2006 election 
 
 The United States Census Bureau reports a variety of industry activity within 
congressional district boundaries.49  The census collects this data from household 
                                                
49 There are other measurements for constituency characteristics, some are specific to the nature of the 
study: districts’ rural area (Stratmann 1992, 655), percent labor union membership in district (Endersby 





responses and matches these self-responses to the SIC for the 1980 and 1990 census and 
the SIC replacement NAICS for the 2000 census.  The census instructs the respondents 
to report the job/industry in which they are employed for the week that they respond to 
the survey.  If the respondent works more than one job, then the respondent is instructed 
to report the industry in which he/she works the longest amount of hours.  The 
unemployed report their most recent working experience.  The census codes these 
responses for their industry codes using computer software, and for those responses not 
coded electronically, census staffers code the responses manually using the American 
Business Index (ABI), which links the business name with the SIC/NAICS.  Table 2.79 
reports the 15-industry employment categories used in the 2000 census.  Throughout 
this study I will use the 2000 census categorization to describe constituency 
characteristics; however, it is important to note that the comparability between 1980, 
1990, and 2000 census is limited. 
Table 2.79 Census Bureau Employment by Industry Categories 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 
Mining 
Construction 
Manufacturing (Durable and Non-Durable Goods) 
Transportation and Warehousing 
Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Rental and Leasing 
Information and Utilities 
Health Care and Social Assistance 
Educational Services 
Professional, Scientific, Management, Administrative, and Waste Mgmt 
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodation, and Food Services 
                                                                                                                                          
in district using the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 
1170; Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 52-53), constituency opinion (Shin 2004, 138).  The effect of 
constituency characteristics may not be linear because those with the most favorable constituency 




Other Services (Business Repair and Personal Services) 
Public Administration 
Source: U.S. Census on Housing and Population, Summary Tape File 3D 2000 
 
There are three reasons for guarding against comparing categories from 1980 
through 2000.  First, from 1980 to 2000 the census has altered the individual categories 
that aggregate into these larger classifications in Table 2.79.  The alterations result from 
the disappearance of some individual categories and the development of others; in other 
words, as a result of changes in American economic production.  Second, the census 
shifts the classification of individual categories that changes how each of these 
industries are aggregated.  Third, the change from the SIC to the NAICS involved the 
alteration of specific industry categories that changes how industries are aggregated 
from the individual categories.  The comparability of 1980, 1990, and 2000 industry 
employment numbers is not a focus of this study; instead, I use these categories to 
explain the distribution of PAC campaign contributions for the appropriate electoral 
cycle (e.g., I am not using the 2000 census industry employment numbers to explain the 
1990 election).  Important for this study is the linking of constituency characteristics, as 
defined by this census data, with the appropriate PAC industry.  This linkage must 
occur for each election cycle, so comparability across time is not as imperative as 
comparability across PAC/constituent industry.  Appendix D reports how these industry 
categories change in the census from 1980 to 2000, and reports the individual categories 
that aggregate to the larger industry categories reported in Table 2.79. 
 The most important problem I had to overcome was how the census reports its 
industry employment data.  There are slight differences in how the census reports 




numbers and the ensuing congressional sessions.  For the industry employment data for 
the 98th, 99th, and 103rd congressional sessions, which I use as an independent variable 
for the 1990 electoral cycle, the census reports employment in mining with employment 
in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.  In addition, this industry employment data reports 
personal services with arts and entertainment, while in the latter reports, personal 
services are grouped with business and repair services.  For the 103rd congressional 
session (the 1992 electoral cycle), I re-categorized the industry employment data to 
match those categories for the 105th congressional district lines.  I was able to conduct 
this calculation by keeping the ratio of mining to agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (and 
arts and entertainment to personal, business, and repair services) the same as was 
reported for the 105th Congress.  The 105th Congress industry employment data has the 
same source as the 103rd Congress data (the 1990 census), the only adjustments that 
must occur are with those districts whose state legislatures redrew their boundaries, 
because for those districts not redrawn, I can use the 105th data and categorization for 
the 103rd Congress.   
For example, in Florida’s second congressional district, the 105th Congress 
census industry employment data reports 10,356 workers in agriculture, forestry, and 
fishing and 591 workers in mining.  For the 103rd and 104th congressional district lines, 
which I must use since Florida redrew the second congressional district boundaries for 
the 105th Congress and the industry employment numbers changed (i.e., employment 
numbers are different for the 103rd/104th Congress and the 105th Congress); however, 
for the 103rd Congress and 104th Congress, the census only reports agriculture, forestry, 




amount of mining workers out of 10,740, I use the same ratio as reported in the 105th 
Congress and then multiply that ratio by the 103rd and 104th Congress industry 
employment totals: 591/(10,356 + 591) * 10,740 = 580.  As a result, I determine that the 
drop in industry workers from the 105th Congress (10,947) to the 103rd and 104th 
Congress (10,740) resulted in a drop in mining employment from 591 to 590 workers.  
The only assumption I make is that the ratio of mining workers to agriculture, forestry, 
and fisheries workers stays constant from 1992 to 1996.  I made the same calculations 
to determine the changes in arts and entertainment employment and business, repair, 
and personal services employment during this time period.  The purpose was only to 
match the 103rd Congress categories with those of the 105th Congress categories, which 
derived from the same 1990 census data.  I only had to perform these calculations on 
those redistricted districts from 1992 to 1996. 
Conclusion: The PAC System, 1990-2006 
 The PAC system, regardless of whether it is thought of as local re-election 
constituencies or as extensions of policy and lobbying domains, has not changed all that 
much from when it first began in the early 1970s.  Donations from the PAC system are 
biased towards the Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means committee, and shy 
away from lesser important committees in the House of Representatives.  The PAC 
system also donates more money to incumbents, leadership, the two-party system, 
freshmen running for reelection, and very senior members of the chamber.  These 
legislative variables are vital to understanding the nature of PAC strategy.  Electorally, 
the PAC system favors districts with incumbents, close races, but also favoring winners 




of the PAC Decade were not.  First, this strategy of donating to winners does not 
necessarily mean that PACs can predict the future, as they took it on the chin in 1994 
and 2006.  Second, while PACs give more money to incumbents, what they do give to 
challengers, they give to quality challengers.  The one major change in PAC behavior 
from the PAC Decade is that PACs donate a lot of money to open seat elections.   
In sum, there appears to be plenty of PAC money to go around, but analyzing 
total PAC-system donations masks much of what is interesting about PAC strategy.  
Even though PAC donation decisions can succumb to idiosyncratic processes, there are 
consistent patterns, and an underlying rationality, to PAC strategy.  The two approaches 
to PAC strategy (organizational presence, public choice) simply disagree about which 
underlying logic and rationality best explains all PAC donation decisions.  It is common 
knowledge that PACs use multiple metrics to determine the distribution of resources, as 
indicated by the findings in this chapter, and what we need is a model to explain and 
predict all elements of PAC strategy.  Much research tries to parse specific hypotheses 
about specific donation strategies, finding different PACs act differently, finding 
support for all of them.  A small group of scholars approached PAC behavior to build 
theory, designing comprehensive models meant to address the core elements of PAC-
decision-making applying to all PACs. 
 At stake in understanding PAC strategy is our ability to comprehend the current 
state of American political representation.  The central guiding this research is: why do 
PACs establish relationships with some candidates and not others?  There are two sub-




donors influence PAC strategy, and how do legislative characteristics influence PAC 
strategy?  The first is a demand-side question and the second a supply-side question.   
 Chapter Three investigates and re-tests the demand-side hypothesis that PACs 
use electoral and ideological cues to satisfy donors and Chapter Four investigates and 
re-tests the supply-side hypothesis that PACs use legislative cues to discern which 
congressional member is worthy of PAC money.  The results in both chapters indicate 
that neither approach explains the variation in PAC contributions across congressional 
elections very well.  Chapter Five posits a new approach to PAC-strategy modeling that 
accounts for both the geographic distribution of individual donors to PACs and rent-



















THE DEMAND-SIDE APPROACH 
 
Introduction 
Organized interests demand legislation and politicians supply legislation.  In this 
market for legislation, organized interests act strategically to attain favorable policy.  
There are two sets of variables explaining variation in this strategy: demand- and 
supply-side.  Scholars using the demand-side approach argue organizational-level 
variables best explain the variation in organized-interest strategy.  Scholars using the 
supply-side approach argue politician characteristics and legislature-level variables best 
explain organized-interest strategy.  This chapter tests and evaluates the demand-side 
approach, and the next chapter tests and evaluates the supply-side approach to 
explaining organized interest strategy.   
In an attempt to understand why PACs form relationships with some candidates 
and not others, each chapter asks a sub-question unique to its own approach.  To assess 
the accuracy of the demand-side approach, I ask, how does the geographic dispersion of 
individual PAC donors affect PAC strategy?  To assess the accuracy of the supply-side 
approach, I ask, how do candidate-level characteristics affect PAC strategy?  Asking 
and answering the demand-side question implies that PAC strategy may cater more 
toward organizational maintenance goals rather than legislative goals for its parent 
organization.  The need to keep PAC donors happy, which in turn gives PAC donors 




curbing the amount of pure legislative-oriented contributions (Eismeier and Pollock 
1985, 211; 1986, 290; Wright 1985, 1989).50   
The use of organizational variables to explain PAC strategy questions the single-
minded, legislative-seeking PAC that nationalizes and centralizes congressional 
elections: 
PACs, are not, as it turns out influence-maximizing actors guided by 
questionable ethics and armed with limitless dollars and perfect information.  
They are political organizations whose behavior turns on a variety of decision 
rules and whose spending strategies are shaped by the internal structures they 
have and the financial resources they control (Eismeier and Pollock 1984, 124-
125).51 
 
The size of the legislative-intent contributions are small and the “typical PAC is a 
modest operation and, we suspect, a locally oriented one” (Eismeier and Pollock 1984, 
138).  A careful examination of PAC organizational variables dispels those thinking 
PACs have perfect information, unlimited resources, and are unresponsive to its 
members. 
Scholars working within the demand-side approach find that the PAC 
organizational structure, along with budget size, play an important role in determining 
which candidates receive PAC contributions (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and 
Bartels 2005; Eismeier and Pollock 1984; Gopoian 1984; Sabato 1984; Wilcox 1989; 
                                                
50 Eismeier and Pollock (1985, 194) refer to organizational-maintenance goals as internal and legislative 
goals as external.  For external goals there is a difference between content (e.g., material versus purposive 
goals) and scope (e.g., narrow versus broad). 
51 Wilcox (1989, 165-171) finds that organizational variables explain much of the PAC variation in 
contribution strategy in any given election cycle; however, changes in organizational variables across 
election cycles do not explain changes in contribution strategy (switching between Republican and 
Democratic incumbents and challengers) as well as electoral expectations (presidential approval, 
economic conditions).  Wilcox (1989, 158-159) first reports the proportion of PAC contributions to 
incumbents, political parties, and margin of victory, and then uses multivariate regression analysis for a 
more conservative statistical test, using independent variables of a Washington, D.C. office, PAC age, 




Wright 1985, 1989).  The most robust theoretical treatment of the demand-side 
approach to PAC strategy is the organizational presence model, which explains the link 
between PAC organizational variables and PAC strategy with this contradiction: 
organizational characteristics that allow the PAC to solicit individual donations and 
maintain fundraising are the same characteristics that inhibit a legislative PAC strategy 
(Wright 1985, 400).  Local PAC officials, typically working in field offices, must make 
decisions with the goal of future fundraising in mind, and those local PAC donors wish 
for the PAC to donate more money to local, electorally vulnerable, ideologically 
friendly politicians, which can undermine a pure legislative strategy preferred by 
national, lobbying-oriented PAC officials.  PAC contribution decisions are not isolated 
from the wishes and expectations of PAC donors because PACs concern themselves 
with organizational maintenance, making a “surprising amount of PAC activity…meant 
for internal consumption and organizational survival” (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 
194).  The importance of these organizational variables lies in its relation to PAC 
strategy, since “despite their relative autonomy, PAC staffs are constrained in their 
strategic choices by organizational goals, contributor expectations, and in some cases by 
the committee’s decision-making structure” (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 197). 
This chapter is the first macro-level test of the organizational presence model’s 
expectations.  Using the geographic dispersion of PAC donors as the primary variable 
of interest, I test the organizational presence model’s expectations using PAC 
contribution data during the 1990-2006 electoral cycles of the House of 
Representatives.  While the organizational presence model’s explanatory power is low, 




helps to standardize a way of measuring “organizational presence” in future macro-level 
studies. 
Demand-Side and PAC Strategy: The Organizational Presence Model 
 Where you stand depends on where you sit is a common phrase meaning the 
opinions and decisions a person forms and makes will always be in relation to their own 
position, material or otherwise.  All organizational analyses recognize the tension 
within a PAC between the committee that makes contribution decisions and the 
individual donors supplying the money to PAC decision-makers use to fund candidate 
campaigns.  The PAC decision-making committee and the individual donors sit in 
different places and take different stands on who should receive the contributions.  
While the size of a PAC’s budget, certainly an organizational variable, places 
mathematical constraints on PAC strategy, it is the internal dynamic between PAC 
decision makers and PAC donors that provides the tension between organizational 
maintenance and legislative goals.  The organizational presence model emphasizes this 
tension in explaining PAC strategy.  
Studies of the internal workings of PAC communication show that PAC officials 
communicate with members formally, with newsletters, annual reports, and meetings to 
inform donors about candidates who received contributions, and the win/loss record of 
the PAC.  This communication is conducted with a keen eye toward organizational 
maintenance and solidifying future donations (Sabato 1984, 67; Sorauf 1984, 602-603).  
Donor voice within the PAC is rarely formalized, but the goal of future fundraising 
influences the PAC decision makers: 
Most PACs do, however, actively solicit recommendations from their donors 




committees, by their own accounts, heed those suggestions…in short, observers 
and PAC people agree that very few PACs will support a candidate if local 
contributors do not, and many feel compelled to offer at least token financial 
support, regardless of the better judgment of its leadership, to a candidate with 
important local backing…beyond these reports from the PACs, there is a good 
deal of indirect evidence pointing to a substantial donor voice.  The 
decentralization and dispersion of PAC contributions suggest a sensitivity to the 
local wishes and initiatives of the many constituencies of most PACs (Sorauf 
1984, 602-603).52 
 
 Regarding the relationship between PAC decision makers and PAC donors, 
there is evidence that donors do not have a high level of input, and individual PAC 
donors give money precisely because they do not want to directly engage the political 
process; however, PAC decision-makers may feel obligated to make strategic decisions 
to please donors, and Eismeier and Pollock’s (1985, 196) survey finds this portrayal to 
be accurate, as PAC decision-makers report that giving to a winning candidate is one of 
the best ways to show donors that their money has influence.  Electability ranks high, 
along with legislative success, candidate financial need, and contributing to a candidate 
within the same geographic region (e.g., state) (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 198; 1986, 
297).53  Of all PAC decision-makers studied, nearly half thought the geographic 
congruence between donors and candidates was important to PAC strategy (Eismeier 
                                                
52 Sorauf (1984, 603) does not expect the geographic distribution of donors to influence the decisions of 
non-connected (e.g., ideological) PACs: 
As for the PACs without parent organizations, a concept of ‘voice’ whether formal or informal, 
hardly applies.  Donors to most of them are scattered across the country.  They have no contact 
either with each other or with the leadership or staff of the PAC.  They are bound together, not 
by a common profession, occupation, or workplace, but by computer-based mailing lists…in the 
independent PACs, therefore, donors rarely can affect, even indirectly, the allocative or strategic 
decisions of the PAC. 
53 Eismeier and Pollock (1985, 202) find that trade association PACs are the most likely to use a pure 
legislative strategy and “in most of these committees, donor participation and influence are negligible.”  
A possible reason is that trade association PACs have geographically diverse donor bases.  Despite this 
finding, “PACs with more modest budgets may put the long-term organizational health and power 
engendered by donor participation ahead of whatever short-term benefits might be achieved by leaving 




and Pollock 1985, 198).  The ability for PAC officials to sell the importance of their 
efforts to donors and potential donors is important for organizational maintenance and 
product differentiation (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 199).54  The influence of donors 
and those located in the Washington, D.C. office or PAC officials in general is always 
in flux, “yet as with the large trade PACs, local affiliates of labor PACs often take the 
view that because they raised the money, it ought to be spent in their states.  As a result, 
Washington staffers walk a line between internal harmony and external effectiveness” 
(Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 206).  These findings indicate that whether or not a PAC 
has a Washington, D.C. office, there will be a tension between PAC decision makers 
and PAC donors, which for those PAC decision makers, is a tension between internal 
and external goals.  The influence of PAC donors can hamper legislative strategies. 
The organizational presence model represents the most coherent explanation of 
how the organization of PACs influences PAC contribution strategies.  The essence of 
the organizational presence model is to show how the “factors that allow some PACs to 
become very rich are the very same factors that undercut their potential influence,” 
which means the necessities of raising money take precedence over the necessities of 
demanding legislation (Wright 1985, 400).55  The reason for this conundrum is that 
                                                
54 Inter-organizational relations are an important variable in PAC contribution strategy.  Those PACs with 
parents may not have to compete for donors, but they do compete against each other for influence in 
Congress.  Also, there is a PAC network, with a few bellwether PACs that share information with other 
PACs about to whom to donate, “as with other political organizations, we would expect that patterns of 
competition and cooperation among PACs will depend on the relative complementarity (sic) of their 
policy objectives and relative independence of their organizational bases” (Eismeier and Pollock 1985, 
199). 
55 The five national PACs Wright (1985, 401-402) examines are the American Medical PAC, Dealers 
Election Action Committee, American Bankers Association, Realtors PAC, and the associated General 
Contractors PAC, for the 1978 and 1980 election cycles.  To measure organizational presence, Wright 




local inputs influence PAC decision-making and these local inputs prefer an electoral 
and ideological contribution strategy, discounting the legislative strategy preferred by 
national inputs.  Local PAC inputs are those individuals working in local field offices, 
whose duty is to raise money for enlarging PAC budgets.  Traditionally, scholars 
capture this tension between the local and the national with proxy variables, isolating 
the effect of PAC geography (e.g., Washington, D.C. headquarters, location of PAC 
interests, geographic dispersion of PAC donors).  A tension can occur between those 
that work in the field offices and those PAC-affiliated lobbyists or staffers working in 
Washington, D.C., but the local input is well respected and these individuals control 
much of the contribution decisions (Sorauf 1984, 595; Wright 1985, 403-404).   
The Washington, D.C. office does not dictate all contribution decisions, rather it 
creates a tension between the national and local PAC officials (lobbying concerns 
versus local knowledge) and “this conflict – rather than purely rational calculation – 
appears to affect, and occasionally even determine, a PACs choice of candidate 
recipients” (Sabato 1984, 44).  This conflict between the national and the local is not 
unique to the D.C. office, as corporate and union PACs conflict between the national 
PAC staff and local corporate plants and union chapters (Sabato 1984, 80).  This tension 
between local and national inputs should be most distinctive when a PAC locates its 
headquarters in Washington, D.C.  If a PAC has its headquarter location in Washington, 
D.C., then the PAC is expected to communicate with lobbyists more frequently than 
those PACs without an office in Washington, D.C., which in turn, should lead to 
different PAC contribution strategies.  Scholars expect those PACs without a D.C. 




while those PACs with a Washington, D.C. headquarter location will communicate with 
lobbyists and are more likely to contribute at higher rates to incumbents, be less partisan 
in contribution patterns (Eismeier and Pollock 1984, 125, 137; Sabato 1984, 44; Sorauf 
1984, 595; Wilcox 1989, 162-165), and contribute less money to lost causes (Wilcox 
1989, 164-165).  This influence is implicit because PAC decision makers realize that 
donors will become disgruntled with decisions and stop giving money in the next 
election cycle (Sabato 1984, 31, 594-595).   
PAC staffs listen to local inputs because of the internal, organizational 
maintenance goals of PACs.  Listening to local donors and local PAC officials is vital to 
continuing the funding stream in future elections, and this organizational need results in 
an electoral and local strategy because local PAC donors are political amateurs and 
either do not know or are not interested in the legislative effectiveness of donations, or 
local PAC activists know more about electoral and ideological characteristics of 
politicians (Wright 1985, 405).  In sum, “campaign contributions will be used to elect 
ideologically sympathetic candidates in close races rather than alter the policy positions 
of not-so-sympathetic candidates in safe races” (Wright 1985, 406).  The organizational 
presence model is a culmination of two deductive and empirically validated studies 
(Wright 1985, 1989).   
According to Wright (1985), if local activists have influence on PAC decisions, 
then PACs should give to where they have donors, to the ideologically friendly 
politician, in a close election.  If lobbyists or PAC officials in Washington, D.C. have 
most of the influence, then institutional/policy variables should explain most of the 




on committees of jurisdiction and leadership positions (Wright 1985, 406).56  When 
determining the influence of local inputs in PAC contribution strategies, two 
characteristics are important: the size of the contribution and where/why the 
contribution occurs.  As electoral need increases and candidate ideology becomes closer 
to that of the PAC, the amount of the PAC contribution increases, implying the 
influence of local PAC officials in contribution decisions (Wright 1985, 407-408).  
Another approach to this same issue is to understand whether or not PACs acquire 
access for their parent organization after the election when (and if) PACs contribute to 
districts where they have little or no organizational presence. 
The goal is to understand if PACs pursue a strategy that allows them to attain 
access they normally would not have if politicians make decisions on the basis of 
geographic constituency concerns exclusively.57  PAC officials have choices between 
following an expanding or maintaining strategy with respect to its lobbyists’ concerns.  
An expanding strategy occurs when “organizations make ‘outside’ contributions – 
contributions selectively targeted to representatives from districts where they have little 
or no organizational base – and then follow these contributions with organized lobbying 
efforts” (Wright 1989, 715).  The other PAC strategy is a maintaining strategy, which 
occurs when PACs contribute money to politicians who represent a geographic area 
                                                
56 To test these hypotheses, Wright (1985, 406) uses an interaction term of ideology and electoral 
competition, with close elections being a dichotomous variable for those candidates who received less 
than 60% of the two-party vote in the previous election. 
57 Wright (1989, 715) uses PAC contributions from 30 organizations during the 1984 election cycle for 
the House of Representatives and interviews from lobbyists as his data to make his theoretical claims.  
Interviews are common to measure decision-making within a PAC, as some scholars used “structured, 
questionnaire-based interviews with officials of 58 political action committees headquartered in 
Washington…we supplemented these data with open-ended interviews with 12 additional committees” 




where the PAC has “moderate or strong organizational base,” and the PAC’s parent 
organization follows these contributions with direct lobbying techniques, with the 
purpose of maintaining visibility within their home state or congressional district 
(Wright 1989, 716).  Wright’s (1989) findings indicate that an expansionary strategy is 
used rarely and most of the variation in PAC contributions can be explained with a 
maintenance strategy: 
Of the 333 total contributions made by all groups in the sample…only 113, or 
34%, were outside contributions.  Even if lobbying followed all 113 
contributions – which seems unlikely – contributions are still far more often 
used to maintain influence than to expand it…in the vast majority of instances, a 
group’s contributions only supplemented, or reinforced, whatever pressures the 
group was able to exert through its organizational presence in the 
representative’s district (Wright 1989, 723-724). 
 
The organizational presence model makes one central prediction about PAC strategy: 
PACs contribute money to electorally vulnerable, ideologically friendly politicians, 
located in states where PAC donors reside (see also Gopoian 1984, 271).  While Wright 
(1984, 1989) stresses the geographic distribution of PAC organization, scholars 
operationalize this variable differently.  
The home district is meant to measure where a PAC has donors; however, 
scholars measure home districts differently, even within the same research design.  In a 
study of defense PACs, oil PACs, auto manufacturing PACs, and labor PACs, Gopoian 
(1984) operationalized each home state variable differently.  For defense firms the 
home district variable was measured using the headquarter location of the PAC’s parent 
company.  For auto manufacturers, the home state variable was those representatives 




Louisiana, Texas, and Oklahoma, and for labor unions, the home state variable was the 
amount of blue-collar workers in the area (Gopoian 1984, 266).  The findings indicate: 
On the average, home state representatives were four times as likely as all others 
to receive contributions from the Michigan-based auto industry PACs and twice 
as likely as all other incumbents to receive contributions from defense PACs.  
On the other hand, only modest support materialized for the home district 
hypothesis with the oil PACs and the home district indicator appears totally 
unrelated to labor PAC contributions (Gopoian 1984, 267). 
 
It is entirely plausible that auto PACs and defense PACs strategize to contribute to 
home district representatives; however, it is also plausible that those two measures of 
home district were more accurate than oil and labor PACs.  Defense is the only home 
state variable that is actually a home state variable, with auto manufacturers coming 
close (due to the concentration of the auto industry in the late 1970s in Michigan).  For 
oil and labor, the operationalization of home districts is closer to constituency 
characteristics, which indicate little about where the PAC donation originated; leading 
to this ambiguous conclusion: “these findings indicate that the home district connection 
may be an important consideration for some PACs, but not necessarily for all economic 
interest PACs” (Gopoian 1984, 267).58  Recent research determines the geographic 
distribution of PAC donors to be the most appropriate operationalization of a PAC’s 
home state. 
In their study of PAC contribution timing of corporate and labor PACs, Box-
Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartels (2005) find the geography and resources of PACs 
                                                
58 Gopoian (1984, 267-270) finds small support for committee assignment, strong support for PACs 
contributing to electorally vulnerable incumbents, ambiguous support for partisanship, and strong support 




(demand-side variables) have the most explanatory power in determining the 
distribution and timing of PAC contributions during an election cycle:  
Candidates are more likely to receive money earlier in the campaign from large 
and small corporate PACs and large labor PACs based in their home state…in 
general, the larger the share of a PAC’s fund-raising in a state, the more likely 
PACs are to make contributions in that state…substantial evidence suggests that 
PACs contribute where they have members (Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and 
Bartels 2005, 566). 
 
This measurement of a PAC’s home state is more useful in explaining corporate PAC 
giving than from labor PACs because labor PACs rely on employee check-off 
donations, not large individual donations, but the percent of union membership is an 
important prediction of labor PAC strategy (Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartels 
2005, 566).  The home state variable, which has been neglected in the literature, plays 
an important role in early money decisions, and in fact, is the primary determinant of 
early money decisions, having more explanatory power than a Washington, D.C. office 
(Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartels 2005, 572-575). 
The findings of the organizational presence model are clear: despite the 
idiosyncratic nature of most PAC decision-making committees (Sabato 1984, 37), more 
often than not, PACs rely on local inputs to make strategic contribution decisions, and 
this reliance occurs because local inputs are responsible for fundraising year-after-year, 
and this reliance results in PACs using electoral and ideological cues. 
Testing the Organizational Presence Model: Data, Variables, and Hypotheses 
 According to the organizational presence model, PACs will contribute money to 
candidates campaigning in districts and states where PACs have an organizational 
presence, to electorally vulnerable and ideologically friendly candidates.  I test this 




2006.  The dependent variable is the percentage of the PAC’s total allocations to a 
particular candidate, measured as net real dollars.  The independent variables for this 
test derive directly from the organizational presence model. 
The organizational presence model is a model with three base variables and two 
interactive terms: organizational presence (home state), ideology, and electoral 
vulnerability.  To measure organizational presence, I use the percentage of a PACs 
individual donor contributions coming from the same state (Box-Steffensmeier, 
Radcliffe, and Bartels 2005, 557).  Based on the percentage of incoming PAC donations 
coming from a state, I organize each PAC into a state category: dominant, strong, 
moderate, majority, weak, and none.59  These categories capture the amount of 
                                                
59 Grenzke (1988) is actually studying the redistributive effects of PACs: “an index was estimated for 
each PAC that reflects the proportion of the PAC’s receipts that comes from individuals within a 
member’s district…that index is multiplied by the PACs contribution to the member to determine the 
proportion of the PAC’s contribution that could be considered within-district.  The within-district 
contributions of all the PAC’s contributing to a particular incumbent are added together to determine the 
incumbent’s summary proportion of within-district PAC contributions” (Grenzke 1988, 87).  Grenzke’s 
logic is the following: find the location of the individual donor to the PAC, and regardless of PAC 
location, track the amount of PAC money contributed to the incumbent of the original individual donor’s 
location.  Grenzke then calculates a within-district index “dividing the amount of money reported coming 
into the PAC from within a House member’s district by the sum of the PACs receipts for which the 
geographic source is reported,” and this calculation gives us the percent of PAC budget coming from 
within a certain zip code, which were grouped by district (Grenzke 1988, 97).  Each PAC has a within 
district index percentage for each legislator, “the amount of within-district money coming from a single 
PAC to a legislator is estimated as the product of the PAC’s within-district index for that legislator and 
the PAC’s total contribution to the legislator.  These products are then summed for all PACs contributing 
to the legislator” (Grenzke 1988, 97).  Here is the flaw in this approach: “assume that $1,000 is collected 
from each of districts A, B, and C.  The PAC contributes $1,000 each to incumbents running in districts 
A, D, and E, but nothing to candidates in districts B or C.  The within-district index for the candidate in 
district A for this PAC is 33.3% ($1,000/$3,000), and $333 of the $1,000 contributed to the candidate in 
district A is considered within-district money” (Grenzke 1988, 97).  A second approach would “divide the 
amount of reported money coming into the PAC from within a House member’s district by the PAC’s 
contribution to the House member (instead of by the PAC’s total receipt),” then the incumbent from 
district A would have 100 percent within-district donations from the PAC (Grenzke 1988, 98).  Grenzke 
settles on using the first approach because she cannot know how the dollars were spent by the PAC, “if I 
assume that all of A’s money from the PAC was within-district, then I must also assume that none of the 
money from districts B or C went to the candidate from district A.  I must also assume that the money 
from districts B and C went only to candidates from districts that didn’t contribute to the PAC such as D 





incoming contributions to the PAC come from a particular state.  A PAC is a dominant 
state PAC if it receives 90% or more of its money from one state, is a strong state PAC 
if it receives 70-89% of its money from one state, is a majority state PAC if it receives 
50-69% of its money from one state, is a moderate state PAC if it receives 30-49% of its 
money from one state, is a weak state PAC if it receives 1-29% of its money from one 
state, and a PAC is not affiliated with a state if it receives no money from that state.  
PACs can be in multiple categories at once.  For example, a PAC can be a strong state 
PAC in one state and a weak state PAC in another state; however, that PAC’s strategy 
should differ in the strong state versus its strategy with respect to the weak state.  I then 
match each organizational presence category with the spending of those PACs; in other 
words, I ask, do strong state PACs contribute money to candidates in that same state? 
To determine an answer to this question, I first present two descriptive tables for 
each state.  For each category (dominant, strong, majority, moderate, weak, none), the 
tables display the mean spent in the state and the total spent in the state, with 
comparisons to the mean spent overall and the total spent overall.  Second, I conduct an 
independent sample t-test on the mean spent in the state for two categories; the first 
category groups dominant, strong, and majority state PACs together, with the second 
category being the rest of PACs loosely tied or not tied to the state (defined as a lack of 
individual donors to the PAC from that state).  This t-test will show if the difference of 
means (mean spent by the PAC in that state across the two different groups) is 
statistically significant.  Since it is reasonable to conclude that the distribution of PAC 
                                                                                                                                          
1988, 98).  Studying the amount of money flowing in and out of districts is preposterous when the bulk of 




contributions in each category (those PACs with 50% or more individual contributions 
coming from one state, and those with less than 50%) is abnormal (most PAC 
distributions are), I present the Mann-Whitney nonparametric test statistic to determine 
if the difference of medians of two skewed distributions is statistically significant.  The 
purpose of these tables is to determine if PACs contribute money disproportionately to 
candidates where the PACs have an organizational presence (as defined by the 
geographic distribution of PAC donors).  I conducted this analysis for every state in 
every election cycle, from 1990 through 2006, which produces 100 tables for each 
election cycle.  For the sake of space, I present the results for the 1990 election cycle 
only; however, the 1990 results are indicative of trends within the PAC system.   
After this descriptive and statistical analysis, I proceed to test other aspects of 
PAC strategy, as hypothesized by the organizational presence model.  Very simply, 
PACs pursue an electoral and ideological strategy within states and districts where they 
have an organizational presence.  Specifically, PACs within their organizational 
boundaries will give to ideologically friendly candidates who are facing a close 
election.  This local spending occurs because PACs need to satisfy their goal of 
organizational maintenance (e.g., keeping donors happy), in order to accrue future 
fundraising.  I expect the model to have high explanatory power for those PACs with 
over fifty percent of fundraising from one state.60 
                                                
60 Another important organizational variable is budget size, which I do not study here. Regarding budget 
size, as PAC budgets increase (measured as amount of expenditures), PACs tend to give more to 
challengers and open seats and close elections (Eismeier and Pollock 1984, 125; Wilcox 1989, 165).  The 
rationale for this hypothesis is those larger budgets PACs have more money to provide venture capital for 
candidates that may otherwise have little PAC money to use (Wilcox 1989, 171). This finding leads 





 To measure electoral vulnerability, I use the percentage of the Democratic 
presidential two-party vote within the congressional district.  This variable is a 
structural measure of partisan competition, exogenous from the performance of House 
candidates.  To measure ideology, I use first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores.  I also 
include controls for incumbent status, and for strong state PACs, I provide a dummy 
variable indicating if the candidate is in the PACs home state. 
Findings 
 The first hypothesis of the organizational presence model is that PAC money 
flows to districts and states where the PAC has individual donors.  The empirical 
validity of this hypothesis is at issue in the Grenzke (1988) – Wright (1985, 1989) 
debate.  Grenzke (1988) argues that an overwhelming amount of PAC dollars received 
by congressional candidates comes from outside their districts, implying that PACs 
create a financial constituency distinct from the geographic.  Wright (1985, 1989) 
argues that PACs donate money to congressional candidates that represent geographic 
areas where PACs have an organizational presence; implying the distinction between 
the financial and geographic constituency is slight.  According to Wright (1985, 1989), 
what appears to be outside money, when looking at the PAC’s headquarter-location, 
usually overlaps with the congressional candidate’s constituency.  The findings 
presented in this chapter represent the first, national, long-term test of the hypothesis 
that underlies this unresolved debate. 
                                                                                                                                          
but also in the budgets of existing PACs, the dollar volume of challenger contributions may increase 




 Tables 3.1 through 3.100 presented below report my test of this first 
organizational presence hypothesis for the 1990 electoral cycle only.  After examining 
the findings from 1992-2006, the findings from 1990 are representative of the entire 
sample, and for the sake of space, clarity, and brevity, I present the 1990 results only.  
These tables (two per-state) represent a simple, yet enlightening, analysis of the PAC 
system.  The first table for each state (the odd-numbered tables) is the amount of money 
PACs contributed to congressional candidates in that state (reporting the mean, number 
of PACs, standard deviation, and total amount of PAC money).  In this first table, I 
divide the PAC system by organizational presence into six categories (dominant, strong, 
majority, moderate, weak, and none).  These categories represent the strength of ties 
each PAC has to the state in question (i.e., percent of individual donors from the state in 
question).  For example, Table 3.1 is the amount of PAC money donated to House races 
in Alabama in the 1990 electoral cycle (in real 1990 dollars).  I divide the PAC system 
into Dominant Alabama PACs, Strong Alabama PACs, Majority Alabama PACs, 
Moderate Alabama PACs, Weak Alabama PACs, and None (PACs with no individual 
donors from Alabama).  Below each odd-numbered table is my statistical test of the 
difference of PAC donation means to the state.  To conduct this independent samples t-
test, I construct two categories: (1) those PACs with a majority of individual donors 
from the state in question (dominant, strong, majority) and (2) those PACs without a 
majority of individual donors from the state in question (moderate, weak, none).  I will 
determine if the difference of means is statistically significant between these two 
groups.  Assuming the distribution of PAC dollars to each state violates normality 




Mann-Whitney test-statistic to determine if the median dollar amounts for the two 
groups is statistically significant.  The Mann-Whitney statistic is usually significant in 
this analysis because many states have few PACs, and few PACs are rooted only in one 
state.  With very small sample sizes (less than 5), the Mann-Whitney statistic is not 
reliable.  The second table for each state (the even-numbered tables) displays 
information about the same PAC groupings for contributions to the entire population of 
congressional candidates, not only within the same state as in the odd-numbered tables.  
Comparing the totals across tables is instructive, and my summary analysis appears 






















Table 3.1: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Alabama, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from AL Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 10091.8824 17 1.08596E4 171562.00 
Strong 70-89% 7050.0000 3 4960.09072 21150.00 
Majority 50-69% 11250.0000 1 . 11250.00 
Moderate 30-49% 1100.0000 3 529.15026 3300.00 
Weak 1-29% 3711.3046 151 8372.36639 560407.00 
None 466.7417 2896 2705.17303 1351684.00 
 
Total 690.1182 3071 3466.70716 2119353.00 
*Difference of means for Alabama PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 9712.4762 and 
627.9970 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed), with a 
Mann-Whitney of 4441.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.2: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Alabama PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
PAC77 Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from AL Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 20947.7647 17 2.37091E4 356112.00 
Strong 70-89% 22616.6667 3 1.00437E4 67850.00 
Majority 50-69% 24500.0000 1 . 24500.00 
Moderate 30-49% 26525.0000 3 1.57568E4 79575.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.0503E5 151 4.00910E5 3.10E7 
None 27075.6488 2896 1.05173E5 7.84E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.3: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Alaska, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from AK Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 200.0000 2 282.84271 400.00 
Strong 70-89% .0000 1 . .00 
Majority 50-69% 1000.0000 1 . 1000.00 
Weak 1-29% 906.3830 47 1414.73676 42600.00 
None 79.3632 3020 522.83227 239677.00 
 
Total 92.3728 3071 556.25315 283677.00 
*Difference of means for Alaska PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 350 and 92.0368 
respectively, is statistically insignificant (same for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney 
of 3522 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .001, but the Mann-Whitney is always statistically significant 
when the number of cases is below five. 
Table 3.4: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Alaska PAC to House of Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent 
Individual Contributions to PAC 
from AK Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 200.0000 2 282.84271 400.00 
Strong 70-89% .0000 1 . .00 
Majority 50-69% 24500.0000 1 . 24500.00 
Weak 1-29% 3.3968E5 47 4.47735E5 1.60E7 
None 31095.5371 3020 1.24850E5 9.39E7 
 





Table 3.5: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Arizona, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from AZ Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 2328.5294 17 2581.38636 39585.00 
Majority 50-69% 3716.6667 3 5704.01905 11150.00 
Moderate 30-49% 6437.5000 4 4849.97852 25750.00 
Weak 1-29% 1258.6250 160 3417.01736 201380.00 
None 165.2982 2887 924.84240 477216.00 
 
Total 245.8746 3071 1277.88811 755081.00 
*Difference of means for Arizona PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2536.7500 and 
230.8574 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.01), 
with a Mann-Whitney of 7663.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.6: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Arizona PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from AZ Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 6056.7059 17 9209.48255 102964.00 
Majority 50-69% 10200.0000 3 1.49158E4 30600.00 
Moderate 30-49% 26781.2500 4 3.22040E4 107125.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.8436E5 160 3.95874E5 2.95E7 
None 27765.5837 2887 1.05354E5 8.02E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.7: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Arkansas, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from AR Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 4458.3333 12 6506.04032 53500.00 
Weak 1-29% 3032.1809 94 5021.89301 285025.00 
None 300.9744 2965 1412.61687 892389.00 
 
Total 400.8186 3071 1768.67625 1230914.00 
*Difference of means for Arkansas PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4458.3333 and 
384.9016 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.1), 
with a Mann-Whitney of 3905.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.8: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to Arkansas House of Representatives, 
1990 
PAC78 Categorical Variable of Percent 
Individual Contributions to PAC from AR Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 11424.0833 12 1.80484E4 137089.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.3929E5 94 4.49248E5 2.25E7 
None 29432.7862 2965 1.13076E5 8.73E7 
 














Table 3.9: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in California 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from CA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 9068.8611 144 1.56468E4 1305916.00 
Strong 70-89% 18355.5385 26 3.23370E4 477244.00 
Majority 50-69% 9373.2400 25 1.11279E4 234331.00 
Moderate 30-49% 9653.5152 33 1.37459E4 318566.00 
Weak 1-29% 9650.5302 430 2.57320E4 4149728.00 
None 1697.8442 2413 9186.10973 4096898.00 
 
Total 3446.0055 3071 1.39119E4 1.06E7 
*Difference of means for California PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 10346.1077 and 
2978.1613 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, 
p<.001), with a Mann-Whitney of 117828 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.10: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by California PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent 
Individual Contributions to PAC from CA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 16492.8681 144 3.23174E4 2374973.00 
Strong 70-89% 91819.6154 26 2.60347E5 2387310.00 
Majority 50-69% 44087.4800 25 5.05836E4 1102187.00 
Moderate 30-49% 75481.0303 33 1.18798E5 2490874.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.0650E5 430 2.71422E5 4.58E7 
None 23103.3630 2413 9.97565E4 5.57E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.11: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Colorado, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from CO Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 5674.3636 11 7070.15194 62418.00 
Strong 70-89% 900.0000 3 360.55513 2700.00 
Majority 50-69% 3375.0000 2 1590.99026 6750.00 
Moderate 30-49% 498.3333 6 666.64583 2990.00 
Weak 1-29% 2502.1495 194 5342.71152 485417.00 
None 288.5716 2855 1711.21429 823872.00 
 
Total 450.7154 3071 2252.80009 1384147.00 
*Difference of means for Colorado PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4491.75 and 429.5512 
respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.05), with a 
Mann-Whitney of 4195.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.12: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Colorado PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from CO Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 32262.0909 11 6.52485E4 354883.00 
Strong 70-89% 19166.6667 3 9207.65080 57500.00 
Majority 50-69% 24000.0000 2 2.72236E4 48000.00 
Moderate 30-49% 4915.0000 6 4237.13937 29490.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.6718E5 194 3.70072E5 3.24E7 
None 26961.4932 2855 1.03609E5 7.70E7 
 





Table: 3.13: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Connecticut, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from CT Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 2175.4500 20 2202.10984 43509.00 
Strong 70-89% 6187.5000 8 7095.71047 49500.00 
Majority 50-69% 3877.0833 12 5428.53842 46525.00 
Moderate 30-49% 1154.1667 12 1969.36288 13850.00 
Weak 1-29% 2558.9406 286 5375.78976 731857.00 
None 393.4819 2733 2153.80282 1075386.00 
 
Total 638.4328 3071 2758.61267 1960627.00 
*Difference of means for Connecticut PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 3488.3500 and 
600.8225 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, 
p<.001), with a Mann-Whitney of 17871.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.14: Total 1990, Net Real Dollars Donated by Connecticut PAC to House of 
Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from CT Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 17263.9000 20 4.08476E4 345278.00 
Strong 70-89% 52703.1250 8 6.32393E4 421625.00 
Majority 50-69% 84763.9167 12 8.65193E4 1017167.00 
Moderate 30-49% 74957.6667 12 1.39675E5 899492.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.3701E5 286 3.26659E5 3.92E7 
None 24891.8353 2733 9.86958E4 6.80E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.15: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Delaware, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from DE Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 380.0000 2 91.92388 760.00 
Strong 70-89% 812.5000 2 972.27182 1625.00 
Majority 50-69% 1083.3333 3 1876.38837 3250.00 
Moderate 30-49% 1000.0000 1 . 1000.00 
Weak 1-29% 597.1429 70 1782.17087 41800.00 
None 54.2944 2993 440.00789 162503.00 
 
Total 68.6871 3071 520.53761 210938.00 
*Difference of means for Delaware PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 805 and 67.0049 
respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (insignificant for equal variances not assumed), with a 
















Table 3.16: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Delaware PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from DE Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 380.0000 2 91.92388 760.00 
Strong 70-89% 8362.5000 2 1.16496E4 16725.00 
Majority 50-69% 39508.3333 3 4.75101E4 118525.00 
Moderate 30-49% 6800.0000 1 . 6800.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.9849E5 70 4.47209E5 1.39E7 
None 32028.3291 2993 1.22620E5 9.59E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.17: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Florida, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from FL Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 7218.4186 43 1.19051E4 310392.00 
Strong 70-89% 11271.4286 7 1.21373E4 78900.00 
Majority 50-69% 4355.9091 11 6554.05097 47915.00 
Moderate 30-49% 3744.4444 9 4572.43401 33700.00 
Weak 1-29% 5973.9490 353 1.67373E4 2108804.00 
None 915.2863 2648 5193.40243 2423678.00 
 
Total 1629.2377 3071 7816.39030 5003389.00 
*Difference of means for Florida PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 7167.3279 and 
1517.0040 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, 
p<.001), with a Mann-Whitney of 34103.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.18: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Florida PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from FL Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 20110.2791 43 5.06401E4 864742.00 
Strong 70-89% 36771.4286 7 4.26417E4 257400.00 
Majority 50-69% 20833.1818 11 2.54231E4 229165.00 
Moderate 30-49% 44879.8889 9 6.76337E4 403919.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.2559E5 353 2.95271E5 4.43E7 
None 24097.6862 2648 1.00279E5 6.38E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.19: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Georgia, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from GA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 6835.4167 24 8185.17322 164050.00 
Strong 70-89% 7700.0000 11 8491.58407 84700.00 
Majority 50-69% 6487.5000 4 1.29750E4 25950.00 
Moderate 30-49% 1703.5714 7 3701.98226 11925.00 
Weak 1-29% 4504.3281 256 1.32578E4 1153108.00 
None 529.9895 2769 2500.88573 1467541.00 
 
Total 946.6864 3071 4780.68303 2907274.00 
*Difference of means for Georgia PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 7043.5897 and 
868.2632 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, 




Table 3.20: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Georgia PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from GA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 16072.9167 24 2.23998E4 385750.00 
Strong 70-89% 36641.3636 11 4.43796E4 403055.00 
Majority 50-69% 71112.5000 4 1.27372E5 284450.00 
Moderate 30-49% 98658.4286 7 1.77425E5 690609.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.5439E5 256 3.49437E5 3.95E7 
None 24778.5150 2769 9.56176E4 6.86E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.21: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Hawaii 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from HI Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 5181.5000 10 7985.64895 51815.00 
Moderate 30-49% 333.3333 3 577.35027 1000.00 
Weak 1-29% 955.0789 76 2493.20045 72586.00 
None 118.9115 2982 1217.51314 354594.00 
 
Total 156.2993 3071 1370.33918 479995.00 
*Difference of means for Hawaii PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 5181.5 and 139.8824 
respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.1), with a 
Mann-Whitney of 3494.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.22: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Hawaii PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from HI Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 10714.0000 10 1.78451E4 107140.00 
Moderate 30-49% 3.6767E5 3 5.33470E5 1103009.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.6936E5 76 4.79618E5 2.05E7 
None 29583.1050 2982 1.13303E5 8.82E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.23: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Idaho, 1990 
PAC91 Categorical Variable of Percent 
Individual Contributions to PAC from ID Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 1500.0000 1 . 1500.00 
Strong 70-89% 3966.6667 3 1674.31578 11900.00 
Majority 50-69% 8000.0000 1 . 8000.00 
Moderate 30-49% 500.0000 1 . 500.00 
Weak 1-29% 2266.2923 65 3784.01281 147309.00 
None 170.6437 3000 1079.07909 511931.00 
 
Total 221.7975 3071 1250.13468 681140.00 
*Difference of means for Idaho PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4280 and 215.1794 
respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.001), with a 








Table 3.24: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Idaho PAC to House of Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from ID Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 1500.0000 1 . 1500.00 
Strong 70-89% 84927.3333 3 1.27577E5 254782.00 
Majority 50-69% 40000.0000 1 . 40000.00 
Moderate 30-49% 2250.0000 1 . 2250.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.5412E5 65 3.53530E5 1.65E7 
None 31027.2693 3000 1.28453E5 9.31E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.25: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Illinois, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from IL Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 5210.3151 73 9339.39239 380353.00 
Strong 70-89% 6133.5500 20 5722.17758 122671.00 
Majority 50-69% 3361.8182 11 5012.78754 36980.00 
Moderate 30-49% 8213.4615 26 2.00053E4 213550.00 
Weak 1-29% 5589.7778 351 1.32303E4 1962012.00 
None 915.9131 2590 4721.33056 2372215.00 
 
Total 1656.7180 3071 6883.34847 5087781.00 
*Difference of means for Illinois PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 5192.3462 and 
1532.7863 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, 
p<.001), with a Mann-Whitney of 60805 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.26: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Illinois PAC to House of Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from IL Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 25185.7260 73 5.21057E4 1838558.00 
Strong 70-89% 39193.2000 20 7.36373E4 783864.00 
Majority 50-69% 14386.8182 11 2.15056E4 158255.00 
Moderate 30-49% 1.2583E5 26 3.98701E5 3271636.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.2062E5 351 2.91854E5 4.23E7 
None 23748.3954 2590 9.52234E4 6.15E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.27: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Indiana, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from IN Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 4655.7500 16 6059.60744 74492.00 
Strong 70-89% 1700.0000 3 1630.18404 5100.00 
Majority 50-69% 1500.0000 2 2121.32034 3000.00 
Moderate 30-49% 1412.5000 4 2003.48654 5650.00 
Weak 1-29% 5159.8392 199 1.49262E4 1026808.00 
None 793.0734 2847 4333.14379 2257880.00 
 
Total 1098.3165 3071 5760.54613 3372930.00 
*Difference of means for Indiana PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 3932.9524 and 
1078.7993 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.05) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.05), 






Table 3.28: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Indiana PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from IN Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 17741.5000 16 3.48743E4 283864.00 
Strong 70-89% 17995.3333 3 1.92586E4 53986.00 
Majority 50-69% 17975.0000 2 2.50669E4 35950.00 
Moderate 30-49% 27087.5000 4 2.71277E4 108350.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.6691E5 199 3.81678E5 3.32E7 
None 26765.5578 2847 9.94803E4 7.62E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.29: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Iowa, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from IA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 2622.2222 9 3104.44350 23600.00 
Strong 70-89% 3200.0000 3 3647.94463 9600.00 
Majority 50-69% 1525.0000 2 601.04076 3050.00 
Moderate 30-49% 6500.0000 2 3535.53391 13000.00 
Weak 1-29% 2806.9231 143 5089.10443 401390.00 
None 314.7840 2912 1710.57184 916651.00 
 
Total 445.2266 3071 2081.42090 1367291.00 
*Difference of means for Iowa PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2589.2857 and 435.4076 
respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.05), with a 
Mann-Whitney of 4356 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.30: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Iowa PAC to House of Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from IA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 11622.2222 9 1.72677E4 104600.00 
Strong 70-89% 7700.0000 3 5210.80608 23100.00 
Majority 50-69% 5150.0000 2 3606.24458 10300.00 
Moderate 30-49% 52525.0000 2 2.65519E4 105050.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.9036E5 143 4.02685E5 2.72E7 
None 28308.4224 2912 1.08188E5 8.24E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.31: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Kansas, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from KS Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 1608.3333 9 1825.94154 14475.00 
Strong 70-89% 3525.0000 4 2794.48862 14100.00 
Majority 50-69% 600.0000 4 516.39778 2400.00 
Moderate 30-49% 483.3333 3 225.46249 1450.00 
Weak 1-29% 2129.1189 143 3733.44635 304464.00 
None 275.0395 2908 1351.76163 799815.00 
 
Total 370.1413 3071 1600.56311 1136704.00 
*Difference of means for Kansas PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 1822.0588 and 
362.0593 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.01), 





Table 3.32: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Kansas PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from KS Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 2758.3333 9 2193.52741 24825.00 
Strong 70-89% 42168.7500 4 6.26145E4 168675.00 
Majority 50-69% 10318.7500 4 8301.59059 41275.00 
Moderate 30-49% 13900.0000 3 2.13063E4 41700.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.9338E5 143 4.06001E5 2.77E7 
None 28187.1431 2908 1.07410E5 8.20E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.33: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Kentucky, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from KY Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 1298.0833 12 2061.60099 15577.00 
Strong 70-89% 2766.6667 3 1553.49069 8300.00 
Majority 50-69% 987.5000 4 1367.70794 3950.00 
Moderate 30-49% 2472.1667 6 2613.51644 14833.00 
Weak 1-29% 2200.6486 148 3988.37220 325696.00 
None 254.8482 2898 1382.10122 738550.00 
 
Total 360.4383 3071 1669.15807 1106906.00 
*Difference of means for Kentucky PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 1464.5789 and 
353.5645 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.01) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.05), 
with a Mann-Whitney of 15936.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.34: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Kentucky PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from KY Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 3114.7500 12 5295.12999 37377.00 
Strong 70-89% 24150.0000 3 2.03124E4 72450.00 
Majority 50-69% 6325.0000 4 3893.26341 25300.00 
Moderate 30-49% 39459.6667 6 3.65554E4 236758.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.9836E5 148 4.17113E5 2.94E7 
None 27663.4310 2898 1.03424E5 8.02E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.35: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Louisiana, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from LA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 4354.5455 11 5521.88621 47900.00 
Strong 70-89% 1925.0000 4 2368.01605 7700.00 
Majority 50-69% 2690.0000 5 4518.62811 13450.00 
Moderate 30-49% 1200.0000 3 1866.14576 3600.00 
Weak 1-29% 3119.8966 145 6801.66114 452385.00 
None 366.1230 2903 1503.35763 1062855.00 
 
Total 517.0596 3071 2201.15099 1587890.00 
*Difference of means for Louisiana PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 3452.5 and 497.8171 
respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.05), with a 




Table 3.36 Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Louisiana PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from LA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 20758.1818 11 4.01777E4 228340.00 
Strong 70-89% 11375.0000 4 1.09412E4 45500.00 
Majority 50-69% 20245.0000 5 3.02038E4 101225.00 
Moderate 30-49% 41956.6667 3 3.80765E4 125870.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.0800E5 145 4.58917E5 3.02E7 
None 27294.8147 2903 9.43349E4 7.92E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.37: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Maine, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from ME Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 3083.3333 3 2240.72161 9250.00 
Moderate 30-49% 2000.0000 1 . 2000.00 
Weak 1-29% 1969.6197 71 3233.07038 139843.00 
None 173.7707 2996 1127.46582 520617.00 
 
Total 218.7268 3071 1250.46190 671710.00 
*Difference of means for Maine PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 3083.3333 and 215.9257 
respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (insignificant for equal variances not assumed), with a 
Mann-Whitney of 300.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.38: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Maine PAC to House of Representatives 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from ME Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 19700.0000 3 1.70789E4 59100.00 
Moderate 30-49% 35467.0000 1 . 35467.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.6199E5 71 4.79510E5 1.86E7 
None 30441.4973 2996 1.16826E5 9.12E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.39: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Maryland 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from MD Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 6812.0588 17 1.08489E4 115805.00 
Strong 70-89% 9700.0000 3 9153.68778 29100.00 
Majority 50-69% 1770.6667 6 1466.56151 10624.00 
Moderate 30-49% 4160.2500 20 6331.07592 83205.00 
Weak 1-29% 3060.8537 294 6382.30100 899891.00 
None 526.7836 2731 2617.67271 1438646.00 
 
Total 839.2286 3071 3436.25516 2577271.00 
*Difference of means for Maryland PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 5981.8846 and 
795.3176 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.01), 









Table 3.40: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Maryland PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from MD Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 58034.0588 17 1.89038E5 986579.00 
Strong 70-89% 39875.0000 3 3.71684E4 119625.00 
Majority 50-69% 18189.0000 6 1.70095E4 109134.00 
Moderate 30-49% 1.4033E5 20 2.83919E5 2806672.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.2994E5 294 3.05683E5 3.82E7 
None 24779.7397 2731 1.01344E5 6.77E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.41: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Massachusetts, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from MA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 3358.3333 6 4269.82630 20150.00 
Strong 70-89% 2987.5000 4 4039.87933 11950.00 
Majority 50-69% 13600.0000 2 6222.53967 27200.00 
Moderate 30-49% 3110.0000 7 5883.85078 21770.00 
Weak 1-29% 2485.2778 252 6278.41674 626290.00 
None 351.4175 2800 2417.34120 983969.00 
 
Total 550.7421 3071 3028.01616 1691329.00 
*Difference of means for Massachusetts PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4941.6667 and 
533.5172 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.05), 
with a Mann-Whitney of 6367 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.42: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Massachusetts PAC to House of 
Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from MA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 8533.3333 6 1.06557E4 51200.00 
Strong 70-89% 10525.0000 4 1.19608E4 42100.00 
Majority 50-69% 3.4200E5 2 2.65666E5 684008.00 
Moderate 30-49% 14546.8571 7 1.86279E4 101828.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.4726E5 252 3.42024E5 3.71E7 
None 25682.4268 2800 9.93742E4 7.19E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table: 3.43: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Michigan, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from MI Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 8026.6774 31 7830.29390 248827.00 
Strong 70-89% 5717.2222 9 7595.47938 51455.00 
Majority 50-69% 2266.6667 3 3100.53759 6800.00 
Moderate 30-49% 4505.0000 4 3929.89822 18020.00 
Weak 1-29% 5483.9203 251 1.20470E4 1376464.00 
None 1043.7093 2773 5477.67930 2894206.00 
 
Total 1496.5067 3071 6454.61850 4595772.00 
*Difference of means for Michigan PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 7141.4419 and 
1416.3441 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, 




Table 3.44: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Michigan PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from MI Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 23791.1935 31 3.85518E4 737527.00 
Strong 70-89% 26509.7778 9 4.74374E4 238588.00 
Majority 50-69% 35348.3333 3 5.27759E4 106045.00 
Moderate 30-49% 10580.0000 4 8945.31162 42320.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.4315E5 251 3.25539E5 3.59E7 
None 26268.5831 2773 1.05711E5 7.28E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.45: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Minnesota, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from MN Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 4543.7500 20 5675.84999 90875.00 
Strong 70-89% 3900.0000 6 1645.29633 23400.00 
Majority 50-69% 4014.2857 7 8513.45574 28100.00 
Moderate 30-49% 3652.0000 4 3307.87434 14608.00 
Weak 1-29% 3506.7406 212 7269.62516 743429.00 
None 458.6322 2822 2446.00690 1294260.00 
 
Total 714.6441 3071 3199.37666 2194672.00 
*Difference of means for Minnesota PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4314.3939 and 
675.5421 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, 
p<.001), with a Mann-Whitney of 16666 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.46: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Minnesota PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from MN Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 15897.0000 20 3.03177E4 317940.00 
Strong 70-89% 12716.6667 6 1.26126E4 76300.00 
Majority 50-69% 51388.7143 7 1.03813E5 359721.00 
Moderate 30-49% 35220.7500 4 3.32901E4 140883.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.6547E5 212 3.56017E5 3.51E7 
None 26195.7279 2822 1.03164E5 7.39E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.47: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Mississippi, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from MS Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 2506.2500 8 1926.77330 20050.00 
Majority 50-69% .0000 2 .00000 .00 
Moderate 30-49% 1400.0000 2 141.42136 2800.00 
Weak 1-29% 3510.3673 98 6853.02910 344016.00 
None 312.4556 2961 1618.65184 925181.00 
 
Total 420.7252 3071 2084.85231 1292047.00 
*Difference of means for Mississippi PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2005 and 415.5495 
respectively, is statistically significant (p<.05) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.05), with a 






Table 3.48: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Mississippi PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from MS Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 8493.7500 8 1.57101E4 67950.00 
Majority 50-69% 829.0000 2 500.63160 1658.00 
Moderate 30-49% 49847.5000 2 6.55453E4 99695.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.1832E5 98 4.58417E5 2.14E7 
None 29832.2486 2961 1.11685E5 8.83E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.49: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Missouri, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from MO Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 5334.3810 21 5064.87419 112022.00 
Strong 70-89% 10560.7143 7 1.30571E4 73925.00 
Majority 50-69% 5716.6667 6 4382.19884 34300.00 
Moderate 30-49% 3953.3333 15 5866.35281 59300.00 
Weak 1-29% 5077.6038 212 1.44964E4 1076452.00 
None 606.4765 2810 2786.44797 1704199.00 
 
Total 996.4826 3071 4893.75126 3060198.00 
*Difference of means for Missouri PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 6477.8529 and 
935.1172 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, 
p<.001), with a Mann-Whitney of 10233 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.50: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Missouri PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from MO Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 19586.2857 21 5.28696E4 411312.00 
Strong 70-89% 2.0599E5 7 5.02858E5 1441950.00 
Majority 50-69% 53775.0000 6 5.65407E4 322650.00 
Moderate 30-49% 78179.2000 15 1.75656E5 1172688.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.7413E5 212 3.98329E5 3.69E7 
None 24780.6609 2810 8.55458E4 6.96E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.51: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Montana, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from MT Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 900.0000 2 141.42136 1800.00 
Majority 50-69% .0000 1 . .00 
Weak 1-29% 1518.2540 63 2854.71175 95650.00 
None 112.3983 3005 705.70418 337757.00 
 
Total 141.7151 3071 831.86883 435207.00 
*Difference of means for Montana PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 600 and 141.2669 
respectively, is not statistically significant (same for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney 






Table 3.52: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Montana PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from MT Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 2900.0000 2 777.81746 5800.00 
Majority 50-69% 250.0000 1 . 250.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.8737E5 63 4.26512E5 1.81E7 
None 30545.1181 3005 1.22853E5 9.18E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.53: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Nebraska, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from NE Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 3978.0000 6 3594.35418 23868.00 
Strong 70-89% 2616.6667 3 1758.07660 7850.00 
Majority 50-69% .0000 2 .00000 .00 
Moderate 30-49% 10550.0000 2 3606.24458 21100.00 
Weak 1-29% 4393.7429 105 1.27871E4 461343.00 
None 330.5713 2953 1753.93774 976177.00 
 
Total 485.2940 3071 3027.27143 1490338.00 
*Difference of means for Nebraska PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2883.4545 and 
476.6732 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.01) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.05), 
with a Mann-Whitney of 4928.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.54: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Nebraska PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990  
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from NE Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 7603.0000 6 9082.39132 45618.00 
Strong 70-89% 10016.6667 3 1.23179E4 30050.00 
Majority 50-69% 5275.0000 2 7459.97654 10550.00 
Moderate 30-49% 1.5171E5 2 1.61656E5 303416.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.1089E5 105 4.09191E5 2.21E7 
None 29585.1118 2953 1.16234E5 8.74E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.55: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Nevada, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from NV Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 2288.8889 9 2738.81564 20600.00 
Strong 70-89% 4000.0000 2 5656.85425 8000.00 
Majority 50-69% 1650.0000 2 1626.34560 3300.00 
Moderate 30-49% 500.0000 3 259.80762 1500.00 
Weak 1-29% 1386.1111 90 3376.91292 124750.00 
None 79.9619 2965 466.69013 237087.00 
 
Total 128.6998 3071 803.41631 395237.00 
*Difference of means for Nevada PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2453.8462 and 
118.8152 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.05), 







Table 3.56: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Nevada PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from NV Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 7348.2222 9 6675.27553 66134.00 
Strong 70-89% 6775.0000 2 3217.33585 13550.00 
Majority 50-69% 8725.0000 2 7389.26586 17450.00 
Moderate 30-49% 69390.0000 3 6.03003E4 208170.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.5811E5 90 4.70261E5 2.32E7 
None 29127.3642 2965 1.10830E5 8.64E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.57: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in New Hampshire, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from NH Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 3125.0000 2 1944.54365 6250.00 
Moderate 30-49% 13200.0000 1 . 13200.00 
Weak 1-29% 1987.3776 98 3623.42017 194763.00 
None 180.2657 2970 1276.70011 535389.00 
 
Total 244.0905 3071 1467.45943 749602.00 
*Difference of means for New Hampshire PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 3125 and 
242.2131 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.01) (insignificant for equal variances not assumed), 
with a Mann-Whitney of 134 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.58: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by New Hampshire PAC to House of 
Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent 
Individual Contributions to PAC from 
NH Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 3125.0000 2 1944.54365 6250.00 
Moderate 30-49% 51250.0000 1 . 51250.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.1703E5 98 4.17464E5 2.13E7 
None 29822.1886 2970 1.16736E5 8.86E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.59: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in New Jersey, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from NJ Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 4909.4375 32 6306.84153 157102.00 
Strong 70-89% 5792.5000 6 4700.74861 34755.00 
Majority 50-69% 6991.3333 15 1.02938E4 104870.00 
Moderate 30-49% 2296.4286 14 3359.79992 32150.00 
Weak 1-29% 4041.9054 349 1.03661E4 1410625.00 
None 613.5183 2655 3711.29827 1628891.00 
 
Total 1096.8391 3071 5159.04047 3368393.00 
*Difference of means for New Jersey PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 5598.6226 and 
1017.7820 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, 






Table 3.60: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by New Jersey PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from NJ Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 9810.0625 32 1.25538E4 313922.00 
Strong 70-89% 28351.0000 6 2.82869E4 170106.00 
Majority 50-69% 1.0335E5 15 2.89779E5 1550289.00 
Moderate 30-49% 40191.0000 14 3.90281E4 562674.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.2705E5 349 3.13383E5 4.43E7 
None 23714.2689 2655 9.08926E4 6.30E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.61: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in New Mexico, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from NM Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 3016.6667 6 1704.60162 18100.00 
Strong 70-89% .0000 1 . .00 
Majority 50-69% 1400.0000 1 . 1400.00 
Moderate 30-49% 2361.0000 2 3338.95822 4722.00 
Weak 1-29% 2006.1798 89 3169.24873 178550.00 
None 179.2773 2972 768.49828 532812.00 
 
Total 239.5259 3071 990.08870 735584.00 
*Difference of means for New Mexico PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2437.5 and 
233.7852 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, 
p<.001), with a Mann-Whitney of 2432.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.62: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by New Mexico PAC to House of 
Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from NM Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 3616.6667 6 2220.06006 21700.00 
Strong 70-89% 4950.0000 1 . 4950.00 
Majority 50-69% 1400.0000 1 . 1400.00 
Moderate 30-49% 49385.0000 2 3.98596E4 98770.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.8809E5 89 5.18926E5 2.56E7 
None 28307.8893 2972 1.02398E5 8.41E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.63: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in New York, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from NY Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 5229.7407 54 9601.93372 282406.00 
Strong 70-89% 3665.3846 13 6314.61218 47650.00 
Majority 50-69% 8320.0370 27 1.60956E4 224641.00 
Moderate 30-49% 6665.9070 43 1.48071E4 286634.00 
Weak 1-29% 8384.9158 380 2.14652E4 3186268.00 
None 1252.3312 2554 7382.80711 3198454.00 
 
Total 2352.9967 3071 1.07418E4 7226053.00 
*Difference of means for New York PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 5901.0319 and 
2240.9661 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, 




Table 3.64: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by New York PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from NY Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 30364.5185 54 5.58962E4 1639684.00 
Strong 70-89% 19573.8462 13 3.17505E4 254460.00 
Majority 50-69% 52176.2963 27 9.10847E4 1408760.00 
Moderate 30-49% 52985.5116 43 1.20063E5 2278377.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.2286E5 380 3.02535E5 4.67E7 
None 22564.7937 2554 9.20903E4 5.76E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.65: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in North Carolina, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from NC Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 3504.0000 15 5553.01308 52560.00 
Strong 70-89% 5583.3333 6 7662.35386 33500.00 
Majority 50-69% 23900.8000 5 2.83279E4 119504.00 
Moderate 30-49% 4027.2727 11 5383.64949 44300.00 
Weak 1-29% 4824.8792 207 1.07037E4 998750.00 
None 589.5550 2827 2679.28830 1666672.00 
 
Total 949.2953 3071 4215.40064 2915286.00 
*Difference of means for North Carolina PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 7906.3077 and 
889.8923 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.05), 
with a Mann-Whitney of 16049 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.66: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by North Carolina PAC to House of 
Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from NC Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 8068.4000 15 1.42502E4 121026.00 
Strong 70-89% 18076.5000 6 2.54634E4 108459.00 
Majority 50-69% 1.6349E5 5 2.44404E5 817454.00 
Moderate 30-49% 19281.8182 11 2.21005E4 212100.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.5831E5 207 3.47721E5 3.28E7 
None 26837.4694 2827 1.06581E5 7.59E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.67: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in North Dakota, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from ND Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 1500.0000 1 . 1500.00 
Moderate 30-49% 2000.0000 2 2121.32034 4000.00 
Weak 1-29% 1318.6047 43 1535.49369 56700.00 
None 125.6221 3025 578.35560 380007.00 
 
Total 143.9945 3071 621.05181 442207.00 
*Difference of means for North Dakota PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 1500 and 
143.5528 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.05) (insignificant for equal variances not assumed), 






Table 3.68: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by North Dakota PAC to House of 
Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from ND Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 1500.0000 1 . 1500.00 
Moderate 30-49% 1.5565E5 2 1.82465E5 311305.00 
Weak 1-29% 3.6217E5 43 6.36353E5 1.56E7 
None 31078.3511 3025 1.13524E5 9.40E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.69: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Ohio, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from OH Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 5084.8235 34 7870.73233 172884.00 
Strong 70-89% 6338.8889 9 3175.10116 57050.00 
Majority 50-69% 6067.0000 10 6733.63044 60670.00 
Moderate 30-49% 3275.0000 12 4017.82958 39300.00 
Weak 1-29% 5102.6308 279 1.25408E4 1423634.00 
None 826.8159 2727 4572.68270 2254727.00 
 
Total 1305.1986 3071 5960.39359 4008265.00 
*Difference of means for Ohio PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 5483.0943 and 1231.8294 
respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.001), with a 
Mann-Whitney of 28360 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.70: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Ohio PAC to House of Representatives 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from OH Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 48746.7941 34 2.26753E5 1657391.00 
Strong 70-89% 22250.0000 9 9847.91380 200250.00 
Majority 50-69% 26126.1000 10 3.56547E4 261261.00 
Moderate 30-49% 32021.8333 12 3.52133E4 384262.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.3936E5 279 3.15777E5 3.89E7 
None 25124.3469 2727 1.01233E5 6.85E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.71: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Oklahoma, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from OK Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 3535.2143 14 7404.94995 49493.00 
Strong 70-89% 4725.0000 2 6682.15908 9450.00 
Majority 50-69% 2500.0000 1 . 2500.00 
Moderate 30-49% 2690.0000 5 2674.97664 13450.00 
Weak 1-29% 2982.7734 128 6491.99057 381795.00 
None 292.3369 2921 1347.67946 853916.00 
 
Total 426.7678 3071 2020.51584 1310604.00 
*Difference of means for Oklahoma PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 3614.2941 and 
409.0246 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.1), 







Table 3.72: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Oklahoma PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from OK Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 17749.3571 14 4.20848E4 248491.00 
Strong 70-89% 4900.0000 2 6434.67171 9800.00 
Majority 50-69% 12950.0000 1 . 12950.00 
Moderate 30-49% 20670.6000 5 2.06702E4 103353.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.0247E5 128 4.22000E5 2.59E7 
None 28623.0366 2921 1.08438E5 8.36E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.73: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Oregon, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from OR Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 5091.2308 13 6020.78643 66186.00 
Strong 70-89% 1841.6667 3 818.66253 5525.00 
Majority 50-69% 4337.5000 2 6134.15133 8675.00 
Moderate 30-49% 2916.6667 3 4836.92395 8750.00 
Weak 1-29% 3985.6014 138 6817.45609 550013.00 
None 382.4481 2912 1862.27341 1113689.00 
 
Total 570.7711 3071 2488.51546 1752838.00 
*Difference of means for Oregon PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4465.8889 and 
547.8061 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.01), 
with a Mann-Whitney of 5368 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.74: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Oregon PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from OR Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 9700.2308 13 1.44894E4 126103.00 
Strong 70-89% 2550.0000 3 823.10388 7650.00 
Majority 50-69% 10087.5000 2 1.42659E4 20175.00 
Moderate 30-49% 27168.3333 3 2.54443E4 81505.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.2933E5 138 4.41174E5 3.16E7 
None 26790.7376 2912 9.91260E4 7.80E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.75: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Pennsylvania, 1990  
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from PA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 4478.8065 62 6063.52451 277686.00 
Strong 70-89% 5434.4118 17 8334.20885 92385.00 
Majority 50-69% 2792.3077 13 3847.01433 36300.00 
Moderate 30-49% 4577.9412 17 6319.80940 77825.00 
Weak 1-29% 5700.6893 338 1.47921E4 1926833.00 
None 1013.4962 2624 4563.69374 2659414.00 
 
Total 1651.0723 3071 6754.16786 5070443.00 
*Difference of means for Pennsylvania PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4417.0761 and 
1565.6502 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, 




Table 3.76: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Pennsylvania PAC to House of 
Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from PA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 10132.7258 62 1.51336E4 628229.00 
Strong 70-89% 55437.3529 17 1.69034E5 942435.00 
Majority 50-69% 22700.3846 13 3.38663E4 295105.00 
Moderate 30-49% 31135.6471 17 4.69534E4 529306.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.3035E5 338 3.17711E5 4.41E7 
None 24178.2961 2624 9.30852E4 6.34E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.77: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Rhode Island, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from RI Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 4165.0000 2 4051.72186 8330.00 
Strong 70-89% 500.0000 1 . 500.00 
Majority 50-69% 1948.5000 4 2425.38155 7794.00 
Moderate 30-49% 7275.0000 2 388.90873 14550.00 
Weak 1-29% 2534.5287 87 4868.68327 220504.00 
None 187.0013 2975 1233.80064 556329.00 
 
Total 263.1088 3071 1532.09693 808007.00 
*Difference of means for Rhode Island PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2374.8571 and 
258.2843 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.1), 
with a Mann-Whitney of 2383 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.78: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Rhode Island PAC to House of 
Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent 
Individual Contributions to PAC from RI Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 4165.0000 2 4051.72186 8330.00 
Strong 70-89% 500.0000 1 . 500.00 
Majority 50-69% 34342.5000 4 5.52047E4 137370.00 
Moderate 30-49% 1.2889E5 2 1.37225E5 257785.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.3352E5 87 4.43395E5 2.03E7 
None 29975.8235 2975 1.16311E5 8.92E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.79: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in South Carolina 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from SC Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 2711.1111 9 3452.42467 24400.00 
Strong 70-89% 3850.0000 1 . 3850.00 
Moderate 30-49% 7700.0000 1 . 7700.00 
Weak 1-29% 3014.7398 123 6117.59813 370813.00 
None 296.8594 2937 1610.96930 871876.00 
 
Total 416.3592 3071 2078.69577 1278639.00 
*Difference of means for South Carolina PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2825 and 
408.4904 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.05), 





Table 3.80: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by South Carolina PAC to House of 
Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from SC Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 3877.7778 9 4932.17188 34900.00 
Strong 70-89% 6850.0000 1 . 6850.00 
Moderate 30-49% 98900.0000 1 . 98900.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.2230E5 123 4.38945E5 2.73E7 
None 28060.7303 2937 1.05562E5 8.24E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.81: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in South Dakota, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from SD Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 400.0000 3 529.15026 1200.00 
Weak 1-29% 1000.8197 61 2203.39684 61050.00 
None 65.6615 3007 548.23248 197444.00 
 
Total 84.5633 3071 637.56491 259694.00 
*Difference of means for South Dakota PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 400 and 84.2549 
respectively, is statistically insignificant (same for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney 
of 1792.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.82: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by South Dakota PAC to House of 
Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from SD Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 566.6667 3 814.45278 1700.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.7394E5 61 5.51495E5 1.67E7 
None 30989.7024 3007 1.13772E5 9.32E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.83: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Tennessee, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from TN Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 8708.8235 17 2.12939E4 148050.00 
Strong 70-89% 2400.0000 5 2770.37904 12000.00 
Majority 50-69% 2762.5000 4 3776.10359 11050.00 
Moderate 30-49% 1116.6667 6 1331.79077 6700.00 
Weak 1-29% 3325.3695 203 7472.01737 675050.00 
None 446.1079 2836 2102.87793 1265162.00 
 
Total 689.6815 3071 3320.86153 2118012.00 
*Difference of means for Tennessee PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 6580.7692 and 
639.3800 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.1), 












Table 3.84: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Tennessee PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from TN Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 31154.7059 17 1.02777E5 529630.00 
Strong 70-89% 4990.0000 5 3783.25257 24950.00 
Majority 50-69% 25725.0000 4 2.14038E4 102900.00 
Moderate 30-49% 19485.0000 6 3.70937E4 116910.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.5301E5 203 3.71025E5 3.11E7 
None 27525.8843 2836 1.02382E5 7.81E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.85: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Texas, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from TX Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 7372.4000 95 1.00419E4 700378.00 
Strong 70-89% 8117.8571 21 1.49761E4 170475.00 
Majority 50-69% 5282.5000 20 7718.77879 105650.00 
Moderate 30-49% 7403.4000 25 1.36563E4 185085.00 
Weak 1-29% 8213.8773 383 2.07587E4 3145915.00 
None 1293.2723 2527 5672.19343 3268099.00 
 
Total 2466.8193 3071 9640.28263 7575602.00 
*Difference of means for Texas PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 7180.1691 and 
2248.4153 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, 
p<.001), with a Mann-Whitney of 79972 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.86: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Texas PAC to House of Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from TX Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 12700.2737 95 1.79071E4 1206526.00 
Strong 70-89% 46338.2381 21 1.41578E5 973103.00 
Majority 50-69% 55142.3500 20 1.65195E5 1102847.00 
Moderate 30-49% 45610.1200 25 5.20127E4 1140253.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.2423E5 383 2.99770E5 4.76E7 
None 22910.0313 2527 9.30508E4 5.79E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.87: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Utah, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from UT Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 3781.1429 7 6374.09778 26468.00 
Strong 70-89% 1750.0000 2 353.55339 3500.00 
Moderate 30-49% .0000 2 .00000 .00 
Weak 1-29% 2142.8125 80 4252.04712 171425.00 
None 267.3916 2980 1655.10589 796827.00 
 
Total 325.0472 3071 1822.31409 998220.00 
*Difference of means for Utah PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 3329.7778 and 316.2155 
respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (insignificant for equal variances not assumed), with a 






Table 3.88: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Utah PAC to House of Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from UT Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 8145.4286 7 1.23298E4 57018.00 
Strong 70-89% 10800.0000 2 1.12430E4 21600.00 
Moderate 30-49% 5800.0000 2 2404.16306 11600.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.1927E5 80 4.40404E5 1.75E7 
None 30961.8131 2980 1.19578E5 9.23E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.89: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Vermont, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from VT Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 550.0000 1 . 550.00 
Majority 50-69% .0000 1 . .00 
Weak 1-29% 1701.5088 57 2612.42521 96986.00 
None 102.2291 3012 718.53175 307914.00 
 
Total 132.0254 3071 823.11927 405450.00 
*Difference of means for Vermont PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 275 and 131.9322 
respectively, is statistically insignificant (same for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-Whitney 
of 1791 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .029 
Table 3.90: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Vermont PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from VT Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 550.0000 1 . 550.00 
Majority 50-69% 5000.0000 1 . 5000.00 
Weak 1-29% 3.4289E5 57 5.37635E5 1.95E7 
None 29996.0647 3012 1.13846E5 9.03E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.91: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Virginia, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from VA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 4578.5500 20 8115.94772 91571.00 
Strong 70-89% 5336.3636 11 5368.01131 58700.00 
Majority 50-69% 3369.2308 13 8542.57813 43800.00 
Moderate 30-49% 2238.2500 24 4052.14817 53718.00 
Weak 1-29% 3364.8792 331 7646.34705 1113775.00 
None 475.3372 2672 2324.48837 1270101.00 
 
Total 856.9407 3071 3592.23093 2631665.00 
*Difference of means for Virginia PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4410.7045 and 
805.2838 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, p<.05), 










Table 3.92: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Virginia PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from VA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 17451.7500 20 3.63780E4 349035.00 
Strong 70-89% 28649.0000 11 2.84678E4 315139.00 
Majority 50-69% 1.2032E5 13 3.69061E5 1564134.00 
Moderate 30-49% 24590.2083 24 2.82272E4 590165.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.4002E5 331 3.24224E5 4.63E7 
None 22729.0801 2672 8.68779E4 6.07E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.93: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Washington, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from WA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 3587.2800 25 4696.37080 89682.00 
Strong 70-89% 7075.0000 4 6036.07212 28300.00 
Majority 50-69% 6859.0000 5 1.02940E4 34295.00 
Moderate 30-49% 4750.0000 5 7403.54645 23750.00 
Weak 1-29% 4480.2727 220 8376.46247 985660.00 
None 547.9011 2812 2435.17494 1540698.00 
 
Total 879.9691 3071 3474.87530 2702385.00 
*Difference of means for Washington PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 4478.7353 and 
839.6799 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (same for equal variances not assumed, 
p<.001), with a Mann-Whitney of 16494.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.94: Total Net Real Dollars Donated by Washington PAC to House of Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from WA Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 5714.0800 25 7495.29869 142852.00 
Strong 70-89% 97747.5000 4 1.81099E5 390990.00 
Majority 50-69% 11164.0000 5 9103.26755 55820.00 
Moderate 30-49% 2.5044E5 5 3.24353E5 1252185.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.7680E5 220 3.80297E5 3.89E7 
None 24595.0832 2812 9.14317E4 6.92E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.95: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in West Virginia, 1990 
PAC129 Categorical Variable of Percent 
Individual Contributions to PAC from WV Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Strong 70-89% 5366.6667 3 6689.98007 16100.00 
Majority 50-69% 8100.0000 1 . 8100.00 
Moderate 30-49% 500.0000 1 . 500.00 
Weak 1-29% 2037.0000 78 3823.30415 158886.00 
None 236.2373 2988 1471.82206 705877.00 
 
Total 289.6330 3071 1621.39009 889463.00 
*Difference of means for West Virginia PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 6050 and 
282.1203 respectively, is statistically significant (p<.001) (insignificant for equal variances not assumed), 






Table 3.96: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by West Virginia PAC to House of 
Representatives, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from WV Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Strong 70-89% 75721.6667 3 1.25389E5 227165.00 
Majority 50-69% 75285.0000 1 . 75285.00 
Moderate 30-49% 1500.0000 1 . 1500.00 
Weak 1-29% 2.2716E5 78 3.55029E5 1.77E7 
None 30748.2587 2988 1.26785E5 9.19E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.97: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Wisconsin, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from WI Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 3023.0000 10 3781.21982 30230.00 
Majority 50-69% 1000.0000 1 . 1000.00 
Moderate 30-49% 2461.1111 9 3941.66667 22150.00 
Weak 1-29% 4026.7711 201 9227.78466 809381.00 
None 530.8923 2850 2916.68841 1513043.00 
 
Total 773.6255 3071 3781.12024 2375804.00 
*Difference of means for Wisconsin PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 2839.0909 and 
766.2007 respectively, is statistically insignificant (same for equal variances not assumed), with a Mann-
Whitney of 3716.5 and an Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 
Table 3.98: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Wisconsin PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from WI Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 4043.0000 10 4204.43430 40430.00 
Majority 50-69% 1750.0000 1 . 1750.00 
Moderate 30-49% 26709.1111 9 3.84031E4 240382.00 
Weak 1-29% 1.6255E5 201 3.61123E5 3.27E7 
None 26997.3772 2850 1.04539E5 7.69E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
Table 3.99: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by PAC to House Races in Wyoming, 1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from WY Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 633.3333 3 125.83057 1900.00 
Moderate 30-49% 1100.0000 1 . 1100.00 
Weak 1-29% 1838.6000 40 2704.63959 73544.00 
None 177.3987 3027 1031.74822 536986.00 
 
Total 199.7818 3071 1085.41256 613530.00 
*Difference of means for Wyoming PACs (individual donations > 50%), means are 633.3333 and 
199.3579 respectively, is statistically insignificant (and statistically significant for equal variances not 









Table 3.100: Total 1990 Net Real Dollars Donated by Wyoming PAC to House of Representatives, 
1990 
Categorical Variable of Percent Individual 
Contributions to PAC from WY Mean N Std. Deviation Sum 
Dominant 90+% 1233.3333 3 1061.05294 3700.00 
Moderate 30-49% 7500.0000 1 . 7500.00 
Weak 1-29% 3.4857E5 40 6.23868E5 1.39E7 
None 31696.1123 3027 1.17170E5 9.59E7 
 
Total 35785.8180 3071 1.40603E5 1.10E8 
 
 
 The descriptive analysis is instructive because it adds some nuance to the 
Grenzke (1988) – Wright (1985, 1989) debate.  In support of Grenzke (1988), the 
number of PACs that receive over 50% of incoming donations from one state is 
substantial, but a majority of PACs have a national constituency (in 1990, 1,632 PACs 
out of 3071 had less than fifty percent of fundraising from one state), and this money is 
redistributed to candidates out of the state.  The large number of PACs corresponding to 
the financial, real estate, and insurance industries, and trade associations contributes to 
the nationality of the PAC system.  As a result, there are large amounts of PAC money 
flowing into states where the PAC has weak or no organizational presence in that state.  
This result is true especially for sparsely populated states.  Also in support of Grenzke 
(1988), the amount of money donated by PACs rooted in one state is minimal by 
comparison, and in fact, of these small budgets, only part of the budget is spent within 
that same state (compare the dominant, strong, and majority group sums in even-
numbered tables to the same category in odd-numbered tables for the same state).   
 In support of Wright (1985, 1989), the mean donation (and the median as 




candidates in that same state are higher than PACs not rooted in that state.61  This data 
supports Wright’s (1985, 1989) claims because the structure of individual donors helps 
to determine where the PAC will spend money.  PACs rooted disproportionately in one 
state will raise less money and contribute more of that money to in-state congressional 
candidates.  PACs not tied to one particular state will raise more money and donate less 
of that money to any one particular state.  While the distribution of individual donors 
does affect where a PAC will contribute money (and especially the amount raised), 
these types of PACs do not dominate the PAC system.  These findings support both 
Grenzke (1988) and Wright (1985, 1989).  My findings would better support Wright’s 
(1985, 1989) claims if more PACs were rooted disproportionately in one state; however, 
most PACs are weakly tied to one state, making most PAC money outside-the-state 
money.  These findings also add nuance to Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartel’s 
(2005) finding that an overwhelming amount of early PAC contributions are giving 
within the same state of the individual contributors to the PAC.  While this early money 
finding may be true, total money is contributed across state lines, and even early money 
could be national money given the number of weakly tied PACs in the PAC system. 
 With some evidence that PACs contribute a majority of money to congressional 
candidates that represent constituencies where individual PAC donors reside, I select 
four large states with a sizable amount of state-based PACs (California, Michigan, New 
York, and Texas) to test the second hypothesis of the organizational presence model: 
                                                
61 This result must be interpreted with caution because there are many congressional candidates within 
each state that do not receive PAC contributions from a majority of PACs.  Future analysis should take 
the zeros out of the analysis, and only examine PACs that contributed to candidates in that state (e.g., 
what is the statistical significance of the difference of means for state-based PACs versus non-state-based 




PACs that strategize to obtain organizational maintenance goals will contribute to 
ideologically friendly and electorally vulnerable candidates.  The four states I chose 
have a sufficient number of dominant, strong, majority, moderate, and weak state-based 
PACs to conduct this analysis.  To extend the organizational presence hypothesis, I 
hypothesize that the dominant, strong, and majority state-based PACs will exhibit a 
stronger relationship with congressional candidates of that same state.  I aggregate 
dominant, strong, and majority state-based PACs into one PAC grouping called state-
based PACs. The dependent variable for this analysis is the percent of each state-based 
PAC budget given to the congressional candidate.  The key independent variable of 
interest is the home state dichotomous variable, coded for each congressional candidate.  
This variable should be positive, large, and statistically significant for state-based 
PACs, along with the interactive terms measuring the organizational-maintenance 
strategy.  State-based PACs should donate more money to those candidates within its 
home state who are electorally vulnerable and ideologically friendly.  Tables 3.101 – 












Table 3.101 California-Based PAC Strategy According to the Organizational 
Presence Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      .001 (3.35E-5)**   
California Candidate     2.637E-5 (6.249E-5) 
Incumbency      .001 (2.31E-5) ** 
Ideology      3.473E-5 (3.54E-5)  
District Partisanship     1.59E-4 (1.25E-4)  
Electoral Margin     -.001 (4.53E-5)** 
California Candidate * Ideology    -3.67E-4 (1.12E-4)** 
California Candidate * District Partisanship  -.001 (4.45E-4)** 
California Candidate * Electoral Margin  -2.87E-4 (1.76E-4)  
1992       1.11E-4 (4.90E-5)*  
1994       -7.211E-5 (4.29E-5)   
1996       -8.074E-5 (3.98E-5)*  
1998       4.14E-5 (4.21E-5)   
2000       2.26E-5 (4.17E-5)   
2002       2.83E-5 (4.31E-5)   
2004       7.81E-5 (4.35E-5)  
2006       .1.77E-5 (4.42E-5)   
R2       .291     
Adj. R2      .290     
F       288.357    
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.029    
N       11,277    
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the state-based PAC total allocation to a candidate and I 
measure this percentage with net 1990 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections). 
The model is heteroscedastic, with a statistically significant correlation between the residuals and 
predicted values, .070 (.006)**      





















Table 3.102 Michigan-Based PAC Strategy According to Organizational Presence 
Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      .001 (4.55E-5)**   
Michigan Candidate     4.48E-5 (1.58E-4) 
Incumbency      .001 (3.17E-4)** 
Ideology      4.048E-5 (4.68E-5)   
District Partisanship     5.957E-5 (1.66E-4)   
Electoral Margin     -.001 (6.08E-5)**  
Michigan Candidate * Ideology    -4.15E-4 (2.26E-4) 
Michigan Candidate * District Partisanship  .003 (.001)** 
Michigan Candidate * Electoral Margin  .001 (4.34E-4)** 
1992       1.08E-4 (6.73E-5)   
1994       -7.12E-5 (5.9E-5)   
1996       -7.12E-5 (5.47E-5)*  
1998       2.03E-5 (5.78E-5)   
2000       -8.65E-6 (5.73E-5)   
2002       -5.5E-7 (5.91E-5)   
2004       5.09E-5 (5.97E-5)   
2006       2.74E-6 (6.07E-5)   
R2       .177    
Adj. R2      .175    
F       150.878   
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/7.729    
N       11,277    
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the state-based PAC total allocation to a candidate and I 
measure this percentage with net 1990 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections). 
The model is heteroscedastic, with a statistically significant correlation between the residuals and 
predicted values, .057 (.005)**      





















Table 3.103 New York-Based PAC Strategy According to Organizational Presence 
Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      .001 (3.32E-5)**   
New York Candidate     -4.88E-5 (8.09E-5) 
Incumbency      .001 (2.30E-5)** 
Ideology      4.714E-5 (3.42E-5)   
District Partisanship     -1.77E-4 (1.25E-4)   
Electoral Margin     -.001 (4.48E-5)**  
New York Candidate * Ideology    1.82E-4 (1.55E-4) 
New York Candidate * District Partisanship  .002 (.001)** 
New York Candidate * Electoral Margin  -6.89E-5 (2.31E-4) 
1992       1.42E-4 (4.88E-5)**   
1994       -4.43E-5 (4.28E-5)   
1996       -4.43E-5 (3.97E-5)  
1998       8.40E-5 (4.19E-5)*   
2000       7.91E-5 (4.16E-5)   
2002       6.56E-5 (4.29E-5)   
2004       1.19E-4 (4.33E-5)**   
2006       6.65E-5 (4.40E-5)   
R2       .287    
Adj. R2      .286    
F       282.763   
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.133    
N       11,277     
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the state-based PAC total allocation to a candidate and I 
measure this percentage with net 1990 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections).  
The model is heteroscedastic, with a statistically significant correlation between the residuals and 
predicted values, .068 (.006)**      




















Table 3.104 Texas-Based PAC Strategy According to Organizational Presence 
Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      .001 (3.27E-5)**   
Texas Candidate     2.541E-5 (7.4E-5) 
Incumbency      .001 (2.27E-5)** 
Ideology      1.85E-5 (3.42E-5)   
District Partisanship     1.4E-4 (1.23E-4)   
Electoral Margin     -.001 (4.52E-5)**  
Texas Candidate * Ideology     -4.36E-4 (1.32E-4)** 
Texas Candidate * District Partisanship  -.002 (4.7E-4)** 
Texas Candidate * Electoral Margin   9.03E-5 (1.53E-4) 
1992       1.4E-4 (4.82E-5)**   
1994       -4.34E-5 (4.22E-5)   
1996       -4.24E-5 (3.92E-5)  
1998       8.16E-5 (4.14E-5)   
2000       5.23E-5 (4.11E-5)   
2002       6.64E-5 (4.24E-5)   
2004       1.23E-4 (4.28E-5)**   
2006       5.38E-5 (4.35E-5)   
R2       .296    
Adj. R2      .295    
F       295.342   
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.049    
N       11,277     
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the state-based PAC total allocation to a candidate and I 
measure this percentage with net 1990 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections).  
The model is heteroscedastic, with a statistically significant correlation between the residuals and 
predicted values, .072 (.006)**      
* p<.05, ** p<.01 
 
 
 Tables 3.101 – 3.104 show clearly the lack of evidence supporting the 
organizational presence model’s expectations for PAC strategy.  The home state 
candidate does not receive a larger percentage of state-based PAC money and the 
overall fit of the model is low, which means that additional variables are needed to 
explain the variation in state-based PAC strategy.  The common theme from 1990 
through 2006 is that state-based PACs give disproportionately more money to 




within the same state; however, the robustness of the organizational presence model is 
tenuous at best.   
Conclusion 
 The organizational presence model places organizational maintenance as the 
primary goal of a PAC, which leads PAC decision-makers to use ideological, electorally 
vulnerable, and geographical proximity as cues for strategic donation decisions.  While 
not the dominant explanation for PAC strategy, this model still receives favor among 
scholars in political science (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier, Radcliffe, and Bartels 2005, 
Wright 1989); however, in this first macro-study of the organizational presence model, I 
find that the model does not explain the majority of PAC decisions.  In essence, the 
model requires the scholar to organize PACs by geographic location, and the model 
argues that PACs should be thought of as geographic entities that operate as local 
electoral fundraising organizations.  My findings do not support this hypothesis.  The 
overwhelming amount of PAC money in congressional elections is raised and spent 
nationally.  The majority of PACs and the majority of PAC spending is not isolated in 
one particular state.  Of those PACs that do raise money from one or two states, a slight 
majority of that spending occurs within the same state; however, the strategic 
expectations of the organizational presence model do not explain much of the variation 
in PAC strategy. 
 I isolate PACs that receive a majority of their funding from one state and 
examine the strategy of these PACs, finding that home-state candidates do not receive 
any additional amount of money from these PACs.  From 1990 through 2006, state-




disproportionately high amount of money to candidates from California, Michigan, New 
York, or Texas.  While ideology and electoral vulnerability are significant predictors of 
PAC decisions, the overall fit of the organizational presence model is low.  Much of the 
variation in PAC strategy, even among the population of PACs the organizational 
presence model should explain the best, goes unexplained.  These results question both 
the focus on organizational maintenance and the mutual exclusivity of organizational 
maintenance as a strategy separate from legislative concerns.  Organizational 
maintenance, according to my findings, does not lead more PAC money being 
distributed to local candidates, and it is shortsighted to argue that PAC donors are 
political amateurs with myopic focus on local candidates.  My findings do not overturn 
or even address the need for PACs to maintain future funding streams by claiming 
success; however, scholars should interpret success broadly to mean electoral and 
legislative success.  Even political amateurs want their money to be useful beyond the 
electoral arena.  The implications of my findings are that organizational presence should 
be a control variable in models of PAC strategy, but building PAC-strategy theory off 












THE SUPPLY-SIDE APPROACH 
 
The fight between proponents and opponents of CFR [campaign finance reform] is 
difficult to resolve because both sides have valid points.  Government ought not to serve 
particular interests at the expense of others.  Nor should people who have sworn to 
uphold the Constitution silence political speech…the existence of this dilemma stems 
from reluctance on the part of many to address the underlying causes of the difficulties 
in question…from an economic perspective, if both proponents and opponents of CFR 
were serious about curtailing the abuse of the political process, they would make 
serious proposals for reducing the size and scope of the state.  Instead, one side’s 
solution legitimizes graft, while the other side’s solution penalizes political speech.  The 
solution lies neither in silencing political discourse nor in permitting corruption, but in 
the alteration or abolition of the governmental authorities that allow for the offensive 
practices in question…government is too large.  This being the case, both sides should 
redirect their efforts to the advocacy of privatization and deregulation. 
 
~D.W. MacKenzie and Christopher Westley, 2002~62 
 
As long as the government has the power to pick winners and losers in business, 
market-actors will have an incentive to invest, by whatever means necessary, in 
political influence…lobbying and campaign finance reform are true red herrings.  As 
long as government has the power to interfere dramatically in the market, market actors 
will devote resources to influencing what government does.  The only real solution is to 
respect constitutional limits on government activity and allow consumers to return to 
their natural role as the ‘bosses’ in a truly free market. 
 
~Arthur Foulkes, 2004~63 
 
Campaign finance reform efforts are entirely superfluous – what is needed is the 
abolition of the redistributive state, period. 
 




                                                
62 MacKenzie, D.W. and Christopher Westley. 2002. “The Debate on Campaign Finance.” The Free 
Market 20 (9): 1-2.  Published online at http://mises.org.  
63 Arthur Foulkes is a journalist, and his quote originated in an essay he wrote for the Ludwig Von Mises 
Institute on 19 April 2004, found at http://blog.mises.org/1859/money-in-politics-a-red-herring/.  






While the study and centrality of organized interests diminished among political 
science in the 1970s, it began to rise in the research program of public choice.  Scholars 
from the Chicago and Virginia schools of economics such as George Stigler, Sam 
Peltzman, Richard Posner, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Ann Krueger, Robert 
Tollison, Robert McCormick, William Shughart, Gary Becker, Dennis Mueller, and 
others helped create the field of public choice from one postulate: the application of 
economic assumptions and pro-market philosophy to politics will provide new insights 
on policymaking processes and outcomes.  Public choice is simply the “economic study 
of nonmarket decision-making, or…the application of economics to political science” 
(Mueller 1976, 395).65  In this application, the public choice research agenda seeks to 
explain all organized interest behavior with supply-side variables in hopes of 
minimizing government’s role in economic affairs.  While elitism, pluralism, and public 
choice all understand organized interests to be the central component of policymaking 
processes (Mitchell and Munger 1991, 536), the single contribution of public choice to 
group theory is explaining this behavior from the supply-side, meaning the organization 
of legislative institutions explains organized interests’ level of activity, strategy, and 
influence. 
                                                
65 In their review of group theory, Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 66) only make brief reference to the 
public choice approach of the Chicago and Virginia Schools of economic thought.  The public choice 
perspective developed by these schools dominates explanations of organized interest formation, strategy, 
and influence since the 1970s.  For a review of how these schools of thought developed see Mitchell 
(1990), Mitchell and Munger (1991), and Mueller (1976, 1988).  These reviews were helpful in 




Public choice scholars tell a simple and expected story about the policymaking 
process: since government has the power to tax, spend, and draft enforceable regulation 
in a majority-rule system, organized interests (i.e., producers) engage in a costly process 
of securing particular benefits to the economic detriment of unorganized interests (i.e., 
consumers).  The best way to minimize this costly behavior is to replace majority rule 
with a system of unanimous (or two-thirds) consent voting procedures via a 
constitutional amendment.  Embedded in this story is a dichotomy between empirical 
and normative research, which scholars use to legitimize the public choice project.66 
Scholars engaged in the empirical element of public choice investigate 
policymaking processes and its outcomes, while the normative element of public choice 
recommends policy solutions to the problems found during the empirical project 
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 281-289, 291-299).  This distinction occurs throughout 
the development and application of public choice.  Empirically, public choice 
scholarship proceeds from the assumptions that individuals are the most important 
                                                
66 There are three broad criticisms of public choice: (1) the distinction between empirical and normative is 
ambiguous, (2) the assumptions are not empirically accurate, and (3) public choice undermines public 
morality.  I will elaborate on the first criticism now, and the second and third criticisms appear in notes 
throughout the chapter.  The first criticism has two prongs.  First, the distinction between empirical and 
normative is ambiguous because public choice is tautological.  Its conclusions are built into the 
assumptions; for example, “freedom, economic justice, and efficiency are achieved in free, unregulated 
markets because freedom, economic justice, and efficiency have strict market definitions” (De Gregori 
1974, 223).  Second, the distinction between empirical and normative is ambiguous because public choice 
is ideological.  The individualistic and the anti-historicism nature of public choice make the project an 
arbitrary denial of class and more holistic conceptions of the state (e.g., general will).  Due to this anti-
historicism, public choice scholarship neglects the “coercion that was used to bring ‘free’ markets into 
existence,” and fosters an anti-interventionist attitude when it comes to the actions of government and 
administration, ignoring historical privilege and power that brought about particular economic 
relationships, selecting only a few cases to support their cause (De Gregori 1974, 221-223; also see 
Orchard and Stretton 1997, 410-411).  On this point, “the assumptions of this theory lead to one public 
policy conclusion: do virtually nothing.  More fundamental is the hidden assumption that honoring tastes 
expressed in the marketplace is freedom; honoring those expressed in the voting booth is repression” (De 




decision-making unit and are rational, self-interested, utility-maximizing agents.  From 
these assumptions, public choice argues that politics concerns the distribution of 
material goods, and government is described best as the arbiter of wealth transfers.  
Central to this process is organized-interest behavior, strategizing to extract as many 
private benefits as possible from government, resulting in economically inefficient and 
suboptimal policies.  Normatively, public choice scholars propose constitutional 
amendments and policy solutions limiting majority rule to curb this harmful group 
behavior found during the empirical investigations. 
Starting in the mid-1970s, public choice scholars turned their attention to PACs, 
and campaign contributions, since organized interest behavior in elections represented 
the epitome of efforts to seek particular benefits from government.  PACs became 
integral to public choice arguments concerning the nature of politics and role of 
government.  Applying the assumptions of public choice, and treating the 
PAC/legislator relationship as a market exchange of money and legislation, leads 
scholars to examine several hypotheses about PAC strategy.  The empirical validity of 
these hypotheses would lend support to public choice expectations about the 
policymaking process and efforts for reform.  At its core, the public choice project 
reasserts a pluralistic (or, hyperpluralistic) and anti-Marxist, conception of the 
American republic, and places PACs at the forefront of this discussion.  The purpose of 
this chapter is to trace the intellectual tradition of the most dominant explanation of 
PAC strategy to date, to show how this tradition influences the modeling of PAC 
strategy, and then to re-test the public choice model of PAC strategy.  This replication 




questions the utility of only using supply-side variables to model organized interest 
behavior in elections.   
Public Choice and Organized Interests: The Old Idea of Politics without Romance 
Public choice, developed most fully by the Chicago (e.g., Peltzman 1976; 
Posner 1971, 1974; Stigler and Friedland 1962) and Virginia (e.g, Buchanan and 
Tullock 1962; Shughart, Tollison and Goff 1986; McCormick and Tollison 1981) 
schools of economics, emerged from a critical response to both Keynesian and Marxist 
economics.  Keynesianism or welfare economics more generally, views markets as 
prone to disequilibrium and failure, and believes government spending can return 
markets to an equilibrium point.  Public choice views Keynesian economics as 
idealizing politics and government capabilities; thus, James Buchanan writes: 
in a very real sense, public choice became a set of theories of governmental 
failures, as an offset to the theories of market failures that had previously 
emerged from theoretical welfare economics…public choice may be 
summarized by the three-word description ‘politics without romance’ (Buchanan 
2008, 8).67 
 
Simply stated, public choice is a response to those who argue government can act in the 
public interest (Buchanan 2003, 8; Buchanan 2005, 1; Mitchell and Munger 1991, 520; 
                                                
67 Without actually addressing the Keynesian critique of laissez-faire capitalism, James Buchanan 
essentially designs a research program around this principle: if Keynesians show that markets cannot 
always serve the public good, then public choice will show that government cannot either.  Buchanan 
simply romanticizes the economic and debases the political.  This ideology occurs through out the public 
choice literature, especially concerning the origins of governmental regulation.  Kau and Rubin (1982, 2) 
note that regulation does not occur from market failures, instead the “purpose of much regulation seemed 
to be the creation of wealth for one or another set of special interests in the economy,” as there is “little 
relation between market failure and regulation.”  The entire public choice approach should be read as an 
attempt to eliminate most governmental programs.  In their discussion of automobile safety laws, Kau and 
Rubin (1982, 16-17) write, “even if the laws worked as designed, little theoretical basis exists for them 
since many of the reforms they mandate create no external benefits…automobile manufacturers, for 
example, seem to have been major losers.  In sum, automobile safety laws do not seem to serve any 




Orchard and Stretton 1997, 410).68  The study of economics suffered from a gap in the 
literature about governmental decision-making and public choice scholars sought to fill 
this gap by debunking the assumption that government can solve economic problems 
(Buchanan 2005, 1; Orchard and Stretton 1997, 410).  Politics without romance refers 
to the role individual political behavior plays in collective, government decision-
making; more specifically, the term indicates the public choice belief that rational, 
collective decision-making rarely can achieve public interest goals because individuals 
do not alter their self-interested motivations when transitioning from the economic to 
the political realm (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 19; Kau and Rubin 1982, 11-12).69  As 
a result, most regulations and public policies are manifestations of private interests 
seeking private economic gain over an unorganized population of taxpayers and 
consumers.  To reach this conclusion of politics without romance, public choice 
scholars begin with the assumptions of economic man. 
The homo economicus principle means that individuals act similarly in the 
economic and political realms, insinuating that it is different supply-side forces pushing 
markets toward equilibrium and governments toward failure (Buchanan and Tullock 
1962, 289).  Adopting homo economicus as the primary source of individual behavior 
                                                
68 While it is difficult to find a public choice scholar who provides a citation of who they believe to be a 
public interest theorist of governmental action, from various quotes and placement of terms, one can 
discern that public interest theorists include, Keynesians, Marxists, and Civic Republicans (Buchanan 
2003, 10). 
69 On this point, Kelman (1987) criticizes public choice scholarship for debasing political life, which 
results in a de-legitimization of political decision-making that undermines authority.  Public choice 
scholars respond by asking why keep the myth alive (Brennan and Buchanan 1988, 187-188)?  
Interestingly, working within the public choice tradition, Parker (1996, 153-154) finds that rent seeking 
undermines the intrinsic public interest motivations of congressional members, and fosters adverse 
selection of politicians who are only motivated by rent-seeking benefits; hence, rent seeking undermines 




assumes: (1) individuals are the most appropriate unit of analysis for all forms of 
decision-making (i.e., methodological individualism), (2) rationality, self-interest, and 
utility maximization characterize all individual-level decision-making, and (3) James 
Madison identified correctly the most important aspects of human nature (Buchanan 
2003, 1; Mitchell 1990, 85; Mueller 1976, 395).70   
The first assumption of methodological individualism means the individual, not 
groups, people, community, or class makes decisions and is the most important 
decision-making unit; thus, the study of collective decision-making is the study of how 
individuals act collectively when faced with varying constraints and incentive structures 
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 30-31).  While some public choice scholars cloak the 
importance of methodological individualism in its unit of analysis, which shifts away 
from ambiguous and non-verifiable larger units, the individual as the unit of analysis is 
the least important aspect of methodological individualism.  The significance of 
methodological individualism is its reactionary nature; positing the importance of the 
individual is a reaction to organic conceptions of societal organization (e.g., Keynes’s 
social welfare functions, Rousseau’s general will, Marx’s proletariat and bourgeoisie).  
Public choice is opposed to the Marxist conception of the State, and dismisses it as 
                                                
70 Critics argue that neither methodological individualism nor rationality are appropriate assumptions of 
political behavior.  First, proponents of class- and/or community-based decision-making argue that 
individuals behave within a structure and system that influences their behavior (De Gregori 1974, 209-
210).  Second, scholars criticize the rationality assumption for being empirically inaccurate (e.g., Green 
and Shapiro 1996; Wittman 1996; McQuaig 2001; Opp 1999).  Some argue that public choice takes a 
narrow view of rationality, which means preferences are egoistic, constraints must be tangible and 
explain the majority of decisions, and decisions are characterized by full information.  It is possible that 
organized interests have a wide conception of rationality, which means that non-egoistic preferences are 
relevant, all constraints are important including subjective constraints, and full information is not 
assumed  to characterize decision-making, and the relationship between preferences and constraints 
explains choices (Opp 1999, 174).  Another critique of self-interested rationality is evidence of altruistic 




irrelevant because Marx redefines economics as class warfare instead of gains from 
trade and exchange (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 11-15, 311-303).  Very simply, public 
choice argues that individuals have economic motivations in politics, but this 
motivation is not rooted in class, as indicated by their vehement denial of Beard’s thesis 
on U.S. constitutional development (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 24-25).  Class 
motivations are not accurate because “different individuals have different utility 
functions,” and the “individual must act contrary to his own economic interest to further 
the interest of the social class” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 25).  It is not differences 
in class, but differences in taste (i.e., utility functions) that separate individuals 
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 25); thus, it is not the individual, but the detached, 
separated nature of individuals/groups that is the most important aspect of 
methodological individualism.  Contrary to those organic conceptions of societal 
organization, methodological individualism posits that interests vary among individuals 
making these interests separated from each other. 
The variability and separateness of individual interests is vital to a proper 
understanding of methodological individualism because it moves analyses away from 
the simplistic and meaningless unit of analysis issue, and allows methodological 
individualism to infiltrate group theory discussions.  The variability of individual 
interests means that economists cannot derive proper social welfare functions because 
there are too many conceptions of public interest for a universal principle to benefit all 
interests; however, it is the separateness of interests that represents the force of public 
choice and what it means to be an economic individualist (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 




‘public interest’ does not exist, for the individual, as something apart from and 
independent of special group interests.”  If the primary concern of methodological 
individualism is the source of interests, then the unit of analysis is irrelevant for public 
choice studies (as long as it is not class), as indicated by the public choice founders’ 
support for the founder of modern pluralism: 
Although developed independently, our conception of democratic process has 
much in common with that accepted by the school of political science which 
follows Arthur Bentley in trying to explain collective decision-making in terms 
of the interplay of group interest.  Throughout our analysis the word ‘group’ 
could be substituted for the word ‘individual’ without significantly affecting the 
results (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 9). 
 
This passage is important for two reasons.  First, Buchanan and Tullock agree with 
Bentley’s conceptualization of group interest, which at its core is anti-Marxist.71  
Bentley argued that group interests are rooted rarely in mass, classed-based coalitions, 
and if this were to occur, a tyrannical government would ensue (Bentley 1908, 467).  
Second, Buchanan and Tullock are willing to have public choice extend to the study of 
organized interests (a unit of analysis shift away from individuals), which indicates 
what is truly economic about their approach is not individualism per se, but the 
exchange relation resulting from separated interests. 
 The application of economics to political science means that scholars should 
view politics as an exchange or trade relationship instead of one’s will opposing another 
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 308-309), which is the most controversial aspect of 
public choice: 
                                                
71 Please see Manley (1987, 116) for a discussion of Bentley’s denial of class-based group interests and 




Our theory is ‘economic’ only in that it assumes that separate individuals are 
separate individuals and, as such, are likely to have different aims and purposes 
for the results of collective action…when individual interests are assumed to be 
identical, the main body of economic theory vanishes.  If all men were equal in 
interest and in endowment, natural or artificial, there would be no organized 
economic activity to explain.  Each man would be a Crusoe.  Economic theory 
thus explains why men co-operate through trade: they do so because they are 
different (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 3-4).72 
 
The authors continue: 
The economic approach, which assumes man to be a utility maximizer in both 
his market and his political activity, does not require that one individual increase 
his own utility at the expense of other individuals.  This approach incorporates 
political activity as a particular form of exchange; and, as in the market relation, 
mutual gains to all parties are ideally expected to result from the collective 
relation” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 22). 
 
From these core assumptions, and viewing political decision-making as a market of 
exchange, public choice scholars derive a definition of government and politics focused 
on the distribution of material wealth.  The assumptions of methodological 
individualism, rationality, and the self-interested aspect of human nature are all directly 
related to the solutions offered by public choice to the problem of organized interest 
behavior: the unanimity decision-rule. 
The Chicago and Virginia schools of economic thought disagree slightly on the 
role government now plays in American representative democracy.  The Chicago school 
viewed government as a cartel manager that engages in “price fixing, restriction of 
entry, subsidies, suppression of substitute goods and promotion of complementary 
goods” (Mitchell 1990, 90).  The Virginia school viewed government as the arbiter of 
wealth transfers, since politics concerns who receives what in terms of material goods 
                                                
72 Public choice scholarship cannot maintain the separated individual when they advocate for 
constitutional change, or even when they discuss the empirical validity of organized (i.e., producers) 




(Hersch and McDougall 2000, 331; Mitchell 1990, 94; Mitchell and Munger 1991, 524; 
Orchard and Stretton 1997, 410).  Regardless of these subtle differences in definition, 
both schools of thought emphasize the role organized interests play in causing cartels or 
wealth transfers via government decision-making.  Cartels and/or wealth transfers result 
from the relationship between reelection-minded legislators and rent-seeking organized 
interests.  Organized interests are an “institutional manifestation of the active promotion 
of economic interest” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 269).  The sole purpose for the 
existence and strategy of organized interests is to seek particular benefit from 
government (i.e., rent seeking); thus, the Chicago and Virginia schools found that 
regulation and public policy rarely occur in the name of public interest (Mitchell 1990, 
89-90). 
The Virginia school developed the rent-seeking concept most fully (e.g., 
Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974), and it is defined as the costs 
paid on behalf of those organized groups (e.g., lobbying, campaign contributions, 
advertising) to acquire rents or benefits from government.  Rents refer to the economic 
gain accrued by an organized group at the cost of another group, typically unorganized 
taxpayers, because “concentrated pressure overcomes diffuse resistance” (Orchard and 
Stretton 1997, 412).  In more technical terms, “rent is the part of the payment to an 
owner of resources over and above that which those resources could command in any 
alternative use.  Rent is receipt in excess of opportunity cost” (Buchanan 1980, 3; also 
see Buchanan 2005, 49-50).  The concept of economic rent refers to the ability of a firm 
through innovation to accrue a profit that is more than it would be in a competitive 




firms enter as a result of seeing the profit accrued by the original firm (Buchanan 1980, 
3-7; Tullock 1988, 52-53).73  This profit-seeking behavior returns the new market to 
equilibrium; however, this same behavior in politics, called rent seeking, results in rents 
that are more permanent and gives incentives to firms to engage in lobbying rather than 
spending resources on innovation (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 21; Tullock 1988, 57).  
This incentive results in a system that seeks to protect existing rents and/or create 
cartels, as it is a “fairly obvious characteristic of our political process that protecting 
what you have is somewhat easier than acquiring a new income source or wealth” 
(Tullock 1988, 58; also see Buchanan 1980, 8).   
The difference between profit seeking and rent seeking is the different 
institutional settings in which the same behavior takes place (Buchanan 1980, 4).  In 
government, or collective decision-making, the result is social waste because the costs 
that government levies on unorganized individuals, the loss in innovation, and the 
money, time, and effort it takes to pursue advantages (e.g., lobbying), which organized 
interests could use to increase economic growth in accordance with public interest.  In 
addition, politicians and bureaucrats spend time seeking out these benefits from 
organized interests (Buchanan 1980, 8; Mitchell 1990, 95; Mueller 1988, 231; Tullock 
1988, 61).  The existence of rents means that Pareto efficient policies are available, but 
government fails to enact these policies.   
The public choice emphasis on rent-seeking behavior by organized interests 
reasserts a notion well known to political science: the distribution of organized interests 
                                                
73 Buchanan (1980, 7) acknowledges the “freedom of entry” or a lack of substantial barriers to entry is an 




helps determine the character of legislation (Crawford 1939; Schattschneider 1935, 
1960; Schriftgiesser 1951).74  Students of organized interests have always known that 
lobbyists seek something from government, and many times, government gives it to 
them.  What is unique about the public choice scholarship on rent seeking is its ability 
to explain the demand for rents with variables pertaining to the supply of rents.   
Analyzing and explaining organized interest behavior from the supply-side starts 
with a foundational assumption: organized interests engage in rent-seeking behavior 
because of government’s ability to tax, spend, and draft enforceable regulation 
(Mitchell and Munger 1991, 525; Mitchell 1990, 95).  Rent-seeking behavior results not 
from organized interests alone, but from the institutional design in which the organized 
interests operate.  Explaining rent seeking from an institutional viewpoint fills a gap left 
by the works of Truman (1951) and Olson (1965, 1982) because these works treat “rent-
seeking as a pure demand phenomenon leaving out the powerful role of the supplier, i.e. 
government, in aiding the pursuits of rent-seekers” (Mitchell 1990, 88; also see Mitchell 
and Munger 1991, 518).  Olson too narrowly focused on organized interest formation 
and the structure of inputs into the policymaking process, neglecting institutional 
design. 
                                                
74 James Buchanan (2003, 6) believes the rent-seeking approach, developed in the 1960s and 1970s 
represents a profound change in the way scholars view organized interest behavior:  
if an opportunity that promises to yield value arises, persons will invest time and resources in 
efforts to capture such value for themselves…the extension of this motivational postulate to the 
share of value allocated through politics or collective action seems elementary now, but until 
Tullock explicitly made the connection, no attention had been paid to the profound implications. 
These implications are the welfare costs associated with the pursuit of governmental policy advantage.  
There is nothing profound about rent seeking, it only provides a generalizable language with which to 
categorize the findings of political science with regards to lobbying (see especially Crawford 1939; 




The second assumption of the supply-side approach is that logrolling 
characterizes the lawmaking process, resulting in distributional and re-distributional 
policy coalitions (Orchard and Stretton 1997, 412).  Majority voting on legislation in 
Congress (neglecting the complexity of the lawmaking process including the filibuster 
power in the Senate, the conference committee, and presidential veto) exacerbates 
government spending and by extension, rent seeking: 
The twentieth century experienced a manifold increase in the size of 
government, at all levels, but concentrated in the United States at the federal 
level.  The political decision structure accelerated this growth.  Congress found 
itself able to advance popular spending programs separately from the imposition 
of taxes needed to finance them.  Further, the spending process itself was 
effectively decentralized through the delegation of authority to committees, 
members of which were necessarily responsive to interest groups (Buchanan 
2005, 1).75 
 
The extent of rent-seeking behavior is endogenous to the decision-making rule in 
legislative institutions, since building a coalition requires the distribution of money to 
legislators, and in return, the distribution of rents (Buchanan 2003, 4).  Organized 
interests, all acting to pursue private benefits, creates rent-induced policies, such as 
quotas, monopolies, license requirements, subsidies, price fixing, and tariffs; resulting 
in this paradox: “the better a polity performs its task of representing the economic 
interests of constituent groups, the worse it may be at managing its economy” (Mitchell 
1990, 88; also see Buchanan 1980, 9-10; Mueller 1988, 235-243).  The exposure of rent 
seeking is supposed to show that public policy is a series of government failures, and 
when juxtaposed against a market of voluntary exchange, convinces public choice 
                                                
75 Legislators are presented with a dilemma, as they cannot let the rents get too large to incorporate 
everyone, as the market would fail, but must sustain barriers to entry in order to attain power and money 




scholars to engage in the normative project to alter the decision-making process of 
government.76   
The empirical validity of rent-seeking behavior, coupled with a normative belief 
in unregulated market efficiency and mutual benefit, fosters the public choice argument 
that the outcomes of public and private decision-making differ substantially.  Public 
choice scholars argue that individuals in the private market act rationally to exchange 
goods and services for a Pareto efficient price; however, in the public market of 
government decision-making, acting rationally does not lead to a preferable equilibrium 
point, as the “invisible hand of competitive markets surely does not operate in the polity 
as in the private economy” (Mitchell 1990, 88; also see Mitchell and Munger 1991, 
516).  In sum, public choice wants to show how individuals operating on behalf of the 
same underlying motivation (i.e., utility maximization) in both the private market and 
public sphere arrive at mutual benefit via voluntary exchange in the private market, and 
private benefit via rent seeking and coercion in the public sphere (Buchanan and 
                                                
76 Another example of the ambiguity between the empirical/normative distinction in public choice is its 
incessant belief in market-based solutions.  Public choice scholars consider rents a social cost, not 
because an established capitalistic class is using the levers of government to benefit monetarily, or that 
government itself was established by an upper class and is not exogenous to the foundation of rent 
seeking, but because rents are distorting their neoclassical view of the marketplace.  In describing the 
organized interest influence in regulation, Mitchell (1990, 90) argues, “these practices have been widely 
recognized and documented by political scientists and fill the pages of their skeptical – sometimes 
Marxist-inspired – American government texts and countless research monographs.  Still many, prefer to 
believe in the welfare possibilities of vigorous governmental regulation of business.  Market competition 
is not thought to be robust.”  Mitchell does not provide a citation, but one can assume that those who 
believe in governmental regulation are Keynesians, and those who are skeptical-Marxists are those who 
believe government policy furthers class-based interests.  Public choice wants to refute both Keynes and 
Marx by arguing that government cannot help economic disequilibrium because of rent-seeking behavior, 
and government is not the tool of the capitalist class because of majority rule voting.  On the incessant 
belief that markets always tend toward equilibrium and are a system of voluntary exchange with mutual 
benefit, some public choice scholars either wish to ignore Marx’s arguments, do not understand them, or 
have not read Marx’s arguments about the development of capitalism.  For example, “since Adam Smith, 
we have known that the profit-seeking activity of the butcher and baker ensures results beneficial to all 
members of the community…but let us be honest.  How much more do we know about market process 




Tullock 1962, 99).  Since public choice engages in an institutional analysis of rent-
seeking behavior, all of their constitutional and policy changes affect legislative 
institutions; public choice scholarship defines the solution into the problem.   
The notion that American lawmakers can design institutions and rules to curb 
the effects of organized interests is older than the U.S. Constitution itself.  James 
Madison in Federalist Paper #10 recognized that it is human nature to form groups to 
serve interests, and liberty allows group formation and influence of government.  The 
downside of liberty is that these factions will influence government and the resulting 
public policy will levy costs on the losing minority.  Recognizing that curtailing liberty 
is not an option, Madison outlines two methods for controlling these adverse effects of 
factions, a demand- and a supply-side approach.  The demand-side approach is to locate 
government in a well-populated society, which will have diverse organized interests.  A 
society with heterogeneous organized interests will make the consistent application of 
costs on a consistent minority unlikely; pluralists recognize and advocate for this 
solution.  The supply-side solution offered by Madison is to develop a republic, not a 
democracy.  The scheme of representation offered by a republic provides distance 
between the majority of people and legislative power, helping ensure minority rights.  
Public choice scholars emphasize the supply-side Madisonian principle that the design 
of legislative institutions affects the influence of organized interests.  Emanating from 
this thought is the argument that Madison did not go far enough in curbing the effects of 
factions, as the scheme of representation and majority rule still foster rent-seeking 




‘optimal’ in 1900 are probably not ‘optimal’ in 1960” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 
275).   
Public choice theory adopts many Madisonian assumptions and goals by 
assuming humans are selfish and acquisitive, preferring to preserve the economic status 
quo with minority rule, wanting to control factions that pursue government influence for 
private gain, by preserving the wealth distribution created in the market.  Public choice 
parts ways with Madison on two occasions: (1) public choice only focuses on 
Madison’s supply-side solutions, neglecting demand-side controls of factions, and (2) 
public choice argues that Madison did not move far enough in his institutional design to 
ensure the goals of preserving wealth accrued in the private market.  The sub-category 
of public choice adopting this line of argument is called constitutional economics.77 
Constitutional economics is the study and understanding of the relation between 
constitutional decision-making rules and the growth of government influence in the 
economy, which rent seeking facilitates.  Unlike early public choice founders, Duncan 
Black and Kenneth Arrow, who were concerned with the stability of voting preferences 
                                                
77 Once again, the public choice normative agenda is a source of criticism for being an ideological 
diatribe.  Kau and Rubin (1982, 2) begin their book by stating, “it should be noted that we have a 
normative bias: we believe that much of the new regulation is inefficient and that the world would be a 
better place if it had not been passed.”  There is little doubt that a policy goal of public choice is to 
abolish the regulatory state, as Buchanan (2005, 3) writes, “the ‘regulatory state’ has not worked.  
Abandonment of its constitutional legitimacy offers a starting point for constructive dialogue.”  The 
questions not answered by public choice are, has not worked for whom, and by which metric?  One critic 
writes, “much of the writing and teaching in this vein has a consistent non-interventionist, anti-
administration, and ‘conservative’ bent to it” (De Gregori 1974, 211).  Of course, the public choice is 
non-interventionist once they achieve a constitutional amendment or policy changes that make it nearly 
impossible for government to spend money or act as a system of organization to counter the corporation.  
To my knowledge no public choice scholarship has occurred on the hypothesis that rent-seeking behavior 
occurs for de-regulatory purposes, distributing wealth upwards (e.g., Enron); however, some rent-seeking 
is seen as beneficial.  Mueller (1988, 241) argues, “rent seeking can sometimes improve welfare, for 
example, when it succeeds in eliminating a trade barrier.”  Buchanan (2003, 11) states that Keynesianism 




in collective decisions, James Buchanan concerns himself with preventing this 
instability from influencing public policy, protecting minority rule (Buchanan 2003, 3).  
A well-ordered and just society will abolish majority rule (presumably in elections and 
legislative voting) in favor of unanimity or at least a 2/3 voting procedure.  A change of 
this magnitude requires a constitutional amendment. 
This approach derives from the social contract tradition.  The ultimate goal of 
this social contract is to establish a political system that allows for extensive exchanges 
in the market, which are deemed to benefit both buyers and sellers, and producers and 
consumers (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 308-309).  Buchanan and Tullock (1962), 
however, replace the original intention of social contract theory, which is the argument 
for the origins of government, with their version, which is the “perfecting of existing 
institutions of government” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 304).  This conceptual shift 
essentially excludes historical conceptions of the state.  Their notion of the social 
contract, and the decisions emanating from individuals in this position is related to their 
assumptions about the individual.  The unanimity rule is an obvious choice because it 
allows Buchanan and Tullock not to make “interpersonal comparisons among separate 
individuals” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 14). 
The social contract concerns reducing costs, not accruing benefits, which is a 
normative, a priori judgment: “we propose to consider collective action as a means of 
reducing the external costs that are imposed on the individual by purely private or 
voluntary action,” but here is the value judgment: 
instead of using as our bench mark the situation in which no collective action is 
undertaken at all, we shall use that situation in which no external costs are 
imposed on the individual because of the action of others (Buchanan and 





The costs levied by government onto the individual are related to the decision-
rule in place and the difference between private and collective organizing.  Since the 
emphasis is on cost, the question becomes, what are the “costs of organizing decisions 
collectively” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 42)?  The costs levied on the individual are 
related to the costs of organizing.  Public choice starts from a position where collective 
action already exists, instead of a society where no collective action occurs.  Instead of 
comparing the costs and benefits of collective action itself, public choice only examines 
the costs of collective action and the benefit of not having collective action, or raising 
the costs of decision-making.   
There are two types of costs: (1) external costs, which are costs levied on the 
individual out of his/her control, and (2) decision-making costs, which are the costs 
levied on the individual (or group) for engaging in collective action (Buchanan and 
Tullock 1962, 63).  In the private market, both external and decision-making costs are 
zero in the long-run, since rents dissipate (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 43-45).  But, in 
the political arena, external costs and decision-making costs (together called social 
interdependence) have a different relationship.  The goal is to reduce social 
interdependence, which results from collective action.  Given this goal, the purpose is to 
increase decision-making costs so that external costs are reduced (Buchanan and 
Tullock 1962, 46).  Most areas of the economy will be collectivized if there are low 
decision-making costs, causing high external costs, but if decision-making costs are 
high, the economy will be privatized, keeping external costs low (Buchanan and 
Tullock 1962, 46).  The unanimity rule is most rational because it reduces external costs 




rule increases the size of the decision-making coalition, which organized interests could 
not, or would not bother spending the costs (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 79-80).78   
Public choice scholars focus on the costs of collective action, and not benefits, 
because the assumption in this social contract is that your economic position will 
always be better than the majority; therefore, you will always vote for high decision-
making costs so that the majority does not burden you with taxes for services, as “only 
the unanimity rule will insure that all external effects will be eliminated by 
collectivization” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 84).79  In terms of economic decision-
making, the individual in the social contract is a risk-taker.  Coming full circle, this 
social contract is antithetical to one offered by welfare economics: 
                                                
78 A follow-up research question would ask, would this not increase the likelihood of class-based action 
by having to broaden the coalition?   
79 It takes Buchanan and Tullock until page 84 to mention the foundational assumption of the public 
choice approach.  They use a common-pool resource, oil drilling, to exemplify why an individual would 
want to minimize the influence of collective decision making (i.e., government): 
Let us begin by considering a single activity that is organized by private decision-making but 
which does impose some external costs on the individual.  The individual experiences some 
reduction in his utility as a result of private behavior of other individuals.  Let us further assume 
that these external costs are present because of spillover effects and that no effort is being made 
to eliminate these through voluntarily organized institutional changes.  Take the common oil 
pool as a familiar example.  We assume an initial distribution of property rights such that there 
are many separate owners of drilling rights to the large common pool and that there has been no 
joint arrangement worked out voluntarily.  Recognizing the spillover costs imposed on him by 
the action of others, the single owner will support some collectivization of decision-making if 
the costs of the later are disregarded.  He may recognize that any centralization of decision-
making will reduce external costs that he expects to incur, but he will also recognize that only if 
the consent of all members of the group is required will he be free of all expectations of external 
costs.  Take the circumstances of the single owner whose productive equipment is somewhat 
more modern than that of most of his fellow drillers [emphasis added].  Suppose that a proposal 
is made to set over all limits on drilling by collective action and to allow the actual quotas to be 
set by a simple majority voting rule.  The owner in question may rationally support the 
collectivization of decision-making in the first place because this will reduce the expected 
external costs, but he will vote against the particular quota that the majority of his fellows 
choose because his own interests would be better served by different limits on production…he 
will be unable to determine with any degree of accuracy what his role will be in any particular 
decision in the future…the essence of the collective-choice process under majority voting rules 
is the fact that the minority of voters are forced to accede to actions which they cannot prevent 
and for which they cannot claim compensation for damages resulting.  Note that this is precisely 




it is especially surprising that the discussion about externality in the literature of 
welfare economics has been centered on the external costs expected to result 
from private action of individuals or firms.  To our knowledge little or nothing 
has been said about the external costs imposed on the individual by collective 
action (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 85).   
 
Ironically, or hypocritically, for this constitutional change to occur, consumers must 
recognize their common interest as consumers to get out of their prisoners’ dilemma.  
The ultimate goal, stemming from a pro-market ideology, is to turn politics into an 
exchange process resembling the idealized view of the market (Buchanan 2005, 71-76). 
The logic of a strict voting rule is that organized interests will not have enough 
resources to operate in a logrolling environment that must achieve unanimity or a super-
majority.  This voting procedure, in conjunction with the checks and balances in place, 
should allow market processes to thrive unfettered from future government influence.  
This line of thought makes public choice scholars proponents of low marginal tax rates, 
line-item vetoes, sunset laws, and balanced-budget amendments (Buchanan 2005, 1; 
Mitchell 1990, 101).   
These amendments and policies seek to restore government intervention around 
one central principle: the government must “provide general benefits to all individuals 
and groups and which are financed from general tax revenues” (Buchanan and Tullock 
1962, 273).  Policies violating this principle come in two discriminatory forms: (1) 
policies that target a particular group or population for selective benefit and impose 
costs generally on society, and (2) policies that benefit society generally and impose 
costs selectively (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, 277).  More specifically, policies that 
“are clearly ruled out, at least in principle, are all programs that target persons who 




(Buchanan 2005, 2-3).  In essence, public choice is defending liberty in the name of 
equality, or allowing private individuals and corporations to do as they wish in the 
market place, while arguing that all must be taxed and benefit equally by government 
policy.  The purpose of the general principle, and the policies following this principle is 
to control organized interest behavior through supply-side means, which is the unique 
contribution of public choice. 
 All public choice inquiries into organized interest behavior take supply-side 
constraints as the most important indicator of rent seeking, the central notion behind 
politics without romance.  The public choice project is one that moves from 
assumptions to behavior to outcomes, showing that politics rarely involves the public 
interest and most likely involves an exchange of favors between organized interests and 
legislators.  These favors, and resulting policies, distribute costs disproportionately to 
unorganized interests (i.e., consumers, sometimes referred to as voters).  Analyzing the 
dichotomy between organized and unorganized interests, via a supply-side approach, is 
fundamental to PAC-strategy models.  For public choice, PAC strategy is synonymous 
with rent-seeking strategy, and PAC strategy modeling is rent-seeking modeling.  
Public choice models of PAC strategy take the most important elements of 
methodological individualism (e.g., group interest is rooted in particular self-interest of 
members, behavior based on economic exchange) and utility maximization to formulate 
models of rent seeking.   
Public Choice, Pluralism, and Policymaking: The Supply of Public Policy Model 
While public choice argues the rent-seeking behavior of organized interests fails 




system of rent seeking is in equilibrium.  The modeling of PAC behavior with public 
choice is an attempt to diagram the rent-seeking system; all benefits from government 
have a price, and “in the political world that price can be paid in the form of campaign 
contributions” (Mitchell 1990, 90).  Scholars applying the framework of public choice 
to the rent-seeking system find that when PACs act rationally in their own self-interest 
(maximizing their separate, distinct preferences), the system of interacting politicians, 
organized interests, and unorganized interests is in equilibrium. What better way to 
blame the supply-side of legislative development (i.e., Congress) than to argue there is 
nothing wrong with the demand-side of legislative development (i.e., distribution of 
organized interests)?  All PACs have their own separate economic interest, and 
rationally seek to maximize this interest, which public choice argues can be seen when 
studying how legislative institutional design brings to light this PAC behavior.   
 Denzau and Munger’s (1986) supply of public policy model is the culmination of 
early efforts to explain public policymaking from the incentives and constraints of 
legislator (Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Bental and Ben-Zion 1975; Kau and Rubin 1982; 
Silberman and Yochum 1980).  Through this model’s synthesis of pluralists’ and 
institutionalists’ fundamental claims about policymaking, the model posits that public 
policy originates from those organized interests (i.e., interest groups) who actively 
pursue a policy stance and the discretion of those who must decide on which policy to 
pursue (i.e. legislators).  Policymaking is a product of relationships between three 




(e.g., PACs, interest groups).80  Legislators are motivated, first and foremost, by 
reelection, and unorganized and organized interests are motivated by the substance of 
public policy (Denzau and Munger 1986, 91-92).  This model adds to the work of 
previous supply-side models (Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Bental and Ben-Zion 1975) by 
adding the sophistication of the electorate as something that varies in their deductive 
models, and viewing the legislator as someone who is constrained in their ability to 
serve both voters and organized interests; there must be some trade-off, as it is not 
physically possible to serve both (Mitchell and Munger 1991, 538).  
These three agents have certain freedoms and constraints en route to achieving 
their goals.  Legislators have the most control over how they decide to spend their time, 
usually between constituency service (e.g., casework) and giving specific favors to 
interest groups (e.g., specific items in legislation, testimony at hearings) (Denzau and 
Munger 1986, 91).  Both unorganized and organized interests want to maximize their 
policy preferences, but each entity does so in different ways.  Unorganized interests 
have discretion over their vote choice, and legislators affect this choice through 
casework, roll call votes, and campaign activities (Denzau and Munger 1986, 92).  
Organized interests, or interest groups in elections, have discretion over which legislator 
they give money to during the election cycle.  In sum, legislators legislate, voters vote, 
                                                
80 Throughout public choice, there is a concern for the dichotomy between organized and unorganized 
interests.  For the early developers of the supply side approach (Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Bental and 
Ben-Zion 1975), the central dilemma of political action was that there is “conflict between serving one’s 
geographic constituency for votes and serving interest groups in exchange for the money needed to 
campaign and win those votes” (Mitchell and Munger 1991, 537).  Kau and Rubin (1982, 3) state the 
issue as one of explaining the variation in roll call voting, “we identify three agents who are important in 
the roll call voting model: representatives who actually vote for the bills; constituents, who vote for or 
against representatives based on the stands of the representatives on issues of interest to constituents; and 
contributors to political campaigns, who give to representatives based on the way the representatives will 




organized interests give money, and it is the discretion and constraints over this activity 
that makes the supply of public policy model interesting.81 
Legislators, voters, and organized interests are all constrained maximizers, who 
seek the most efficient way of utilizing their discretionary activities.  Legislators are 
constrained by the total effort they can dispense to voters and organized interests, voters 
are constrained by who appears on their voting ballot, and organized interests are 
constrained by their scare resources (Denzau and Munger 1986, 92).  It is the 
assumptions about goals, discretion, and constraints that foster certain hypotheses about 
public policymaking and the role of PAC decision-making in this system.  These goals, 
discretionary acts, and constraints play into the decision calculus of the legislators, 
voters, and organized interests. 
The voter decision calculus in the supply of public policy model is 
straightforward, as the voter makes choices based on the legislator’s time spent 
conducting constituency service, his/her decisions while in Congress, and their 
campaign activities; however, it is the organized interest decision calculus (e.g., which 
campaign to support, whom to lobby) that is the model’s focal point.  The model is a 
supply-side model because it explains PAC contribution strategy through those that 
supply public policy (i.e., legislators).  The legislator’s promised level of effort is the 
basis on which PACs strategize, and this effort derives from a legislator’s institutional 
capacity and constituent preferences, which make the legislator more or less likely to be 
                                                
81 The supply of public policy model assumes that voters do not contribute money during a campaign and 
that interest groups do not vote.  While this assumption is incorrect and scholars should use empirical 
data to determine if this incorrect assumption influences the model’s findings, I maintain this assumption 
for the same reason as Denzau and Munger (1986, 93): simplicity.  One can relax this assumption by 




productive in a particular policy domain.  Institutional capacity refers to a legislator’s 
ability to influence certain policy domains over others, including committee 
assignments, committee chair positions, and seniority.  A legislator’s constituency 
preferences bind the legislator from making public policy that would diminish his/her 
chances for reelection (Denzau and Munger 1986, 93-99).  What governs the supply 
price of public policy, and the organized interest’s decision to support a legislator, is the 
legislator’s comparative advantage at supplying public policy.  Due to the organization 
of Congress via the committee and seniority system, and geographic representation in 
districts and states, each legislator has something different to offer organized interests; 
hence, “the more adept the legislator is at producing policy services for a group, the 
lower the minimum price he will require for doing so” (Denzau and Munger 1986, 97).  
The legislator’s comparative advantage, while a source of effort on public policy labor, 
also reflects the cost to the PAC when making strategic decisions about electoral 
spending and support. 
The cost of each legislator (i.e., institutional capacity, constituency 
characteristics) is the supply price to the PAC, or the supply price for public policy.  
Since organized interests are constrained maximizers, and have the assumed ability to 
shop between the 535 members of Congress who themselves are organized to achieve a 
division of labor, PACs seek the lowest supply price for public policy favors.  In sum, 
what constrains PAC strategy is the supply price (e.g. legislator characteristics) of 
public policy.  If correct, then this model’s conclusions have ramifications for 




The primary conclusion emanating from the supply of public policy model is 
that our democratic system represents unorganized interests because the supply price 
facing organized interests embed the interests of the unorganized.  Unorganized voters 
make decisions “based not on whether the legislator accepts money, but on what he 
does in order to elicit the contributions in the first place,” thus, “in deciding which 
interest groups to serve, the legislator must consider the response of the large, 
unorganized group” (Denzau and Munger 1986, 95).82  Organized interests are not 
passive elements in the election cycle, merely supplying services and money to those 
legislators seeking monetary help, rather, they seek benefits actively from government, 
exploiting the institutional design of Congress to achieve these benefits cheaply.  The 
assumption is that “each interest group desires to achieve a set of goals, and makes its 
campaign resource contributions in the way it believes best accomplishes these goals” 
(Denzau and Munger 1986, 97).  This assumption of the supply of public policy model, 
and the public choice approach in general, underlies a majority of PAC research. 
Ironically, it is PACs pursuing and maximizing their self-interest that reconciles 
the differences between organized and unorganized interests in elections. Throughout 
the discussion of the constraints faced by voters, interest groups, and legislators, 
Denzau and Munger (1986) assume that there is an antagonism between unorganized 
interests and organized interests, and it is the organized interest’s decision on whom to 
                                                
82 This model presumably works even if voters are “rationally ignorant” since the “legislator must 
consider not only the reaction of voters given their present knowledge, but also the expected reaction if 
voters were to find out…thus, another consideration enters the interest group’s choice of which legislators 
to contribute to – the preferences of a legislators geographic constituency” (Denzau and Munger 1986, 





support monetarily that reconciles this tension.  The beauty, elegance, and seductiveness 
of this approach is that voters and organized interests begin as antagonistic and become 
congruent once organized interests become seekers of legislation.  The representation of 
unorganized interests via the behavior of organized interests is central to this model: 
Although the unorganized group appears nowhere as an explicit agent in the 
bargaining over the policy outcome between the legislator and interest 
groups…the preferences and expected voting reaction of the unorganized group 
are implicitly embodied in the schedule of supply prices…The conclusion is that 
unorganized, noncontributing voters may be effectively represented even in a 
situation in which interest groups are well organized and active.  The 
representation of such voters, deriving from the institutional requirement of 
periodic reelection for legislators, tends to reduce the influence of organized but 
nonvoting economic interests in the political process.  Thus, unorganized groups 
can shape and constrain decisions to a greater extent than predicted by simple 
demand-oriented group theories of collective action (Denzau and Munger 1986, 
98-103).   
 
The fundamental purpose of the supply of public policy model is to show how 
unorganized interests can influence the behavior of congressional members through the 
behavior of organized interests, which is the core element of modern pluralism.  The 
public approach to PAC strategy maintains the essential element of pluralism: the 
political behavior of organized interests helps represent the interests of unorganized 
interests.   
Public Choice, Pluralism, and PAC Strategy: The Legislative Asset Model 
Using the arguments from the supply of public policy model, Grier and 
Munger’s (1986) legislative asset model analyzes PAC strategy more specifically. The 
purpose of the legislative asset model is twofold: (1) to show that the supply-side 
approach can explain most of the variation in PAC donations (and in turn, showing the 
rationality, self-interest motivations of PACs), and (2) to show the rent-seeking system 




interests.  The legislative asset model conveniently subsumes all strategies and PAC 
distinctions (rational, pragmatic, investor, ideological) under one postulate: all PACs 
will pursue their goals efficiently.  Some PACs will pursue more legislative ends, which 
place primacy on the committee assignment, while other PACs place primacy on 
ideology so that ideological variables become more significant than others.83  This 
application began a systematic inquiry into PAC spending combining legislative (i.e., 
pragmatic, investor-oriented PACs), electoral, and ideological strategies (i.e., 
ideological PACs) into one model of PAC behavior, as evidence shows that PACs use 
different strategies for different legislators (Stratmann 1992, 648).84 Much of the PAC 
literature either implicitly (e.g., Grenzke 1989, 259; Rudolph 1999, 196-197) or 
explicitly (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier and Grant 1999, 511; Endersby and Munger 1992, 
79; Grier and Munger 1991, 1993; Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 113; Havrilesky 
1990, 243; Hersch and McDougall 2000, 331; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1163; 
Kroszner and Stratmann 2005, 43-44; Snyder 1993, 219-220; Stratmann 1992, 649) 
adopts the legislative asset model, deriving from the supply-side model of public policy 
                                                
83 Some argue that the public choice approach, and by extension, the legislative asset model, do not think 
PACs are benign access seekers: “a considerable portion of recent discussion insists that PAC campaign 
contributions, in general, are merely investments in ‘access’ to (be able to ‘tell the PAC’s story) 
incumbent politicians that are invariant with respect to either regulatory philosophy or voting records.  
Nevertheless, doubts about these contentions, quite understandably, persist,” and they are found in the 
public choice literature (Havrilesky 1990, 243-244).  Many authors use a dichotomy between pragmatic, 
legislative, or investor oriented PACs versus electoral, ideological PACs (e.g., Rudolph 1999, 196-197; 
Sorauf 1988; Snyder 1990, 1992, 1993). 
84 The central dichotomy in the PAC-strategy literature has always been investment versus ideological, as 
investor PACs are “set up by organizations with relatively narrow economic interests – corporations, 
labor unions, trade associations, and farmers’ cooperatives,” but “ideological PAC contributions should 
be less persistent than investor PAC contributions…in particular, while there is persistence in both types, 
ideological PAC contributions exhibit considerably more year-to-year variation than investor PAC 
contributions” (e.g., Snyder 1992, 19).  It is the unconnected PACs, as defined by the FEC, which are 




and the general public choice approach to political behavior.  PACs are seekers of the 
cheapest favors possible, as they supply money and demand legislation and regulation.   
The fundamental premise of the legislative asset model is that “PACs contribute 
disproportionately to legislators who have a comparative advantage in producing the 
services desired” (Grier and Munger 1986, 349).  The simple premise of the public 
choice approach to PAC strategy is that PACs supply money and demand legislation, 
and strategize to satisfy this demand with minimizing cost.  PACs shop around for the 
lowest cost legislator, and are able to do this shopping because legislator profiles are 
diverse: 
each is elected from a distinct geographic district with voters whose preferences 
may vary widely across districts.  Each legislator also has different endowments 
of ability and experience and a different position in the legislative committee 
system.  Thus, the cost of providing services to interest groups will vary across 
legislators and interest groups can be expected to employ the legislator or group 
of legislators that are the least-cost suppliers of the desired policy (Grier and 
Munger 1986, 352).   
 
This legislator-profile diversity and PACs’ ability to shop for legislators form the 
foundation of the comparative advantage thesis: PACs purchase legislative benefits 
from the lowest-cost providers, who are low cost because they are in a better position to 
supply the benefits, relative to other congressional members (Grier and Munger 1986, 
354).  The three sources of legislator differentiation are legislative, ideological, and 
electoral, which PACs use to establish the supply price (Grier and Munger 1986, 352-
354). 
 A legislative strategy emphasizes the member’s committee assignment, 
incumbency, majority party status, leadership position, and seniority, both in the 




House of Representatives allows some members to be more influential than others 
through committee assignments and leadership positions.  PACs seek those members in 
the best institutional position to supply legislation corresponding to PAC and organized 
interest concerns (Grier and Munger 1986, 354).  As the legislative asset model 
developed, the congressional committee took primacy in explaining PAC strategy.85  
Since the public choice approach views PACs as rent-seeking agents, the congressional 
committee system must be the most important variable in explaining how PACs achieve 
their goals, as rent seekers pursue legislative/regulatory items.  This rent-seeking pursuit 
is not thought to come at the cost of voter wishes since “committees whose jurisdictions 
are most relevant to the policy interest of a group may still not receive contributions 
unless separate account is taken of the preferences of the voters those committee 
members represent” (Grier and Munger 1991, 26-27).  If organized interests are rent 
seekers, and PACs are an extension of some organized interests, then the legislative 
process is the highest concern for PACs.  Since much of the legislative process occurs 
in congressional committees, committee assignment should explain most of the 
variation in PAC donations.  The congressional committee is vital to the public choice 
approach to PAC strategy: 
We focus first on committee assignment because our theory predicts this 
variable is the most important institutional determinant of the allocation of PAC 
funds (Endersby and Munger 1992, 79).   
                                                
85 Box-Steffensmeier and Grant (1999, 512-517) do not find committee assignment to be a significant 
explanatory variable in PAC strategy; they organize committees into constituency, policy, prestige, and 
unrequested and examine total PAC dollars across those committee assignment classifications.  In chapter 
two I use total PAC dollars in the district to search for committee assignment bias, and find little 
significant difference, expect there are a few committees that receive much less PAC money.  The authors 
add another variable to the legislative strategy, legislative success or hit rate, but this new variable adds 






Interest groups maximize profits (or analogous to the model of Peltzman 1976) 
regulatory returns from campaign contributions…the prediction is that, ceteris 
paribus, the pattern of contributions should largely conform to the pattern of 
legislative jurisdictions (Grier, Munger, and Torrent 1990, 113). 
 
The committee system also allows congressional members to develop reputations and a 
long-term relationship with PACs (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1163-1166).  As a 
result, the expectation is that PACs embedded in certain policy domains will donate 
more than the average to members on certain committees, as PACs in certain domains 
donate more to certain committee members than they do to all other members not on the 
committee, and scholars have confirmed this hypothesis (e.g., Endersby and Munger 
1992, 82; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998, 1171-1172).86    In sum, the legislative strategy 
expects incumbency, committee assignments, majority party status, leadership 
positions, and both chamber and committee seniority to explain the variation in the real 
dollar amount of PAC donations to congressional candidates.   
An ideological strategy indicates that PACs account for a congressional 
members’ voting ideology, political party (correlates with ideology), and by extension, 
constituency concerns.  This strategy seeks to reduce constituent costs on the PAC by 
contributing to congressional members who can act on PAC needs without creating 
discontent among constituents.  PACs donate to congressional members who are 
                                                
86 Eismeier and Pollock (1984, 137; 1986, 293, 303) also measure the influence of governmental 
regulation on industry PAC contribution patterns.  The authors find those industries subject to traditional 
economic regulation contributed more to incumbents while those industries subject to new social 
regulation contributed more to Republican challengers in the early 1980s.  The influence of regulation on 
PAC contribution strategy should not only be manifest in partisan giving, but also a broader legislative 
strategy.  Their findings indicate “support for the thesis that at least part of the observed variation in 
corporate PAC spending may be understood in terms of the complex web of government-business 
relations that has been spun in this century” (Eismeier and Pollock 1986, 303).  Another interesting 
research design is using Eismeier and Pollock’s application of electoral expectations (I could interact 




ideologically similar because it would cost too much to shift a member ideologically 
(Grier and Munger 1986, 355).  This strategy is also indicated by PACs giving more 
money to the one political party over another (Brunell 2005, 685).  In sum, the 
ideological strategy predicts that ideology, as measured with roll call votes, and district 
partisanship, as measured with the Democratic presidential normal vote, explains the 
variation in the real dollar amount of PAC donations to congressional candidates. 
 An electoral strategy indicates that PACs donate to those friendly members who 
face electoral uncertainty during the current election, allowing PACs to acquire leverage 
over a winning candidate in the next congressional session.  Electoral costs refer to a 
PAC’s ability to rent low-cost members by supporting vulnerable representatives.  
Congressional members are more likely to act in the PAC’s interest when the member 
needs money to win an election.  If the candidate campaigns for a safe seat, then PACs 
must spend more money to acquire the congressional member’s attention (Grier and 
Munger 1986, 353-355).   
Underlying these three strategies is the notion that PACs donate only in districts 
with constituent preferences congruent with the PAC’s goals.  PACs will not donate the 
required amount of money (it may be an amount beyond the limit anyways) necessary 
to shift a congressional member’s policy preferences in a direction opposite of his/her 
constituency.  Even in cases of industry rivalry (e.g., General Motors, Ford), the PACs 
within an industry illustrate similar donation patterns to congressional districts with 
high industry employment, regardless of the company, which could mean that PAC 
strategy concerns collective, industry benefits rather than particular benefits to one 




important variables for the legislative asset model conform to legislative, ideological, 
and electoral strategies, with no variables concerning the organizational or maintenance 
needs of PACs and how those needs affect PAC strategy.  
 The assumption that must occur for this model to be the most accurate 
explanation of PAC strategy is that PACs are placeless entities: 
Our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between 
serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his 
constituency…we do not model interest group decisions directly, assuming 
simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost 
supplier…policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the 
incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium (Grier and Munger 1991, 24-
25). 
 
The legislative asset model, and all research that uses this model, views legislators and 
voters as bound geographically to a district, and it is PACs that can maneuver among 
districts donating money.  By law, this conceptualization of elections is true, money can 
cross district and state lines, but voters and legislators cannot; however, in reality, the 
model ignores demand-side constraints making PAC donations less portable (e.g., PACs 
have organizational maintenance goals and must respond to individual donor wishes).  
The assumption that PACs are placeless entities, responding to supply prices, unbound 
by organizational need and geography is not academic, its accuracy has real 
consequence for the public choice approach to politics. 
 The purpose of the legislative asset model is to show how the distribution of 
organized interests through out American politics (i.e., the demand side) is 
inconsequential for public policy outputs because organized interests respond to supply-
side forces, and these supply-side actors (i.e., legislators) must respond to unorganized 




donate money to legislators who cannot deviate beyond the policy parameters set by 
unorganized interests.  For this story to represent reality, PACs must be placeless 
organizations.  If PACs do not act according to the legislative asset model, then the 
pluralistic conception of representation is less appealing.   
 I test the legislative asset model on the net 1989 real dollar PAC donation 
patterns of twelve policy sectors during the 1990 through 2006 electoral cycles (direct 
and in-kind donations): agribusiness, communications/electronics, construction, 
defense, energy and natural resources, finance, insurance, and real estate, health, 
ideological and single issues, labor, lawyers and lobbyists, miscellaneous business, and 
transportation.  Organizing PACs by policy sector is the most appropriate method to test 
the legislative asset model, as opposed to geographical organization, because the 
legislative asset model views PACs as rent seekers, and PACs representing similar 
public policy domains should have similar strategies to obtain public policy goals.   
The dependent variable is the percentage of total policy sector donations to a 
congressional district during the electoral cycle, measured with direct and in-kind 
donations.  For example, if a policy sector donated $9 million in direct and in-kind 
donations, and $25,000 of that total was donated to a single congressional district, then 
the value of the dependent variable for that observation is .0028.  In this example, the 
policy sector donated .28% of its total donations to that congressional district.   
At the policy-sector level the PAC system is highly stable and diffuse, with the 
twelve policy sectors exhibiting repeat giving across most congressional districts.  Table 
4.1 displays the proportion of congressional districts receiving PAC donations from 




makes little sense to use a dichotomous dependent variable for the incidence of PAC 
donations; instead, it is more important to focus on the amount of the policy sector 
donations to each district, in the form of a percent of the entire policy sector donations 
(direct, in-kind) to the district.   
Table 4.1 Incidence of PAC Donations to Congressional Districts by Policy Sector, 
1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Policy Sector   Congressional Districts  Percent of Total 
    Receiving Donations   (Total N=3,915) 
Agribusiness    3,782     96.6% 
Communications/Electronics  3,791     96.8% 
Construction    3,659     93.4% 
Defense    3,399     86.8% 
Energy and Natural Resources 3,778     96.5% 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 3,857     98.5% 
Health     3,843     98.1% 
Ideological and Single Issue  3,840     98.1% 
Labor     3,814     97.4% 
Lawyers and Lobbyists  3,735     95.3% 
Miscellaneous Business  3,840     98.1% 
Transportation    3,775     96.4% 
a. PAC donations refers to direct donations (24K) and in-kind donations (24Z) only, measured as net 
1989 real dollar donations. 
 
Using OLS multivariate regression, I regress a series of independent variables on this 
dependent variable, and the value of each coefficient is a percent.  There is a total of 24 
models.  I test the legislative asset model on each of the 12 policy sectors listed in table 
4.1, and for each policy sector there is an incumbent and open seat model.  The 
incumbent model uses the dependent variable for congressional districts with an 
incumbent in the general election, and the open seat model uses the dependent variable 
for congressional districts without an incumbent in the general election.  The 
independent variables represent the three strategies of the legislative asset model.   
For the legislative strategy, I use the full committee assignments of jurisdiction 




House Administration, Rules, and Ways and Means Committees).  I measure both 
jurisdiction and policy full committee assignments with a categorical variable capturing 
those that sit on the committee (value of 1), the committee chair (value of 2), and those 
that do not sit on the committee (value of 0).  The House Administration committee is 
usually not included in most research designs but those congressional members sitting 
on this committee receive more money than those that do not (see Chapter Two), 
probably for one particular reason.  The House Administration Committee’s jurisdiction 
includes drafting regulations for contested elections, corrupt behavior, and campaign 
contributions.  I measure the committee assignment variable using the assignment from 
the second term of the previous legislative session.  For the incumbent model, it is the 
committee assignment of the incumbent entering the general election, and for the open 
seat model, it is the committee assignment of the previous congressional member.  The 
other two variables that represent the legislative strategy are leadership and chamber 
seniority.  I measure leadership position with a dichotomous variable.  Those districts 
with a congressional member occupying the Speaker of the House, the 
majority/minority party leader, and majority/minority party whip are considered 
leadership positions (value of 1), and all other positions are not considered leadership 
(value of 0).  I measure leadership position using the positioning of the second term of 
the previous legislative session.  For the incumbent model, it is the leadership 
positioning of the incumbent entering the general election, and for the open seat model, 
it is the leadership positioning of the previous congressional member.  I measure 
chamber seniority with the total legislative sessions of service of the previous 




total sessions of the incumbent entering the general election, and for the open seat 
model, it is the total sessions of the previous congressional member.87  I expect high-
priced committees, committees of jurisdiction, leadership positioning, and chamber 
seniority to all increase the percentage of net real dollar donations of a policy sector to a 
congressional district, for both the incumbent and open seat model.  The only policy 
sector I do not expect to have a legislative strategy is the ideological and single issue 
PACs. 
The ideological strategy consists of two variables, capturing the ideology of the 
congressional member and of the district.  I measure the ideology of the congressional 
member using the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE scores, with negative values 
indicating the congressional member is a liberal and positive values indicating the 
congressional member is a conservative.  I measure the ideological scores for the 
previous congressional member.  For the incumbent model, it is the ideological score of 
the incumbent entering the general election, and for the open seat model, it is the 
ideological score of the previous congressional member.   I measure district partisanship 
using the Democratic presidential normal vote (two-party percentage of vote for the 
Democratic presidential candidate in district minus the two-party percentage of vote for 
the Democratic presidential candidate in nation), with negative values indicating 
conservative districts and positive values indicating liberal districts.  I measure this 
variable using the current election when the electoral cycle is a presidential election 
year and the previous election when it is a midterm election (e.g., 1992 normal vote for 
                                                
87 I do not use majority party or political party affiliation because ideology correlates with those variables, 




the 1992 electoral cycle, and 1992 normal vote for the 1994 electoral cycle).  I expect 
the ideological strategy to influence the percentage of net real dollar policy sector 
donations to a congressional district, but the direction of such influence will depend on 
the policy sector.  For example, I expect labor PACs to donate heavily to liberal and 
Democratic districts, and miscellaneous business PACs to donate heavily to 
conservative and Republican districts.   
The electoral strategy includes five independent variables: electoral margin, 
Democratic quality challenger, Republican quality challenger, freshman status, and 
constituency characteristics.  I measure electoral margin of victory using the results 
from the current electoral cycle, and as a percent difference between the winner and the 
second-place finisher [ (# votes for winner - # votes for second-place) / (# votes for 
winner + # votes for second-place)].  I measure quality challenger with a dichotomous 
variable for each the Democratic and Republican Party.  Those challengers who have 
held elected office previously are quality challengers (value of 1).  I measure the 
freshman status of the incumbent with a dichotomous variable.  I consider a freshman as 
those incumbents entering their second election with one legislative session of 
experience (value of 1).   The final variable of the electoral strategy is constituency 
characteristics.  I measure constituency characteristics using percent employment in a 
policy sector, which derives from the U.S. Census Bureau, measured every 10 years and 
updated for congressional redistricting.  I also include dichotomous control variables for 
electoral cycles 1992 through 2006, with 1990 as the baseline.   
I expect the electoral strategy to influence the percentage of net real dollar 




should have a negative correlation with PAC donations, as the margin of victory 
increases, the percent of PAC donations to the congressional district should decrease.  
The presence of a quality challenger should increase the percentage of PAC donations 
to a congressional district, but the partisanship of such increase is ambiguous.  For 
example, an increase in total PAC donations to a congressional district as a result of the 
presence of a Democratic quality challenger may not actually go to that Democrat.  If a 
policy sector donates to conservative districts, then the total PAC donations may 
increase as a result of the Democratic quality challenger because the policy sector 
donates more to the conservative incumbent.  I expect the presence of a freshman 
incumbent to increase PAC donations, and the level of employment in the district 
should increase the net real dollar percentage as well.  PACs within a policy sector 
should place more emphasis on elections in districts with higher employment in that 
sector.  While the overall performance of the legislative asset model is important to the 
entire public choice theoretical perspective of PAC strategy, committee assignments 
and constituency characteristics are the most important variables to the model.  The 
statistical significance of committee assignments gives credence to the rent-seeking 
approach, and the statistical significance of constituency characteristics gives credence 
to the pluralistic perspective on political representation.   
Findings 
 Tables 4.2-4.13 display the incumbent and open seat models for each of the 
twelve policy sectors, all with predictable results corresponding to previous findings.  
Across all policy sectors, the legislative asset model explains PAC donations to 




and while elements of all strategies are statistically significant, the legislative strategy 
and constituency characteristics influence a greater percentage of PAC donations to 
congressional districts than other strategies; however, the overall fit of the legislative 
asset model to the PAC system is questionable.     
Table 4.2 Agribusiness PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral 
Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Incumbent Model  Open Seat Model 
Constant    .075 (.015)***   .138 (.048)** 
Legislative Strategyb 
Agriculture Committee   .401 (.012)***   .059 (.034) 
Appropriations Committee  .113 (.01)***   .021 (.03) 
Energy and Commerce Committee  .086 (.011)***   .007 (.029) 
House Administration Committee  .045 (.018)*   -.01 (.062) 
Rules Committee    .063 (.018)***   -.042 (.054) 
Ways and Means Committee  .131 (.012)***   .053 (.03)  
Leadership Position   .418 (.031)***   .109 (.132) 
Chamber Seniority   -.001 (.001)   .000181 (.002) 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology    .019 (.013)   -.014 (.032) 
District Partisanship   -.203 (.042)***   -.119 (.112) 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin    -.104 (.014)***   -.169 (.052)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)  .06 (.014)***   .023 (.021) 
Quality Challenger (Republican)  .022 (.014)   .013 (.021) 
Freshman    .02 (.011)   N/A 
Percent Employed in Agriculture,   2.597 (.153)**   2.671 (.402)*** 
Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992     .036 (.015)*   -.044 (.041) 
1994     .028 (.015)   -.047 (.043) 
1996     .026 (.015)   -.026 (.043) 
1998     .063 (.015)***   .033 (.048) 
2000     .059 (.015)***   .087 (.048) 
2002     .063 (.015)***   .078 (.049) 
2004     .053 (.015)***   .034 (.047) 
2006     .062 (.015)***   .003 (.048) 
R2     .470    .282 
Adj. R2     .466    .236 
F     133.5    6.135 
Cook’s D Min/Max   .000/.048   .000/.129 
N     3,492    367 
a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations 
to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) 
multiplied by 100.  The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), 
with standard errors in parentheses.  I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats 
(n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11). 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 




assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Agriculture 
Committee, Appropriations Committee, House Administration, and Ways and Means Committee. 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Table 4.3 Communications and Electronics PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 
1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Incumbent Model  Open Seat Model 
Constant    .097 (.016)***   .172 (.041)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee  .025 (.01)**   .035 (.021) 
Energy and Commerce Committee  .418 (.01)***   .051 (.021)* 
Homeland Security Committee  .059 (.022)**   .003 (.051) 
House Administration Committee  .058 (.017)***   -.041 (.046) 
Rules Committee    .114 (.017)***   .013 (.04) 
Science Committee   .02 (.01)*   .015 (.024) 
Ways and Means Committee  .071 (.012)***   .031 (.022) 
Leadership Position   .671 (.03)***   .237 (.1)* 
Chamber Seniority   .009 (.001)***   .0000364 (.002) 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology    .043 (.012)***   .002 (.024) 
District Partisanship   -.04 (.039)   -.168 (.081)* 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin    -.092 (.013)***   -.092 (.039)* 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)  .035 (.013)**   .001 (.015) 
Quality Challenger (Republican)  .036 (.013)**   .003 (.016) 
Freshman    .062 (.01)***   N/A 
Percent Employed in Information  1.611 (.312)***   1.006 (.857) 
and Utilities 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992     .008 (.014)   -.067 (.03)* 
1994     .002 (.014)   -.051 (.031) 
1996     -.009 (.014)   -.032 (.031) 
1998     -.021 (.014)   -.046 (.035) 
2000     -.027 (.014)*   .002 (.034) 
2002     -.038 (.014)**   .003 (.035) 
2004     -.039 (.014)**   -.09 (.035)** 
2006     -.044 (.014)**   -.058 (.035) 
R2     .430    .151 
Adj. R2     .426    .094 
F     109.173    2.656 
Cook’s D Min/Max   .000/.029   .000/.193 
N     3,492    367 
a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations 
to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) 
multiplied by 100.  The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), 
with standard errors in parentheses.  I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats 
(n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11). 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Energy and 
Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Judiciary Committee, Rules Committee, and 
Homeland Security Committee. 





Table 4.4 Construction PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral 
Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Incumbent Model  Open Seat Model 
Constant    .172 (.017)***   .354 (.055)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee  .074 (.009)***   .072 (.026)** 
Banking and Financial    .049 (.009)***   .016 (.026)  
Services Committee  
Energy and Commerce Committee  .055 (.01)***   .007 (.026) 
House Administration Committee  -.004 (.015)   .009 (.054) 
Rules Committee    .076 (.016)***   -.022 (.047) 
Transportation and Infrastructure  .183 (.009)***   .038 (.025) 
Ways and Means Committee  .065 (.011)***   .049 (.027) 
Leadership Position   .375 (.028)***   .291 (.115)* 
Chamber Seniority   .005 (.001)***   .001 (.002) 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology    .112 (.011)***   .036 (.028) 
District Partisanship   -.117 (.038)**   -.225 (.101)* 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin    -.149 (.012)***   -.264 (.045)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)  .076 (.012)***   .017 (.018) 
Quality Challenger (Republican)  .046 (.012)***   .027 (.018) 
Freshman    .074 (.009)***   N/A 
Percent Employed in Construction  .412 (.204)*   -.732 (.637) 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992     -.012 (.013)   -.135 (.035)*** 
1994     -.024 (.013)   -.076 (.037)* 
1996     -.043 (.013)***   -.055 (.037) 
1998     -.033 (.013)**   -.006 (.04) 
2000     -.036 (.013)**   .081 (.04)* 
2002     -.034 (.013)**   .005 (.041) 
2004     -.036 (.013)**   -.066 (.041) 
2006     -.042 (.013)***   -.069 (.04) 
R2     .322    .331 
Adj. R2     .318    .286 
F     68.710    7.37 
Cook’s D Min/Max   .000/.046   .000/.344 
N     3,492    367 
a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations 
to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) 
multiplied by 100.  The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), 
with standard errors in parentheses.  I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats 
(n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11). 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Appropriations 
Committee, Banking and Financial Services Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Rules Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and 
Homeland Security Committee. 








Table 4.5 Defense PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Incumbent Model  Open Seat Model 
Constant    -.017 (.023)   .088 (.036)* 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee  .401 (.016)***   .047 (.023)* 
Armed Services Committee  .445 (.016)***   .138 (.023)*** 
Energy and Commerce Committee  .019 (.017)   .007 (.022) 
Foreign Affairs Committee  -.01 (.017)   -.029 (.023)  
Homeland Security Committee  .047 (.035)   .059 (.052)  
House Administration Committee  .056 (.027)*   -.014 (.047) 
Permanent Select Committee on   .198 (.023)***   .025 (.045) 
Intelligence 
Rules Committee    .042 (.028)   .025 (.041) 
Science Committee   .11 (.017)***   .03 (.025) 
Ways and Means Committee  .024 (.02)   .02 (.023) 
Leadership Position   .2 (.048)***   .038 (.103) 
Chamber Seniority   .017 (.002)***   .001 (.002) 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology    .032 (.02)   .001 (.024) 
District Partisanship   -.363 (.066)***   -.087 (.086) 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin    -.076 (.021)***   -.112 (.039)** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)  .013 (.021)   -.001 (.016) 
Quality Challenger (Republican)  .039 (.021)   -.001 (.016) 
Freshman    .035 (.016)*   N/A 
Percent Employed in Professional,   1.151 (.204)***   .665 (.332)* 
Scientific, and Management 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992     -.016 (.023)   -.066 (.031)* 
1994     -.019 (.023)   -.08 (.033)* 
1996     -.008 (.023)   -.067 (.032)* 
1998     -.039 (.024)   -.103 (.038)** 
2000     -.056 (.024)*   .011 (.039) 
2002     -.064 (.024)**   -.008 (.037) 
2004     -.079 (.024)***   -.072 (.038) 
2006     -.085 (.024)***   -.067 (.038) 
R2     .356    .237 
Adj. R2     .350    .179 
F     70.770    4.062 
Cook’s D Min/Max   .000/.036   .000/.119 
N     3,492    367 
a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations 
to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) 
multiplied by 100.  The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%),  
with standard errors in parentheses.  I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats 
(n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11). 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Appropriations 
Committee, Armed Services Committee, House Administration Committee, Science Committee, and 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 





Table 4.6 Energy and Natural Resource PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-
2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Incumbent Model  Open Seat Model 
Constant    .058 (.015)***   .13 (.044)** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Agriculture Committee   -.003 (.011)   -.031 (.025) 
Appropriations Committee  .087 (.01)***   .067 (.025)** 
Energy and Commerce Committee  .333 (.011)***   .025 (.024) 
House Administration Committee  .032 (.017)   .053 (.052) 
Resources Committee   .077 (.011)***   .063 (.03)* 
Rules Committee    .046 (.018)**   -.025 (.045) 
Science Committee   .035 (.011)***   -.008 (.028) 
Ways and Means Committee  .135 (.012)***   .053 (.025)* 
Leadership Position   .482 (.03)***   .079 (.11) 
Chamber Seniority   .004 (.001)***   -.003 (.002) 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology    .042 (.013)***   -.03 (.027) 
District Partisanship   -.304 (.04)***   -.38 (.094)*** 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin    -.091 (.014)***   -.105 (.044)* 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)  .086 (.013)***   .03 (.018) 
Quality Challenger (Republican)  .023 (.013)   .029 (.018) 
Freshman    .08 (.01)***   N/A 
Percent Employed in Mining  2.421 (.194)***   2.274 (.522)*** 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992     .072 (.016)***   .022 (.04) 
1994     .066 (.016)***   .066 (.041) 
1996     .056 (.016)***   .076 (.041) 
1998     .077 (.016)***   .068 (.046) 
2000     .074 (.016)***   .13 (.044)** 
2002     .064 (.016)***   .102 (.045)* 
2004     .07 (.016)***   .027 (.044) 
2006     .064 (.016)***   .084 (.044) 
R2     .387    .273 
Adj. R2     .383    .223 
F     87.534    5.365 
Cook’s D Min/Max   .000/.046   .000/.226 
N     3,492    367 
a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations 
to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) 
multiplied by 100.  The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), 
with standard errors in parentheses.  I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats 
(n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11). 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Agriculture 
Committee, Appropriations, Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, Resources Committee, 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Science Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.  







Table 4.7 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 
1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Incumbent Model  Open Seat Model 
Constant    .116 (.014)***   .165 (.034)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee  .014 (.009)   .027 (.019) 
Banking and Financial Services  .304 (.009)***   .109 (.02)*** 
Energy and Commerce Committee  .154 (.009)***   .011 (.019) 
House Administration Committee  .093 (.015)***   .079 (.041) 
Rules Committee    .167 (.016)***   .032 (.036) 
Ways and Means Committee  .299 (.011)***   .067 (.02)*** 
Leadership Position   .555 (.027)***   .149 (.088) 
Chamber Seniority   .001 (.001)   -.000085 (.002) 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology    .021 (.011)   -.013 (.021) 
District Partisanship   -.184 (.037)***   -.23 (.075)** 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin    -.11 (.012)***   -.115 (.035)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)  .038 (.012)***   .022 (.014) 
Quality Challenger (Republican)  .05 (.012)**   -.000259 (.014) 
Freshman    .035 (.009)***   N/A 
Percent Employed in Finance,  1.0 (.136)***   .345 (.314) 
Insurance, Real Estate, Rental 
and Leasing 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992     -.023 (.013)   -.013 (.027) 
1994     -.017 (.013)   -.048 (.028) 
1996     -.025 (.013)*   -.036 (.028) 
1998     -.026 (.012)*   .017 (.031) 
2000     -.024 (.012)   .03 (.031) 
2002     -.042 (.013)***   .054 (.031) 
2004     -.038 (.012)**   -.007 (.03) 
2006     -.038 (.012)**   .023 (.031) 
R2     .441    .234 
Adj. R2     .437    .185 
F     118.737    4.782 
Cook’s D Min/Max   .000/.018   .000/.344 
N     3,492    367 
a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations 
to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) 
multiplied by 100.  The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), 
with standard errors in parentheses.  I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats 
(n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11). 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Banking and Financial 
Services Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Rules 
Committee, and Ways and Means Committee. 









Table 4.8 Health PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Incumbent Model  Open Seat Model 
Constant    .206 (.018)***   .348 (.055)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee  .059 (.01)***   .029 (.025) 
Budget Committee   -.011 (.011)   .01 (.025) 
Education and Labor Committee  .018 (.011)   -.005 (.026) 
Energy and Commerce Committee  .319 (.01)***   .001 (.024) 
House Administration Committee  .096 (.017)***   -.042 (.053) 
Rules Committee    .083 (.017)**   -.008 (.046) 
Ways and Means Committee  .367 (.012)***   .066 (.026) 
Leadership Position   .555 (.01)***   .131 (.113) 
Chamber Seniority   .0000451 (.001)   -.002 (.002) 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology    .001 (.012)   .002 (.028) 
District Partisanship   -.045 (.04)   -.128 (.098) 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin    -.148 (.013)***   -.08 (.045) 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)  .044 (.013)***   .011 (.018) 
Quality Challenger (Republican)  .052 (.013)***   .003 (.018) 
Freshman    .08 (.01)***   N/A 
Percent Employed in Health  -.240 (.182)   -.347 (.536) 
Care and Social Assistance 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992     -.018 (.014)   -.07 (.035)* 
1994     -.024 (.014)   -.026 (.037) 
1996     -.02 (.014)   -.085 (.036)* 
1998     .002 (.015)   -.069 (.044) 
2000     -.003 (.015)   -.011 (.043) 
2002     -.009 (.015)   -.065 (.045) 
2004     -.007 (.015)   -.056 (.044) 
2006     -.006 (.015)   -.06 (.045) 
R2     .397    .096 
Adj. R2     .393    .036 
F     95.305    1.59 (.043) 
Cook’s D Min/Max   .000/.080   .000/.233 
N     3,492    367 
a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations 
to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) 
multiplied by 100.  The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), 
with standard errors in parentheses.  I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats 
(n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11). 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Energy and 
Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and District of 
Columbia Committee. 









Table 4.9 Ideological and Single Issue PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 
Electoral Cycles 1990-2006a 
Independent Variables   Incumbent Model  Open Seat Model 
Constant    .319 (.014)***   .791 (.074)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee  .015 (.011)   .066 (.049) 
Energy and Commerce Committee  -.002 (.012)   -.065 (.047) 
House Administration Committee  .007 (.019)   -.038 (.104) 
Judiciary Committee   -.007 (.013)   .054 (.061) 
Rules Committee    .000249 (.019)   -.056 (.09) 
Ways and Means Committee  -.016 (.013)   .025 (.05) 
Leadership Position   .252 (.033)***   -.023 (.221) 
Chamber Seniority   -.003 (.001)*   -.007 (.004) 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology    -.062 (.014)***   .000105 (.054) 
District Partisanship   .041 (.044)   .688 (.185)*** 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin    -.332 (.015)***   -.814 (.087)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)  .144 (.015)***   .015 (.035) 
Quality Challenger (Republican)  .164 (.015)***   .052 (.035) 
Freshman    .156 (.012)***   N/A 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992     -.058 (.016)***   -.291 (.067)*** 
1994     -.052 (.015)***   -.205 (.07)** 
1996     -.038 (.016)*   -.306 (.07)*** 
1998     -.012 (.015)   -.08 (.077) 
2000     -.018 (.015)   .08 (.075) 
2002     -.011 (.015)   .065 (.078) 
2004     -.005 (.015)   -.045 (.076) 
2006     -.012 (.015)   -.058 (.077) 
R2     .311    .343 
Adj. R2     .307    .303 
F     71.204    8.58 
Cook’s D Min/Max   .000/.027   .000/.049 
N     3,492    367 
a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations 
to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) 
multiplied by 100.  The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), 
with standard errors in parentheses.  I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats 
(n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11). 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Science Committee 
and Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. 













Table 4.10 Labor PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Incumbent Model  Open Seat Model 
Constant    .271 (.021)***   .455 (.087)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee  .009 (.008)   .042 (.027) 
Education and Labor Committee  .009 (.008)   -.017 (.027) 
Energy and Commerce Committee  .002 (.008)   -.029 (.026) 
House Administration Committee  .029 (.013)*   .09 (.056) 
Rules Committee    .039 (.013)**   -.077 (.049) 
Transportation and Infrastructure  .047 (.007)***   .022 (.026)  
Ways and Means Committee  .001 (.009)   .021 (.027) 
Leadership Position   .234 (.023)***   .105 (.119) 
Chamber Seniority   -.003 (.001)***   -.002 (.002) 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology    -.251 (.009)***   -.081 (.029)** 
District Partisanship   .006 (.033)   .569 (.106)*** 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin    -.247 (.01)***   -.511 (.048)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)  .099 (.01)***   .053 (.019)** 
Quality Challenger (Republican)  .085 (.01)***   .003 (.019) 
Freshman    .084 (.008)***   N/A 
Percent Employed in Construction  .142 (.173)   -.314 (.688) 
Percent Employed in Manufacturing -.038 (.041)   .094 (.144) 
Percent Employed in Mining  .029 (.147)   -.537 (.581) 
Percent in Transportation and  .427 (.197)*   .793 (.783) 
Warehousing 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992     -.037 (.012)**   -.163 (.045)*** 
1994     -.034 (.012)**   -.103 (.046)** 
1996     -.009 (.012)   -.122 (.045)** 
1998     .011 (.013)   -.047 (.052) 
2000     .006 (.013)   .053 (.052) 
2002     .017 (.013)   .005 (.052) 
2004     .023 (.013)   -.024 (.051) 
2006     .013 (.013)   -.013 (.052) 
R2     .477    .419 
Adj. R2     .473    .375 
F     116.903    9.443 
Cook’s D Min/Max   .000/.014   .000/.093 
N     3,492    367 
a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations 
to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) 
multiplied by 100.  The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), 
with standard errors in parentheses.  I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats 
(n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11). 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Post Office and Civil 
Service Committee. 








Table 4.11 Lawyers and Lobbyists PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 
Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Incumbent Model  Open Seat Model 
Constant    .144 (.012)***   .295 (.042)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee  .045 (.009)***   .032 (.026) 
Energy and Commerce Committee  .114 (.009)***   .013 (.025) 
House Administration Committee  .081 (.015)***   .009 (.055) 
Judiciary Committee   .074 (.01)***   -.019 (.117) 
Rules Committee    .078 (.015)***   -.021 (.048) 
Ways and Means Committee  .139 (.011)***   .094 (.026)*** 
Leadership Position   .431 (.027)***   .191 (.117) 
Chamber Seniority   .01 (.001)***   .000411 (.002) 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology    -.129 (.011)***   -.072 (.029)* 
District Partisanship   -.109 (.036)**   .189 (.099) 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin    -.136 (.012)***   -.219 (.046)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)  .037 (.011)***   .001 (.018) 
Quality Challenger (Republican)  .065 (.012)***   -.022 (.019) 
Freshman    .098 (.009)***   N/A 
Percent Employed in Professional,  .308 (.113)**   .715 (.387) 
Scientific, and Management 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992     -.021 (.013)   -.121 (.037)*** 
1994     -.026 (.013)*   -.042 (.038) 
1996     .001 (.013)   -.091 (.038)* 
1998     .005 (.013)   -.107 (.045)* 
2000     -.002 (.013)   -.017 (.045) 
2002     -.005 (.013)   -.033 (.044) 
2004     -.004 (.013)   -.094 (.044)* 
2006     -.009 (.013)   -.07 (.045) 
R2     .282    .174 
Adj. R2     .277    .121 
F     59.176    3.3 
Cook’s D Min/Max   .000/.055   .000/.111 
N     3,492    367 
a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations 
to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) 
multiplied by 100.  The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), 
with standard errors in parentheses.  I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats 
(n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11). 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Energy and 
Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Judiciary Committee, and Ways and Means 
Committee.  









Table 4.12 Miscellaneous Business PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 
Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Incumbent Model  Open Seat Model 
Constant    .309 (.041)***   .304 (.136)* 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee  .037 (.009)***   .062 (.026)* 
Energy and Commerce Committee  .109 (.009)***   -.003 (.026) 
House Administration Committee  .065 (.015)***   -.094 (.055) 
Rules Committee    .066 (.015)***   .046 (.048) 
Small Business Committee  .033 (.01)***   .023 (.031) 
Transportation and Infrastructure  .048 (.008)***   .011 (.025) 
Ways and Means Committee  .242 (.01)***   .078 (.027)** 
Leadership Position   .634 (.026)***   .169 (.117) 
Chamber Seniority   .003 (.001)***   -.003 (.002) 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology    .109 (.011)***   -.024 (.029) 
District Partisanship   -.061 (.036)   -.217 (.1)* 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin    -.170 (.012)***   -.3 (.047)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)  .091 (.011)***   .037 (.018)* 
Quality Challenger (Republican)  .045 (.011)***   .051 (.019)** 
Freshman    .079 (.009)***   N/A 
Percent Employed in Manufacturing -.016 (.045)   .141 (.14) 
Percent Employed in Retail  -.356 (.214)   .044 (.623) 
Percent Employed in Wholesale  -.784 (.31)*    -.113 (.943) 
Trade 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992     -.009 (.013)   -.122 (.036)*** 
1994     -.023 (.012)   -.055 (.038) 
1996     -.042 (.012)***   -.038 (.038) 
1998     -.047 (.016)**   .021 (.054) 
2000     -.048 (.016)**   .067 (.053) 
2002     -.047 (.016)**   -.038 (.53) 
2004     -.046 (.016)**   -.071 (.053) 
2006     -.051 (.016)***   -.046 (.053) 
R2     .387    .323 
Adj. R2     .382    .274 
F     84.119    6.517 
Cook’s D Min/Max   .000/.048   .000/.053 
N     3,492    367 
a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations 
to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) 
multiplied by 100.  The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), 
with standard errors in parentheses.  I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats 
(n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11). 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Agriculture 
Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee, Small Business Committee, and Ways and Means Committee. 







Table 4.13 Transportation PAC Strategy According to Legislative Asset Model, 1990-2006 
Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables   Incumbent Model  Open Seat Model 
Constant    .079 (.014)***   .192 (.038)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee  .098 (.009)***   .05 (.02)* 
Energy and Commerce Committee  .096 (.009)***   -.009 (.02) 
House Administration Committee  .027 (.014)   -.006 (.042) 
Rules Committee    .082 (.015)**   -.017 (.037) 
Transportation and Infrastructure  .241 (.008)***   .036 (.02) 
Ways and Means Committee  .138 (.01)***   .05 (.02)* 
Leadership Position   .491 (.026)***   .294 (.09)*** 
Chamber Seniority   .007 (.001)***   -.002 (.002) 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology    .076 (.011)***   .005 (.022) 
District Partisanship   -.229 (.034)***   -.275 (.076)*** 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin    -.110 (.012)***   -.124 (.036)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)  .047 (.011)***   .003 (.014) 
Quality Challenger (Republican)  .017 (.011)   .007 (.014) 
Freshman    .043 (.009)***   N/A 
Percent Employed in Transportation 2.029 (.221)***   .362 (.575) 
and Warehousing 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992     -.003 (.012)   -.047 (.027) 
1994     -.016 (.012)   -.014 (.029) 
1996     -.024 (.012)*   -.016 (.028) 
1998     -.021 (.012)   .024 (.031) 
2000     -.026 (.012)*   .089 (.031)** 
2002     -.027 (.012)*   .045 (.031) 
2004     -.033 (.012)**   .004 (.031) 
2006     -.036 (.012)**   .012 (.031) 
R2     .382    .270 
Adj. R2     .378    .224 
F     93.228    5.796 
Cook’s D Min/Max   .000/.034   .000/.424 
N     3,492    367 
a. The dependent variable for both the incumbent and open seat model is percent Agribusiness donations 
to the congressional district, is net 1989 real dollars (positive donation minus any refunds, corrections) 
multiplied by 100.  The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is .122%), 
with standard errors in parentheses.  I do not include congressional districts that are new open seats 
(n=45) or congressional districts with two incumbents in the general election (n=11). 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Appropriations 
Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Rules 
Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.   






The legislative strategy is significant for all policy domains except ideological 
PACs.  Across all policy sectors, except ideological PACs, PACs donate a higher 
percentage of their total net real dollar donations to districts with incumbents on policy 
committees and committees of jurisdictions important to the PACs.  Not only are these 
committee assignments statistically significant and high levels (p < .001), but the 
coefficients are relatively large, explaining larger shifts in the percent donated to the 
district than many other variables.  For example, for incumbents sitting on the 
Agriculture committee, on average, those districts receive .401 percent more agriculture 
PAC donations than those who do not sit on the committee, and for financial, insurance, 
and real estate PACs, those incumbents sitting on the Banking and Financial Services 
Committee have an increase of .304 percent of those PACs donation budget.  The other 
two variables of the legislative strategy are donations to those in leadership positions 
and donations on the basis of chamber seniority.  Those districts with congressional 
members in a leadership position (Speaker of the House, majority/minority party leader, 
majority/minority party whip) all receive more PAC donations than those not occupying 
leadership positions.  This variable is statistically significant, positive, and explains 
large shifts in the percent of total policy sector donations to a district, even for 
ideological PACs.  Chamber seniority is not a significant explanatory variable for many 
policy sectors, and when it is significant, it does not explain large shifts in percent 
donations.   
 For open seats, only in isolated cases does the committee assignment of the 
previous congressional member explain variation in policy sector PAC donations.  




sat on the Armed Services Committee; energy and natural resource PACs to districts 
where the previous member sat on the Appropriations, Resources, or Ways and Means 
committee; finance, insurance, and real estate PACs to districts where the previous 
member sat on the Banking and Financial Services Committee or the Ways and Means 
Committee; lawyer and lobbyist PACs to districts where the previous member sat on the 
Ways and Means Committee; miscellaneous business PACs to districts where the 
previous member sat on the Appropriations or the Ways and Means Committees; and 
transportation PACs to open seat districts where the previous member sat on the 
Appropriations or the Ways and Means Committees.   
 These findings lend support for the legislative strategy, and the notion that PACs 
behave as policy-seeking actors in elections.  Policy sectors, as represented by PACs, do 
exist in congressional elections, as PACs have ties to certain committees of jurisdiction 
depending on the policy interests of the PACs.  With some nuance, the ideological and 
electoral strategies are as equally robust and as stable as the legislative strategy.  
Both the congressional member ideological variable and the district partisanship 
variable are statistically significant predictors of PAC donations, but the influence of 
these variables is policy sector dependent.  For construction, energy and natural 
resources, lawyers/lobbyists, and transportation policy sector PACs, both the individual 
and district ideological measures are statistically significant (health PACs do not have 
an ideological strategy, as both variables were statistically insignificant), and consistent, 
meaning the construction, energy and natural resources, and transportation policy 
sectors donated more money to conservative candidates and conservative districts.  The 




incumbents and to more conservative districts.  The remaining policy sectors donate 
according to an ideological strategy, but only one of the variables are statistically 
significant.  Agribusiness, defense, and finance, insurance, and real estate donate more 
money to conservative districts, while communications/electronics and miscellaneous 
business PACs donate more to districts with conservative congressional members.  
Ideological and labor PACs donate more money to liberal congressional members.  For 
open seats there is a slightly more uniform trend.  Agribusiness, defense, and health 
PACs do not use an ideological strategy (as measured by these two variables) in open 
seat elections; neither the ideological leanings of the previous congressional member 
nor the voters’ partisanship explain the distribution of PAC dollars in open seat 
elections for these policy sectors.  Communications/electronics, construction, energy 
and natural resources, finance, insurance, and real estate, miscellaneous business, and 
transportation PACs donate to open seats on the basis of district partisanship alone, and 
give more money to open seats with more conservative voters.  Ideological PACs give 
more money to liberal congressional districts in open seat elections, as do labor PACs, 
but labor PACs also donate more money to open seat elections in districts where the 
previous congressional member was an ideological liberal.  Several variables 
representing the electoral strategy are also statistically significant in both incumbent and 
open seat elections. 
For every policy sector, the election margin variable is statistically significant 
and negative, meaning that PAC donations for all policy sectors, as a percentage of its 
total, decrease as election margins between the winner and the second-place loser 




decreases.  This trend is also true for open seat elections, with the exception of the 
health policy sector, which does not use electoral margin as a strategy for open seat 
elections.  All policy sectors donate more to districts with a freshman incumbent 
running for reelection, with the exception of agribusiness.  The presence of a quality 
challenger is another indication that more PAC money will flow into a congressional 
district.  Communications/electronics, construction, finance, insurance, and real estate, 
health, ideological, labor, lawyers/lobbyists, and miscellaneous business donated a 
larger percentage of money to congressional districts with a Democratic quality 
challenger or a Republican quality challenger.  Agribusiness, energy and natural 
resources, and transportation PACs only donated more money to congressional districts 
with a Democratic quality challenger; however, when coupled with a conservative 
ideological strategy, these policy sectors are not thought to give to the Democratic 
quality challenger, but to the Republican incumbent.  It is this incumbent and 
conservative strategy that is increasing PAC money in the district with a Democratic 
quality challenger.  Defense PACs did not increase donations to congressional districts 
with a quality challenger of either political party. 
The last independent variable of interest is percent policy sector employment in 
the district.  This variable is one of the strongest predictors of the amount of net real 
dollar policy sector PAC donations in a district.  All policy sector PACs increase 
donations when the same policy sector’s employment in that district increases.  The 
only exception to this rule is the health sector, which could be a result of a lack of 
variation in health sector employment, as the amount of health care sector workers in 




donations explained by constituent employment, while still statistically significant, 
donate less on the basis of constituent employment; however, this finding could be an 
artifact of faulty variable operationalization.  I expect a percent labor union membership 
variable to be a highly significant and positive predictor of labor PAC donations.   
These PAC-strategy models seem to predict each policy sector fairly well, as the 
legislative, ideological, and electoral strategies intertwine to produce the predictions of 
the public choice approach: PACs pursue congressional members and select the 
politicians in best position to distribute rents back to the PAC.  The two keystones of 
the model, the congressional committee and constituency characteristics, perform well, 
which gives credence to the notion that the rent-seeking system exists and is in 
equilibrium, as PACs seek those districts that support the industry; however, the model 
is a house of cards, once the model reaches beyond its limited foundation, it becomes 
very unstable.  
This reproduction of the legislative asset model stays true to previous research, 
and its findings are identical to the findings that provided the justification for the entire 
legislative asset approach (e.g., Grier and Munger 1986, 356-357; Grier and Munger 
1991, 34-39).88  There is something curious about my reproduction of the legislative 
asset model, and the findings of the previous decades of legislative asset research.  Most 
variables in the model reach statistical significance, and for those that reach this 
significance the level is high (p < .000), yet the goodness-of-fit measures are relatively 
low (Adj. R2 between .277 and .473).  Goodness-of-fit measures are not the sole 
                                                
88 These initial works used Tobit to determine the importance of committee assignments and constituency 
characteristics, producing a pseudo-R2 and asymptotic T-ratios, but the same findings result: very high 




measure of a model’s worth to knowledge development, and it is important to know that 
variables within the legislative asset model do explain some variation of PAC strategy 
with very high levels of statistical significance, but this situation should have sent 
alarms off decades ago.  A residual analysis of each of the models in tables 4.2-4.13 
shows substantial heteroscedasticity in the legislative asset models, calling into question 
the theoretical basis of the supply-side approach to PAC strategy and the public choice 
conceptualization of representation in the United States. 
One reason why a model can have high levels of statistical significance for most 
of the variables and relatively low goodness of fit measures is the model’s inability to 
explain all observations with equal success (e.g., a model’s success could be the result 
of high levels of explanatory power for small PAC donations, but the model could fail 
to explain large PAC donations).  To determine if the legislative asset model suffers 
from this problem, I plot the absolute value standardized residuals (y-axis) against the 
standardized predicted values (x-axis) for each model appearing in tables 4.2-4.13 (I 
conduct the same analysis for open seat elections with similar results, but I only report 
residual analysis for incumbent election models).  Figures 4.1-4.12 display these 
residual plots, which should show a cloud of data points with no correlation between the 
absolute value standardized residuals and standardized predicted values; however, in all 
figures, there is a positive correlation between the predicted values and the variance of 










Figure 4.1 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Agribusiness PAC 























Figure 4.2 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Communications 
/Electronics PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the 























Figure 4.3 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Construction PAC 
























Figure 4.4 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Defense PAC Donations to 
























Figure 4.5 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Energy and Natural 
Resources PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the 























Figure 4.6 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Finance, Insurance, and 
Real Estate PAC Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the 






















Figure 4.7 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Health PAC Donations to 























Figure 4.8 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Ideological and Single Issue 























Figure 4.9 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Labor PAC Donations to 























Figure 4.10 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Lawyer and Lobbyist 























Figure 4.11 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Miscellaneous Business 
























Figure 4.12 Residual Plot of Legislative Asset Model for Transportation PAC 
Donations to Congressional Districts with Incumbents in the General Election, 
1990-2006 
 
These figures help visualize the potential problem for the legislative asset model.  As 
the predicted values increase for all policy sector models, the variance of the residuals 
increases, meaning that as the predicted values of PAC donations increase, the model’s 
explanatory power decreases.  The significance of the legislative asset model’s variables 
is a result of predicting small PAC donations with great accuracy; however, the model 
does an inadequate job explaining large donations.  In other words, the variables in the 
legislative asset model are a necessary but not sufficient condition for receiving high net 
real dollar amounts of PAC donations; thus, PAC strategy may not be what the 




using the standardized residuals to re-predict the standardized predicted values.  For 
every policy sector incumbent model, the standardized residuals are statistically 
significant and positive predictors of the standardized predicted values, indicating the 
heteroscedasticity seen in figures 4.2-4.13.   
Table 4.14 Heteroscedasticity of Legislative Asset Model by Policy Sector, 1990-
2006 Electoral Cycles (Derived from Appropriate Policy Sector Regression Tables 
4.2-4.13) 
Policy Sector Residuals  Incumbent Model  Open Seat Model 
Agribusiness    .541 (.02)***   .491 (.068)***  
Communications and    .550 (.021)***   .286 (.072)***  
Electronics 
Construction    .498 (.023)***   .242 (.084)** 
Defense    .683 (.018)***   .642 (.061)*** 
Energy and Natural    .621 (.02)***   .524 (.074)*** 
Resources 
Finance, Insurance, and   .602 (.02)***   .404 (.074)*** 
Real Estate 
Health     .628 (.019)***   .115 (.077) 
Ideological and    .562 (.021)***   .528 (.083)*** 
Single Issue 
Labor     .414 (.025)***   .150 (.084) 
Lawyer and Lobbyists  .461 (.023)***   .230 (.077)** 
Miscellaneous Business  .563 (.022)***   .307 (.083)*** 
Transportation    .534 (.022)***   .362 (.076)*** 
a. The dependent variable in this bivariate regression is the appropriate predicted values from Tables 4.2-
4.13.  The independent variable is the residuals from those regressions.   
b. ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
The presence of heteroscedasticity indicates that the legislative asset model is 
underspecified.  An independent variable not included in the model would improve the 
model’s predictability either by itself or as an interaction term within the legislative 
asset model.89  Most PAC scholars mediate this problem using robust standard errors, 
because, in this case, the presence of heteroscedasticity causes the standard errors for 
                                                
89 Another reason for heteroscedasiticy is the presence of a non-normally distributed independent 




each variable to be too high; however, using robust standard errors does not solve the 
theoretical problem with the supply-side approach.  The best way to explain this 
theoretical problem is with an example: 
In terms of legislative characteristics, from 2000 to 2004, Maurice Hinchey (D-
NY) and Sam Farr (D-CA) are strikingly similar. As incumbents during this 
time, both represented congressional districts near metropolitan areas yet have 
sufficient agricultural production to make them appealing to fruit, nut, and wine 
industry PACs. Hinchey represented the twenty-second district northwest of 
New York City, along the Pennsylvania border, consisting of over 8 percent of 
the state’s wineries and fruit and nut farms combined. Farr represented the 
seventeenth district, south of San Francisco, along the Pacific Ocean, home to 
nearly 3 percent of California’s wineries and fruit and nut farms combined. In 
addition, both members sat on an important committee of jurisdiction 
(Agriculture Subcommittee on Appropriations) with similar ideological voting 
records on the economy (both place on the liberal side of the left–right 
spectrum). Hinchey won reelection by an average of a 30 percent vote margin 
and Farr with an average of 41 percent. Despite these similarities, California 
fruit, nut, and wine PACs contributed $58,785 net dollars to Farr and only 
$1,500 net dollars to Hinchey during the same period (Jorgensen 2010, 16). 
 
The legislative asset model does well in predicting the California fruit, nut, and wine 
donations to Representative Hinchey, but does poor in predicting the same industry’s 
PAC donations to Representative Farr, and this disparity is the reason why error 
variance increases when the predicted values increase for the legislative asset model.  
The model predicts similar PAC donations to each candidate, which likely causes the 
error to be the greatest for the case of Representative Farr.  In this example, the 
committee assignment is important, but a variable(s) not captured in the legislative asset 
model is influencing the dollar disparity between Representatives Farr and Hinchey.  In 
addition, the dollar disparity in this case calls into question the value of constituency 
characteristics as a method of explaining PAC strategy.  It is possible that PAC strategy 




and modern pluralism would expect.  Existing studies and theoretical approaches of 
PAC strategy have yet to model accurately the high-dollar donations. 
Building a New Model of PAC Strategy 
 The public choice solution to the ills of American campaign finance is to abolish 
government, or to make decision rules too stringent thereby rendering government 
incapable of responding to societal problems.  Stripping the supply of political 
authority, legitimacy, and ability is the philosophical goal of public choice, and this goal 
influences empirical study of political phenomena by public choice scholars.  The strict 
adherence to supply-side variables in public choice scholarship is an implicit 
endorsement of this philosophy.  The purpose of this chapter was not to argue against 
public choice on philosophical grounds, but to put its empirical assertions to a statistical 
test.  If the approach fails on empirical grounds, then some of its philosophical 
assertions come into question.   
Interestingly, or perhaps purposely, while public choice scholars claim to 
explain all organized interest behavior from supply-side variables (i.e., governmental 
actors and institutional design cause organized interest behavior and strategy), their 
strongest assertions concern characteristics of the demand-side for legislation (i.e., the 
organized interest community).  They claim that while rent-seeking behavior harms 
unorganized consumers by wasting resources on lobbying and preserving economic rent 
with those resources, which could be used to create wealth for the entire economy, the 
system of rent-seekers is in equilibrium, so those that are not organized into a rent-
seeking interest but sympathize with the cause are in fact benefiting from the organized 




with the public choice argument that society can only benefit from policy change if it 
comes in the form of controlling supply-side forces.  In essence, what the legislative 
asset model argues is that although rent seeking is a negative value in society, 
representation of demand-side for legislation is in equilibrium, so no demand-side 
policy change is required.  Public choice is pluralism in a poorly designed disguise.  To 
move PAC studies beyond this ideological approach into a more empirical and factual 
understanding of this political reality (which does not undermine the fact that rent 
seeking is the primary purpose of the PAC), I design a model taking demand-side 



















A NEW APPROACH TO PAC STRATEGY MODELING 
 
Introduction 
The PAC literature is bifurcated between those that use demand-side variables 
and those that use supply-side variables to explain PAC strategy.  Both approaches lack 
explanatory power.  Demand-sided approaches argue that PAC decision-makers place 
primacy on the goal of organizational maintenance and are encumbered by the need to 
maintain funding streams when making decisions about which candidates should 
receive PAC money.  PAC decision-makers respond to political amateurs, and know 
PAC strategy could be improved by using legislative cues, but PAC decision-makers 
must follow the wishes of the individual donors to the PAC.  I find little evidence 
supporting the empirical validity of this approach to PAC strategy.  The amount of 
PACs that could be encumbered by geography is small and using geography, ideology, 
and electoral vulnerability to explain PAC strategy tells only a small part of the story.   
The supply-side approach argues PAC decision-makers strive to attain rent-
seeking goals and will use legislative, electoral, and ideological cues to find the lowest 
cost legislator in order to maximize rent-seeking benefits.  This marginal-cost approach 
explains more of the variation of PAC strategy from 1990 through 2006, but small 
donations drive the statistical significance of the model.  As the predicted dollar 
amounts increase, the error variance of the supply-side model increases, which means 
that the model is underspecified and those missing variables could help explain the 
larger donations by PACs.  The purpose of the third approach to explaining PAC 
strategy is to use geography to explain larger PAC donations and to provide a more 




The lobbying literature provides the origins of this third approach, and argues 
that PACs pursue legislative benefits (assuming rent-seeking goals) but will do so 
within the bounds of its organizational presence; in other words, PACs will use 
legislative asset cues in states where individual donors reside.  This hypothesis derives 
from scholars that find lobbyists decide which congressional member to lobby by the 
amount of interest group membership within that congressional member’s district.  I 
call this new approach to PAC strategy the mediated model because a pure rent-seeking 
strategy is mediated by the geographic characteristics of the PAC.   
Intellectual Roots of the Mediated Model 
 The intellectual roots of the mediated model occur in an answer to this question: 
why do lobbyists pursue access to some congressional members and not others?  
Interest groups that have PACs and that employ lobbyists are the same groups that 
dominate the PAC system (Tripathi, Ansolabehere, and Snyder 2002, 133), and the 
lobbyists employed by interest groups with PACs make contact with more members of 
Congress than those groups without a PAC (Hojnacki and Kimball 2001, 169).  This 
fact raises a similar concern addressed in Chapter One: interest groups with PACs can 
create financial constituencies that differ substantively from geographic constituencies.  
If it is PAC money that buys lobbyist access, then the financial constituency is 
determining how congressional members spend their time and effort (Hojnacki and 
Kimball 2001, 162; also see Hall and Wayman 1990 on this point); however, scholars 
find that lobbyists decide whom to lobby in Congress via a similar decision-making 
process as PAC decision-makers when they try to decide which congressional candidate 




 Hojnacki and Kimball (2001, 163) reiterate this message and relate their 
findings back to Wright’s (1985, 1989) research: 
The results of our analysis demonstrate that PAC-affiliated organizations 
contacted more committee members – particularly undecided legislators – than 
did non-affiliated groups.  We also offer evidence that this advantage derives 
primarily from the organizational presence of PAC-affiliated groups in a 
relatively diverse array of congressional districts.  Once we control for district 
ties, we see that contributions play, at best, a very small role in providing PAC 
affiliates with a means of accessing members of Congress.   
 
The reason why interest groups that maintain a PAC and pay a lobbying firm enjoy 
more lobbying contacts with congressional members, according to these authors, is that 
groups with PACs have a greater organizational presence around the country and are 
known to the politician.  Lobbyists capitalize on this diverse organizational presence 
when making decisions on whom to lobby.  It is this organizational presence and not the 
money that allows groups increased access to congressional members.   
 When comparing interest groups with individual supporters in a district and a 
PAC in that district, against interest groups that only give money to a candidate without 
that organizational presence, the lobbyists for that interest group are much more likely 
to make contact with the congressional member from districts with organizational ties 
(Hojnacki and Kimball 2001, 173).  As a result, the money itself does not open the door 
as much as the presence of an organization in the district/state.90   
The lobbyist’s decision is complicated somewhat by the issue position of the 
congressional member.  When organizations employ a lobbyist to contact a 
                                                
90 Hojnacki and Kimball use a survey to determine the level of organizational presence in a district/state.  
The question wording is as follows: “for each of the following members of Congress, can you please tell 
us whether your group’s organizational presence or base of support – in terms of members, supporters, 
and their level of activism – in each legislator’s state or district is strong, medium, or weak to none” 




congressional member, and that organization has a base of support and has given a 
campaign contribution, the predicted probability of a lobbyist contact is equal for allies 
and uncertain congressional members, but increases sharply for opponents; hence, 
campaign donations that are given to issue opponents will increase the probability that a 
lobbyist will contact that foe in Congress; “thus, PAC-affiliated organizations may use 
contributions to try to broaden their access to legislators whose issue positions are 
opposed to their own when they have no district-based means of establishing contact 
with a member” (Hojnacki and Kimball 2001, 175). 
Hojnacki and Kimball (2001, 164-165) recognize the importance of their 
findings on the PAC-strategy literature, but they fail to notice the full implications when 
they argue: 
Given that groups with a sizable and easy to identify contingent of potential 
contributors are more likely to maintain PACs, and that contributions tend to 
flow to legislators who represent the districts of group supporters, we believe is 
reasonable to expect that any advantage PAC affiliates enjoy in contacting 
legislators is derived from their distribution of organized support in legislative 
districts, not campaign donations per se.  Specifically, we hypothesize that 
groups with a PAC will have an organizational presence in relatively more 
districts than will non-PAC groups, providing the PAC affiliates with a ‘natural’ 
means of establishing contact with a greater array of legislators…In this way, 
the same organizational attributes that make groups more likely to form and 
maintain a PAC also make PAC-affiliated groups more effective lobbying 
organizations on Capitol Hill.   
 
If lobbyists choose to pursue contact with congressional members from areas where 
there are interest group supporters, and interest groups with PACs have more supporters 
in more geographic areas, then it is reasonable that Hojnacki and Kimball (2001) rely 
on Wright’s (1985, 1989) theory of PAC-strategy to buttress their findings.  In their 
argument cited above, Hojnacki and Kimball assume that contributions tend to flow to 




lobbyist strategy congruent with geographic constituency.  My findings in Chapter 3 
question this assumption, but more on that issue later in this chapter.  The important 
point now is that Hojnacki and Kimball’s findings actually negate Wright’s 
organizational presence model’s expectations.  When they argue that the same 
organizational attributes that make groups more likely to form and maintain a PAC 
also make PAC-affiliated groups more effective lobbying organizations, they are 
negating Wright’s paradox of PAC organizing.  Wright’s paradox is that PACs are 
organized in such a fashion as to negate their legislative effectiveness, and this paradox 
occurs because PACs respond to individual donors who are political amateurs, caring 
only about ideologically friendly, electorally vulnerable, local candidates.  In short, 
PACs can follow a contribution strategy that satisfies both political amateurs and 
lobbyists. 
 If lobbyists mainly contact congressional members who represent interest group 
and PAC members in their geographic constituency (i.e., it is the organization, not the 
money), then this apparent reality raises a burdensome question for PAC strategy: why 
do PACs give to congressional members outside of the PACs geographic donor base? 
Hojnacki and Kimball (2001, 177-178) actually dodge the question they pose: 
Ultimately, though, this study raises the question of why PAC affiliates give 
money to congressional campaigns.  If votes are not purchased and contributions 
do not facilitate opportunities for direct contact with legislators, why do groups 
spend money in this way?  We believe that the answer suggested by our analysis 
is akin to the rationale for giving offered by Wright (1985, 1989).  Money may 
be given to legislators who have the support of the members and patrons of the 
PAC-affiliated organization in their districts.  Indeed, organization 
representatives have an incentive to satisfy these contributors (and potential 
contributors), especially if they give financial support to the organization as well 
as to the organization’s PAC.  Organizations also may contribute to legislators’ 




By arguing that PACs are still rational, and give according to an organizational 
maintenance strategy, not a purely legislative strategy (but since lobbyists contact 
members based on organizational presence, there is no paradox), the authors do not 
acknowledge the amount of PAC money that does cross state lines.  
 The questions for this chapter are as follows: (1) do PACs, as organized by 
policy sectors, contribute more money to congressional candidates running for office in 
the same state as PAC funders, and (2) if PACs do follow the expectations of the 
organizational presence model, then does this strategy negate rent-seeking strategies?  
Bringing forth a large dataset, which is relatively uncommon in the PAC literature, my 
answer to the first question is no, state-based PACs do not give more money to 
candidates in that home state.  The number of PACs that may be geographically bound 
(over 90% of fundraising money from one state) is small enough that the issue is 
inconsequential.  Acknowledging the findings in Chapter 3, I seek to answer the first 
question one more time with a different, more efficient variable that allows me to 
combine the geography and the policy sector of the PAC into one model.   
Answering the second question is the focal point of this chapter.  I predict that 
the geographic distribution of PAC donors does not negate the rent-seeking strategy of 
PACs.  Committee assignments, incumbency, and political party should be important to 
PACs in addition to the geographic location of the congressional member.  At worst for 
the rent-seeking model, the geographic distribution of PAC donors mediates legislative 
assets.  If PACs follow this rent-seeking strategy more often, then studies of lobbying 





Mediated Model: Data, Variables, and Hypotheses 
 The data, variables, and hypotheses of the mediated model are similar to those 
of the legislative asset model; however, the mediated model provides one additional 
variable to the legislative asset model: the percent of money to policy-sector PACs from 
the candidates’ state.  This variable is meant to capture the important aspects of the 
organizational-maintenance strategy outlined by Wright (1985, 1989) and corroborated 
by Hojnacki and Kimball (2001).  I measure this variable for each candidate and each 
policy sector from 1990 through 2006 by adding all individual donations of over $200 
to each policy sector PAC and then deriving the percentage of those donations coming 
from each state.  This variable is continuous, and measures the same aspects of PAC 
strategy that the state classifications measured in Chapter Three, but this new variable is 
more efficient because it allows me to combine the geography of individual donors to 
the PAC system with policy sector classifications in one regression equation for all 
states.   
If PACs pursue Wright’s (1985, 1989) organizational-maintenance strategy, then 
two results should occur: (1) as the percentage of money to a policy sector increases in a 
candidate’s state, the amount of PAC donations to that candidate should increase, and 
(2) when this variable is significant, the amount of variation explained by this variable 
should be more than the legislative assets of the particular candidate and/or district.  
Given the findings in Chapter Three, I do not expect geography of individual donors to 
play the significant role assigned to it in the political science literature.  An interesting 
test of the organizational presence model against the legislative asset model is to 




variable in Chapter 4 (measured using Census Bureau statistics).  If and when the 
individual PAC donor variable is significant, it will not diminish the significance of 
committee assignments, and the two strategies of organizational maintenance and rent 
seeking can co-exist (the central prediction of the mediated model).   
I measure the committee assignment of the committees of jurisdiction using the 
assignment status at the end of the legislative session of the previous congressional 
member (a zero indicates no assignment, a one indicates an assignment on that 
committee, and a two indicates a committee chair).  For incumbents running for 
reelection, it is their committee assignment going into the election, and for challengers 
it is the committee assignment of their incumbent opponent.  To finish testing the 
legislative strategy, I include a dichotomous variable for those candidates holding a 
leadership position (Speaker of the House, majority/minority leader, majority/minority 
whip), and I include chamber seniority (the number of congressional sessions served).  I 
measure both the leadership and seniority variable using the values of the previous 
congressional member.  For open seats, it is the assignment of the incumbent who is not 
campaigning for office.  Since the open seat model performed poorly in Chapter Four, I 
simply combine the open seat model with the incumbent model and add two 
dichotomous incumbent variables to measure the political party affiliation of the 
incumbent.  I also include a dichotomous variable indicating if the incumbent is a 
freshman, and campaigning as the first time as an incumbent.   
I measure ideology using first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, and I 
measure district partisanship using the Democratic presidential two-party normal vote.  




party from the same measure at the congressional district level.  Negative values 
indicate a conservative district, while negative values for DW-NOMINATE indicate a 
liberal candidate.  The ideology measure uses values of the previous congressional 
candidate, similar to how I measure committee assignments.  The measurement of 
quality challenger by political party also gives a good indication of the ideological and 
partisan leanings of a policy sector.  A quality challenger is a candidate who has held 
any publicly elected office before campaigning for the House of Representatives.  To 
measure electoral margin, I measure the percent gap between first and second place 
[(#first-place votes - #second-place votes) / Total # of votes], and I use the election 
results of that cycle (not the previous election).  With legislative, ideological, and 
electoral controls, I expect PAC donor geography to coexist with the significance of 
other legislative assets; however, for many policy sectors, I do not expect PAC donor 
geography to be significant, as many PACs redistribute money across state lines, 
questioning Wright’s (1985, 1989) conceptualization of organizational maintenance 
strategy. 
Findings 
 Tables 5.1 through 5.12 show the results of the mediated model’s central 
variable in each policy sector, with table 5.13 measuring the heteroscedasticity of the 
mediated model.  For the most part, the results do not support the geographic nature of 
PACs posited by the organizational presence model.  Agribusiness, defense, energy and 
natural resources, and lawyers/lobbyists give a significant portion of their spending 
budget back to candidates in states where individual donors live, but all the other policy 




defense, and energy and natural resources are all industries that are rooted in geographic 
locations and would require distributive benefits from Congress (e.g., defense PACs 
would lobby Congress to maintain military installations).  The primary support for the 
mediated model has come from state-based PACs in the agribusiness industry 
(Jorgensen 2010).  
Table 5.1 Agribusiness PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables    Regression Coefficients (Standard Error)  
Constant      -.033 (.004)*** 
Legislative Strategyb 
Agriculture Committee     .082 (.003)*** 
Appropriations Committee    .028 (.003)*** 
Energy and Commerce Committee    .018 (.003)*** 
House Administration Committee    .012 (.005)* 
Rules Committee      .01 (.005)* 
Ways and Means Committee    .029 (.004)***  
Leadership Position     .109 (.009)*** 
Chamber Seniority     -.001 (.00039)** 
Incumbent (Democrat)     .116 (.003)*** 
Incumbent (Republican)     .164 (.003)*** 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology      -.014 (.003)*** 
District Partisanship     -.075 (.011)*** 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin      -.025 (.004)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)    .043 (.008)*** 
Quality Challenger (Republican)    .118 (.008)*** 
Freshman      .002 (.003) 
Percent Employed in Agriculture,     .563 (.041)*** 
Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting 
Percent Contributions to AG PAC    .176 (.03)*** 
From Candidate’s State 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992       .009 (.005)*    
1994       .006 (.004)    
1996       .005 (.004)    
1998       .017 (.004)***   
2000       .018 (.004)***   
2002       .015 (.004)*** 
2004       .013 (.004)**  
2006       .021 (.004)*** 
R2       .372   
Adj. R2       .370  
F       256.07 
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.043 
N       11,277 
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, 
using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is 




b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls, and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Agriculture 
Committee, Appropriations Committee, House Administration, and Ways and Means Committee. 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 5.2 Communications and Electronics PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 
Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables    Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      -.033 (.004)***    
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee    .006 (.003)*    
Energy and Commerce Committee    .093 (.003)***    
Homeland Security Committee    .009 (.006)   
House Administration Committee    .008 (.005)    
Rules Committee      .025 (.005)***   
Science Committee     .007 (.003)* 
Ways and Means Committee    .016 (.003)*** 
Leadership Position     .183 (.009)***  
Chamber Seniority     .002 (.00033)***  
Incumbent (Democrat)     .130 (.003)*** 
Incumbent (Republican)     .160 (.003)*** 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology      -.001 (.003) 
District Partisanship     -.021 (.011)* 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin      -.017 (.004)***  
Quality Challenger (Democrat)    .031 (.008)*** 
Quality Challenger (Republican)    .070 (.007)*** 
Freshman      .011 (.003)***  
Percent Employed in Information    .414 (.089)***  
and Utilities 
Percent Contributions to CE PAC    .018 (.013) 
From Candidate’s State 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992       .008 (.004)  
1994       .002 (.004) 
1996       -.009 (.003) 
1998       -.021 (.004) 
2000       -.027 (.004) 
2002       -.038 (.004)  
2004       -.039 (.004)  
2006       -.044 (.004) 
R2       .402  
Adj. R2       .401  
F       280.581  
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.041 
N       11,277  
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, 
using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is 
.122%), with standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 




assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Energy and 
Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Judiciary Committee, Rules Committee, and 
Homeland Security Committee. 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 5.3 Construction PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables    Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      -.009 (.005)* 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee    .019 (.003)*** 
Banking and Financial      .012 (.002)***   
Services Committee  
Energy and Commerce Committee    .012 (.003)*** 
House Administration Committee    -.003 (.005) 
Rules Committee      .014 (.005)** 
Transportation and Infrastructure    .041 (.002)*** 
Ways and Means Committee    .015 (.003)*** 
Leadership Position     .101 (.008)*** 
Chamber Seniority     .001 (.00029)*** 
Incumbent (Democrat)     .078 (.003)*** 
Incumbent (Republican)     .189 (.003)*** 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology      -.015 (.003)*** 
District Partisanship     -.038 (.01)*** 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin      -.043 (.004)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)    .027 (.007)***  
Quality Challenger (Republican)    .171 (.007)*** 
Freshman      .011 (.002)*** 
Percent Employed in Construction    .127 (.058)* 
Percent Contributions to CN PAC    .029 (.026) 
From Candidate’s State  
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992       .001 (.004) 
1994       -.002 (.013) 
1996       -.002 (.013) 
1998       .003 (.013) 
2000       .004 (.013) 
2002       .002 (.004) 
2004       .004 (.004)  
2006       .009 (.004)* 
R2       .41 
Adj. R2       .409  
F       289.657    
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.037 
N       11,277 
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, 
using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is 
.122%), with standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Appropriations 




Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Rules Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and 
Homeland Security Committee. 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 5.4 Defense PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables    Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      -.062 (.006)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee    .100 (.004)*** 
Armed Services Committee    .100 (.004)***  
Energy and Commerce Committee    .004 (.004) 
Foreign Affairs Committee    -.006 (.005) 
Homeland Security Committee    .015 (.009)  
House Administration Committee    .013 (.008) 
Permanent Select Committee on     .056 (.007)*** 
Intelligence 
Rules Committee      .006 (.008) 
Science Committee     .023 (.004)*** 
Ways and Means Committee    .002 (.005) 
Leadership Position     .07 (.013)*** 
Chamber Seniority     .003 (.00038)** 
Incumbent (Democrat)     .137 (.004)*** 
Incumbent (Republican)     .182 (.004)*** 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology      -.011 (.005)* 
District Partisanship     -.097 (.017)*** 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin      -.018 (.006)** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)    .019 (.012) 
Quality Challenger (Republican)    .035 (.011)** 
Freshman      .008 (.004) 
Percent Employed in Professional,     .118 (.054)*  
Scientific, and Management 
Percent Contributions to DF PAC    .177 (.034)*** 
From Candidate’s State 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992       .009 (.006) 
1994       .006 (.006)  
1996       .006 (.005) 
1998       .006 (.006) 
2000       .005 (.006) 
2002       .001 (.006) 
2004       .009 (.006) 
2006       .006 (.006) 
R2       .298 
Adj. R2       .297 
F       159.439  
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.03 
N       3,492   
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, 
using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is 
.122%), with standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 




assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Appropriations 
Committee, Armed Services Committee, House Administration Committee, Science Committee, and 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 5.5 Energy and Natural Resource PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 
Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables    Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      -.037 (.004)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Agriculture Committee     .001 (.003) 
Appropriations Committee    .021 (.003)*** 
Energy and Commerce Committee    .071 (.003)*** 
House Administration Committee    .004 (.005) 
Resources Committee     .02 (.003)*** 
Rules Committee      .006 (.005) 
Science Committee     .007 (.003)**  
Ways and Means Committee    .03 (.003)***  
Leadership Position     .121 (.008)*** 
Chamber Seniority     .000 (.000) 
Incumbent (Democrat)     .1 (.003)*** 
Incumbent (Republican)     .169 (.003)*** 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology      -.013 (.003)*** 
District Partisanship     -.075 (.01)*** 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin      -.022 (.004)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)    .036 (.007)*** 
Quality Challenger (Republican)    .119 (.007)*** 
Freshman      .013 (.002)*** 
Percent Employed in Mining    .522 (.048)*** 
Percent Contributions to ER PAC    .136 (.014)*** 
From Candidate’s State 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992       .01 (.004)* 
1994       .018 (.004)*** 
1996       .015 (.004)*** 
1998       .016 (.004)*** 
2000       .019 (.004)***  
2002       .018 (.004)*** 
2004       .021 (.004)*** 
2006       .025 (.004)*** 
R2       .400  
Adj. R2       .399  
F       268.133  
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.044 
N       11,277 
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, 
using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is 
.122%), with standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Agriculture 




Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Science Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 5.6 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-
2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables    Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      -.021 (.004)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee    .004 (.003) 
Banking and Financial Services    .065 (.003)***  
Energy and Commerce Committee    .032 (.003)*** 
House Administration Committee    .023 (.005)*** 
Rules Committee      .037 (.005)*** 
Ways and Means Committee    .07 (.003)*** 
Leadership Position     .149 (.008)*** 
Chamber Seniority     .000 (.000) 
Incumbent (Democrat)     .124 (.003)*** 
Incumbent (Republican)     .164 (.003)*** 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology      -.01 (.003)** 
District Partisanship     -.042 (.011)***   
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin      -.034 (.004)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)    .044 (.008)*** 
Quality Challenger (Republican)    .101 (.007)*** 
Freshman      .005 (.003)* 
Percent Employed in Finance,    .214 (.044)*** 
Insurance, Real Estate, Rental 
and Leasing 
Percent Contributions to FIRE PAC   .013 (.018) 
From Candidate’s State 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992       .005 (.004) 
1994       -.002 (.004) 
1996       .001 (.003) 
1998       -.001 (.004) 
2000       -.001 (.004)  
2002       .003 (.004) 
2004       .001 (.004) 
2006       .002 (.004) 
R2       .397  
Adj. R2       .396 
F       285.203  
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.037 
N       11,277 
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, 
using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is 
.122%), with standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Banking and Financial 
Services Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Rules 




* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 5.7 Health PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables    Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      .005 (.006) 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee    .012 (.003)*** 
Budget Committee     .003 (.004) 
Education and Labor Committee    .006 (.003) 
Energy and Commerce Committee    .067 (.003)*** 
House Administration Committee    .017 (.006)** 
Rules Committee      .016 (.006)** 
Ways and Means Committee    .087 (.004)*** 
Leadership Position     .150 (.01)*** 
Chamber Seniority     -.001 (.000) 
Incumbent (Democrat)     .122 (.003)*** 
Incumbent (Republican)     .152 (.003)*** 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology      -.012 (.004)** 
District Partisanship     -.011 (.013) 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin      -.043 (.005)***  
Quality Challenger (Democrat)    .075 (.009)***  
Quality Challenger (Republican)    .108 (.009)*** 
Freshman      .012 (.003)*** 
Percent Employed in Health    -.086 (.064) 
Care and Social Assistance 
Percent Contributions to HH PAC    9.72E-5 (.047) 
From Candidate’s State 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992       .009 (.005) 
1994       .001 (.005) 
1996       .003 (.004) 
1998       .009 (.005)  
2000       .007 (.005) 
2002       .006 (.005) 
2004       .003 (.005) 
2006       .008 (.005) 
R2       .287 
Adj. R2       .285 
F       167.567  
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.070 
N       11,277  
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, 
using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is 
.122%), with standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Energy and 
Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and District of 
Columbia Committee. 






Table 5.8 Ideological and Single Issue PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, Electoral 
Cycles 1990-2006a 
Independent Variables    Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      .055 (.003)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee    .000 (.003) 
Energy and Commerce Committee    .001 (.003) 
House Administration Committee    .003 (.005) 
Judiciary Committee     -.001 (.003)  
Rules Committee      -.005 (.005) 
Ways and Means Committee    .001 (.003) 
Leadership Position     .032 (.008)*** 
Chamber Seniority     -.001 (.000)*** 
Incumbent (Democrat)     .06 (.003)*** 
Incumbent (Republican)     .064 (.003)*** 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology      -.004 (.003) 
District Partisanship     .019 (.01) 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin      -.112 (.004)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)    .151 (.007)*** 
Quality Challenger (Republican)    .161 (.007)*** 
Freshman      .028 (.003)*** 
Percent Contributions to ISI PAC    -.025 (.026) 
From Candidate’s State 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992       -.001 (.004) 
1994       -.01 (.004)** 
1996       -.006 (.003) 
1998       .012 (.004)*** 
2000       .002 (.004) 
2002       .005 (.004) 
2004       -.005 (.004) 
2006       .017 (.004)*** 
R2       .204    
Adj. R2       .202  
F       115.439 
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.020 
N       11,277   
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, 
using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is 
.122%), with standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Science Committee 
and Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. 











Table 5.9 Labor PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables    Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      .044 (.007)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee    .004 (.003) 
Education and Labor Committee    .003 (.003) 
Energy and Commerce Committee    -.002 (.003) 
House Administration Committee    .016 (.005)*** 
Rules Committee      .01 (.005)* 
Transportation and Infrastructure    .009 (.002)***  
Ways and Means Committee    .001 (.003) 
Leadership Position     .069 (.008)*** 
Chamber Seniority     -.001 (.000)** 
Incumbent (Democrat)     .191 (.003)*** 
Incumbent (Republican)     .011 (.003)*** 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology      .016 (.003)*** 
District Partisanship     .025 (.011)** 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin      -.078 (.004)***  
Quality Challenger (Democrat)    .257 (.007)*** 
Quality Challenger (Republican)    -.017 (.007)** 
Freshman      .011 (.002)*** 
Percent Employed in Construction    -.159 (.059)** 
Percent Employed in Manufacturing   -.001 (.014) 
Percent Employed in Mining    .076 (.047) 
Percent in Transportation and    .085 (.069)  
Warehousing 
Percent Contributions to LB PAC    -.046 (.027) 
From Candidate’s State 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992       .003 (.004) 
1994       -.003 (.012) 
1996       .001 (.003) 
1998       .016 (.004)*** 
2000       .009 (.004)* 
2002       .008 (.004)* 
2004       -.009 (.004)* 
2006       .01 (.004)* 
R2       .429  
Adj. R2       .427  
F       281.31 
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.017 
N       11,277 
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, 
using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is 
.122%), with standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Post Office and Civil 
Service Committee. 






Table 5.10 Lawyers and Lobbyists PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 
Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables    Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      -.015 (.003)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee    .011 (.002)*** 
Energy and Commerce Committee    .024 (.002)*** 
House Administration Committee    .018 (.004)*** 
Judiciary Committee     .014 (.003)*** 
Rules Committee      .017 (.004)*** 
Ways and Means Committee    .032 (.003)*** 
Leadership Position     .122 (.007)*** 
Chamber Seniority     .002 (.000)*** 
Incumbent (Democrat)     .162 (.002)*** 
Incumbent (Republican)     .082 (.002)*** 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology      .000 (.003) 
District Partisanship     -.024 (.009)** 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin      -.03 (.003)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)    .123 (.006)*** 
Quality Challenger (Republican)    .019 (.006)**  
Freshman      .015 (.002)*** 
Percent Employed in Professional,    .041 (.028) 
Scientific, and Management 
Percent Contributions to LL PAC    .134 (.021)*** 
From Candidate’s State 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992       -.001 (.003) 
1994       .004 (.003) 
1996       .004 (.003) 
1998       .005 (.003) 
2000       .007 (.003)* 
2002       .008 (.003)* 
2004       .005 (.003) 
2006       .005 (.003) 
R2       .438  
Adj. R2       .437  
F       337.112  
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.047 
N       11,277  
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, 
using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is 
.122%), with standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Energy and 
Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Judiciary Committee, and Ways and Means 
Committee.  








Table 5.11 Miscellaneous Business PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 
Electoral Cyclesa 
Independent Variables    Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      .022 (.01)* 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee    .009 (.002)*** 
Energy and Commerce Committee    .022 (.002)*** 
House Administration Committee    .011 (.004)*** 
Rules Committee      .014 (.004)*** 
Small Business Committee    .008 (.003)** 
Transportation and Infrastructure    .008 (.002)*** 
Ways and Means Committee    .056 (.003)*** 
Leadership Position     .164 (.007)*** 
Chamber Seniority     .000 (.000) 
Incumbent (Democrat)     .081 (.002)*** 
Incumbent (Republican)     .169 (.002)*** 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology      -.009 (.003)** 
District Partisanship     -.011 (.036) 
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin      -.046 (.003)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)    .023 (.006)*** 
Quality Challenger (Republican)    .18 (.006)*** 
Freshman      .012 (.002)*** 
Percent Employed in Manufacturing   .011 (.012) 
Percent Employed in Retail    -.049 (.05) 
Percent Employed in Wholesale    -.232 (.084)**  
Trade 
Percent Contributions to MB PAC    -.042 (.029) 
From Candidate’s State 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992       .001 (.004) 
1994       .000 (.003)  
1996       -.001 (.003) 
1998       -.001 (.004)** 
2000       .000 (.004)* 
2002       .000 (.004)** 
2004       .000 (.004)** 
2006       .005 (.004)** 
R2       .437 
Adj. R2       .435 
F       300.511  
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.037 
N       11,277 
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, 
using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is 
.122%), with standard errors in parentheses. 
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Agriculture 
Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, House Administration Committee, Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee, Small Business Committee, and Ways and Means Committee. 





Table 5.12 Transportation PAC Strategy According to Mediated Model, 1990-2006 Electoral 
Cyclesa 
Independent Variables    Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Constant      -.035 (.004)*** 
Legislative Strategyb  
Appropriations Committee    .024 (.002)*** 
Energy and Commerce Committee    .021 (.003)*** 
House Administration Committee    .004 (.004) 
Rules Committee      .016 (.004)***  
Transportation and Infrastructure    .052 (.002)***  
Ways and Means Committee    .033 (.003)*** 
Leadership Position     .141 (.007)***  
Chamber Seniority     .001 (.000)*** 
Incumbent (Democrat)     .108 (.002)*** 
Incumbent (Republican)     .184 (.002)*** 
Ideological Strategy 
Ideology      -.009 (.003)*** 
District Partisanship     -.064 (.009)***  
Electoral Strategy 
Electoral Margin      -.025 (.003)*** 
Quality Challenger (Democrat)    .024 (.007)*** 
Quality Challenger (Republican)    .115 (.006)***  
Freshman      .006 (.002)* 
Percent Employed in Transportation   .458 (.064)***  
and Warehousing 
Percent Contributions to TP PAC    .003 (.02) 
From Candidate’s State 
Electoral Cycle Controls 
1992       .008 (.004) 
1994       .003 (.003) 
1996       .003 (.003) 
1998       .004 (.003) 
2000       -.002 (.003)* 
2002       .004 (.003)* 
2004       .006 (.003)** 
2006       .008 (.003)** 
R2       .469 
Adj. R2       .468 
F       382.83 
Cook’s D Min/Max     .000/.037 
N       11,277 
a. The dependent variable is the percent of the policy sector domain budget allocated to the candidate, 
using 1990 net real dollars. The unstandardized coefficients should be read as percentages (e.g., .122 is 
.122%), with standard errors in parentheses.   
b. Committee assignments included in this equation derive from deductive reasoning based on 
information about committee jurisdiction.  I conducted an inductive regression analysis with every 
committee assignment as independent variables without any other controls and these committee 
assignments are statistically significant and positive explanatory variables (p<.05): Appropriations 
Committee, Energy and Commerce Committee, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Rules 
Committee, Ways and Means Committee, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.   







Table 5.13 Heteroscedasticity of Legislative Asset Model by Policy Sector, 1990-
2006 Electoral Cycles (Derived from Appropriate Policy Sector Regression Tables 
5.1-5.12) 
Policy Sector Residuals   Regression Coefficients (Standard Error) 
Agribusiness       .240 (.005)*** 
Communications and       .235 (.004)*** 
Electronics 
Construction       .244 (.006)*** 
Defense       .254 (.005)*** 
Energy and Natural       .260 (.005)***  
Resources 
Finance, Insurance, and      .213 (.005)*** 
Real Estate 
Health        .155 (.005)*** 
Ideological and       .138 (.007)*** 
Single Issue 
Labor        .247 (.007)*** 
Lawyer and Lobbyists     .231 (.005)*** 
Miscellaneous Business     .269 (.006)***  
Transportation       .257 (.005)***  
a. The dependent variable in this bivariate regression is the appropriate predicted values from Tables 4.2-
4.13.  The independent variable is the residuals from those regressions.   
b. *** p<.001 
 With the exception of the geographic location of individual PAC donors, the 
remainder of the model shows remarkable consistency across all policy sectors.  
Important for this chapter, the addition of the mediated model variable did not diminish 
the explanatory power of various legislative assets, especially committee assignment 
and leadership position.  Those congressional members that sit on committees important 
to the policy sector and those select few leaders of the House of Representatives receive 
more policy sector PAC money.   
 Another remarkably consistent cue that all PACs use is margin of victory.  
Coefficients across all policy sectors are negative and statistically significant, meaning 
that as candidates face close elections, the percent of the PAC’s budget going to those 
candidates increases.  The negative coefficient indicates that as the margin of victory 




coefficients are largest for ideological and single-issue PACs and labor PACs, which is 
consistent with expectations; however, the consistency of this electoral cue does not 
negate the rent seeking purpose of PAC strategy.  Coefficient size for committee 
assignments is equal to or larger than that of margin of victory.  The percent of the 
policy sector PAC budgets spent on existing incumbents shows PACs follow a 
legislative strategy in addition to giving in close elections. 
 The incumbency variable shows an interesting pattern when compared to 
donations to quality challengers.  Across every policy sector, incumbency is one of the 
most important variables and explains more about PAC strategy than most other 
variables.  Even at this broad level of policy sector, there are partisan patterns across the 
twelve policy domains.  The only two policy sectors giving more money to Democrats 
than Republicans are labor and lawyers/lobbyists.  Again, this finding is not surprising.  
Even though policy sectors will give a lot of money to both parties (labor even gives 
some money to Republicans, as the coefficient is statistically significant and positive), 
PACs will give more to one party over another.  Even across sixteen years, which saw a 
change in the majority party, some policy sectors pursue one party over another.  
Agribusiness, miscellaneous business, construction, and transportation/warehousing all 
pursued Republican incumbents with more money than Democratic incumbents; 
however, only examining the incumbent variable to determine partisan PAC giving does 
not capture the extent to which these policy sectors choose one party over another.   
 The differences in being a Democrat and Republican become vivid when 
examining the coefficients for quality challengers.  In selecting which quality 




difference between the Democratic and Republican coefficients across all policy sectors 
are informative.  All policy sectors support incumbents, and the difference in being a 
Democratic or Republican incumbent does not matter to the PAC as much as it is does 
when the quality challenger is a Democrat or Republican.  The differences between the 
coefficients across political party affiliation are larger for the quality challenger variable 
than the incumbent variable.  The only two sectors supporting Democratic quality 
challengers are labor and lawyers/lobbyists, with all other sectors supporting, heavily, 
Republican quality challengers.  PACs will give to incumbents of both parties with the 
differences between the two parties being minimal; however, PACs show partisan 
donation patterns when examining contributions to challengers.  The PAC system 
overall, from 1990 through 2006, dealt with Democratic and Republican incumbents, 
but when selecting which quality challengers to support, most policy sectors gave a lot 
more money to Republicans.   
 The coefficients in tables 5.1-5.12 are small because this analysis occurs at the 
candidate level; thus, the coefficient represents the percent of the entire policy-sector 
spending going to a candidate.  A unit shift in the independent variable will increase the 
percent of the policy-sector spending going to that candidate.  While the coefficients are 
small, this small shift can result in large sums of money, especially for candidates in 
need.  The largest coefficients are typically an important committee assignment, being 
in a leadership position, and having a constituency that is employed in the PAC’s policy 
domain.  When the percent of money raised by the PAC from the candidate’s state is 
significant, the coefficient is usually large.  For example, using the coefficient generated 




increase in the amount of money going to agribusiness PACs from a candidate’s state, 
then that candidate would expect $22,837 (1990 real dollars) more money from 
agribusiness PACs.  The coefficients for constituency characteristics (employment in 
policy domain, individual donors to PACs) are not always statistically significant 
predictors of which candidates a policy sector will support, but when these coefficients 
are significant, they are large.  When PACs contribute to a candidate using employment 
and individual donors, these PACs will give a lot of money to those local candidates.  I 
view this strategy as leverage, following the money with personal pressure or using jobs 
to cast leverage over the candidate.  Given the statistical significance of the geographic 
variable and the legislative variables, the organizational maintenance and rent seeking 
strategies are not mutually exclusive and the organizational maintenance strategy does 
not prevent legislative rent seeking.  Wright’s (1985) paradox of PAC organizing is not 
necessarily true, as PACs have developed into the nationalizing, money distributing 
force that scholars worried about in the 1980s. 
Since the geographic location of individual donors to PACs did not explain any 
additional variance in many policy sectors, the heteroscedasticity of PAC modeling still 
exists, as seen in table 5.13.  The positive value and statistical significance of the 
coefficients in table 5.13 indicate that the mediated model is still underspecified and 
only explains the variance in small donations.  As the predicted values of PAC 
donations increase, the variance of error increases.  The search for variables that 







 It is clear that PACs, as organized into policy sectors do not follow the 
predictions of the organizational presence model, and of those policy sectors that do 
distribute a percentage of its budget to home state candidates, this geographic 
distribution does not diminish the percent of the budget going to congressional members 
with important legislative assets.  The difference between my study and older studies 
trumpeting the value of organizational presence is a function of data.  Those studies that 
find value of having activists on the ground over an exchange of cash use survey 
questions of PAC decision-makers and lobbyists to determine subjectively the amount 
of organizational presence in a district/state.  While there is merit in this approach, since 
activists could be a larger group of people than individual donors, I measure 
organizational presence objectively, using the behavior of individual donors who gave 
the PAC over $200 in a single contribution.  The value of this approach is that I can use 
the entire population of PACs in the FEC database and identify an important class of 
individuals in the PAC system: the donors. 
 Using the geographic location of individual donors as a measure of 
organizational presence, I find that PACs act in accordance to rent-seeking models 
developed by public choice economists and political scientists (agribusiness, defense, 
energy and natural resources, and lawyers/lobbyists act in favor of the mediated model).  
I find that PACs are relatively placeless entities; however, I am not arguing that 
demand-side forces are inconsequential.  Who gives to the American political system is 
important, and all models of PAC strategy are under-specified.  The search for the 





UNDERSTANDING POLITICS USING ORGANIZED INTERESTS 
 
Why do PACs form relationships with some congressional candidates and not 
others?  I sought to answer this question using one of the largest datasets in the PAC 
literature to date, and using this data in one of the first tests of both the organizational 
presence and legislative asset model.  Case studies using only a selection of PACs have 
been useful to build theory, but the evidence of this study shows the limitation of using 
only a small selection of PACs to make theoretical claims, since most PACs are not 
encumbered by geographic constraints as once thought by most political scientists.  
Combining both demand-side and supply-side variables when necessary (e.g., 
agribusiness, defense, energy and natural resources, lawyers/lobbyists), I determined 
that PACs form relationships with congressional members who are most likely to help 
them legislatively and who have PAC donors in close geographic proximity.  Almost 
uniformly, PACs give to those congressional members who occupy institutional 
positions of interest to the PAC, challengers from a political party more apt to act 
favorably in the PAC’s interest, and those congressional members in electoral need.  
PAC strategy tends to resemble expectations of the rent-seeking approach more than 
expectations of organizational maintenance; however, my findings raise more questions 
than answers, and in this concluding chapter I offer ways to study PACs that can 
strengthen the overall group theory approach to politics, which is on the rise again in 
political science. 
My findings do not undermine organizational maintenance as a PAC strategy; 
rather, my findings call into question the political amateurishness of PAC donors.  To 




contributors that money is effective in politics (regardless of the true effectiveness of 
money) and keep donors happy.  PAC staffers can accomplish the goal of future 
fundraising by showing legislative effectiveness in addition to electoral success, and 
individual donors may not be amateurs at all, calling for money to be distributed out of 
state.  If the geographic location of individual donors represents an accurate 
measurement of organizational presence (as opposed to a survey with a limited sample 
size and subjective assessment), then organizational presence is not a prominent reason 
why PACs form relationships with some candidates over others, and should be no more 
than a control variable in future models. 
PACs are the nationalizing force that scholars feared in the 1980s (e.g., Grenzke 
1988), and money clearly crosses state lines at high rates, creating financial 
constituencies that are different from geographical constituencies; however, this 
dilemma may not be the most accurate way of thinking about PACs (PACs do give to 
candidates with constituency characteristics that mirror the PACs concerns).  PACs 
pose a more important problem for political representation by reinforcing the political 
representation of occupation.  The organizational-presence model solution to the 
dilemma of financial constituencies taking precedence over geographic constituencies 
when making policy was to argue that money flows into districts where individual 
donors reside.  This solution is not empirically accurate.  Money does cross state lines 
into states where PACs have no organizational presence, but the employment 
characteristics of the state are important in determining where PAC money flows.  The 
significance of employment characteristics does not mean that organized interests 




existing level of occupational organization, which reflects poorly on most Americans’ 
ability to become a member of the financial constituency.  The lack of secondary 
organizations outside of the corporation in the financial constituency is disturbing, and 
the failure to vote on the Employee Free Choice Act since 2008 is a prime example. 
Future research on PAC strategy should change in two ways: (1) become 
substantively relevant to policy discussions, and (2) re-theorize the demand-side aspects 
of the legislative market.  In changing the literature in these two ways, PAC-strategy 
scholarship can strengthen the group theory approach to political science, which 
scholars have reinvigorated recently with the current economic downturn (e.g., Hacker 
and Pierson 2010; Johnson and Kwak 2010).  The case of the Employee Free Choice 
Act is an example of how PAC-strategy literature can become substantively relevant to 
political discussions.  Upon passage and implementation, this act would have made it 
easier for employees to unionize by not informing employers of public elections to form 
union.  This act would have made it easier for employees in the service sector to 
organize, especially among younger workers; hence, strengthening one of the major 
secondary organizations concerned with the economics of the middle class (Hacker and 
Pierson 2010, 56-61, 127-132).  PAC-strategy modeling can become relevant in a 
discussion of this magnitude by examining how political candidates marginalized the 
labor movement in their quest for campaign financing.  When no labor party exists, as 
in the United States, labor must enter into a coalition with certain businesses to attain 
influence, typically through the Democratic Party.  It is well documented that the 
Democratic Party relies more on corporations for financing starting in the early 1980s 




The supply-side model cannot account for the failure of the Employee Free 
Choice Act because it does not account for shifts in the demand-side of the Democratic 
Party.  The coalition within the Democratic Party changed, with businesses hostile to 
more unionization filling the reelection treasuries of more Democrats.  PAC-strategy 
modeling must account for the coalitions within each party to become more relevant to 
discussions of the policy process.  To become more relevant to policy discussions, 
PAC-strategy modeling must have a more robust treatment of the demand-side of the 
legislative market. 
Given PAC-strategy models are not robust, and small donations drive the 
significance of these models, scholars must derive new ways to think about PACs.  No 
longer should we think of PACs as local, reelection constituencies, and no longer 
should we neglect the demand-side of the legislative market.  The geographic location 
of individual donors is not the best way to capture the essence of demand-side PAC 
strategy; instead, scholars should re-categorize PACs to resemble crucial aspects of our 
economic structure (e.g., class and trade issues), and account for more substantive 
supply-side variables (e.g., election forecasts, likelihood of new legislation in the next 
congressional session) to determine why PACs form relationships with some candidates 
and not others.  Accomplishing this task would also connect the PAC literature with the 
political party literature.  The primary theory PAC scholars should use to advance the 
literature is investment theory. 
Investment theory of political parties begins with a simply stated premise: if 
scholars, journalists, and academics wish to know who rules politically, then follow the 




his colleagues’ (1976) research concerning personal vote choice, finding voters’ party 
affiliation and vote choice is cognitive rather than affective, meaning voters sought cues 
(or short-cuts) to minimize information costs associated with knowledge of candidate 
policy positions.  The implication of this research is that voters try to control public 
policy via the electoral process, but this control is costly; hence those who are most able 
to control policy are those who can pay the cost it takes to control political parties.  
Investment theory extends this rationale by asking and answering the next logical 
question: who does have the capacity to pay the costs necessary to control government 
policy?  According to investment theory, major blocs of investors, who invest economic 
resources into the political party, control the parameters of that party’s policy options 
(Ferguson 1995, 27).   
The political party represents investor-bloc coalitions who coalesce during 
elections.  Investment theory’s assumptions, findings, and implications are antithetical 
to rational-choice approaches (e.g., Downs 1957) because: (1) political parties 
maximize money, not votes; (2) political parties are organizations that represent 
business elite investments, not independent organizations detached from its financiers; 
(3) political party policy preferences represent those of its investors, not those of the 
median voter; and (4) not all policy preferences are discussed seriously by the two 
political parties because on issues that both of its major investors agree, there will be no 
conflict (Ferguson 1995, 21-36).  Beyond establishing the reasons for investigating 
investors instead of voters to understand political party behavior, investment theory 
offers hypotheses concerning coalition change and coalition stability.  Coalitions 




changes in industrial structures,” which (2) combine with “a variety of short-run factors, 
notably steep economic downturns” (Ferguson 1995, 23).  When industrial structures 
and short-run economic conditions are stable, the dominant investor bloc must defend 
its position by “making positive appeals to some (which need not be the same from 
election to election) or by minimizing voter turnout or both” (Ferguson 1995, 23).  In 
sum, major-investor blocs are the only groups of people who can pay the price to 
control government, which changes the definition of the political party from coalitions 
of voters to coalitions of investors, making it difficult (but not impossible) for voters to 
control political party policy positions, as the parties do not move to the center and do 
not set the agenda with all issues of societal importance; thus, “the electorate is not too 
stupid or too tired to control the political system.  It is merely too poor” (Ferguson 
1995, 384). 
No longer can scholars afford to use models of PAC strategy that reinforce the 
pluralist vision of political representation, discounting the differences between financial 
and geographic constituencies and neglecting the differences between organized 
occupations/interests and unorganized or less organized interests.  Scholars need new 
ways to categorize PACs and individual donors that reflect the true nature of American 
economy (e.g., manufacturing versus financial interests, businesses that need to 
suppress wages for profit and those that do not rely on low wages for profit), and to 
contribute to the increased awareness of group theory (e.g., Hacker and Pierson 2010, 
116-136).   
An increase focus on demand-side forces can account for a wide array of forms 




are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to campaign finance, and the lack of FEC 
willingness to confront these new forms make it appear to be a captured agency.  These 
new forms of influence can include front groups as allowed in the form of all donations 
(exacerbated by the majority opinion in Citizens United v. FEC 2010) and consulting 
fees paid by think tanks to politicians, just to name a few (Ferguson 2011, 25).  The 
need to expand beyond the PAC system, treating PACs as part of the larger system of 
influence can bring relevancy back to the PAC literature. 
While an increase in attention to group theory, and to the power relationships 
embedded in the quest for legislative success, will inevitably bring a repeat of the old 
methodological discussions, as seen between Robert Dahl, Nelson Polsby, Peter 
Bachrach, and Morton Baratz, but this new emphasis on group theory will focus more 
heavily on the connections between the political party and interest groups, and how 
economic structure affects interest group influence (e.g., Hacker and Pierson 2010; 
Ferguson 1995).  The PAC-strategy literature can offer data-driven evidence in this 
resurgence; however, a re-focus on demand-side influences is necessary as the lack of 
explanatory power of PAC models shows the shallow vision of demand-side factors in 
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CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS AND THOSE PACS OVER THE 
LIMITS 
 
Individual to a Candidate’s PAC 
 Pre-BCRA: $1,000, per candidate, per election 
 2004 Election Cycle: $2,000 (Subject to aggregate limit, but can rise when 
candidate is campaigning against a wealthy opponent 
financing his/her own campaign) 
 2006 Election Cycle: $2,100 
 2008 Election Cycle: $2,300 
 2010 Election Cycle: $2,400 
 
Individual to Political Party PAC 
 Pre-BCRA: $20,000 per political party PAC, per year 
 2004 Election Cycle: $25,000 per political party PAC, per year, subject to 
aggregation limit 
 2006 Election Cycle: $26,700 
 2008 Election Cycle: $28,500 
 2010 Election Cycle: $30,400 
 
Individual to a State/Local Party PAC 
 Pre-BCRA: $5,000 per state/local party PAC, per year 
 2004 Election Cycle: $10,000 per state/local party PAC, per year (Levin Funds) 
 2006 Election Cycle: $10,000 
 2008 Election Cycle: $10,000 
 2010 Election Cycle: $10,000 
 
Individual to Any Other PAC 
 Pre-BCRA: $5,000 per PAC, per year 
2004 Election Cycle: $5,000 to per PAC, per year, subject to aggregation limit 
 2006 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 2008 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 2010 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 
Individual Aggregation Limits 
 Pre-BCRA: $25,000 per year 
2004 Election Cycle: $95,000 per election cycle: $37,500 to candidates, 
$57,500 to national political party PACs and other PACs 
(only $37,500 allowed to go to other PACs per election 
cycle) 
2006 Election Cycle: $101,400 per election cycle: $40,000 to 
candidates, $61,400 to national political party PACs and 
other PACs (only $40,000 allowed to go to other PACs 
per election cycle) 




candidates, $65,500 to national political party PACs and 
other PACs (only $40,000allowed to go to other PACs per 
election cycle) 
2010 Election Cycle: $115,500 per election cycle: $45,600 to 
candidates, $69,900 to national political party PACs and 
other PACs (only $45,600 allowed to go to other PACs 
per election cycle) 
 
Multi-Candidate PAC to a Candidate’s PAC 
Pre-BCRA: $5,000 per PAC, per year 
2004 Election Cycle: $5,000 to per PAC, per year 
 2006 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 2008 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 2010 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 
Multi-Candidate PAC to a Political Party PAC 
Pre-BCRA: $15,000 per PAC, per year 
2004 Election Cycle: $15,000 to per PAC, per year 
 2006 Election Cycle: $15,000 
 2008 Election Cycle: $15,000 
 2010 Election Cycle: $15,000 
 
Multi-Candidate PAC to a State/Local Party PAC 
 Pre-BCRA: $5,000 per state/local party PAC, per year 
 2004 Election Cycle: $5,000 per state/local party PAC, per year 
 2006 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 2008 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 2010 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 
Multi-Candidate PAC to Any Other PAC 
 Pre-BCRA: $5,000 per PAC, per year 
2004 Election Cycle: $5,000 to per PAC, per year 
 2006 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 2008 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 2010 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 
Multi-Candidate PAC Aggregation Limits 
Pre-BCRA: No Limit 
2004 Election Cycle: No Limit 
 2006 Election Cycle: No Limit 
 2008 Election Cycle: No Limit 
 2010 Election Cycle: No Limit 
 
Other PACs to a Candidate’s PAC 
Pre-BCRA: $1,000 per PAC, per year 




 2006 Election Cycle: $2,100 
 2008 Election Cycle: $2,300 
 2010 Election Cycle: $2,400 
 
Other PACs to a Political Party PAC 
Pre-BCRA: $20,000 per PAC, per year 
2004 Election Cycle: $25,000 to per PAC, per year 
 2006 Election Cycle: $25,000 
 2008 Election Cycle: $25,000 
 2010 Election Cycle: $30,400 
 
Other PACs to a State/Local Party PAC 
 Pre-BCRA: $5,000 per state/local party PAC, per year 
 2004 Election Cycle: $10,000 per state/local party PAC, per year (Levin Funds) 
 2006 Election Cycle: $10,000 
 2008 Election Cycle: $10,000 
 2010 Election Cycle: $10,000 
 
Other PACs to Any Other PAC 
 Pre-BCRA: $5,000 per PAC, per year 
2004 Election Cycle: $5,000 per PAC, per year 
 2006 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 2008 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 2010 Election Cycle: $5,000 
 
Other PACs Aggregation Limits 
Pre-BCRA: No Limit 
2004 Election Cycle: No Limit 
 2006 Election Cycle: No Limit 
 2008 Election Cycle: No Limit 
 2010 Election Cycle: No Limit 
 
Potential Errors in FEC/CRP Data, Multi-Candidate PACs to Candidates 
*Includes all active candidate PACs, same as analysis 
 
All donation files (PAC to Candidate) were merged together to create one large file, 
then the most noticeable date errors and those with dates prior to 11/9/1988 or after 
11/7/2006, were removed (n = 513+ 6782; out of 2126273 +(513+6782)), including 
donations by all PACs, to all candidates (House, Senate, President).  For all offices, 
there were 93 missing cases in the CRP data that was missing the CRP candidate ID and 
FEC candidate ID numbers.  I deleted those items, meaning the above numbers should 
subtract 93 from total.  For just House transactions, there were 1,671,472 total 
transactions; the number of transactions eliminated for being outside the election cycles 
for only House transactions is 379 + 4740; for a grand net total of 1,666,353 
transactions, including refunds/corrections.  The total amount of donation transactions 




(negative amounts) was 38,875 (2.3%).  The amount of leadership, party, candidate, 
joint committee transactions to candidates was 169,891, leaving 1,496,462 
















































HOUSE STANDING COMMITTEE NAMES BY CONGRESSIONAL SESSIONS  
 
Reproduced from the Standing Committee rosters of the 101st and 102nd congressional 
sessions and from Charles Stewart and Jonathan Woon’s data found at 
http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html 
Agriculture (101st – 110th) 
Appropriations (101st – 110th) 
Armed Services (101st – 103rd, 109th – 110th) 
 National Security (104th – 108th) 
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (101st – 103rd) 
 Banking and Financial Services (104th – 106th) 
 Financial Services (106th – 110th) 
Budget (101st – 110th) 
District of Columbia (101st – 103rd) 
Education and Labor (101st – 103rd, 110th) 
 Economic and Educational Opportunities (104th) 
 Education and the Workforce (105th – 109th) 
Energy and Commerce (101st – 103rd, 107th – 110th) 
 Commerce (104th – 106th) 
Foreign Affairs (101st – 103rd, 110th) 
 International Relations (104th – 109th) 
Government Operations (101st – 103rd) 
 Government Reform and Oversight (104th – 109th) 
 Oversight and Government Reform (110th) 
Homeland Security (Permanent Select 107th – 108th; Standing 109th – 110th) 
House Administration (101st – 103rd, 109th – 110th) 
 House Oversight (104th – 108th) 
Judiciary (101st – 110th) 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries (101st – 103rd) 
Natural Resources (103rd, 110th) 
 Resources (104th – 109th) 
 Interior and Insular Affairs (101st – 102nd) 
Post Office and Civil Service (101st – 103rd) 
Public Works and Transportation (101st – 103rd) 
 Transportation and Infrastructure (104th – 110th) 
Rules (101st – 110th) 
Science, Space, and Technology (101st – 103rd) 
 Science (104th – 109th) 
 Science and Technology (110th) 
Small Business (101st – 110th) 
Standards of Official Conduct (101st – 110th) 
Veterans Affairs (101st – 110th) 
Ways and Means (101st – 110th) 






INCUMBENTS NOT RETURNING FOR NEXT CONGRESSIONAL SESSION 
BY ELECTORAL CYCLE AND POLITICAL PARTY 
 
Underline denotes incumbent lost in general election 
 
Italics denotes an resulting open seat election 
 
Bold denotes incumbent PAC not active in election cycle 
 
Plain font (no bold) denotes an active incumbent PAC that did not make it to the general 
election (other reasons for this occurrence are death, losing in primary, retirement, 
appointment to bureaucratic position, and campaigning for another office 
 
Elected in 1988, but did not serve after 1990 election 
 
Ron Flippo (D) AL-5 
Tommy Robinson (R) AR-2 
Douglas Bosco (D) CA-1 
No Shumway (R) CA-14 
Charles Pashayan (R) CA-17 
Augustus Hawkins (D) CA-29 
Jim Bates (D) CA-44 
Hank Brown (R) CO-4 
Bruce Morrison (D) CT-3 
John Rowland (R) CT-5 
Bill Grant (R) FL-2 
Bill Nelson (D) FL-11 
Patricia Saiki (R) HI-1 
Dani Akaka (D) HI-2 
Larry Craig (R) ID-1 
Lyn Martin (R) IL-16 
John Hiler (R) IN-3 
Thom Tauke (R) IA-2 
Robert Whittaker (R) KS-5 
Cori Boggs (D) LA-2 
Joseph Brennan (D) ME-1 
Roy Dyson (D) MD-1 
Bill Schuette (R) MI-10 
George Crockett (D) MI-13 
William Frenzel (R) MN-3 
Arlan Strangeland (R) MN-7 
Jack Buechner (R) MO-2 
Virginia Smith (R) NE-3 
Robert C. Smith (R) NH-1 




James Florio (D) NJ-1 
James Courter (R) NJ-12 
James McClure Clark (D) NC-11 
Mic DeWine (R) OH-7 
Donald E. Lukens (R) OH-8, Location in Dataset is R_3, Unique Case ID 1417 
Wes Watkins (D) OK-3 
Denny Smith (R) OR-5 
Doug Walgren (D) PA-18 
Claudine Schneider (R) RI-2 
Marvin Leath (D) TX-11 
Howard Nelson (R) UT-3 
Peter Smith (R) VT 
Stan Parris (R) VA-8 
Robert Kastenmeier (D) WI-2 
 
Elected in 1990, but did not serve after 1992 election (1992 District Numbers) 
 
William Dickinson (R) AL-2 
Ben Erdreich (D) AL-6 
Claude Harris (D) AL-7 
John Rhodes (R) AZ-1 
Bill Alexander (D) AR-1, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1560 
John Hammerschmidt (R) AR-3 
Beryl Anthony (D) AR-4, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1563 
Frank Riggs (R) CA-1 
Barbara Boxer (D) CA-6 
Tom Campbell (R) CA-14 
Robert Lagomarsino (R) CA-22, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 1585 
Edward Roybal (D) CA-25 
Mel Levine (D) CA-36 
Mervyn Dymally (D) CA-37 
Glenn Anderson (D) CA-38 
William Dannemeyer (R) CA-39 
Bill Lowery (R) CA-50 
Ben Nighthorse Campbell (D) CO-3 
Thomas Carper (D) DE 
Charles Bennett (D) FL-4 
William Lehman (D) FL-17 
Thomas Lindsey (D) GA-1 
Charles Hatcher (D) GA-2, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1653 
Richard Ray (D) GA-3 
Ben Jones (D) GA-10, Location in Dataset is D_5, Unique Case ID 1661 (Switched 
from GA-4) 
Ed Jenkins (D) GA-9 
Doug Barnard (D) GA-10 




Charles Hayes (D) IL-1, Location in Dataset is D_6, Unique Case ID 1667 
Gus Savage (D) IL-2, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1668 
John Cox (D) IL-16 
Terry Bruce (D) IL-19, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1685 
Jim Jontz (D) IN-5 
David Nagle (D) IA-2 
Carroll Hubbard (D) KY-1, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1706 
Larry Hopkins (R) KY-6 
Clyde Holloway (R) LA-6, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 1717 
Jerry Huckaby (D) LA-5 
Thomas C. McMillen (D) MD-1 
Beverly Byron (D) MD-6, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1726 
Joseph Early (D) MA-3 
Chester Atkins (D) MA-5, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1733 
Nicholas Mavroules (D) MA-6 
Robert Davis (R) MI-11 
Carl Pursell (R) MI-2 
Howard Wolpe (D) MI-7 
Guy Vander Jagt (R) MI-2, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 1740 
Vin Weber (R) MN-2 
Gerry Sikorski (D) MN-6 
Joan Kelly Horn (D) MO-2 
Thomas E. Coleman (R) MO-6 
Ron Marlenee (R) MT-1 
Matthew Rinaldo (R) NJ-7 
Robert Roe (D) NJ-8 
Frank Guarini (D) NJ-13 
Thomas Downey (D) NY-2 
Robert Mrazek (D) NY-3 
Norman Lent (R) NY-4 
Ted Weiss (D) NY-8, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1808 
Stephen Solarz (D) NY-12, Location in Dataset is D_4, Unique Case ID 1812 
Bill Green (R) NY-14 
David O’Brien Martin (R) NY-24 
Matthew McHugh (D) NY-26 
Henry Nowak (D) NY-30 
Walter Jones (D) NC-1, Location in Dataset is D_5, Unique Case ID 1832 
Byron Dorgan (D) ND 
Charles Luken (D) OH-1, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1845 
Bob McEwen (R) OH-6 
Mary Rose Oaker (D) OH-10 (Moved from OH-20) 
Donald Pease (D) OH-13 
Chalmers Wylie (R) OH-15 
Edward Feighan (D) OH-19 
Mickey Edwards (R) OK-5, Location in Dataset is R_4, Unique Case ID 1868 




Joe Kolter (D) PA-4, Location in Dataset is D_3, Unique Case ID 1878 
Gus Yatron (D) PA-6 
Peter Kostmayer (D) PA-8 
Lawrence Coughlin (R) PA-13 
Don Ritter (R) PA-15 
Elizabeth Patterson (D) SC-4 
Robin Tallon (D) SC-6 
Albert Bustamante (D) TX-23 
Wayne Owens (D) UT-2 
Jim Olin (D) VA-6 
John Miller (R) WA-1 
Sid Morrison (R) WA-4 
Rod Chandler (R) WA-8 
Harley Staggers (D) WV-1, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 1968 
Jim Moody (D) WI-5 
 
Elected in 1992, but did not serve after 1994 election 
 
Sam Coppersmith (D) AZ-1 
Kyl, Jon (R) AZ-4 
Karen English (D) AZ-6 
Dan Hamburg (D) CA-1 
Don Edwards (D) CA-16 
Leon Panetta (D) CA-17 
Richard Lehman (D) CA-19 
Michael Huffington (R) CA-22 
Alfred McCandless (R) CA-44 
Lynn Schenk (D) CA-49 
Earl Hutto (D) FL-1 
Jim Bacchus (D) FL-15 
Tom Lewis (R) FL-16 
George Darden (D) GA-7 
Don Johnson (D) GA-10 
Larry LaRocco (D) ID-1 
Dan Rostenkowski (D) IL-5 
George Sangmeister (D) IL-11 
Robert Michel (R) IL-18 
Philip Sharp (D) IN-2 
Jill Long (D) IN-4 
Frank McClosky (D) IN-8 
Neal Smith (D) IA-4 
Fred Grandy (R) IA-5 
Jim Slattery (D) KS-2 
Dan Glickman (D) KS-4 
Thomas Barlow (D) KY-1 




Romano Mazzoli (D) KY-3 
Thomas Andrews (D) ME-1 
Olympia Snowe (R) ME-2 
Helen Delich Bentley (R) MD-2 
Bob Carr (D) MI-8 
William Ford (D) MI-13 
Timothy Penny (D) MN-1 
Rod Grams (R) MN-6 
Jamie Whitten (D) MS-1 
Mike Espy (D) MS-2 
Alan Wheat (D) MO-5 
Peter Hoagland (D) NE-2 
James Bilbray (D) NV-1 
Dick Swett (D) NH-2 
William Hughes (D) NJ-2 
Herb Klein (D) NJ-8 
Dean Gallo (R) NJ-11, Location in Dataset is R_3, Unique Case ID 2230 
George Hochbrueckner (D) NY-1 
David Levy (R) NY-4 
Hamilton Fish (R) NY-19 
Tim Valentine (D) NC-2 
Martin Lancaster (D) NC-3 
David Price (D) NC-4 
Stephen Neal (D) NC-5 
J. Alex McMillan (R) NC-9 
David Mann (D) OH-1 
Willis Gradison (R) OH-2 
Ted Strickland (D) OH-6 
Douglas Applegate (D) OH-18 
Eric Fingerhut (D) OH-19 
James Inhofe (R) OK-1 
Mike Synar (D) OK-2, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 2300 
Dave McCurdy (D) OK-4 
Glen English (D) OK-6 
Robert Smith (R) OR-2 
Michael Kopetski (D) OR-5 
Lucien Blackwell (D) PA-2, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 2311 
Majorie Margolies-Mezvinsky (D) PA-13 
Rick Santorum (R) PA-18 
Austin Murphy (D) PA-20 
Thomas Ridge (R) PA-21 
Ronald Machtley (R) RI-1 
Arthur Ravenel (R) SC-1 
Butler Derrick (D) SC-3 
Marilyn Lloyd (D) TN-3 




Don Sunquist (R) TN-7 
Jack Brooks (D) TX-9 
J.J. Pickle (D) TX-10 
Bill Sarpalius (D) TX-13 
Craig Washington (D) TX-18, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 2366 
Michael Andrews (D) TX-25 
Karen Shepherd (D) UT-2 
Leslie Byrne (D) VA-11 
Maria Cantwell (D) WA-1 
Al Swift (D) WA-2 
Jolene Unsoeld (D) WA-3 
Jay Inslee (D) WA-4 
Thomas Foley (D) WA-5 
Mike Kreidler (D) WA-9 
Les Aspin (D) WI-1 
Peter Barca (D) WI-1 
Craig Thomas (R) WY-1 
 
Elected in 1994, but did not serve after 1996 election 
 
Glen Browder (D) AL-3 
Tom Bevill (D) AL-4 
Blanche Lambert Lincoln (D) AR-1 
Ray Thornton (D) AR-2 
Y. Tim Hutchinson (R) AR-3 
Richard Baker (R) CA-10 
Norman Mineta (D) CA-15 
Andrea Seastrand (R) CA-22 
Anthony Beilenson (D) CA-24 
Carlos Moorhead (R) CA-27 
Walter Tucker (D) CA-37 
Robert Dornan (R) CA46 
Patricia Schroeder (D) CO-1 
Wayne Allard (R) CO-4 
Gary Franks (R) CT-5 
Douglas Peterson (D) FL-2 
Sam Gibbons (D) FL-11 
Harry Johnston (D) FL-19 
Mel Reynolds (D) IL-2 
Michael Patrick Flanagan (R) IL-5 
Cardiss Collins (D) IL-7 
Richard Durbin (D) IL-20 
John Myers (R) IN-7, Location in Dataset is R_11, Unique Case ID 2563 
Andrew Jacobs (D) IN-10 
Jim Lightfoot (R) IA-3 




Sam Brownback (R) KS-2 
Jan Meyers (R) KS-3 
Mike Ward (D) KY-3 
Cleo Fields (D) LA-4 
James Hayes (D) LA-7 
James Longley (R) ME-1 
Kweisi Mfume (D) MD-7 
Peter Blute (R) MA-3 
Peter Torkildsen (R) MA-6 
Gerry Studds (D) MA-10 
Dick Chrysler (R) MI-8 
Barbara Rose-Collins (D) MI-15, Location in Dataset is D_7, Unique Case ID 2623 
G.V. Montgomery (D) MS-3 
Mel Hancock (R) MO-7 
Bill Emerson (R) MO-8 
Harold Volkmer (D) MO-9 
Pat Williams (D) MT 
Barbara Vucanovich (R) NV-2 
William Zeliff (R) NH-1 
William Martini (R) NJ-8 
Robert Torricelli (D) NJ-9 
Dick Zimmer (R) NJ-12 
Dan Frisa (R) NY-4 
David Funderburk (R) NC-2 
Fred Heineman (R) NC-4 
Charlie Rose (D) NC-7 
Frank Cremeans (R) OH-6 
Martin Hoke (R) OH-10 
Bill Brewster (D) OK-3 
Wes Cooley (R) OR-2, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 2741 
Ron Wyden (D) OR-3 
Jim Bunn (R) OR-5 
William Clinger (R) PA-5 
Robert Walker (R) PA-16 
Jack Reed (D) RI-2 
Tim Johnson (D) SD 
James Quillen (R) TN-1 
Ford, Harold E. (D) TN-9 
Jim Chapman (D) TX-1 
Charles Wilson (D) TX-2 
John Bryant (D) TX-5 
Jack Fields (R) TX-8 
Steve Stockman (R) TX-9 
Pete Geren (D) TX-12 
Greg Laughlin (R) (Switched political parties during this cycle and ran as a Republican 




E. de la Garza (D) (TX-15) 
Ronald Coleman (D) TX-16 
Bill Orton (D) UT-3 
Enid Greene Waldholtz (R) UT-2 
Lewis Payne (D) VA-5 
Randy Tate (R) WA-9 
Steve Gunderson (R) WI-3 
Toby Roth (R) WI-8 
 
Elected in 1996, but did not serve after 1998 election 
 
Frank Riggs (R) CA-1 
Vic Fazio (D) CA-3 
Ronald Dellums (D) CA-9 
Walter Capps (D) CA-22 
Esteban Edward Torres (D) CA-34 
Jane Harman (D) CA-36 
Jay Kim (R) CA-41, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 2909 
Sonny Bono (R) CA-44 
David Skaggs (D) CO-2 
Dan Schaefer (R) CO-6 
Barbara Kennelly (D) CT-1 
Newt Gingrich (R) GA-6 
Michael Crapo (R) ID-2 
Sidney Yates (D) IL-9 
Harris Fawell (R) IL-13 
Glenn Poshard (D) IL-19 
Vince Snowbarger (R) KS-3 
Jim Bunning (R) KY-4 
Scotty Baesler (D) KY-6 
Joseph Kennedy (D) MA-8 
Mike Parker (R) MS-4 
Jon Christensen (R) NE-2 
John Ensign (R) NV-1 
Mike Pappas (R) NJ-12 
Steven Schiff (R) NM-1 
Bill Richardson (D) NM-3 
Bill Redmond (R) NM-3 
Floyd Flake (D) NY-6 
Thomas Manton (D) NY-7 
Charles Schumer (D) NY-9 
Susan Molinari (R) NY-13 
Gerald Solomon (R) NY-22 
Bill Paxon (R) NY-27 
W.G. Hefner (D) NC-8 




Elizabeth Furse (D) OR-1 
Robert Smith (R) OR-2 
Thomas Foglietta (D) PA-1 
Joseph McDade (R) PA-10 
Jon Fox (R) PA-13 
Paul McHale (D) PA-15 
Bob Inglis (R) SC-4 
Henry Gonzalez (D) TX-20 
Frank Tejeda (D) TX-28 
Rick White (R) WA-1 
Linda Smith (R) WA-3 
Mark Neumann (R) WI-1 
Scott Klug (R) WI-2 
Jay Johnson (D) WI-8 
 
Elected in 1998, but did not serve after 2000 election 
 
Matt Salmon (R) AZ-1 
Jay Dickey (R) AR-4 
Tom Campbell (R) CA-15 
James Rogan (R) CA-27 
Matthew Martinez (R, switched after losing Democratic Primary) CA-31, Location in 
Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 3334 
Julian Dixon (D) CA-32 (died on 7 December 2000, won the 2000 general election) 
Steven Kuykendall (R) CA-36 
George Brown (D) CA-42 
Ron Packard (R) CA-48, Location in Dataset is R_9, Unique Case ID 3351 
Brian Bilbray (R) CA-49 
Sam Gejdenson (D) CT-2 
Tillie Fowler (R) FL-4, Location in Dataset is R_3, Unique Case ID 3372 
Bill McCollum (R) FL-8 
Charles Canady (R) FL-12 
Helen Chenoweth (R) ID-1 
John Edward Porter (R) IL-10 
Thomas Ewing (R) IL-15 
David McIntosh (R) IN-2 
Edward Pease (R) IN-7, Location in Dataset is R_7, Unique Case ID 3433 
Debbie Stabenow (D) MI-8 
David Minge (D) MN-2 
Bruce Vento (D) MN-4, Location in Dataset is D_9, Unique Case ID 3498 
James Talent (R) MO-2 
Pat Danner (D) MO-6, Location in Dataset is D_5, Unique Case ID 3513 
Rick Hill (R) MT 
Bill Barrett (R) NE-3, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 3520 
Bob Franks (R) NJ-7 




Rick Lazio (R) NY-2 
John Kasich (R) OH-12 
Tom Coburn (R) OK-2 
Ron Klink (D) PA-4 
William Goodling (R) PA-19 
Robert Weygand (D) RI-2 
Marshall Sanford (R) SC-1 
Bill Archer (R) TX-7 
Merrill Cook (R) UT-2, Location in Dataset is R_5, Unique Case ID 3685 
Herbert Bateman (R) VA-1, Location in Dataset is R_9, Unique Case ID 3688 
Owen Pickett (D) VA-2, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 3689 
Thomas Bliley (R) VA-7, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 3694 
Jack Metcalf (R) WA-2 
Robert Wise (D) WV-2 
 
Elected in 2000, but did not serve after 2002 election 
 
Sonny Callahan (R) AL-1, Location in Dataset is R_8, Unique Case ID 3721 
Bob Riley (R) AL-3, Location in Dataset is R_4, Unique Case ID 3723 
Earl Hilliard (D) AL-7, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 3727 
Asa Hutchinson (R) AR-3 
Bob Stump (R) AZ-3, Location in Dataset is R_8, Unique Case ID 3730 
Gary Condit (D) CA-18, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 3758 
Stephen Horn (R) CA-38 
Bob Schaffer (R) CO-4, Location in Dataset is R_4, Unique Case ID 3797 
James Maloney (D) CT-5 
Karen Thurman (D) FL-5 
Dan Miller (R) FL-13 
Carrie Meek (D) FL-17, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 3823 
Cynthia McKinney (D) GA-4, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 3835 
Bob Barr (R) GA-7 (Lost in primary to incumbent John Linder (R) from GA-11), 
Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 3838 
Saxby Chambliss (R) GA-8  
Patsy Mink (D) HI-2 (died in September of election year, name still on the ballot, 
special election to elect Ed Case) 
Rod Blagojevich (D) IL-15 
David Phelps (D) IL-9 
Tim Roemer (D) IN-3 
Brian Kerns (R) IN-7 (Lost in primary to incumbent Stephen Buyer (R) in IN-4), 
Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 3871 
Greg Ganske (R) IA-4 (became IA-5 in 2002) 
John Cooksey (R) LA-5 
John Baldacci (D) ME-2 
Robert Ehrlich (R) MD-2, Location in Dataset is R_3, Unique Case ID 3902 
Constance Morella (R) MD-8 




James Barcia (D) MI-5 (Lost in primary to incumbent Dale Kildee (D)), Location in 
Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 3923 
David Bonior (D) MI-10, Location in Dataset is D_3, Unique Case ID 3928 
Lynn Rivers (D) MI-13 (Lost in primary of MI-15), Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique 
Case ID 3933 
Bill Luther (D) MN-6 
Ronnie Shows (D) MS-4 
John Sununu (R) NH-1 
Marge Roukema (R) NJ-5, Location in Dataset is R_10, Unique Case ID 3968 
Joe Skeen (R) NM-2, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 3978 
Felix Grucci (R) NY-1 
Benjamin Gilman (R) NY-20 
John LaFalce (D) NY-29, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4008 
Eva Clayton (D) NC-1, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4009 
Tony Hall (D) OH-3, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4025 
Tom Sawyer (D) OH-14 (Lost in primary in OH-17), Location in Dataset is D_7, 
Unique Case ID 4039 
James Trafficant (D) OH-17 
Steve Largent (R) OK-1 
Wes Watkins (R) OK-3, Location in Dataset is R_3, Unique Case ID 4043 
J.C. Watts (R) OK-4, Location in Dataset is R_8, Unique Case ID 4044 
Robert Borski (D) PA-3 (became PA-13), Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 
4063 
Bud Shuster (R) PA-9 
William Coyne (D) PA-14, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4064 
George Gekas (R) PA-17 
Frank Mascara (D) PA-20 (Lost in primary, became PA-12), Location in Dataset is 
D_2, Unique Case ID 4062 
Floyd Spence (R) SC-2, Location in Dataset is R_6, Unique Case ID 4073 
Lindsey Graham (R) SC-3 
John Thune (R) SD 
Van Hilleary (R) TN-4 
Bob Clement (D) TN-5 
Ed Bryant (R) TN-7 
Ken Bentsen (D) TX-25 
Richard Armey (R) TX-26, Location in Dataset is R_7, Unique Case ID 4113 
James Hansen (R) UT-1, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4120 
Thomas Barrett (D) WI-5 
 
Elected in 2002, but did not serve after 2004 election 
 
Doug Ose (R) CA-3 
Calvin Dooley (D) CA-20 
Scott McInnis (R) CO-3 
Porter Goss (R) FL-14 




Denise Majette (D) GA-4 
Johnny Isakson (R) GA-6 
Mac Collins (R) GA-8 
Max Burns (R) GA-12 
Phillip Crane (R) IL-8 
Barron Hill (D) IN-9 
Ken Lucas (D) KY-4 
Ernie Fletcher (R) KY-6 
David Vitter (R) LA-1 
W.J. Tauzin (R) LA-3 
Christopher John (D) LA-7 
Nick Smith (R) MI-7 
Richard Gephardt (D) MO-3 
Karen McCarthy (D) MO-5 
Dough Bereuter (R) NE-1 
Jack Quinn (R) NY-27 
Amo Houghton (R) NY-29 
Frank Ballance (D) NC-1 
Richard Burr (R) NC-5 
Cass Ballenger (R) NC-10 
Brad Carson (D) OK-2 
James Greenwood (R) PA-8, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4493 
Joseph Hoeffel (D) PA-13 
Patrick Toomey (R) PA-15 
Jim DeMint (R) SC-4 
William Janklow (R) SD 
Max Sandlin (D) TX-1 
Nick Lampson (D) TX-2 
Lloyd Doggett TX-10 (moved to TX-25) 
Chet Edwards TX-11 (moved to TX-17) 
Martin Frost TX-24 (moved to TX-32) 
Charles Stenholm (D) TX-19 
Martin Frost (D) TX-32 
Chris Bell (D) TX-9, Location in Dataset is D_3, Unique Case ID 4531 
Ciro Rodriguez (D) TX-28, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4550 
Edward Schrock (R) VA-2, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4560 
George Nethercutt (R) WA-5 
Jennifer Dunn (R) WA-8 
Gerald Kleczka (D) WI-4 
 
Elected in 2004, but did not serve after 2006 election 
 
J.D. Hayworth (R) AZ-5 
Jim Kolbe (R) AZ-8, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4606 
Robert Matsui (D) CA-5 




William Thomas (R) CA-22, Location in Dataset is R_4, Unique Case ID 4632 
Randy Cunningham (R) CA-50, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4660 
Joel Hefley (R) CO-5, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4668 
Bob Beauprez (R) CO-7 
Rob Simmons (R) CT-2 
Nancy Johnson (R) CT-5 
Michael Bilirakis (R) FL-9 
Jim Davis (D) FL-11 
Katherine Harris (R) FL-13 
Mark Foley (R) FL-16, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4692 
E. Clay Shaw (R) FL-22 
Cynthia McKinney (D) GA-4, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4705 
Ed Case (D) HI-2 
C.L. Otter (R) ID-1 
Henry Hyde (R) IL-6, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4724 
Lane Evans (D) IL-17, Location in Dataset is D_2, Unique Case ID 4735 
Chris Chocola (R) IN-2 
John Hostettler (R) IN-8 
Mike Sodrel (R) IN-9 
Jim Nussle (R) IA-1, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4747 
James Leach (R) IA-2 
Jim Ryun (R) KS-2 
Anne Northup (R) KY-3 
Benjamin Cardin (D) MD-3 
Joe Schwarz (R) MI-7, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4795 
Gil Gutknecht (R) MN-1 
Martin Olav Sabo (D) MN-5, Location in Dataset is D_13, Unique Case ID 4808 
Mark Kennedy (R) MN-6 
Tom Osborne (R) NE-3, Location in Dataset is R-2, Unique Case ID 4828 
Jim Gibbons (R) NV-2, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4830 
Jeb Bradley (R) NH-1 
Charles Bass (R) NH-2 
Robert Menendez (D) NJ-13 
Major Owens (D) NY-11 
Sue Kelly (R) NY-19 
John Sweeney (R) NY-20 
Sherwood Boehlert (R) NY-24, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4873 
Charles Taylor (R) NC-11 
Rob Portman (R) OH-2, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4894 
Michael Oxley (R) OH-4, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4896 
Ted Strickland (D) OH-6, Location in Dataset is D_4, Unique Case ID 4898 
Sherrod Brown (D) OH-13 
Bob Ney (R) OH-18, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4910 
Ernest Istook (R) OK-5 
Melissa Hart (R) PA-4 




Michael Fitzpatrick (R) PA-8 
Don Sherwood (R) PA-10 
William Jenkins (R) TN-1, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4949 
Harold Ford E. Jr. (D) TN-9 
Tom DeLay (R) TX-22, Location in Dataset is R_2, Unique Case ID 4979 
Henry Bonilla (R) TX-23 
Bernie Sanders (I) VT 











































CENSUS INDUSTRY CATEGORIES FOR 1980, 1990, AND 2000 
 
Industry Employment Categorization for the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census 
 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining (1980) 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (1990) 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting (2000) 
Mining (1990, 2000) 
 
Construction (1980, 1990, 2000) 
 
Manufacturing (Durable and Non-Durable Goods) (1980, 1990, 2000) 
 
Transportation (1980, 1990) 
Transportation and Warehousing (2000) 
 
Wholesale Trade (1980, 1990, 2000) 
 
Retail Trade (1980, 1990, 2000) 
 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (1980, 1990) 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Rental and Leasing (2000) 
 
Communication and Public Utilities (1980, 1990) 
Information and Utilities (2000) 
 
Health Services (1980, 1990) 
Health Care and Social Assistance (2000) 
 
Educational Services (1980, 1990, 2000) 
 
Other Professional Related Services (1980, 1990) 
Professional, Scientific, Management, Administrative, and Waste Mgmt (2000) 
 
Personal, Entertainment, and Recreation Services (1980) 
Entertainment and Recreation Services (1990) 
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodation, and Food Services (2000) 
 
Business and Repair Services (1980) 
Business, Repair, and Personal Services (1990) 
Other Services (2000) 
 






1980/1990 Census Industry Categories 
(1980 Census) and (1972 Standard Industrial Classification Codes) 
 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (10-31) 
Agricultural Production, Crops (10) (01)  
Agricultural Production, Livestock (11) (02) 
Agricultural Services, Except Horticultural (20) (07, not 078) 
Horticultural Services (21) (78) 
Forestry (30) (08) 
Fishing, Hunting, and Trapping (31) (09) 
 
Mining (40-50) 
Metal Mining (40) (10) 
Coal Mining (41) (11, 12) 
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction (42) (13) 
Non-Metallic Mining and Quarrying, Except Fuel (50) (14) 
 
Construction (60) (15, 16, 17) 
 
Manufacturing, Non-Durable Goods (100-222) 
Food and Kindred Products (100-122) 
 Meat Products (100) (201) 
 Dairy Products (101) (202) 
 Canned and Preserved Fruits and Vegetables (102) (203) 
 Grain Mill Products (110) (204) 
 Bakery Products (111) (205) 
 Sugar and Confectionery Products (112) (206) 
 Beverage Industries (120) (208) 
 Miscellaneous Food Preparations and Kindred Products (121) (207, 209) 
 Not Specified Food Industries (122) 
 Tobacco Manufacturers (130) (21) 
 Textile Mill Products (132-150) 
  Knitting Mills (132) (225) 
Dyeing/Finishing Textiles, Except Wool, Knit Goods (140) (226) 
Floor Coverings, Except Hard Surfaces (141) (227) 
Yarn, Thread, and Fabric Mills (142) (228, 221-224) 
Miscellaneous Textile Mill Products (150) (239) 
Apparel and Other Finished Textile Products (151-152) 
Apparel and Accessories, Except Knit (151) (231-238) 
Paper and Allied Products (160-162) 
Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills (160) (261-263, 266) 
Miscellaneous Paper and Pulp Products (161) (264) 
Paperboard Containers and Boxes (162) (265) 
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries (171-172) 
Newspaper Publishing and Printing (171) (271) 




Chemicals and Allied Products (180-192) 
Plastics, Synthetics, and Resins (180) (282) 
Drugs (181) (283) 
Soaps and Cosmetics (182) (284) 
Paints, Varnishes, and Related Products (190) (285) 
Agricultural Chemicals (191) (287) 
Industrial and Misc. Chemicals (192) (281, 286, 289) 
Petroleum and Coal Products 
Petroleum Refining (200) (291) 
Misc. Petroleum and Coal Products (201) (295, 299) 
Rubber and Misc. Plastic Products (210-212) 
Tires and Inner Tubes (210) (301) 
Other Rubber Products, Plastics Footwear/Belting (211) (302, 304, 306) 
Misc. Plastics Products (212) (307) 
 Leather and Leather Products (220-222) 
  Leather Tanning and Finishing (220) (311) 
  Footwear, Except Rubber and Plastic (221) (313, 314) 
  Leather Products, Except Footwear (222) (315-317, 319) 
 
Manufacturing, Durable Goods (230-391) 
Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture (230-241) 
 Logging (230) (241) 
 Sawmills, Planning Mills, and Millwork (231) (242, 243) 
 Wood Buildings and Mobile Homes (232) (245) 
 Misc. Wood Products (241) (244, 249) 
Furniture and Fixtures (242) (25) 
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products (250-262) 
 Glass and Glass Products (250) (321-323) 
 Cement, Concrete, Gypsum, and Plaster Products (251) (324, 327) 
 Structural Clay Products (252) (325) 
 Pottery and Related Products (261) (326) 
 Misc. Non-Metallic Mineral and Stone Products (262) (328, 329) 
Metal Industries 
 Blast Furnaces, Steelworks, Rolling and Finishing Mills (270) (331) 
 Iron and Steel Foundries (271) (332) 
 Primary Aluminum Industries (272) (3334, part 334, 3353-3355, 3361) 
 Other Primary Metal Industries (280) (3331-3333, 3330, part 334, 3351, 3356, 
3357, 3362, 3369, 339) 
Cutlery, Handtools, and Other Hardware (281) (342) 
Fabricated Structural Metal Products (282) (344) 
Screw Machine Products (290) (345) 
Metal Forgings and Stampings (291) (346) 
Ordnance (292) (348) 
Misc. Fabricated Metal Products (300) (341, 343, 347, 349) 
Not Specified Metal Industries (301) 




 Engines and Turbines (310) (351) 
 Farm Machinery and Equipment (311) (352) 
 Construction and Material Handling Machines (312) (353) 
 Metalworking Machinery (320) (354) 
 Office and Accounting Machines (321) (357, Except 3573) 
 Electronic Computing Equipment (322) (3573) 
 Machinery, Except Electrical (331) (355, 356, 358, 359) 
 Not Specified Machinery (332) 
Electrical Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies (340-350) 
 Household Appliances (340) (363) 
 Radio, T.V., and Communication Equipment (341) (365, 366) 
 Electrical Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies (342) (361, 362, 364, 367, 369) 
Not Specified Electrical Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies (350) 
Transportation Equipment (351-370) 
 Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment (351) (371) 
 Aircraft and Parts (352) (372) 
 Ship and Boat Building and Repairing (360) (373) 
 Railroad Locomotives and Equipment (361) (374) 
 Guided Missiles, Space Vehicles, and Parts (362) (376) 
 Cycles and Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment (370) (375, 379) 
Professional and Photographic Equipment, and Watches (371-382) 
 Scientific and Controlling Instruments (371) (381, 382) 
 Optical and Health Services Supplies (372) (383, 384, 385) 
 Photographic Equipment and Supplies (380) (386) 
 Watches, Clocks, and Clockwork Operated Devices (381) (387) 
 Not Specified Professional Equipment (382) 
Toys, Amusement, and Sporting Goods (390) (394) 
Misc. Manufacturing Industries (391) (39, Except 394) 
Not Specified Manufacturing Industries (392) 
 
Transportation (400-432) 
Railroads (400) (40) 
Bus Service and Urban Transit (401) (41, Except 412) 
Taxicab Service (402) (412) 
Trucking Service (410) (421, 423) 
Warehousing and Storage (411) (422) 
U.S. Postal Service (412) (43) 
Water Transportation (420) (44) 
Air Transportation (421) (45) 
Pipe Lines, Except Natural Gas (422) (46) 
Services Incidental to Transportation (432) (47) 
 
Communication and Other Public Utilities (440-472) 
Radio and Television Broadcasting (440) (483) 
Telephone (Wire and Radio) (441) (481) 




Utilities and Sanitary Services (460-472) 
 Electric Light and Power (460) (491) 
 Gas and Steam Supply Systems (461) (492, 496) 
 Electric and Gas, and Other Combinations (462) (493) 
 Water Supply and Irrigation (470) (494, 497) 
 Sanitary Services (471) (495) 
 Not Specified Utilities (472) 
 
Wholesale Trade (500-571) 
Durable Goods (500-532) 
 Motor Vehicles and Equipment (500) (501) 
 Furniture and Home Furnishings (501) (502) 
 Lumber and Construction Materials (502) (503) 
 Sporting Goods, Toys, and Hobby Goods (510) (504) 
 Metals and Minerals, Except Petroleum (511) (505) 
 Electrical Goods (512) (506) 
 Hardware, Plumbing, and Heating Supplies (521) (507) 
 Not Specified Electrical/Hardware Products (522) 
 Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies (530) (508) 
 Scrap and Waste Materials (531) (5093) 
 Misc. Wholesale, Durable Goods (532) (5094, 5099) 
Non-Durable Goods (540-571) 
 Paper and Paper Products (540) (511) 
 Drugs, Chemicals, and Allied Products (541) (512, 516) 
 Apparel, Fabrics, and Notions (542) (513) 
 Groceries and Related Products (550) (514) 
 Farm Products – Raw Materials (551) (515) 
 Petroleum Products (552) (517) 
 Alcoholic Beverages (560) (518) 
 Farm Supplies (561) (5191) 
 Misc. Wholesale, Non-Durable Goods (562) (5194, 5198, 5199) 
 Not Specified Wholesale Trade (571) 
 
Retail Trade (580-691) 
Lumber and Building Material Retailing (580) (521, 523) 
Hardware Stores (581) (525) 
Retail Nurseries and Garden Stores (582) (526) 
Mobile Home Dealers (590) (527) 
Department Stores (591) (531) 
Variety Stores (592) (533) 
Misc. General Merchandise Stores (600) (539) 
Grocery Stores (601) (541) 
Dairy Products Stores (602) (545) 
Retail Bakeries (610) (546) 
Food Stores (611) (542, 543, 544, 549) 




Auto and Home Supply Stores (620) (553) 
Gasoline Service Stations (621) (554) 
Misc. Vehicle Dealers (622) (555, 556, 557, 559) 
Apparel and Accessory Stores, Except Shoe (630) (56, Except 566) 
Shoe Stores (631) (566) 
Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores (632) (571) 
Household Appliances, T.V., Radio Stores (640) (572, 573) 
Eating and Drinking Places (641) (58) 
Drug Stores (642) (591) 
Liquor Stores (650) (592) 
Sporting Goods, Bicycles, and Hobby Stores (651) (5941, 5945, 5946) 
Book and Stationary Stores (652) (5942, 5943) 
Jewelry Stores (660) (5944) 
Sewing, Needlework, and Piece Goods Stores (661) (5949) 
Mail Order Houses (662) (5961) 
Vending Machine Operators (670) (5962) 
Direct Selling Establishments (671) (5963) 
Fuel and Ice Dealers (672) (598) 
Retail Florists (681) (5992) 
Misc. Retail Stores (682) (593, 5947, 5948, 5993, 5994, 5999) 
Not Specified Retail Trade (691) 
 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (700-712) 
Banking (700) (60) 
Savings and Loan Associations (701) (612) 
Credit Agencies (702) (61, Except 612) 
Security, Commodity Brokerage, and Investment Companies (710) (62, 67) 
Insurance (711) (63, 64) 
Real Estate, Including Estate-Insurance-Law Offices (712) (65, 66) 
 
Business and Repair Services (721-760) 
Advertising (721) (731) 
Services to Dwellings and Other Buildings (722) (734) 
Commercial, Research, Development, and Testing Labs (730) (7391, 7397) 
Personnel Supply Services (731) (736) 
Business Management and Consulting Services (732) (7392) 
Computer and Data Processing Services (740) (737) 
Detective and Protective Services (741) (7393) 
Business Services (742) (732, 733, 735, 7394, 7395, 7396, 7399) 
Automotive Services, Except Repair (750) (751, 752, 754) 
Automotive Repair Shops (751) (753) 
Electrical Repair Shops (752) (762, 7694) 
Misc. Repair Services (760) (763, 764, 7692, 7699) 
 
Personal Services (761-791) 




Hotels and Motels (762) (701) 
Lodging Places, Except Hotels and Motels (770) (702, 703, 704) 
Laundry, Cleaning, and Garment Services (771) (721) 
Beauty Shops (772) (723) 
Barber Shops (780) (724) 
Funeral Service and Crematories (781) (726) 
Shoe Repair Shops (782) (725) 
Dressmaking Shops (790) (part 729) 
Misc. Personal Services (791) (722, part 729) 
 
Entertainment and Recreation Services (800-802) 
Theaters and Motion Pictures (800) (78, 792) 
Bowling Alleys, Billiard and Pool Parlors (801) (793) 
Misc. Entertainment and Recreation Services (802) (791, 794, 799) 
 
Professional and Related Services (812-892) 
Health Services (840) (807, 808, 809) 
 Offices of Physicians (812) (801, 803) 
 Offices of Dentists (820) (802) 
 Offices of Chiropractors (821) (8041) 
 Offices of Optometrists (822) (8042) 
 Offices of Health Practitioners (830) (8049) 
 Hospitals (831) (806) 
 Nursing and Personal Care Facilities (832) (805) 
Legal Services (841) (81) 
Educational Services (860) (829) 
 Elementary and Secondary Schools (842) (821) 
 Colleges and Universities (850) (822) 
 Business, Trade, and Vocational Schools (851) (824) 
 Libraries (852) (823) 
Job Training and Vocational Rehabilitation Services (861) (833) 
Child Day Care Services (862) (835) 
Residential Care Facilities, Without Nursing (870) (836) 
Social Services (871) (832, 839) 
Museums, Art Galleries, and Zoos (872) (84) 
Religious Organizations (880) (866) 
Membership Organizations (881) (861-865, 869) 
Engineering, Architectural, and Surveying Services (882) (891) 
Accounting, Auditing, and Bookkeeping Services (890) (893) 
Non-Commercial Educational and Scientific Research (891) (892) 
Misc. Professional and Related Services (892) (899) 
 
Public Administration (900-932) 
Executive and Legislative Offices (900) (911-913) 
General Government (901) (919) 




Public Finance, Taxation, and Monetary Policy (921) (93) 
Administration of Human Resources Programs (922) (94) 
Administration of Environmental Quality and Housing Programs (930) (95) 
Administration of Economic Programs (931) (96) 
National Security and International Affairs (932) (97) 
 
 
2000 Census Industry Categories 
(2000 Census) and (2000 North American Industrial Classification System) 
 
Agriculture, forestry, Fishing, and Hunting (001-036) (11) 
Crop Production (017) (111) 
Animal Production (018) (112) 
Forestry, Except Logging (019) (1131, 1132) 
Logging (027) (1133) 
Fishing, Hunting, and Trapping (028) (114) 
Support Activities for Agriculture and Forestry (029) (115) 
 
Mining (037-056) (21) 
Oil and Gas Extraction (037) (211) 
Coal Mining (038) (2121) 
Metal Ore Mining (039) (2122) 
Non-Metallic Mineral Mining and Quarrying (047) (2123) 
Not Specified Type of Mining (048) (part 21) 
Support Activities for Mining (049) (213) 
 
Construction (077-106) (23) 
 
Manufacturing (107-406) 
Animal Food, Grain, and Oilseed Milling (107) (3111, 3112) 
Sugar and Confectionery Products (108) (3113) 
Fruit and Vegetable Preserving and Specialty Food Manufacturing (109) (3114) 
Dairy Product Manufacturing (117) (3115) 
Animal Slaughtering and Processing (118) (3116) 
Retail Bakeries (119) (311811) 
Bakeries, Except Retail (127) (3118, Except 311811) 
Seafood and Other Misc. Foods (128) (3117, 3119) 
Not Specified Food Industries (129) (part 311) 
Beverage Manufacturing (137) (3121) 
Tobacco Manufacturing (139) (3122) 
Fiber, Yarn, and Thread Mills (147) (3131) 
Fabric Mills, Except Knitting (148) (3132, Except 31324) 
Textile and Fabric Finishing and Coating Mills (149) (3133) 
Carpets and Rugs Manufacturing (157) (31411) 
Textile Product Mills Except Carpets and Rugs (159) (314, Except 31411) 




Cut and Sew Apparel Manufacturing (168) (3152) 
Apparel Accessories and Other Apparel Manufacturing (169) (3159) 
Footwear Manufacturing (177) (3162) 
Leather Tanning and Products, Except Footwear Manufacturing (179) (3161, 3169) 
Sawmills and Wood Preservation (377) (3211) 
Veneer, Plywood, and Engineered Wood Products (378) (3212) 
Prefabricated Wood Buildings and Mobile Homes (379) (321991, 321992) 
Misc. Wood Products (387) (3219, Except 321991, 321992) 
Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills (187) (3221) 
Paperboard Containers and Boxes (188) (32221) 
Misc. Paper and Pulp Products (189) (32222, 32223, 32229) 
Printing and Related Support Activities (199) (323) 
Petroleum Refining (207) (32411) 
Misc. Petroleum and Coal Products (209) (32412, 32419) 
Resin, Synthetic Rubber and Fibers, and Filaments Manufacturing (217) (3252) 
Agricultural Chemical Manufacturing (218) (3253) 
Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing (219) (3254) 
Paint, Coating, and Adhesives Manufacturing (227) (3255) 
Soap, Cleaning Compound, and Cosmetic Manufacturing (228) (3256) 
Industrial and Misc. Chemicals (229) (3251, 3259) 
Plastics Product Manufacturing (237) (3261) 
Tire Manufacturing (238) (32621) 
Rubber Products, Except Tires, Manufacturing (239) (32622, 32629) 
Pottery, Ceramics, and Related Products Manufacturing (247) (32711) 
Structural Clay Product Manufacturing (248) (32712) 
Glass and Glass Product Manufacturing (249) (3272) 
Cement, Concrete, Lime, and Gypsum Product Manufacturing (257) (3273, 3274) 
Misc. Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing (259) (3279) 
Iron and Steel Mills and Steel Product Manufacturing (267) (3311, 3312) 
Aluminum Production and Processing (268) (3313) 
Nonferrous Metal, Except Aluminum, Production and Processing (269) (3314) 
Foundries (277) (3315) 
Metal Forgings and Stampings (278) (3321) 
Cutlery and Hand Tool Manufacturing (279) (3322) 
Structural Metals and Tank and Shipping Container Manufacturing (287) (3323, 3324) 
Machine Shops, Turned Product, Screw, Nut, and Bolt Manufacturing (288) (3327) 
Coating, Engraving, Heat Treating and Allied Activities (289) (3328) 
Ordnance (297) (332992-332995) 
Misc. Fabricated Metal Products Manufacturing (298) (3325, 3326, 3329, Except 
332992-332995) 
Not Specified Metal Industries (299) (part 331, part 332) 
Agricultural Implement Manufacturing (307) (33311) 
Construction Mining and Oil Field Machinery Manufacturing (308) (33312, 33313)  
Commercial and Service Industry Machinery Manufacturing (309) (3333) 
Metalworking Machinery Manufacturing (317) (3335) 




Machinery Manufacturing (319) (3332, 3334, 3339) 
Not Specified Machinery Manufacturing (329) (part 333) 
Computer and Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing (336) (3341) 
Communications, Audio, and Video Equipment Manufacturing (337) (3342, 3343) 
Navigational, Measuring, Electromedical, and Control Instruments Manufacturing (338) 
(3345) 
Electronic Component and Product Manufacturing (339) (3344, 3346) 
Household Appliance Manufacturing (347) (3352) 
Electrical Lighting, Equipment, and Supplies Manufacturing (349) (3351, 3353, 3359) 
Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment Manufacturing (357) (3361, 3362, 3363) 
Aircraft and Parts Manufacturing (358) (336411-336413) 
Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing (359) (336414-336419) 
Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing (367) (3365) 
Ship and Boat Building (368) (3366) 
Other Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (369) (3369) 
Furniture and Related Products Manufacturing (389) (337) 
Medical Equipment and Supplies Manufacturing (396) (3391) 
Toys, Amusement, and Sporting Goods Manufacturing (397) (33992, 33993) 
Misc. Manufacturing (398) (3399, Except 33992, 33993) 
Not Specified Manufacturing Industries (399) (Part 3133) 
 
Wholesale Trade 
Motor Vehicles, Parts and Supplies (407) (4211) 
Furniture and Home Furnishings (408) (4212) 
Lumber and Other Construction Materials (409) (4213) 
Professional and Commercial Equipment and Supplies (417) (4214) 
Metals and Minerals, Except Petroleum (418) (4215) 
Electrical Goods (419) (4216) 
Hardware, Plumbing and Heating Equipment, and Supplies (426) (4217) 
Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies (427) (4218) 
Recyclable Material (428) (42193) 
Misc. Durable Goods (429) (4219, Except 42193) 
Paper and Paper Product Wholesalers (437) (4221) 
Drugs, Sundries, and Chemical and Allied Product Wholesalers (438) (4222, 4226) 
Apparel, Fabrics, and Notions Wholesalers (439) (4223) 
Groceries and Related Product Wholesalers (447) (4224) 
Farm Product Raw Material Wholesalers (448) (4225) 
Petroleum and Petroleum Product Wholesalers (449) (4227) 
Alcoholic Beverage Wholesalers (456) (4228) 
Farm Supplies Wholesalers (457) (42291) 
Misc. Non-Durable Goods Wholesalers (458) (4229, Except 42291) 
Not Specified Wholesale Trade (459) (Part 42) 
 
Retail Trade 
Automobile Dealers (467) (4411) 




Auto Parts, Accessories, and Tire Stores (469) (4413) 
Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores (477) (442) 
Household Appliance Stores (478) (44311) 
Radio, TV, and Computer Stores (479) (443112, 44312) 
Building Material and Supplies Dealers (487) (4441, Except 44413) 
Hardware Stores (448) (44413) 
Lawn and Garden Equipment and Supplies Stores (489) (4442) 
Grocery Stores (497) (4451) 
Specialty Food Stores (498) (4452) 
Beer, Wine, and Liquor Stores (499) (4453) 
Pharmacies and Drug Stores (507) (44611) 
Health and Personal Care, Except Drug Stores (508) (446, Except 44611) 
Gasoline Stations (509) (447) 
Clothing and Accessories, Except Shoe Stores (517) (448, Except 44821, 4483) 
Shoe Stores (518) (44821) 
Jewelry, Luggage, and Leather Goods Stores (519) (4483) 
Sporting Goods, Camera, and Hobby and Toy Stores (527) (44313, 45111, 45112) 
Sewing, Needlework and Piece Goods Stores (528) (45113) 
Music Stores (529) (45114, 45122) 
Book Stores and News Dealers (537) (45121) 
Department Stores (538) (45211) 
Misc. General Merchandise Stores (539) (4529) 
Retail Florists (547) (4531) 
Office Supplies and Stationary Stores (548) (45321) 
Used Merchandise Stores (549) (4533) 
Gift, Novelty, and Souvenir Shops (557) (45322) 
Misc. Retail Stores (558) (4539) 
Electronic Shopping and Mail-Order Houses (559) (4541) 
Vending Machine Operators (567) (4542) 
Fuel Dealers (568) (45431) 
Other Direct Selling Establishments (569) (45439) 
Not Specified Retail Trade (579) (Part 4445) 
 
Transportation and Warehousing 
Air Transportation (607) (481) 
Rail Transportation (608) (482) 
Water Transportation (609) (483) 
Truck Transportation (617) (484) 
Bus Service and Urban Transit (618) (4851, 4852, 4854-4859) 
Taxi and Limousine Service (619) (4853) 
Pipeline Transportation (627) (486) 
Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation (628) (487) 
Services Incidental to Transportation (629) (488) 
Postal Service (637) (491) 
Couriers and Messengers (638) (492) 





Information and Utilities (57-76, 647-686) (22, 51) 
Utilities  
 Electric Power Generation Transmission and Distribution (57) (2211) 
 Natural Gas Distribution (58) (2212) 
 Electric and Gas and Other Combinations (59) (Part 2211, 2212) 
 Water, Steam, Air-Conditioning, and Irrigation Systems (67) (22131, 22133) 
 Sewage Treatment Facilities (68) (22132) 
 Not Specified Utilities (69) (Part 22) 
Information 
 Newspaper Publishing (647) (51111) 
 Publishing Except for Newspaper and Software (648) (5111, Except 51111) 
 Software Publishing (649) (5112) 
 Motion Pictures and Video Industries (657) (5121) 
 Sound Recording Industries (659) (5122) 
 Radio and Television Broadcasting and Cable (667) (5131, 5132) 
 Wired Telecommunications Carriers (668) (51331) 
 Other Telecommunication Services (669) (5133, Except 51331) 
 Libraries and Archives (677) (51412) 
 Other Information Services (678) (5141, Except 51412) 
 Data Processing Services (679) (5142) 
 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Rental and Leasing (687-726) (52, 53) 
Finance and Insurance 
 Banking and Related Activities (687) (521, 52211, 52219) 
 Savings Institutions, Including Credit Unions (688) (52212, 52213) 
 Non-Depository Credit and Related Activities (689) (5222, 5223) 
 Securities, Commodities, Funds, Trusts, and Other Financial Investments (697) 
(523, 525) 
 Insurance Carriers and Related Activities (699) (524) 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing  
 Real Estate (707) (531) 
 Automotive Equipment Rental and Leasing (708) (5321) 
 Video Tape and Disk Rental (717) (53223) 
 Other Consumer Goods Rental (718) (53221, 53222, 53229, 5323) 
 Commercial, Industrial, and Other Intangible Assets Rental and Leasing (719) 
(5324, 533) 
 
Professional, Scientific, Management, Administrative, and Waste Management 
Services (727-785) (54-56) 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 
 Legal Services (727) (5411) 
 Accounting, Tax Preparation, Bookkeeping and Payroll Services (728) (5412) 
 Architectural, Engineering, and Related Services (729) (5413) 
 Specialized Design Services (737) (5414) 




 Management, Scientific and Technical Consulting Services (739) (5416) 
 Scientific Research and Development Services (746) (5417) 
 Advertising and Related Services (747) (5418) 
 Veterinary Services (748) (54194) 
 Other Professional, Scientific, Technical Services (749) (5419, Except 54194) 
Management of Companies and Enterprises 
 Management of Companies and Enterprises (757) (55) 
Administrative and Support and Waste Management Services 
 Employment Services (758) (5613) 
 Business Support Services (759) (5614) 
 Travel Arrangement and Reservation Services (767) (5615) 
 Investigation and Security Services (768) (5616) 
 Services to Buildings and Dwellings (769) (5617, Except 56173) 
 Landscaping Services (777) (56173) 
 Other Administrative and Other Support Services (778) (5611, 5612, 5619) 
 Waste Management and Remediation Services (779) (562) 
 
Health Care and Social Assistance (797-855) (62) 
Offices of Physicians (797) (6211) 
Offices of Dentists (798) (6212) 
Offices of Chiropractors (799) (62131) 
Offices of Optometrists (807) (62132) 
Offices of Other Health Practitioners (808) (6213, Except 62131, 62132) 
Outpatient Care Centers (809) (6214) 
Home Health Care Services (817) (6216) 
Other Health Care Services (818) (6215, 6219) 
Hospitals (819) (622) 
Nursing Care Facilities (827) (6231) 
Residential Care Facilities, Without Nursing (829) (6232, 6233, 6239) 
Individual and Family Services (837) (6241) 
Community Food and Housing, and Emergency Services (838) (6242) 
Vocational Rehabilitation Services (839) (6243) 
Child Day Care Services (847) (6244) 
 
Educational Services  (786-796) (61) 
Elementary and Secondary Schools (786) (6111) 
Colleges and Universities, Including Junior Colleges (787) (6112, 6113) 
Business, Technical, and Trade Schools and Training (788) (6114, 6115) 
Other Schools, Instruction, and Educational Services (789) (6116, 6117) 
 
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodation, Food Services (856-865) (71) 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 
 Independent Artists, Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, and Related Industries 
(856) (711) 
 Museums, Art Galleries, Historical Sites, and Similar Institutions (857) (712) 




 Other Amusement, Gambling, and Recreation Industries (859) (713, Except 
71395) 
Accommodation and Food Services 
 Traveler Accommodation (866) (7211) 
 Recreational Vehicle Parks and Camps, and Rooming and Boarding Houses 
(867) (7212, 7213) 
Restaurants and Other Food Services (868) (722, Except 7224) 
 Drinking Places, Alcoholic Beverages (869) (7224) 
 
Other Services (Not Public Administration) (877-936) (81) 
Automotive Repair and Maintenance (877) (8111, Except 811192) 
Car Washes (878) (811192) 
Electronic and Precision Equipment Repair and Maintenance (879) (8112) 
Commercial and Industrial Machinery and Equipment Repair and Maintenance (887) 
(8113) 
Personal and Household Goods Repair and Maintenance (888) (8114, Except 81143) 
Footwear and Leather Goods Repair (889) (81143) 
Barber Shops (897) (812111) 
Beauty Salons (898) (812112) 
Nail Salons and Other Personal Care Services (899) (812113, 81219) 
Dry Cleaning and Laundry Services (907) (8123) 
Funeral Homes, Cemeteries and Crematories (908) (8122) 
Other Personal Services (909) (8129) 
Religious Organizations (916) (8131) 
Civic, Social, Advocacy Organizations, and Grantmaking and Giving Services (917) 
(8132, 8133, 8134) 
Labor Unions (918) (81393) 
Business, Professional, Political, and Similar Organizations (919) (8139, Except 81393) 
 
Public Administration 
Executive Offices and Legislative Bodies (937) (92111, 92112, 92114, Part 92115) 
Public Finance Activities (938) (92113) 
Other General Government and Support (939) (92119) 
Justice, Public Order, and Safety Activities (947) (922, Part 92115) 
Administration of Human Resource Programs (948) (923) 
Administration of Environmental Quality and Housing Programs (949) (924, 925) 
Administration of Economic Programs and Space Research (957) (926, 927) 
National Security and International Affairs (959) (928, Except 928110) 
